THE MEDITATIONS OF

MARCUS AURELIUS

ANTONINUS

TRANSLATED BY

JOHN JACKSON

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

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INTRODUCTION

In the year A.D. 135 the Emperor Hadrian adopted as his son and successor Lucius Ceionius Commodus, who bore also the names of Aurelius and of Annius Verus. Roman nobles of this time often boasted a long string of family appellations. As a rule only two of these were employed, but the same individual might use a different pair at different times, or the son, for distinction's sake, might use one pair, while his father had used another. Partly for this reason, partly because his pedigree is not given, we do not know exactly who Commodus was. But he would seem to have been related on the one side to the Aurelian house, which drew its origin from Nimes in Southern Gaul, on the other to that of Annius Verus, which came, like Trajan and Hadrian, from Spain. Most probably he was related to Hadrian. Certainly he cannot have been selected on the ground of his personal merits. Commodus was a handsome and gentlemanly debauchee, who had never distinguished himself in any way whatever; and was moreover, at the time of his adoption, in the last stage of consumption. But Hadrian was strongly attached to him.

Gibbon and others have spoken of adoption as an excellent method for ensuring the succession of a competent Emperor. But the truth is that in almost every case it was a family arrangement, occasioned by the re-
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Remarkable childlessness of the Roman princes, and neither better nor worse than the rule of primogeniture, which would certainly have been always followed, if circumstances had made it possible.

Commodus died on New Year's Day, 138, and Hadrian, whose own end was approaching, was compelled to make new and speedy arrangements. He would naturally have selected the son of Commodus, but the younger Lucius Verus was a mere child of seven years. Failing him, he would have taken Marcus Annius Verus, but Marcus again was but sixteen. Accordingly he adopted as his son Titus Aurelius Antoninus, a dignified, excellent man, whose crowning merit was that his wife was Galeria Faustina, the paternal aunt of Marcus. Antoninus had been father of two sons, but both appear to have died before his adoption into the imperial family. He submitted cheerfully to Hadrian's condition that he should in his turn adopt the younger Lucius Verus and Marcus. Thus the succession might seem to be firmly established in the Spanish line. In July of the same year Hadrian died, Antoninus became Emperor, and Marcus crown-prince.

Marcus had lost his own father while still an infant, and appears to have been twice adopted before this. At first he had borne the names of Catilius Severus, and he speaks in the Meditations of a brother Severus, who was clearly much older than himself, and to whom he professes himself indebted for his republican opinions. He must, therefore, have been taken into the family of his maternal great-grandfather, Catilius Severus, a dis-
tonguished man, who had been Consul in 120, was a friend and correspondent of the younger Pliny, and had entertained the hope of being himself adopted by Hadrian. Soon afterwards, in the lifetime of Catilius, Marcus was again adopted by his paternal grandfather, Annius Verus, thus recovering his first name. In the house of Annius Verus on the Caelian hill, close by the Lateran, he had been born, and there he passed his early years, under the care of his mother Domitia Calvilla or Lucilla, a devout and accomplished woman. Catilius Severus also continued to watch over him. 'He sent me,' says Marcus, 'to the public courses of instruction, procured for me the wisest tutors at home, and taught me that on education we must spend with an open hand.'

At the same time Marcus was the darling of Hadrian. The cynical old Emperor, who had seen so much and believed so little, delighted in the precocious gravity of the ingenuous child philosopher, bestowed upon him the playname of Verissimus, 'my little Washington,' as we might say; gave him 'a public horse,' or, in other words, made him one of the old Roman Knights, at the age of six, and two years later created him Chief of the Salian priests, an ancient sacred college, filled with men of the highest birth, and specially devoted to the imperial family. The child took his dignities very seriously and performed all his religious duties with the utmost punctiliousness. He would preside at the famous Salian banquets, and dance through the city on the festival of Mars at the head of his colleagues, and he
knew by heart the hymns and formularies belonging to the cult, which were so old that no man knew exactly what they meant. At the age of fourteen Marcus assumed the *toga virilis*, and was betrothed, by direction of Hadrian, to the daughter of Lucius Commodus, his adopted son. About the same time he was appointed to preside over the *Feriae Latinae*, one of the most ancient and venerable of Roman holidays, which was generally conducted by the Consuls, the chief officers of the state. Finally at the age of seventeen, in 138, by special grace of Hadrian, he was promoted quaestor, and took his place in the Senate.

In July of this year Antoninus became Emperor, and thenceforth Marcus was invested with all those marks of observance which belonged to the heir apparent. One serious point in Hadrian’s arrangement was changed. It had been directed that Lucius Verus should marry Faustina, the daughter of Antoninus, while Marcus was to take the sister of Verus, to whom he had been formally betrothed. The new emperor altered this, and married Faustina to Marcus. The reason for this change of plan may be found perhaps in the extreme youth of Verus, who was but eight years old. But the effect was to place Marcus distinctly above Verus in what we may call the Act of Settlement. It is probable that this was the design of Hadrian himself. He did not intend to divide the Empire; but the life of Marcus was precarious, and, in view of the possibility of his early death, it seemed desirable to provide beforehand against the risks of a disputed
succession. As soon as his own position was assured, Marcus gave up his patrimony, desired his mother to leave her own estate also to his sister, Annia Cornificia, and went to live in the imperial palace, the domus Tiberiana. He was created Consul in 140 at the age of nineteen, and again for the second time in 145; he was made also sevir, or captain, of the knights, and member of all the sacred colleges. Finally, Antoninus bestowed upon him the imperial prerogatives of the perpetual tribunician power, and the proconsular imperium. From the time of his adoption to the day of his own accession Marcus never left the emperor's side except for two days. At Rome or in the country, at Lorium, or Lanuvium, or Naples, he dwelt with his wife and children under the roof of his adoptive parents. In 161, the aged emperor, sensible that the end of his days had come, ordered the statuette of Fortuna, which always stood in the bed-chamber of the sovereign, to be carried into the room of Marcus, gave the tribune on service the watchword Equanimity, turned gently round as if to sleep, and so ended his blameless life.

Thus Marcus became Augustus. His own mother had died some little time before. He had never travelled, never served in the army, never ruled a province. All that he knew he had learned from books, or from conversation with academical professors. His only direct preparation for the tremendous responsibilities of sovereign rule was that he had been admitted to share the counsels of Antoninus, and had taken part in the deliberations of the Senate. His health had always been
delicate, and he had been nursed and guarded with the tenderest solicitude. His education had been the best that the age afforded. But the practical experience that might have corrected the faults of his academic training, given him judgement of men, and kept within due bounds the endless self-searchings of his introspective soul—this was denied to him.

From the gossipy anecdotes of Capitoinus, from the opening chapter of his *Meditations*, and from his correspondence with Fronto, we can form a very clear idea of his early habits and disposition.

We have already seen him as chief of the Salii, a boy bishop, performing his religious duties with exemplary gravity and decorum. Throughout his life piety continued to be the basis of his character. As his powers of reflection increased, his views were deepened and refined, but he took from philosophy only so much of its teaching as enlightened and supported his moral life. To the last he clung to the beliefs of his childhood, and at two grave crises we find him flying for help to the vulgarest superstition. Both occurred during the terrible alarms of the Marcomannian war. On the first occasion—it is that which gave rise to the famous Christian myth of the Thundering Legion—when his army, entrapped in a dangerous pass among the mountains, was in danger of perishing by thirst, he called upon Arnouphis, an Egyptian magician, who was in his train; sacrifices were offered, and the abundant rain which followed was attributed to the grace of Hermes and other deities. Again, when preparing to cross the
Danube in face of the enemy, he listened to the advice of the pernicious quack, Alexander of Abonoteichos, and threw into the river two lions with a quantity of spices and other offerings. The lions were killed by the enemy, and the Romans suffered a calamitous defeat. Very few even of the most enlightened pagans were consistent sceptics. In fair weather many of them were all but Christians; in sickness or distress they nearly always appealed to the demons for help. Marcus was a deeply religious man, but he did not rise above the prejudices of his time and class.

Let us take a sketch or two from the correspondence with Fronto. Here is a description of a day of his life written from one of the imperial country houses, probably in the year 144:

'We are all well. I slept a little longer than usual, on account of a chill, which seems to be better. From the eleventh hour of the night to the third of the day I read Cato's Agriculture, and wrote, not quite so deplorably as yesterday. Then I went to salute my father; then, drawing honey-water into my throat, and again expelling it, I fomented my larynx—let me not say I gargled, though the word is used by Novius and others. When I had attended to my throat, I went to my father and assisted at his sacrifice. Thence to break fast. What do you think I took? A morsel of bread, while others round me were devouring beans, onions, and spawning pilchards. Then I helped to measure the grapes, and sweated and sang with the men, and as the poet says, 'some bunches we left unculled, high-hanging
survivors of harvest." At noonday we returned home: I studied a little to no purpose. Then I gossiped with my dear mother as she lay upon her couch. I said, "What do you think my Fronto is doing now?" She rejoined, "Nay, what do you think my Gratia is doing?" "Nay," I replied, "what is my birdie, the little Gratia, busied about?" While we were thus prattling and arguing whether she or I loved you or yours best, the gong sounded, sign that my father had gone to the bath. After bathing in the wine-press-shed supper was laid. I don't mean that we bathed in the shed, but that, after bathing, we supped there, and listened, well-pleased, to the banter of the rustics. Thence back to my chamber, where, before I turn upon my side and snore, I finish my theme, and write an account of the day for my beloved master. If I could long for you more, I would cheerfully endure the sharper pang. Farewell, my Fronto, wherever you are, my honey, my darling, my joy. What has come over me? I love you even in absence.'

Notice his affection for his mother; he never speaks of his wife Faustina in this caressing tone; notice also his girlish love for the pedantic Fronto; his simple delight in the country; his passion for reading and scribbling—we can hardly say for study; his admiration for the archaic writers of the republic, and his dandified elegance of language. 'Gargle' is a vulgar word; the thing has to be done sometimes, but the direct name of the thing is taboo. All these points are characteristic of the earlier stage of Marcus' development.

Throughout his life he practised the most scrupulous
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self-repression. No young seminarist ever watched more anxiously over the instincts of his soul. Once only does Marcus confess himself to have yielded to a young man's love of fun. 'When my father returned from the vineyards, I mounted my horse as usual and set out, riding a little ahead. On the road I came upon a crowded flock of sheep—it was a solitary spot; four dogs, two shepherds, nothing else in sight. Said one shepherd to the other, when he saw a knot of horsemen coming, "Look at yonder riders; they are outrageous robbers." When I heard this, I struck spurs into my horse, and drove it upon the flock. The sheep scattered, running and bleating in all directions. The shepherd hurled his crook; the equerry who followed me was struck to the ground; I galloped away. Thus he who feared for his sheep lost his crook. Do you think this a fable? It is perfectly true. I could write much more about it, but a slave is calling me to the bath.' At the time when he wrote this spirited little sketch Marcus was twenty-two, and had already been consul. There was some nature in him after all; but it was seldom allowed to play.

What has been said will be sufficient to indicate the disposition of Marcus. In one sense he had remarkable strength of character. There was never any other change than that ripening and mellowing which time inevitably brings. From his cradle he was a beautiful soul, delicate in mind as in body, tender, truthful, docile, sweetly melancholy, a virginal flower, shrinking from the world of which he was to be the master. It is
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greatly to the credit of the age that he attracted almost universal affection. Even Hadrian, the scoffing Ulysses, loved this youthful saint. That the sophists and orators of the time vied with one another in singing his praises is not surprising, for Marcus heaped wealth and promotion upon them, delighted in their society, and tolerated their impertinences. But the common people adored him. In every shop, every house, were statuettes of Marcus and his father Pius, often cheap, roughly executed things of common clay, meant for the hovels of the poor.

Let us pass on to his education. Probably those to whom he owed most were his mother and his adoptive father. Of the latter he has given so admirable a sketch in the beginning of the Meditations that it is needless to say more. He gives also an account of his preceptors, not indeed of all, but of those to whom he considered himself under special obligations. At one time or another he came into contact with nearly all the famous teachers of the age, and if we were to notice the names which he omits, for instance, that of Herodes Atticus, we should know which of these celebrities he thought deficient in seriousness and modesty. Marcus abstained on principle from open criticism of his friends, and overvalued some of them to an extravagant degree, but his fine moral perception could not be wholly at fault.

Down to the age of twenty-four he followed with characteristic docility the usual course of education, though it suited neither his temperament nor his position. Not his temperament, because it aimed exclu-
sively at ambitious display; not his position, because it turned entirely on words and abstractions, while what befits a ruler is acquaintance with men and with affairs. It is noticeable that the lessons for which he acknowledges his gratitude are almost entirely moral; and it is due to these old Roman schoolmasters and professors to say that they appear to have taken much pains to train their pupils in ways of rectitude. It is possible that, as a boy, he actually went to school; the school would be that which was maintained in the palace for the imperial pages. Later on, eminent professors seem to have been summoned to give him private instruction. Marcus does not enter into these details, nor does he appear to follow a strictly chronological order in what he tells us. We must content ourselves with touching upon the most important points in his pupilage.

Euphorion, his litterator, whose duty it would be to teach the child reading, writing, and easy arithmetic, managed also to fill him with dislike for the arena and the circus. Marcus would be compelled to watch these noisy and profligate exhibitions from the imperial box, but he marked his repugnance by pulling out a book and reading while the frantic spectators were roaring their applause over the victory of the green faction, or the fatal thrust of some well-known gladiator. He would read even at a dinner party, and Fronto warned him, in courtly phrase, that this excessive devotion to study was not popular.

From Diognetus, who also seems to have been one of his early teachers, he learned another lesson, which later
on led to disastrous results, 'to smile at the tales of miracle mongers and magicians with their incantations and their expulsions of evil spirits.' Heathen magicians he had not learned to despise. At the very time when he was writing the *Meditations* he had the Egyptian Arnouphis in his suite, and was listening to the advice of Alexander. These were fashionable thaumaturgists, who worked by the aid of recognized deities. What Marcus learned to scorn were the vulgar pretenders to supernatural powers, and among these it is only too probable that he included the Christians. Diognetus also drew the child towards Platonic idealism. It seems to have been under his influence that Marcus, at the age of twelve, assumed the philosophic cloak and took to sleeping on the floor. Fortunately his mother, who watched over her delicate child with tender anxiety, found out what was going on, and insisted upon his using a bed covered with rugs of fur. He would never have lived to be Emperor if these pedants had had their way.

At the age of eighteen, when Marcus was already a husband and had entered official life as quaestor, he was introduced by Pius to the care of Cornelius Fronto, an African, one of the most fashionable orators of the time. For the next six years his studies seem to have been entirely rhetorical. He wrote verses and tried his hand at historical composition. But what Fronto impressed upon him, as the duty and the glory of an educated man, was the making of speeches. Fronto has left us samples of his own handiwork, 'the Praise of
Smoke and Dust,' a large fragment of his proposed History of the warlike exploits of Lucius Verus in the East, rules for the composition of what he called 'pom- patic' orations, which he looked upon as the sublimest flight of eloquence, and other pieces. They are all intolerable, affected, pedantic, unveracious, turgid to the last degree. The best we can say for Fronto is that, after all, he is not so gorgeously ridiculous as some of the Greek declaimers. It was on the cultivation of this perverted art that Marcus wasted the hours stolen from sleep and recreation for at least six of the best years of his life.

Oratory was indeed a necessary accomplishment for every Roman gentleman, and Marcus was, by virtue of his position, a high justiciary. It was of serious importance that he should understand the rules of procedure, and the axioms of the Perpetual Edict; that he should be able to reason upon concrete facts, and express his conclusions lucidly and systematically. Some legal training he appears to have received from L. Volusius Maecianus, one of the most eminent jurisconsults of the time. But, if we may judge from his correspondence, he had small liking for the dry erudition of the courts. What Fronto ground into him was archaic refinement of expression, the manufacture of elaborate 'images' or similes, and high-flown declamation on subjects of which he knew nothing. On one occasion Fronto sends him, as subject for a theme, 'A tribune of the plebs casts into prison a free Roman citizen, in spite of the remonstrances of his colleagues, and is branded
by the censor Acilius for this abuse of power. Write two speeches, for and against.’ Marcus, always scrupulous, asks in reply what was the name of the tribune. As if the facts mattered! Again, Marcus writes to his tutor, ‘You set me to write a speech for the Civil Courts, in which there is little scope for display. Do be good and look me out some noisy subject.’ A curious proof of the futility of the Frontonian notions of style is given by Dion. On one occasion the praetorian prefect, Rufus, heard Marcus give a soldier some directions in Latin, which were evidently not understood. ‘Excuse me,’ said Rufus, ‘but he does not know Greek.’ Rufus himself, then, could not make out what language the Emperor was talking. Vulgar Latin was already very unlike the tongue of Cicero and Horace. But the affected jargon, in which Marcus had trained himself with infinite pains, was as unintelligible to plain people as the Euphuism of Sir Piercy Shafton to Scotch peasants.

Fronto has been, upon the whole, rather harshly treated. He has been called an abject flatterer, but he did not hesitate to lay a courtly finger upon the faults of his pupil, not only in style but in behaviour. It was not his fault if Marcus read a book at state banquets, or studied when he ought to have been asleep. He was a courtier, but not servile, at any rate not towards Marcus. It is only before Lucius Verus that he licks the dust. He has drawn for us his own character, and ascribes to himself many virtues, especially those of independence and truthfulness. And, indeed, for
all his tasteless pedantry, he was not a bad man. He was fond of his little daughter Gratia, fond of Marcus, fond of birds, and he laments with genuine sorrow the loss of five children and a much-loved grandson. He was a querulous invalid, and many of his letters are filled with details of his aches and pains, but he took a sympathetic interest in the aches and pains of others. He was kindly disposed towards all mankind, except the unfortunate Christians, of whom he cherished an absolute and cheerfully ignorant abhorrence. Facts never troubled these rhetoricians, and Fronto quite honestly believed that all Christians were cannibals and free lovers. It was the opinion which lent itself best to tragical declamation.

Marcus was too sincere to go on for ever grinding out words without ideas. He did his best to satisfy his eager teacher, and the love of form and style, apart from the contents of thought, is natural to all clever young men. But he found that his gifts did not lie in the direction of rhetoric, and the realities of life, at any rate of the inner life, called to him with a voice that he could not resist. At the age of twenty-four he turned definitely towards philosophy under the influence of Rusticus, an eminent Stoic, sprung from the seed of the illustrious Stoic martyrs of the first century. Rusticus lent him a copy of Epictetus, and, probably about the same time, his brother Severus brought to his knowledge 'the great names of Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion, and Brutus.' Strange heroes for a young despot! All of them were sworn foes of Caesarism,
and Marcus himself was Caesar. Twice the Empire was ruled by princes whose dreams clashed violently with reality; one of them was Marcus, the other was Julian. The Platonism of Plutarch would have taught Marcus—what indeed he might have learned from St. Paul or St. Peter—that Caesar was in temporal affairs a vice-gerent of God, with a high and sacred duty towards the world; and this doctrine was at that time undoubtedly the truth. Stoicism taught him that Caesar was an usurper, whom any man might lawfully slay, and that, if he escaped the patriot’s dagger, he was constrained by the necessity of his position to do nothing but evil. It cannot go well with a sovereign whose conscience draws him in one direction, while fortune drives him to tread the opposite path. Stoicism again taught him that the supreme concern of every man is the salvation of his own individual soul, and no king can safely believe this.

It is true, indeed, that Marcus thought little of doctrine. What he learned from the high-souled and intelligent men with whom he loved to consort—he names with especial gratitude Apollonius, Rusticus, and Maximus—was self-control, diligence, benevolence, patience and all that helps to form ‘a temperate, sweet, and venerable character.’ For a cloistered life hardly any training could have been better. Marcus would have made an exemplary priest; it was his misfortune to be an emperor at a time when a strong hand was needed at the tiller.

He became emperor on March 17, 161, and died on
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the same day in 180. At the time of his accession he was just under forty years of age. Gibbon hails him as the philosopher-king of Plato, and paints his reign in glowing colours as the golden age, when all men were happy under the best of rulers. It was in sober truth a time of unrelieved disaster. Henceforward our judgement of Marcus will depend upon our point of view. If we regard his personal character, we must not speak of him without profound respect. If we regard him as a monarch, we cannot praise without serious qualifications. It is the same painful dilemma that meets us in the case of our own Charles I, and of many other religious kings. The moralist and the historian will arrive at different conclusions, and it is not easy to strike the balance. Indeed, it is hardly possible. Marcus may be called a pagan saint, and in many ways was very like a Christian saint. But of saints there are two orders, the practical and the contemplative. Some few great men have excelled in both spheres, but Marcus is not among them. But we shall see this more clearly when we come to speak of his famous book, the Meditations.

Let us regard him first in his least favourable aspect as emperor.

His reign was one of incessant and, upon the whole, disastrous war. His accession was the signal for rebellions and invasions in Britain and in Germany. From 161 to 166 there was war with the Parthians. The terrible struggle against the Marcomanni began in earnest in 167. An unsatisfactory peace was arranged in 175, and was immediately followed by the serious revolt of
Avidius Cassius in the East. Encouraged by this division in the Roman camp the barbarians renewed their attacks, and were still in arms when Marcus died on March 17, 180, at Vienna.

These troubles were a part of the heritage bequeathed to Marcus by Pius. The good old emperor thought that no price was too high for the peace which he loved so dearly. He bought off the Eastern potentates with subsidies, and used to repeat the saying of Scipio, 'that he would rather save the life of one citizen than slay a thousand enemies.' To Pius also is due a change—or rather perhaps the completion of a change—in the character of the Roman army which was fraught with the most momentous consequences. No more Italians were to be found in the legions, which were recruited by conscription in the districts where they were quartered, men of all classes being swept into the ranks. This change greatly impaired the intelligence and military quality of the troops. The Eastern army in particular, which in Hadrian's time had been a model of efficiency, had become little better than an armed mob. The unpreparedness of the Romans was probably one of the causes of the Parthian war, and greatly increased its peril.

Marcus sent to the East, as commander-in-chief, his adoptive brother, Lucius Verus, whom he had already taken as his colleague in the Empire. It is very doubtful whether Hadrian or Pius had intended this; the elevation of Verus to sovereign rank seems to have been the act of Marcus himself. Dion says that,
being conscious of his own unfitness for military command, he hoped to find in Verus a capable and trusty lieutenant. It may be that he was misled by personal affection or by domestic influences. But, whatever may have been the reason, it was a perilous and ill-advised step. Verus was as graceful, as vicious, and as weak as his father. He went to Syria, lingering on his way to taste the delights of every city along the coasts of Greece and Asia, fixed his quarters in Antioch and there for the most part remained, sunk in debauchery, while the war was carried on by his lieutenants, of whom the most distinguished was Avidius Cassius. The two emperors celebrated their vicarious triumph with great magnificence in 166, but the course of the war had been very chequered, and the result was by no means decisive.

Here again we meet with Cornelius Fronto. He had been tutor to Verus as well as to Marcus, and Verus was extremely anxious that his warlike achievements should be set in full relief by the eloquence of so famous a rhetorician. Accordingly he wrote to Fronto, imploring him to undertake the task, and promising him every possible information, maps, dispatches, reports of the lieutenant-generals, copies of his own allocutions to the troops. We may notice here that those speeches on the field of battle with which ancient historians adorn their narratives were not always fictitious; they were actually delivered, and carefully preserved with the other documents relating to the campaign. Fronto with reluctance agreed to grant a re-
quest which was a command, and actually composed some pages which still exist, and are of great interest as showing firstly that contemporaneous history is not always to be relied upon, even when based on official documents, or perhaps specially in that case; and secondly that Fronto himself was not so veracious as he thought he was. The eulogies which he heaps upon Verus would have been ridiculously extravagant if applied to Julius Caesar or Alexander the Great.

The Parthian war was followed immediately by that which is generally known as the Marcomannian, though the Marcomanni were but one out of a dozen Germanic or Sarmatian tribes who, banded together in a loose confederacy, came swarming over the whole frontier of the Danube. The details of this long and desperate struggle are almost unknown. It was, in fact, the opening chapter in the history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, the first great wave of that advancing tide of barbarism which finally submerged the West. Men regarded it as the most terrible war on record, more terrible even than the Hannibal. Everything seemed to be giving way at once. The Germans ravaged Northern Italy and Greece as far as Phocis and even Rhodes, while Moorish tribes overran almost the whole of Spain, and Egypt was cruelly devastated by the revolt of the Bucolici. The Romans suffered many defeats, in which numbers of distinguished officers lost their lives. The disasters of the time were greatly aggravated by the Oriental plague, which was carried into the West by the soldiers of Verus on their return from the
Parthian war. In Rome itself the mortality was so alarming that the bodies of the dead were carried out to the cemeteries by waggon-loads at the public expense. The pestilence raged from 169 to 182, and perhaps longer, and repeated famines followed in its train.

So great an accumulation of misery naturally caused profound spiritual unrest. The Sibylline Oracles saw in the darkness of the times an indication of the approaching end of the world, and even the heathen shared this belief. One rogue, playing for his own profit upon the superstitious fears of the populace, climbed into a wild fig-tree in the Campus Martius, and thence delivered a harangue to the assembled mob, declaring that fire was about to fall from heaven and burn up the world. As a sign he was to fall from the tree and turn into a stork. He fell, letting loose at the same time a stork which he had concealed in the bosom of his gown. He was seized by the police and brought before the emperor, by whom he was dismissed unpunished. Marcus himself was carried away by the prevailing alarm, summoned to his aid an army of priests from every nation, and sought some hope of the divine favour in the scrupulous performance, not only of Roman, but of foreign rites. It was in this dark time that he began to persecute the Church.

To all the other alarms of the Marcomannian war must be added the revolt of Avidius Cassius. Cassius was not a Roman, but a native of Syria, son of Heliodorus, a rhetorician of some repute. He had gained considerable distinction in the Parthian war, and was
a capable but cruel officer. Verus suspected him of harbouring designs upon the throne, and informed Marcus that he was not to be trusted. 'He calls you', he said, 'a philosophic old woman, and me a dissipated buffoon.' Marcus knew Verus too well to be guided by his advice in so serious a matter, and contented himself with replying, 'No emperor can kill his successor.' It was not till six years after the death of Verus that Cassius revolted. Deceived by a rumour of the death of Marcus, he caused himself to be proclaimed emperor at Antioch. But the falsehood was quickly contradicted; the Eastern army remained true to its allegiance, and the rebel found that he could reckon on no support except that of an unwarlike array of Cilicians, Syrians, Jews, and Egyptians. Even among these there were malcontents. As he was walking in the streets of Antioch, or in the camp, a couple of under-officers attacked him, cut him down, and carried his head to the emperor.

It is possible that Cassius never intended to draw his sword against the master who had trusted him. But after he had taken the fatal plunge he attempted to justify himself by bitter charges of laxity and neglect. 'Marcus Antoninus', he said, 'philosophizes; his head is full of physical science, and the nature of the soul, and of goodness and justice, but he cares nothing for the commonwealth. See these provincial governors, who think that the Senate or Antoninus have entrusted the provinces to their charge, merely in order that they may live in wantonness and pile up riches.' These are
probably not merely the calumnies of a fierce and disappointed man. Marcus was, as Pius had been before him, far too anxious to maintain the dignity of the Senate, and the dignity of the Senate involved liberty for aristocratic governors to plunder the unhappy provincials as they thought fit.

Marcus deeply regretted the revolt, would have spared the life of Cassius, if it had been possible, and treated his family and adherents with great lenity. For this he was angrily blamed by his empress Faustina.

Faustina, like many of the great Roman dames, was a woman of masculine temper and unbridled conduct. If we had only the Augustan History to guide our judgment, we might regard the tale of her infidelities as wholly false; for Roman gossip, which fills so large a space in the pages of this compilation, was shocking and unscrupulous, and people blackened Faustina's character with more than ordinary malignity, because they wanted to believe that the miserable Commodus was really the son of a gladiator. The charges are probably exaggerated, and Faustina may not have been as bad as Messalina. But Dion Cassius, a grave writer and a contemporary, tells us, though without details, that she was an unfaithful wife, and that Marcus deliberately shut his eyes and ears.

Pius spoke of his own wife, the elder Faustina, with hearty affection. 'This is what I feel,' he wrote to Fronto: 'I would rather live with her in Gyara, than without her in the palace.' Marcus, on the other hand,
though he mentions his wife incidentally in his letters, uses no terms of endearment.

Dion appears to have believed another charge that is insinuated in the *Augustan History*. It was said that Faustina had entered into a treasonable correspondence with Avidius Cassius. The story was apparently, not that she had instigated him to revolt, but that, fearing the death of Marcus, she had written to Cassius urging him, if her fear was realized, to declare himself emperor; she was then to bestow her hand upon him, and he on his part was to guarantee the rights of her son Commodus. The plan, if she really conceived it, was neither intelligent nor wifely, but at any rate she is not said to have compassed the death of her husband.

After the fall of Cassius, Marcus went to Asia to settle in person the disorders left behind by the rebellion. Faustina accompanied him, and there died in 176, at Halala, a village under Mount Taurus. Marcus caused all her papers to be seized and burnt them unread, lest he might discover more than he wished to know. He paid to Faustina's memory all the honours which the best of empresses could have received from the most loving of husbands. He raised Halala to the dignity of a colony, and consecrated a temple to her there. In Rome itself he built her another temple on the Capitol which he called by her pet name, and allowed the Senate to set up silver statues of himself and Faustina in the temple of Venus and Rome, with a special altar on which brides and bridegrooms were to offer incense before their marriage. He established a new institu-
tion for the support of poor girls, to be known as the *Novae puellae Faustinianae*. Finally, in the *Meditations* he thanks heaven that he had enjoyed the blessing of 'such a wife, so obedient, so affectionate, so simple.' In the same passage he expresses his gratitude for his children, including Commodus, who were 'not amiss' in mind or in body.

Renan discerns in these strangely chosen expressions the 'inner martyrdom' of a saint who, through tribulation and disillusion, arrives at perfect self-renunciation. 'We shall never comprehend', he says, 'all that was suffered by that poor blighted heart, all the bitterness hidden behind that pale face, always calm, almost smiling. It is true that the farewell to happiness is the beginning of wisdom, and the surest way to find happiness. There is nothing so sweet as the return of joy, which follows the renunciation of joy; nothing so lively, profound and charming as the enchantment of the disenchanted.' There is truth in this; but Marcus should not have praised Faustina for the very qualities which she did not possess. It is right to give up illusions, but it is not right to be wilfully blind.

We can hardly believe that Marcus had ever been in love with Faustina. Their marriage was one of the merest political expedience, and a few weeks before their union they had both been betrothed to others. He knew that he owed the purple to her, and it is said that when he was advised to divorce her, or even to put her to death, he had replied, 'If I send her away, I must give back her dowry.' It was an inauspicious match.
Marcus was a bookworm, an absorbed and introspective student, a valetudinarian who never had been young, in many respects most admirable, but not the right husband for a gay, indiscreet and fierce princess. There must have been constant friction, and on the wife's part, at any rate, there must have been frequent explosions. Why then did Marcus act and speak as if his married life had been one of felicity? We may find the key perhaps in his Stoic philosophy. One of the most cherished axioms of that school was that you must take people as you find them. Two very favourite quotations were *Qui vitia odit, homines odit*, and *Mores amici noveris non oderis*. In friendship, as in all things, it was the business of the sage not to cure but to endure. Faustina, no doubt, had some good qualities; her husband fixed his eyes upon these, and waved everything else aside. If Avidius Cassius spoke the truth, he acted in the same way towards his provincial governors also.

The Marcomannian war lasted on into the reign of Commodus. Marcus did his duty with his habitual scrupulous conscientiousness. From the year 167 he appears to have been, with few interludes, in the neighbourhood of the scene of operations. He was no soldier, and the struggle was so scattered that no single hand could hold all the threads. But the presence of the emperor at or near the front would no doubt inspire the troops, and would moreover hinder the rise of another pretender to the throne. Marcus received the titles of Germanicus in 172, and of Sarmaticus in 174 or 175. But, before the end of the war, the great
treasure left behind by Pius had disappeared, the crown jewels had been sold, gold was no longer minted, and even the silver coinage was debased. Even policemen and gladiators had been forcibly enlisted to fill up the depleted ranks of the regular army, and the number of prisoners taken by the barbarians was almost beyond count. Large tracts of country, even in North Italy, were so denuded of inhabitants that hordes of Germans and Sarmatians were allowed to settle upon the deserted lands within the frontier. These savage immigrants appear to have been the occasion of one of the worst evils that afflicted the Empire in later times. They were treated as neither slaves nor free, but as villains or serfs, bound to the soil, and sold with the soil, yet liable to military service. Gradually nearly the whole of the rustic population was reduced to this pitiable condition.

Dion Cassius says of Marcus: 'He did not prosper as he deserved. His health was not good, and he fell into very many misfortunes throughout almost the whole of his reign.' Capitolinus says that a man was counted sacrilegious who had not in his house a statuette of the emperor. But his time was one of nearly unredeemed calamity, and Marcus was unfortunate in almost every relation of life.

He was the worst and most systematic enemy of the Church that had as yet appeared; he caused innocent blood to be shed in Gaul, in Rome, in Africa and in Asia, and when he died he left the mines of Sardinia full of unhappy Christians, to be released by his unworthy son Commodus. He instituted his persecution
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at a time when the Empire was in urgent need of internal peace, and when the army must have contained many Christians, for it was now composed not of volunteers but of conscripts. His tutor, Fronto, believed that the Christians were a crew of disgusting wretches, who met in secret to perpetrate revolting orgies, but Marcus knew better than this. Galen, the enlightened physician, speaks of the new sect as uneducated but morally admirable. Lucian treats it with not unfriendly banter; the Christians, he says, were a confiding race easily plundered by a false brother, for instance by Peregrinus, yet not so credulous as to be gullied by the dishonest charlatan Alexander of Abonoteichos. Celsus attacked the Christians with great acumen and bitterness; he thinks that they were justly punished, though he admits that they were not immoral. He knew that they were already numerous and powerful, and exhorts them not to stand sullenly aloof while the Empire is in peril. Finally, he offers them a compromise. Why, he asks, cannot they serve two masters? Let them conform, at least externally, to the established religion, and yet keep their own faith. But Marcus would see nothing, and listen to nothing. He could excuse with melancholy resignation the infidelities of Faustina, the precocious vices of Commodus, the misconduct of governors, the revolt of Avidius Cassius. He flattered himself that he was 'a Roman,' and in this one point at least he would be like Nero and Domitian. Well, there have been Christians just as tender-hearted and just as bigoted. But Marcus
had not even the excuse that he was killing men for the
good of their souls, or that he believed with absolute
conviction in the truth of the religion which he pro-

fessed.

He was a philosopher-king, an incarnation of the
dream of Plato, and his reign ought to have ushered
in the age of gold. Plato's own millennium could not
have stood for a year; as soon as his young men began
to fall in love, they would have pelted all the philoso-
phers out of the town. Marcus aimed as wide of the
mark as Plato, but on the opposite side; the latter
shows us the extreme of Socialism, the former the ex-
treme of Individualism. Let us see what his opinions
were, and what were their bearings upon duty in
general, and the duty of a king in particular.

His mature beliefs are known to us from his famous
book, which we generally call his Meditations, though
he himself entitled it To Myself. It is not a treatise,
but rather the diary of a soul; the daily thoughts of a
religious man, jotted down just as they occurred. We
may call it a spiritual commonplace book; there are
quotations from his day's reading, from Plato, Anti-
stenes, the poets; the rest consists of reflections upon
the doctrines of his school, not reasoned out, but illus-
trated with an infinity of epigrams and 'images'. It
is most like the de Imitatione, but less orderly. It is
not an autobiography, such as the Confessions of Au-
gustine, or the Journals of Wesley or Fox, though it
begins with a slight retrospective sketch; nor is it
apologetic or controversial like the Pensées of Pascal.
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It is most singular to reflect that the book was written almost upon the field of battle. Marcus never seems to have been actually in command of the fighting line. We must conceive of him as quartered somewhere near the actual scene of operations, immensely busy, in his slow conscientious way, with reports, dispatches, audiences, with the affairs of the army, and the affairs of the state. Then, after a harassing day of office work, he would snatch an hour or two for reading, and finally write up his diary before he threw himself upon his trundle-bed to seek a little repose. Never was a book composed in such amazing surroundings, and never did any man practise so resolutely the duty of 'recollection' or self-communing.

The Meditations is one of the finest flowers of Paganism. It is the work of a cultivated, delicate, most veracious intelligence. It is indeed not original. It neither adds to knowledge nor recasts old knowledge so as to prepare the way for advance; in other words, it is devotional and that alone. Marcus has indeed the same kind of genius as Thomas a Kempis, docile, graceful, pure, but, unlike a Kempis, he is hampered at every turn by a harsh creed. In truth he would have been a better man if he had had no philosophy at all and simply followed, as Pius did, the guidance of his own excellent disposition.

What is his creed, as we find it in his book? Let us examine it under the three great headings of God, Human Nature, and Society.

The reader will notice at the outset that Marcus has
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no definite settled belief in anything except his own intelligence. I am, and I can think—these are the two axioms which he regards as indisputable. There may be gods or there may not, the world may be ordered by providence or it may not, there may be a future life or there may not. Upon these matters the wise man will always speak with caution and reserve. There is no external revelation, no Bible, no voice of prophecy, no truth inscribed upon the mind itself which can give us assurance about them. The sayings of philosophers, the visions of poets, the argument from design are considerable, but not conclusive. For his own part Marcus believes in God, as Creator and Father, but he does not insist upon this faith, he does not attempt to establish it, and he does not make it his mainstay. All that he needs and all that he affirms with absolute confidence is the existence of his own mind.

He is at bottom what we might call a religious agnostic, a type of character which is not so rare as we are apt to think. By nature sensitive, tender-hearted and brooding, he was yet neither imaginative nor poetic, though he had a charming gift of fancy. He was affectionate but prudish, a man of few friends, who did not wisely choose his friends either in literature or in life, not large in sympathy, yet wasteful of affection, idealizing Cato, idealizing Fronto. There are many such men. When the inevitable disillusions come they are driven in upon themselves; duty as they conceive it, and they do not conceive it wisely, is the one thing left in a world of disappointment. Renan is not wholly
wrong in his interpretation of the 'inner martyrdom,' though assuredly he is not wholly right.

Intelligence, then, is the one dogma left to Marcus. What did it teach him? For men have explained its testimony in very various ways.

First of all, that there is a God, or rather that there are gods, who made the world and govern it; and that man is the highest and most cherished of the divine creatures. Marcus does not formulate his theology, nor does he care to distinguish accurately between 'God,' the great World Spirit, and 'the gods,' Zeus, the Sun, and other denizens of the heathen pantheon. He was throughout his life punctilious in observance of the usual ceremonies, and offered his sacrifice even on days that Pagan ritualists regarded as unfit for the purpose. He praises Pius for his 'religion without superstition,' and this implies that, like most Romans, he attached no value to the immoral Greek myths. But we have seen already that he believed in magic, and did not disdain its aid.

God, like the Stoic himself, is Wisdom and Power, but Love only in a peculiar sense; and the universe which God made and governs is divided into two distinct realms. Matter, and all that is directly connected with matter, including the lower elements of the human soul, is subject to Necessity, or, as we should say, to general laws, which are reasonable and beneficent, but aim at the good, not of the individual, but of the whole. Death and disease, pain and noxious animals, tempests and earthquakes, all that we foolishly call evil, are really
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good, because they belong to the order of nature, which is ever travailing in birth, ever clearing away the old to make room for the new. 'What is good for the swarm is good for the bee.' Nothing is evil except fear, desire, and sorrow, because these spring from ignorance and from rebellion against the divine ordinances.

It is evident how far the Stoic is from Gnosticism, which was teaching, at this very time, that pain and suffering are caused by an evil god. Marcus, we may even say, had affinities with St. Francis of Assisi, and could have sung, though he could hardly have written, the Song of Little Sister Death. But it is to be noticed that, though he recognized frankly the law of change, the idea of progress never entered into his head. The world is like a river; true, but it is like a river that flows upwards. But in the eyes of Marcus, though nothing endures, yet there is nothing new under the sun. The world is like an interminable procession of ants, like a stage army that marches out at one door and in at another. Endless change, yet wearisome monotony. The lesson is that of Ecclesiastes, 'Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity.' How can you fix your heart on one of a flock of birds driven past by the wind? Let them go, and be ready to go with them when the hour strikes. Yes, we might say, but, O Marcus, are we not to make the world better? Are we set here merely to endure boredom as best we can?

Christians were saved from this dull melancholy partly by the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Bible history generally, still more by the belief in immortality.
They were not so unscientific as Marcus probably thought.

But the theology of Marcus is really his psychology. It is the reflex of his view of human nature; with this it begins, and to this it returns. In his view of the world there is really nothing better than man.

Man consists of three parts, flesh, spirit, and intelligence. By the first two, which are material, he is akin to beasts, plants, and inanimate nature, entangled, like them, in the iron laws which govern the world. But Intelligence, though the Stoics believed this also to be in some sense material, is 'a fragment' of the divine essence, it is a particle of God, and may be called in strict truth 'the god within.'

It is sovereign, recognizing the laws of God in external nature, because they are the laws which it would have enacted itself, but in its own domain, that is to say, within the constitution of man, absolutely free and independent, so that neither nature, man, nor God can judge or restrain it. It may be, like Caesar, a bad sovereign, when blinded and misled by ignorance. If this should happen, there is no other physician but itself. Thought alone can cure the aberrations of thought. The king must drive out his unworthy favourites, and this he can do by his own royal power at any moment.

Like all the Stoics, Marcus paints the autonomy of mind in the strongest colours. No power on earth can hold it captive; it has the inalienable power of self-conversion. Vice may shut it up in a sort of prison; but the prison is only an enchanted castle, which mind
has built for itself; whenever it pleases it can break the imaginary fetters of false opinion, and go forth free. No power can make a man think what is false, or do what is wrong.

Obviously this is true only if we suppose that vice is like dirt upon the face, which does not make the conscience dirty, and can be washed off in a moment.

But, further, not only can the mind convert itself, but its chief good is always within its grasp. This again is true only if we limit the notion of the chief good. Accordingly the Stoic speaks not of happiness or joy, but of tranquillity, of sober, cheerful, self-contentment. Man must seek nothing but what is absolutely in his own power: he must be satisfied with virtue, and live in complete detachment from everything of which he is not master. If he is going to pin his felicity to wealth, health, beauty, comfort, fame, to friend, wife, or child, he lays himself open to the slings of fortune, and becomes at once the slave of Necessity. He must be content to live a purely self-centred life. 'Look within,' says Marcus; 'within is the fountain of all good, which will always bubble up, if thou wilt always dig.'

Quite easy the excellent man thought all this; but it is hard enough except for an anchorite, and the anchorite is not a pattern for all to follow, and possesses, moreover, consolations which Stoicism cannot offer. Even the Stoic saw clearly enough that circumstances might arise in which he could no longer shut the world outside his castle walls, or think that he was well when he was not well. The forces arrayed against him might
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become so many and so imperious that, though his mind was free, his hands were not. What was he to do in that case? 'Kill thyself,' says Marcus, 'no one can prevent that.'

We can now understand what is meant when it is said that to the Stoic virtue was the only good, vice the only evil, while things external were things indifferent. The first two of these propositions are true, if virtue and vice are rightly conceived; the third is not true. Let it only be observed that things indifferent include not only my own misfortunes but the misfortunes of other people.

We can see also what was the radical defect of Stoicism. It lies precisely in that habit of logical analysis upon which they prided themselves. Things to which we can give a name are not only distinct but separate and independent. They may be joined together to form a whole, but the whole is nothing but the sum of the parts. The world is at bottom merely a large heap of grains of corn. Men are themselves alone, they can neither help nor injure one another. Everywhere the Stoic separated without an attempt to combine. What is man? He is a parcel of three different things. What is mind? It is a part of God. What is spirit? The word means breath, air, which we pump in and pump out with every movement of the lungs. What is the body? It is a complex of skin, bones, hair, blood, and other nastiness. And so forth. Fame is the clacking of other men's tongues, the imperial purple is the excrement of a sheep dyed with the juice of a kind of
limpet. The Stoic not only taught this melancholy anatomy, but looked upon it as the way of salvation. 'Just consider sensibly what the body is,' he says, 'your wife's body, or a saint's, or your own. Put it upon the dissecting-table, or regard it as it will be in the charnel-house, and see how all your false opinions, your vices, will wither up at once.'

The Stoic thought this insight, but it is commonplace, vulgar, and false. It leaves out the one thing which is important, the relation of flesh to emotion, and of both to intelligence; in a word, it leaves out the living personality. And therefore it really leaves out morality, at any rate it deprives morality of any reasonable basis. For what true fellowship can there be in a world of thinking corpses?

Plutarch was right when he said that the Stoics believed that God made both man and the world, and yet believed that God made the world an unfit place for man's habitation; and again, when he said that they endeavoured to 'jump off their own shadow.'

And yet, in spite of their inhuman theory, the Stoics were, in their way, profoundly moral. If their belief was narrow, at any rate it was high. The reader of the Meditations may be trusted to find this out for himself. Let me only direct attention to a striking passage in which Marcus has enumerated what we may call the Five Deadly Sins. They are, (i) Rebellion against the ordinance of God; (ii) Inhumanity, in the broadest sense of the word; (iii) Giving way to pleasure, shrinking from pain and labour; (iv) Inveracity; (v) Idle,
aimless action. On each he has much to say that is quite admirable. The Stoics are never so good as when they are elaborating and enforcing the idea of Duty. They were the greatest of ancient moralists, and the greatest of ancient preachers; the Cynics, the militant branch of the school, were even missionaries, and bear a curious resemblance to the Mendicant Friars. They cared little for books, and the dogmas of the later Stoics were few and simple. But they made everything turn upon rightness of conduct.

The two capital articles in the list given by Marcus are, the first, my duty to God, and the second, my duty to man. Of the latter much has already been indirectly said, but something ought to be added. For it is here that we are to find how far the Stoic managed to overcome the centrifugal tendency of his system, how far he succeeded in making a unity, and forming for himself the idea of a divine society or church.

Here again we must start with Intelligence. One great attribute of this sovereign faculty is that it sees and understands what is the proper work of man. By virtue of the divine particle, of 'the demon within,' he is at once son of God and brother of all mankind. This is that universal and eternal truth which St. Paul discerned in the teaching of the Porch. The reader will remember how, in his sermon on Mars' Hill, the apostle took for his text the words of the Stoic poet, 'For we are also His offspring.' Intelligence further tells us that, inasmuch as He cares for the whole world, God is 'sociable' (κοινωνικός), and therefore man must be
sociable also. He must do good, and do it not grudgingly or as of necessity, but from the heart cheerfully, not as a servant but as a friend of God. The world, rightly understood, is the City of God.

Marcus emphasizes this point, so familiar to all Christians, by a play upon two words, 'member' and 'part,' which in Greek differ only by a single letter (μέρος, μέλος). Member expresses the higher and more vital idea. 'Say to thyself continually, I am a member of that complex which is composed of the reasonable elements. If thou sayest, I am a part, thou dost not as yet love men from the heart; beneficence does not as yet delight thy reason; thou still doest good merely because it is proper, not as if thou wert doing good unto thyself.'

Here we have the best conception of duty, built upon the right foundation, expressed in Christian terms and with good Christian common-sense. Conversion, as has been observed, is in Stoic doctrine instantaneous or nearly so. Sanctification is not; it is a process; the condition of the part precedes and leads up to that of the member. It is to be regretted that Marcus does not pay more attention to the lower of these stages, which is that of the majority of serious men.

The three particular vices most inimical to unity are Lust, Greed, and Anger. The first, the great sin of Paganism, Marcus condemns, but hardly, we may think, with adequate severity; he could have no idea of a sanctity of the body, nor does he point out the cruelty of sensual vice. Greed is wholly unphilosophical and
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foolish. But the most heinous, because the most directly unsocial, of all vices is Anger, and this the great Stoic teachers were never tired of denouncing. It was a lesson much needed in Rome, where men, especially the nobles, were fiercer and more intractable than in Greece, less civilized, in a word, for there is no surer index of civilization than the power to control sudden gusts of fury or the habitual tendency to cruelty. Marcus indeed carries his teaching upon this head beyond the line of reason. So absolute is his notion of tolerance that he will not allow a place even for indignation. Even social excommunication, or any practical manifestation of disapproval, he would not permit; and it is not easy to see how he would justify even legal punishments. Let us take a few passages.

'It is natural that such things should be done by such men (evil things, that is, by evil men). He who wishes that it should be otherwise wishes that the fig-tree should have no juice. Always remember this, that in a day or two both you and your enemy will be dead men.'

'A man does wrong? What does it matter to me? He has his own disposition, his own way of acting.'

'How harsh it is not to suffer men to follow what they think natural and profitable! but that is what you are doing when you are angry with them because they make mistakes. Everybody does what he thinks good. Well but, you say, it is not good. Then teach them and show them better, but do not be angry.'
Even teaching is not of much use. 'They will do the same things, though you burst yourself.'

'Too much resignation, dear master,' says Renan, in one passage of his admirable sketch of Marcus Aurelius. Too much tolerance, we may add.

'Why should I be indignant?' Marcus asks. 'A bad man cannot injure me.' 'Perhaps not,' we might answer, 'but he injures other people.' 'Not so,' is the rejoinder, 'they are free and intelligent; their minds cannot be harmed except by themselves. And this world's goods are things indifferent. What harm can a thief do them?' This is not language fit for an emperor, whose business it is, as Marcus himself says, to 'reverence the gods and save men.' But he was misled partly by his fatal doctrine of independence, partly by another and equally fatal belief that evil is a necessary element in the constitution of the world, just as clowns and villains are necessary characters in a drama. But, if Marcus could make this large and genial allowance for scoundrels, why could he not leave the Christians alone?

The Antonines did something to give effect to their principle of universal beneficence. The hard lot of the slave was made a little less intolerable. Helpless children were fed and clothed by their 'alimentary institutions,' of which some mention has been made above; schools were established and professorships endowed, and the rugged old customary law of Rome was softened and rationalized by a large infusion of equity. Marcus himself would not have hurt a fly, unless it was a Chris-
tian fly. But he boasted that his age was one of growing humanity, and in this he made a great mistake; he was judging the world, of which he knew very little, by his own mind, of which he knew a great deal. Within a small circle of refined and educated people, manners and ideas were in some directions more civilized, but in others they were not. As to humanity, readers of the *Augustan History*, of the martyrologies, and of the Roman law-books, do not need to be told that barbarity was on the increase. Burning alive, a hideous form of punishment almost unknown under the Republic, had become quite common. Torture, from which, in the old days, free-born men had been almost entirely exempt, was now, under the Empire, much more horrible and almost universal. Marcus himself, during the Lyons persecution, ordered Roman citizens to be tortured to death, an act from which Nero, Domitian, and even Trajan would have shrunken.

It will be evident that, in spite of all their fine sayings about the *City of Zeus*, the Stoics were very far from the conception of a Church. They had no authority, no discipline, no belief in their own mission.

It would not be quite true to say that they had no enthusiasm. Some of them were martyrs, but of a political kind. They were zealots for political freedom, which is good only as a means, and on their own principles is a thing indifferent. Further, the freedom for which they gave their lives was freedom for the Roman nobility to plunder the world.

Again, the Stoic had no adoration. He presented his
compliments to God as one high potentate to another. He was reverent or rather respectful. Indeed, as he believed that he was himself God, adoration would have been a kind of egotism. ‘Zeus’, said one of the lights of the school, ‘does no more for Cleanthes than Cleanthes for Zeus.’

The student who desires to see Stoicism at its best should turn not to Marcus, but to the lame, cheerful, clever old slave Epictetus. Stoicism was meant for men like Epictetus, if they could get nothing better. But clearly it was not a universal religion. It may suit the slave whose life is one of endurance, or the invalid who has said farewell to hope; it may agree with rebels generally—for it is indeed a theory of tyrannicide—but it will not suit the tradesman who ministers to the comfort of the body, or the artist who sees the beauty of the body, or the physician who wants to relieve bodily pain, or the ruler who expects men to serve the state with their bodies. Nor will it suit women or children, of whom Seneca and Epictetus speak with bitter contempt.

Clearly such a faith is helpful only to the few, and therefore cannot be the best even for them.

Stoicism was not even the best faith, in a moral and practical aspect, available for a heathen man in the second century. Among religions Mithraism was superior, among philosophies Platonism. Mention has already been made of Plutarch; let us compare him with Marcus on one other point also. Plutarch’s great work is the Lives, in which he records with genial sym-
pathetic wisdom the virtues, the glories, the errors of the famous statesmen and warriors of Greece and Rome. Marcus is no historian. One thought alone is suggested to him by the heroes of the past, and even by the greatest of his own predecessors, by Augustus, or Trajan, or Hadrian. They are dead, and we must all die. What concerns us is neither the past nor the future, but the present. It is true as far as it goes, but it does not go very far.

Finally, a word should be added as to the relation of Stoicism to Christianity. In some ways they are amazingly alike, but always with a label of difference. At one time Seneca was supposed to have borrowed from St. Paul. Clement of Alexandria copies largely from Stoic moralists, and there are numerous phrases in the Meditations which would not be out of place in the New Testament. ‘Love the human race; follow God.’ ‘The good man is the priest and minister of the gods.’ He is ‘a citizen of the noblest city.’ He is to ‘do each act as if it were the last in his life.’ He is to seek the truth, ‘by which no man was ever injured.’ He is to remember that whatever may befall it is always possible to be virtuous, and that ‘it is royal to do good and be evil spoken of.’ After all, Stoicism and all the great old philosophies wanted one thing only—the belief in the Incarnation.

There is so much to be learned from Marcus that it seems ungracious to dwell upon differences. If the reader thinks this essay too critical, let me remind him that it is merely an introduction. The book itself is
here put into his hands in an easily intelligible form, and its beauties need no showman.

Marcus is a noble figure. Even the Christians of the ages of persecution could not speak evil of him, though he had smitten them very hard. Noble, beautiful, and most pathetic. The equestrian statue on the Campidoglio represents him as a conquering warrior, but he was far from that. We should think of him rather as 'a good man struggling with adversity', never prevailing, never flying, never complaining. His adversity was due mainly to the naughtiness of a world which he could neither persuade nor subdue; the gods had appointed him a task that was far beyond his strength; he wrestled with it, but he wrestled in vain. We may call him the most tragic figure in history. For what is so deeply tragic as the sight of a most admirable man set by divine providence in a position where his very virtue plays him false, because it is not the kind of virtue that the times require?
MEDITATIONS OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS

I

1 It behoves me to learn from Verus, my grandfather, his beauty of character and meekness of temper:
2 From my father's repute and my recollections of him, modesty and manliness:
3 From my mother, piety and liberality; abstention not merely from ill-doing but from the very thought of evil; simplicity and frugality, and contempt for the luxuries of wealth.
4 To my great-grandfather I am debtor in that he sent me to the public courses of instruction, procured for me the wisest teachers at home, and taught me that on education we must spend with an open hand.
5 From the instructor of my youth I learned to care naught for the arena—its charioteers with their green and blue, or its gladiators with their targes and bucklers—but to endure hardship, to be content with little, to labour with my hands, to meddle not with what concerned me not, and to turn a deaf ear to scandal:
6 From Diognetus, to treat trivial things as trivial, to smile at the tales of miracle-mongers and soothsayers, with their incantations and their expulsions of evil spirits, to disdain to keep fighting quails or betray
interest in such sports, and to bear with outspokenness. Through him I was wedded to philosophy and sat at the feet, first of Eutychius, then of Panyasis and Maecianus: through his influence I put my childish Platonizings on paper, and dreamed of the 'mattress and sheepskin' and all the other vagaries of Grecian thought.

From Rusticus I took to heart the great truth that character needs constant correction and cultivation, and was saved from straying into the arid pastures of a contentious sophistry, from scribbling didactic essays, and declaiming gratuitous good advice, as well as from essaying the rôle of the great athlete and man of action. Thanks to him, I learned to hold aloof from rhetoric, minor poetry, and cheap epigrams; to see the absurdity of pacing my palace in gala dress, and similar follies; to write my correspondence in plain Latin—as plain as his in the note he sent my mother from Sinuessa;—to be placable and ready to lay down arms against any one whose offences had stirred me to anger, so soon as he should make overtures for reconciliation; to read accurately, not to rest content with vague general ideas; to be slow in subscribing to a man with a great flow of words; and, finally, through him I first lit on the works of Epictetus, which he lent me out of his private library.

From Apollonius I know that I must strive after ingenuousness, unwavering constancy, and contempt for the gambler's hit or miss; learn, like him, never for an instant to look towards any other guiding star than
reason; and, like him, remain unmoved in paroxysms of pain, in the loss of children, and in lingering disease. He was a living proof that the greatest energy is compatible with the most complete relaxation: his lectures were delivered with unruffled calm, and in him I beheld a man who, in simple truth, looked upon his skill and readiness of exposition as the least meritorious of his qualities. From him I learned in what spirit to receive kindnesses—or what the world deems such—from my friends, neither boorishly ignoring them nor sacrificing my independence in their acknowledgement.

To Sextus I owe the memory of his kindly nature, and the spectacle of a family dwelling in concord under his patriarchal sway; as well as my first notions of life in conformity with Nature. He was unassumingly dignified, an observant guardian of his friends' interests, tolerant of the ignorant and unreflecting, and at home with all sorts and conditions of men, the result being that, while his conversation had far more charm than the most skilfully conceived flattery, he at the same time inspired his listeners with genuine respect. Lucid and, withal, methodical in his search for the true and necessary principles of right living, and in classifying them when found he never displayed the least trace of anger or other strong emotion; and yet, for all his impassiveness, he was the most affectionate of men. He was ungrudging in his praise, though it was quietly given, and his great learning was carried without ostentation.

From Alexander, the grammarian, let me learn to be sparing of rebuke. Should any one, in my hearing,
use a barbarism, or a solecism, or mispronounce a word, let me, like him, refrain from breaking in with a reproof, but, with what tact I may, say what the speaker ought to have said, under pretence of corroborating his arguments or contributing something to the question at issue, avoiding all reference to the disputed phrase,—or at least try to use some similarly inoffensive mode of correction.

From Fronto comes the reflection that jealousy, insincerity, and hypocrisy are the usual concomitants of a crown; and that, in general, our so-called nobility is deficient in the natural affections.

The example of Alexander, the Platonist, admonishes me neither in conversation nor in writing to use the excuse of ‘urgent affairs’, save rarely and in cases of absolute need, lest, through thus continually pleading the stress of business, I come to shirk my relations and obligations to my fellow men.

From Catulus let me learn not to despise the complaint of a friend however irrational it may be, but strive to restore our former relationship; to be ungrudging in the praise of my teachers, bearing in mind the example of Domitian and Athenodotus; and, finally, to love my children as sincerely as he loved his.

My brother, Severus, taught me to love truth, justice, and my friends: through him I came to know the great names of Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dio, and Brutus: from him I acquired the idea of a constitutional state founded on the principles of equality and free speech—a monarchy whose ideal is the freedom
of the subject. From him, also, I may learn to pay unswerving and unfa
ttering homage to philosophy, to stint not in benevolence and charity, and to be hopeful and mistrust not the affection of my friends; and yet he took no pains to conceal his disapproval, and it needed no guesswork on the part of his friends to divine what he wished and what he did not: it was plain for all to see.

15 The example of Maximus may remind me to exercise self-control and not lightly to change my attitude on any point; to imitate his cheerfulness under all circumstances, especially in sickness, and his temperate, sweet, and venerable character. He did the work he was called to do without complaint, and no one could doubt but that what he said he meant, and what he did he did to good purpose. Nothing surprised or confounded him; without haste and without rest, he was never at a loss, never dejected; his countenance never wore a forced smile; he never gave way to anger and never cherished suspicion. He wearied not in well-doing, loved mercy, hated falsehood, and gave the impression of a man who needed not to correct himself, because he never went astray. No one could ever imagine either that Maximus looked down on him or that he was superior to Maximus. His wit, too, was bright, but inoffensive.

16 From the father that adopted me, let me learn to be gentle; to take no decision without careful investigation, but then to hold fast to the anchor of truth; not to be deluded into the pursuit of what men call honour,
but to labour and faint not; to lend a ready ear to all who may propound something to the common good; and to reward every man according to his deserts without fear or favour. He knew by experience when there was need of stringency, when of relaxation; he suppressed unnatural vice with a strong hand, and was ever considerate to others. For instance, his friends were left free to accept his invitations or not; there was no constraint on them to accompany him on his visits to the provinces, and those who had stayed behind through one cause or another found, on his return, no change in his feelings towards them. In council he was accurate and persevering in deliberation, nor would he desist from the quest of truth satisfied with plausible commonplaces. To his friends he was constant, neither admitting them with unreasoning effusion nor changing them with each passing whim. Self-reliant and cheerful in all things, he was far-sighted, and nothing was too small for his unostentatious forethought. In his time public and private adulation were alike repressed. He consistently husbanded the resources of his empire and cut down expenses, heedless of disapproval in some quarters. In religion he was free from superstition, in dealing with men he was no popularity-hunter with the democracy or panderer to the mob, but steady and sober in all things, never in bad taste, and no innovator.

The conveniences of life, of which fortune had been lavish to him, he used alike without ostentation and without apology; if they were present, he enjoyed them unaffectedly; if absent, he felt no need of them.
No one could possibly have described him as a sophist, a licensed jester, or a pedant; but, rather, as a man, ripe and finished, superior to the arts of flattery, and fit to manage either his own affairs or those of a people. In addition to this he held true philosophers in esteem; on the spurious sort he wasted no reproaches, but took good care they did not lead him into error. His conversation was familiar and gracious, but never to excess. He took reasonable care of his body, not that he was a great lover of life or cared much for personal adornment, though he did not go to the opposite extreme of neglect; the result being that his own attention enabled him, for the most part, to dispense with doctors and their drugs and plasters. Most worthy of imitation, also, was the unenvious manner in which he would give way to those who had any special faculty—for instance, for oratory, knowledge of law and custom, and the like—giving them his best help in securing the recognition due to their peculiar abilities. Though he observed the traditional institutions of the empire, he showed no affectation of so doing. He had a thorough dislike for chopping and changing, and preferred to stand by the old places and the old things. After suffering agonies through neuralgia, he would return fresh and vigorous to his usual employments. His secrets were few and far between, and the few he had were confined to matters of public policy. He showed prudence and moderation in the exhibition of public shows and the construction of public buildings, as well as in the distribution of state monies and the
like, looking only to what ought to be done, not to the ensuing popularity. He was not one of those who are at all hours using the baths, nor was he afflicted with the mania for building. No connoisseur of the table, he cared little for the texture or colour of his dress and less for the looks of his slaves. At Lorium he usually wore a toga made at one of his villas on the coast; a tunic, mostly, at Lanuvium; in Tusculum he added an overcoat, about which he was rather apologetic, and all his habits were of the same simplicity. There was nothing harsh or intractable or violent about him; he never rushed around as if the doctor had ordered him to get up a perspiration;—all seemed to have been reasoned out in detail, deliberately, coolly, methodically, vigorously, and consistently. What was said of Socrates was equally applicable to him, that he could with like ease refrain from and enjoy those pleasures in the indulgence of which, with most men, the flesh is strong enough, in abstinence, weak indeed; whereas to have the strength to bear the latter and maintain sobriety in the former needs a soul perfect and invincible, such as he displayed in the illness of Maximus.

Lastly, it was Heaven that gave me good grandparents, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, good connexions, relatives, and friends almost without exception, and that prevented me from thoughtlessly offending any one of these, though my nature was such that I might only too easily have done so, had not the divine kindness ordained that no train of events should occur to expose me, and decreed, withal, that I should
not long remain under the influence of my grandfather's mistress; that I should retain my youthful purity and chastity so long; that I should be placed under an imperial father who could purge me from all arrogance, and teach me that it is possible to live in a court and yet dispense with bodyguards, golden statues with torches in their hands, and all similar vanities; that a king may lower himself almost to the level of his subjects, and lose no whit of dignity or resolution in acting like a king when the common weal is at stake.

To Heaven it is due that I had a brother whose character could stir me to improve my own, and who comforted me with his respect and love; that the children born to me have been deformed in neither body nor mind; that I made but small progress in rhetoric, versifying and the kindred arts, in which I might perhaps have frittered away my time had I noticed that I was making rapid strides in them; that I gave my tutors the preferment I thought they desired, and did not abandon them to hope deferred on the ground that they were too young; that I have known Apollonius, Rusticus, and Maximus; that I have been able to contemplate clearly and often the character of the natural life, and so to see that on the side of the divine will, its dispensations, assistance, and inspiration, there is nothing to hinder me from even now living in harmony with Nature, but that my failure is due to my own imperfections and to my non-observance of the intimations—nay, I might say, the direct instructions—of Heaven; that my bodily health has held out so long under such condi-
tions; that I touched neither Benedicta nor Theodotus, but though once mastered by sensual passion was made whole again; that, often as I have been provoked by Rusticus, I have never had to repent of my treatment of him; that my mother, though fated to die young, yet spent her last years with me; that often as I have had to help the poor and otherwise needy, I have never had occasion to consider the question, 'Where is the money to come from?'; that it has never been my misfortune myself to need another's help; that I married a wife obedient, affectionate, and simple; that I have had no difficulty in procuring fitting tutors for my children; that oracular advice was given me in a dream at Caieta how to cure my giddiness and the spitting of blood†; and that, when all my thoughts were beginning to run on philosophy, I fell in with no sophist, never sat down to waste my time on the analysis of syllogisms, or the pursuit of natural speculations above my head.—For none of these things could have been but for divine assistance and a kindly destiny.

(Written among the Quadi on the Granua.)

II

EVERY morning repeat to thyself: I shall meet with a busybody, an ingrate, and a bully; with treachery, envy, and selfishness. All these vices have fallen to their share because they know not good and evil. But I have contemplated the nature of the good,
and seen that it is the beautiful; of evil, and seen that it is deformity; of the sinner, and seen that it is kindred to my own—kindred, not because he shares the same flesh and blood and is sprung from the same seed, but because he partakes of the same reason and the same spark of divinity. How then can any of these harm me? For none can involve me in the shameful save myself. Or how can I be angered with my kith and kin, or cherish hatred towards them?

For we are all created to work together, as the members of one body—feet, hands, and eyelids, or the upper and nether teeth. Whence, to work against each other is contrary to Nature;—but this is the very essence of anger and aversion.

This thing that I call 'myself' is compact of flesh, breath, and reason. 'Thou art even now in the throes of death; despise therefore the flesh. It is but a little blood, a few bones, a paltry net woven from nerves and veins and arteries. Consider next thy breath. What a trifle it is! A little air, and this for ever changing: every minute of every hour we are gasping it forth and sucking it in again!

Only reason is left us. Consider thus: Thou art stricken in years; then suffer it not to remain a bond-servant; suffer it not to be puppet-like, hurried hither and thither by impulses that take no thought of thy fellow man; suffer it not to murmur at destiny in the present or look askance at it in the future.

The works of God are full of providence; the works of Fortune are not independent of Nature, but inter-
twisted and intertwined with those directed by providence. Thence flow all things. Co-factors, too, are necessity and the common welfare of the whole universe whereof thou art part. Now whatever arises from the nature of the whole, and tends to its well-being, is good also for every part of that nature. But the well-being of the universe depends on change, not merely of the elementary, but also of the compound. Let these dogmas suffice thee, if dogmas thou must have; but put off that thirst for books, and see thou die of good cheer, not with murmurs on thy lips, but blessing God truthfully and with all thy heart.

Bethink thee how long thou hast delayed to do these things; how many days of grace Heaven hath vouchsafed thee and thou neglected. Now is the time to learn at last what is the nature of the universe whereof thou art part; what of the power that governs the universe, whereof thou art an emanation. Forget not there is a boundary set to thy time, and that if thou use it not to uncloud thy soul it will anon be gone, and thou with it, never to return again.

Let it be thy hourly care to do stoutly what thy hand findeth to do, as becomes a man and a Roman, with carefulness, unaffected dignity, humanity, freedom, and justice. Free thyself from the obsession of all other thoughts; for free thyself thou wilt, if thou but perform every action as though it were the last of thy life, without light-mindedness, without swerving through force of passion from the dictates of reason, without hypocrisy, without self-love, without chafing at destiny.
Thou seest how few things are needful for man to live a happy and godlike life: for, if he observe these, Heaven will demand no more.

6  Abase thee, abase thee, O my soul! The time is past for exalting thyself. Man hath but a single life; and this thou hast wellnigh spent, reverencing not thyself, but dreaming thy happiness is situate in the souls of others!

7  Why suffer the incidence of things external to distract thee? Make for thyself leisure to learn something new of good, and cease this endless round.—And here beware lest the wheel only reverse its motion. For fools, too, are they who have worn out their lives in action, yet never set before themselves a goal to which they could direct every impulse—nay, every thought.

8  Thou mayest search, but wilt hardly find a man made wretched through failing to read another's soul; whereas he who fails to ponder the motions of his own must needs be wretched.

9  Let me ever be mindful what is the Nature of the universe, and what my own; how the latter is related to the former, and what part it is of what whole.—And forget not that there is none that can forbid thee to be ever, in deed and word, in harmony with the Nature whereof thou art part.

10  Theophrastus spoke with the voice of true philosophy, when he said in his comparison of the vices—though that comparison, in itself, is popular rather than scientific—that the sins of desire are less venial than
the sins of anger. For a man in anger seems to turn his back on reason through pain and a sort of unconscious spasm of the mind; while he who sins through desire—that is, because he is too weak to withstand pleasure—would appear to be grosser and more effeminate in his vice.

Hence he considered, justly and philosophically enough, that the sins of pleasure are more reprehensible than the sins of pain. For, on the whole, if you take the two sinners, the one will be found to have been driven to anger through injuries previously sustained; while the other has set out deliberately to do wrong, and been swept along by the current of his own appetites.

Let thy every action, word, and thought be that of one who is prepared at any moment to quit this life. For, if God exist, to depart from the fellowship of man has no terrors,—for the divine nature is incapable of involving thee in evil. But if He exist not, or, existing, reck not of mankind, what profits it to linger in a godless, soul-less universe? But God is, and cares for us and ours. For He has put it wholly in man’s power to ensure that he fall not into aught that is evil indeed; and if in the rest of things there had been anything of evil, this too would He have foreseen and enabled us all to avoid.

But how can that which makes not man evil make man’s life evil? Universal Nature could not have thus sinned by omission: it is omniscient, and, being omniscient, omnipotent to foresee and correct all errors; nor
would it have gone so far astray, whether through lack of power or lack of skill, as to allow good and evil to befall the evil and good alike without rhyme or reason.

Rather, life and death, fame and infamy, pain and pleasure, wealth and poverty fall to the lot of both just and unjust because they are neither fair nor foul—neither good nor evil.

12 How speedily change and decay invade all things! In the universe our corporeal substance perishes; in time, its very memory. Look at the things of sense in general: in particular, the allurements of pleasure, the terrors of pain, and all the themes of vanity. Tawdry and despicable, sordid and corruptible, dead and festering are they all!—These are subjects for the intellect to ponder.—And let it ask what are they on whose plaudits and whose fancies fame depends. Let it ask what is death, and reflect that if one look solely to its nature and analyse the idea in itself, plucking off the stage-terrors in which our imagination arrays it, it will be seen to be naught but a function of Nature—and this who but a child would fear? Nay, it is not only a function of Nature but an essential to her well-being.—And let the same reason consider also, how and by what part of himself man can lay hold of God, and under what conditions that part will act for the best.

13 There is no more wretched creature than the man who is ever revolving in a circle, searching, as Pindar says, 'the things of the nether realms'; ever striving to read the riddle of another's soul, ever too blind to see that it is enough to observe the godhead within him
and devote himself loyally to its service. And this service is to preserve it untainted by passion, light-mindedness, or repinings at the works of God or man. For the decisions of Heaven virtue bids us reverence; the deeds of men are the deeds of our kin, and as such we must love them, or, at times, perchance, pity, in that they know not the better and the worse—a blindness blacker than that which renders darkness and light alike to us.

Though the years of thy life should be fixed at three thousand, with three thousand myriads more, remember that no man loses another life than the one he is living, or lives another than that he loses. Thus the longest span is equivalent to the shortest. The present belongs to all in equal measure, so that, when it is lost, the loss, too, must be the same to all. That is to say, through death we lose an infinitesimal portion of time; for we can no more lose the past and the future than be robbed of what we have not.

There are two things, then, which it behoves us to keep in mind: first, that all things from time everlasting have been alike and continue to revolve in the same orbit, so that it matters little whether a man behold the same sights for one century, or two, or through endless aeons: second, that he who dies in the fullness of years and he who is cut down in his youth are losers in like degree. It is the present alone that death tears from us, for the present is all that we have—in other words, all that we can lose.

Remember that all is opinion. The saying of Moni-
Book II

mus the Cynic is evident enough—as evident as its usefulness, if we accept his jocose remark only so far as it is corroborated by truth.

16 The soul of man may debase itself in many ways, but worst of all when it degenerates, as far as in it lies, into a sort of tumour, an alien excretion on the universe. For to repine at aught that is, is a canker alien to that universal nature, in part of which are comprehended all other natures. Again, it debases itself whenever it conceives aversion for any man, or opposes him with purpose of harm; of which type are the souls of those who are possessed by anger. Thirdly, whenever it is overcome by pleasure or pain. Fourthly, when it plays the hypocrite, and is false or feigned in word or deed. Fifthly, whenever it directs an energy or an impulse of itself to no certain mark, but works at random and knows not what it does; whereas, in the least of its actions, it is its duty to look towards the end. And the end of all that has life and reason is to conform to the laws of reason that obtain in the oldest of all bodies politic, the universe.

17 The measure of man’s life is a point, substance a perpetual ebb and flow, sense-perception vague and shadowy, the fabric of his whole body corruptible, the soul past searching out, fortune a whirligig, and fame the decision of unreason. In brief, the things of the body are unstable as water; the things of the soul dreams and vapours; life itself a warfare or a sojourning in a strange land. What then shall be our guide and escort? One thing, and one only—Philosophy.
And true Philosophy is to observe the celestial part within us, to keep it inviolate and unscathed, above the power of pain and pleasure, doing nothing at hazard, nothing with falsehood, and nothing with hypocrisy; careless whether another do this or that, or no; accepting every vicissitude and every dispensation as coming from that place which was its own home; and at all times awaiting death with cheerfulness, in the sure knowledge that it is but a dissolution of the elements whereof every life is compound. For if to the elements themselves there is no disaster in that they are forever changing each to other, how shall we fear the change and dissolution of all? It is in harmony with Nature, and naught that is evil can be in harmony with Nature.

III

It suffices not to remember that every day wears away part of our life and subtracts so much from the sum; it behoves us to reflect, as well, that, should our existence continue, it is all uncertain whether the intellect will retain its power of comprehension, in general, and of that speculation, in particular, which strives after knowledge of the human and divine. Suppose a man fall into the dotage of old age, the breath will not quit his body, the powers of sustenance, imagination, impulse, and the like will not fail him, but the faculty of making use of himself, of filling in every detail of his duty, of analysing appearances, and resolv-
ing the great problem whether or no the time has come to put an end to life, together with all the other points that need the close attention of a practised intellect—this faculty has long since been extinguished.

Let us therefore gird up our loins, not merely because every instant we draw a stage nearer death, but because the cessation of our intellectual and reasoning powers looms still closer.

2 It is worthy, also, of observation that even the by-products of Nature's works exercise a seductive charm of their own. For instance, in the baking of a loaf, a few pieces will often be broken off the crust, thus leaving a sort of gap which, so to say, sins against the canons of the art. Yet these same gaps possess a curious attractiveness and, strangely enough, tempt the appetite. The same is the case with figs, when they are perfectly matured and begin to part in the middle; just as in a ripe olive the very imminence of decay lends a mysterious beauty to the fruit.

So too the ears of corn bending towards their mother-earth, the shaggy eyebrows of the lion, the foam dripping from the jaws of the boar, and objects innumerable of the same type, considered by themselves, are far enough removed from beauty, but being sequels to the operations of Nature serve to deck her out and gladden the heart of the onlooker.

Thus, a man who can feel and think deeply on the phenomena of Nature will find nothing, or next to nothing, in her train of attendants, but what is calculated to awaken pleasure by its presence. Such a man
will view the yawning jaws of lions in the flesh with no less admiration than when transferred to canvass or marble; he will find beauty in the ripeness of old age, whether of man or woman; and behold the loveliness of his youthful slaves with pure and passionless gaze. Nay, many more things will he see whose charms are hid from the non-elect, and revealed to him alone who is wedded to Nature and all her works.

Hippocrates healed the diseases of many, then failed to heal his own and passed away. The Chaldaeans foretold many a man's death, then destiny overtook themselves. Alexander, Pompey, and Caesar razed many cities to the dust, and on many a stricken field slew their tens of thousands, horse and foot, but at last they too went their way. Heraclitus, who discoursed so sagely, and so oft, on the world-conflagration, filled with water, covered himself with dung, and died. Vermin ate Democritus: vermin of another kind took off Socrates.—What is the moral? Thou hast taken thy passage, made thy crossing, come to port: 'tis time to disembark. If thy haven be another life, all is well; for there too God will be. If it be oblivion, again it is well; for thou shalt cast off the burdens of pleasure and pain, and shalt be freed from thy bondage to this earthly vessel, this master who is so far the inferior of his slave—for the servant is reason and divinity; his lord, clay and corruption.

Wear not out what life may still be left thee in taking thought of others, save only when thy goal is the common good. For why neglect thy proper duty in mar-
velling what this man is doing, and why; what he is saying, thinking, and devising; and in all the vain imaginings that divert us from the observation of the guiding principle within. Rather, thy duty is to shun all that is idle and vain in the series of thy thoughts, and, chief of all, curiosity and malignity, and to train thyself till every thought be such that, were a man suddenly to ask 'What thinkest thou?', thou couldst answer, without delay and without concealment, 'This or that,' and make it sun-clear that all in thee is simplicity and kindliness, as befits a member of the community of living creatures—one who cares not for thought of pleasure or the life of enjoyment in general, who has no part in contentiousness, envy, or suspicion, or aught else that might raise a blush, wert thou to confess thou harbouredst it in thy soul.

For such a man, who never postpones his struggle to reach the highest, is a priest and servant of the gods, and he uses well the divinity within, that preserves man unsullied by pleasure; unwearied by pain; untouched by insolence; insensible of evil; a wrestler in the greatest contest of all, never to be overthrown by passion; deep-dyed in justice; welcoming with all his heart every dispensation; and never, save under great constraint and for the sake of the common welfare, heeding word, deed, or thought in others. For he is intent on performing his own task, and is ever mindful of the lot assigned him out of the sum of things: and the things of himself he makes perfect, the things of destiny he is persuaded are good. For the fate assigned
to every man is brought into the world with him and conduces to the whole.

He remembers, too, that all rational life is akin and that, while it is a law of man’s being to care for all mankind, his duty is to heed the opinion, not of all men, but of such only as live in harmony with Nature. Nor does he ever forget the character of those who live not thus; their doings at home and abroad; by night and by day; and the associates with whom they wallow, like by like; and with this in his mind he wastes no thought on the praises of men who cannot satisfy even themselves.

Let thy actions be neither involuntary nor selfish, nor unreflecting nor reluctant. Strive not to embellish thy thoughts with elegance of diction, but be plain-spoken and plain-dealing. See that the godhead within thee have the guardianship of a manly man, stricken in years, a statesman, a Roman, and a king—one who has taken his post like a soldier who awaits the bugle that shall sound his recall in all readiness to obey, requiring no oath and no man’s testimony. More than this, be of cheerful countenance, and let thy mind require no service from without, and stand in no need of the peace that lies in the gift of others. In a word, be right, not set to right.

If thou find aught in the life of man more excellent than truth, justice, temperance, and manliness—in short, than a mind at peace with itself in the sphere wherein it enables thee to act in accordance with the dictates of right reason, and at peace with destiny in the
lot she assigns thee without thy choice—if, I say, thou canst behold aught more excellent than this, turn to it with all thy soul and enjoy the highest to the utmost.

But if there appear naught better than the godhead within thy breast, that has gained the empire over all thy impulses; that scrutinizes every impression; that has weaned itself, in Socrates' words, from every affection of the senses; given in its allegiance to heaven, and assumed the care of mankind—if all else prove small and low beside this, then give place to nothing, towards which if thou once swerve and fall away, it will no longer be thine to pay an undistracted homage to that good which is thine, and thine alone. For God forbid that aught of alien nature, be it the praise of the many, office, wealth, or sensual pleasure, should sit in leaguer against the rational and civic Good! For all these, though for a while they may seem to adapt themselves to the better, yet, the next moment, overmaster us and we are swept away with the current. But do thou choose the better part whole-heartedly and freely, and hold fast to it.—'But the better part is the advantageous,' says one.—Then if it work for the good of thy rational self grasp it firmly, but if it aim to advantage thy animal nature reject it, and hold to thy decision without arrogance, taking heed only that thy verdict be based on sure proof.

Never set a value on anything, through thought it shall advantage thee, if it will compel thee to betray thy trust, to desert thy self-respect, to cherish hatred or suspicion, to call down curses, to play the hypocrite, or
to lust after aught that covets the privacy of wall and
curtain. For the man who has chosen before all to
serve his reason, and the God that dwells within him, is
no tragic mime; he heaves no sighs, seeks no isolation,
and craves no companion-crowd. Chief of all, he will
live his life neither pursuing death nor fleeing from it.
For what imports it to him whether his soul shall be
imprisoned in his body for a longer or shorter term?
Should it be his doom to pass away on the instant he
will depart with alacrity, as one who has but another
task set before him that may be performed decently and
becomingly, his only care throughout life being to allow
his mind to stray into naught that is alien to a rational
being and a member of the great communion.

In the mind of a man who has been chastened and
purified, thou wilt find no festering wounds, no unclea-
ness, no treacherous sores. Destiny will not overtake
him with his life incomplete, as an actor who quits the
stage before his rôle is done and the piece played out.
In such a man, moreover, there is nothing servile and
nothing affected: he is neither bound up with others
nor altogether divorced from them; nor in his conduct
is there aught that need fear scrutiny or hide itself from
the light of day.

Reverence the faculty which governs opinion. In
this is situate absolute power to refuse admittance into
the guiding faculty of reason to any opinion that is in
discord with the nature or the constitution of a rational
being; and in its gift is caution in judgement, intimacy
with man, and obedience to heaven.
Then cast from thee all things else, and hold fast to these few. And remember that no one lives more than this infinitesimal point of time, the present: the rest of his days are either lived out or hidden from him. Thus the life of man is a little thing; and a little thing is the corner of earth that is his home; and a little thing is the most enduring renown. For it passes from mouth to mouth, from one poor mortal to another, all of whom are racing towards death, and none of whom know themselves—far less one who died in a far-off day.

To the foregoing canons let one more be added: always form a definition or rough sketch of whatever presents itself to the mind; strip it naked and look at its essential nature, contemplating the whole through its separate parts, and these parts in their entirety; and repeat mentally the proper name of the whole, and the several names of the parts of which that whole is compound, and into which it must later be dissolved. For there is nothing that tends so much to produce greatness of mind as a methodical and conscientious investigation of the objects that fall under our notice in life, in conjunction with the habit of regarding them in such a light as will, at the same time, illustrate the function of each in the universe, and the nature of that universe; its value in relation to the sum of things, and to man as a citizen of that highest state wherein all others are, so to say, families;—such a light as will make it clear what this object which is, at this time, producing this impression in my mind really is; what are its component parts; what its natural duration, and what the virtue
it challenges—meekness, courage, truthfulness, faithfulness, simplicity, self-sufficiency, or the like.

So, as each occasion arises, a man should have his verdict ready: 'This comes from God': 'This is a dispensation assigned me by the twisting and twining threads of destiny, or her kindred, coincidence and chance': 'This, again, comes from a fellow-countryman, a kinsman, and a partner of mine, though he knows not what is consonant with his nature. But I know; and for this reason treat him with kindness and justice, in conformity with the law of community sanctioned by Nature; striving at the same time, however, to ascertain the relative merits of the things indifferent.'

If thou do the work set before thee, following in the steps of right reason zealously, strenuously, and cheerfully, distracted by no side issues, but preserving the divine part of thee erect and unsullied, as a loan that may have to be returned at a moment's notice—if thou adhere to this, awaiting nothing else and fearing nothing, but content with the natural activity which is thine now, and with the fair tide of truth in every speech and every word, then will thy days be happy; nor lives there any man that can impede this consummation.

As physicians have ever their instruments and scalpels at hand to deal with any sudden case, so do thou keep the principles of Philosophy in readiness that thou mayest distinguish the human and the divine, and perform every action, to the very smallest, as one who remembers the ties that unite the two. For thou canst do naught well in thy dealings with man, if thou make
not reference to the things of God. And the converse of this maxim is equally true.

14 Stray no further. Thou wilt never read those commentaries of thine, those tales of old-time Greece and Rome, that anthology thou wast-reserving for old age. Then hasten to the goal; fling aside these empty hopes, and, if thou carest for thee and thine, succour thyself before it be too late.

15 Men know not how varied are the meanings of the words 'stealing,' 'sowing,' 'buying,' 'resting,' far less of the injunction 'to look what ought to be done'; for this is seen not by the eyes, but by a far other vision!

16 There are three things: body, soul, and mind. Of the body is sensation; of the soul, impulse; of the mind, principles. To receive inward impressions of external things is given even to the beasts of the field: to respond to the strings of impulse is a power common to the brute creation, to those who have made themselves neither man nor woman, to a Phalaris or a Nero, to the atheist and the traitor, and to the wretches who deem no act too gross when once they have closed their doors. If then all else is common to the creatures we have mentioned, there is but one thing left that is the peculiar property of the good man: to follow the guidance of his intellect towards the things he sees to be his duty, to welcome with pleasure all that fate has interwoven with his life, to defile not the godhead implanted in his breast nor break into its calm with a rabble of impressions, but to preserve it tranquil, following the
divine will in decency, and sinning not in word or deed against truth and justice.

Such a man, though all should mistrust him and sneer at his claim to live a simple, modest, and cheerful life, displays no anger at any of these, nor swerves a jot from the path that leads to life's end,—that end which it behoves him to reach in purity, calmness, and readiness to depart, and with unforced acquiescence in his destiny.

IV

WHEN the governing part within us is in harmony with Nature it stands in such a relation to the course of events as enables it to adapt itself with ease to the possibilities allowed it. For it requires no specific material to work in, but its efforts to attain its purpose are conditional, and when it encounters an obstacle in lieu of what it sought it converts this into material for itself, much as a fire lays hold of the objects that fall into it. These would have sufficed to extinguish a flickering lamp, but the blazing fire in a moment appropriates the fuel heaped on it, and uses it as a means whereby to mount higher and higher.

Do not act at random or otherwise than is prescribed by the exact canons of the art of living.

Men are continually seeking retreats for themselves, in the country, or by the sea, or among the hills. And thou thyself art wont to yearn after the like.—Yet all this is the sheerest folly, for it is open to thee every hour.
to retire into thyself. And where can man find a calmer, more restful haven than in his own soul? Most of all he whose inner state is so ordered that he has only to penetrate thither to find himself in the midst of a great peace—a peace that, to my mind, is synonymous with orderliness.

Therefore betake thee freely to this city of refuge, there to be made new. And cherish within thee a few brief and fundamental principles, such as will suffice, so soon as they recur to thee, to wash away all pain and bid thee depart in peace, repining not at the things whereunto thou returnest.—For what is it that vexes thee?—The evil of man's heart?—Call to mind the doctrine that all rational beings exist for the sake each of other, that to bear and forbear is part of justice, and that men's sins are not sins of will. Reflect how many before thee have lived in enmity, suspicion, hatred, and strife, and then been laid out and reduced to ashes.—Think of this and be at rest.—But, perchance, it is the lot assigned thee from the sum of things that troubles thee.—Then recall the dilemma—'Either Providence or atomic theory,' and all the proofs that went to show that the universe is a constitutional state.—Maybe, the ills of the flesh will prick thee somewhat.—Then remember that the mind, when once it has withdrawn itself to itself and realized its own power, has neither part nor lot with the soft and pleasant, or harsh and painful, motions of thy breath; and ponder again the doctrines of pain and pleasure to which thou hast hearkened and assented.—Or, again, thy little meed of
glory may cause thee a twinge.—Then look and see how speedily all things fall into oblivion; what a great gulf of infinite time yawns behind thee and before; how empty are the plaudits of men; how fickle and unreasoning are they who feign to praise thee, and within what narrow boundaries that praise is circumscribed. For the whole earth is but a point; and what a fraction of the whole is this corner where we dwell! Nay, how few even here—and they how insignificant!—will be thy panegyrists.

So much is left thee: forget not to retreat into this little plot of thyself. Above all, let nothing distract thee. Do not strain and struggle, but maintain thy freedom and look things in the face as befits a man and a male, a member of the state, and a mortal creature. And, among the principles which are ever most ready to hand for thee to turn to, let these two find a place: first, that things in themselves have no point of contact with the soul, but are stationed motionless without, while all unrest proceeds solely from the opinion within; second, that all the objects thou now beholdest will anon change and be no more. Think, and think often, how many changes thine own eyes have witnessed, and know that the universe is mutation, and life opinion.

If the intellectual part of us is common to all, so is the reason which gives us our status as rational beings. Granted this, the reason which bids us do or not do must needs be common also. Hence it follows that there is one law; and if the law be one, we are all fellow-
subjects, and, as such, members of one body-politic: that is, the universe is a species of state.—For what other conceivable political community is there, of which the whole human race can be said to be citizens?—And from this city of the universe must proceed those very faculties of intellect and reason, with our conception of law. There is no other possible source; but precisely as the earthly part of myself has been assigned me from some universal earth, and the fluid from the contrary element, while breath, warmth, and heat must each have had their proper fount, in virtue of the axiom that nothing can come from nothing any more than it can return from nothing,—so too must the intellect have had its definite origin.

5 Death is akin to birth in that both are mysteries of nature: in the one there is composition; in the other, decomposition: in both the antecedent and resultant elements are the same.—At all events, it is not a thing to be ashamed of, for in it there is nothing save what is consonant with the nature of rational life, and nothing that is repugnant to the laws of our being.

6 It is a matter of nature and necessity for men of this type to act as they do.—And, in general, remember the truth that, in a little while, both thou and he will be no more; and yet, a little while, and not so much as your names will be left.

7 Take away opinion, and where is the plaint 'I have been harmed'? Take away this plaint, and where is the harm?

8 That which renders not man worse than himself
cannot render his life worse, or work him evil, whether from within or from without.

The nature that determines the universally advantageous has perforce done this thing.

Remember that all that befalls man befalls him justly. Observe this precept with diligence and thou wilt discover its truth, and know that all things happen, not merely by necessary sequence, but in accordance with justice,—dispensations, as it were, of a power rewarding us as we have merited.

Observe it, then, as thou hast begun, and, whatever thou doest, do it with the goodness that is the essential part of our conception of the good man; and in every action hold fast to this principle.

Let not thy thoughts be those of him who wrongs thee, nor such as he would have thee think, but look on things as they are in reality.

It is our duty to have these two principles of action ever in readiness: one, to do nothing but what is dictated on behalf of the common good by the ruling and legislative faculty; the other, to be prepared to change our ground if there be found some one who can correct an opinion of ours or point the way to a better. But this transition must arise from a conviction of its justice or of its conducing to the general welfare. Only these or similar motives should be admitted—not any consideration of pleasure or glory.

Hast thou reason?—I have.—Then why not use it? For, with this doing its work, what more wilt thou have?

Thou camest into the universe as a part of a whole:
thou wilt vanish into that which bare thee; or, rather, thou wilt be transmuted and received afresh into its generative principle.

15 There are many grains of incense sprinkled on the same altar. One falls an instant before the other; but what imports it?

16 Within ten days they who now look on thee as a species of wild beast or ape, will hail thee as a god, if thou return to thy philosophy and the worship of reason.

17 Act not as though the years of thy life were ten thousand. Destiny hangs over thy head. While life is thine become good, ere it be too late.

18 What infinite vexation is spared the man who looks not to what his neighbour has said, done, or thought, but only to his own deeds, that they be just and holy!

†For it behoves the good man to cast no curious glance on the character of others †, but to run his race straight towards the goal, looking neither to right nor left.

19 The man whose hopes flutter round future fame fails to see that the depositaries of his memory will soon be dead, each and all, speedily to be followed by their successors in the heritage, till at last every spark of that recollection, transmitted through foolish ambition, brief remembrance, and speedy extinction, shall have died out in darkness.

But admit that memory and rememberer are alike immortal: what is this to thee? I ask not what it is to the dead; but what is fame to the living? †It may have a certain value as means to an end; but is it
seasonable for a man to neglect the gifts Nature has
given him, to hang on the words of another? +

Every form of the beautiful contains the beginning and the end of its beauty in itself, nor has praise any
part in it whatsoever. Accordingly, nothing changes
whether for better or worse through praise. And this,
I take it, holds good even in the case of the vulgar con-
ceptions of beauty; for instance, material objects and
works of art. Shall we then say that the one true beauty
stands in need of applause? Nay, no more than law
and truth, than kindliness and modesty. Which of
these is beautified by praise or deformed by blame?
Does an emerald lose its value unless we go into rap-
tures over it? Does gold, ivory, or purple? a sword,
a blossom, or a shrub?

If the soul continues to exist, how comes it that the
air from time eternal has space for them all?—As well
ask: How does earth, for age after age, find room for
her dead? The truth is, that just as here below our
bodies endure for a time and are then transmuted and
dissolved, and make room for the other dead, so the
souls that have passed into the air subsist awhile, then
change, and fuse, and turn to flame, and are caught up
once more into the generative power of the universe, so
that the new-comers find an abiding-place.

Such would be our answer on the hypothesis that the
soul preserves her existence. It is not enough, how-
ever, simply to consider the multitude of corpses thus
buried: we must take into account the animals de-
voured every day by man and beast. What numbers
are consumed, and find a tomb of sorts in the bodies they serve to feed! Yet space suffices for them all; for nature assimilates them to our blood or transmutes them into the elements of air and fire.

Where then are we to seek for the truth of the matter? In analysis of everything into the material and the formal.

22 Stray not thus aimlessly; but in every impulse take account of justice, and in every impression preserve the activity of thy understanding.

23 All that is best for thee, O Universe, is best also for me. Nothing, that comes in thy good time, to me comes early or late. To me, O Nature, all that thy seasons bear is fruit. From thee come all things, in thee they abide, and to thee they return.

The poet cries 'O city of Cecrops, land beloved'; and canst thou not say 'O city of God, O land of love!'

24 'Do little and be happy', quoth the sage.—But is it not better to do the things that are needful, whatsoever and howsoever the laws of our being, as living creatures and by nature members of one community, prescribe? For this resolve brings with it not merely the happiness of well-doing, but that of little-doing. For the vast majority of our deeds and words are aught but necessary. Eliminate these, and how much toil and trouble will vanish with them!

Hence, on every occasion, let us ask ourselves, 'Is this one of the needless things?' remembering, at the same time, that it is not enough to eliminate the idle
in action, but that we must purge our thoughts as thoroughly: for so only can we prevent the motiveless in deed from following in their train.

Make trial whether thou canst walk in the steps of a good man; one who accepts with cheerfulness his lot in the sum of things, and deems it bliss enough if his own deeds be just and his nature kindly.

Hast thou seen to all these things? Then look to this. Disquiet not thyself: become simple.—Does a man sin?—He sins to himself.—Hath aught befallen thee?—It is well: all that falls to thy lot was fore-ordained thee from the first and interwoven with thy destiny.—In a word, life is short: profit by the present in justice and reason; and be temperate in thy hours of ease.

Either the universe is an ordered whole or a chaos, confused it may be, but still a whole.—Or thinkest thou that order can reign in the little world within thee, and disorder in the great world without? And this when all things, separate and diffused though they be, are still united in a common sympathy!

Character black, effeminate, stubborn, bestial, puerile, and brutish; doltish, counterfeit, ribald, knavish, and tyrannical!

If that man is a stranger in the universe who knows not what is in it, no less stranger is he who knows not what takes place therein. He who flees from the law of community is a renegade. He whose mind's eye slumbers is blind indeed. He who has not within him all that is needful for life, but craves the help of another,
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is a veritable pauper. He who divorces and sunders himself from the laws of universal Nature, because, forsooth, the course of things pleases him not, is an excretion on the universe. For the same Nature that produces this or that produced thee too. Lastly, he who tears out his own soul from the one universal soul of all rational life makes himself a splinter from the state.

30 One man may have no cloak; another, not a book in the world; yet both be philosophers. And here is a third that goes half naked, and still he says: 'Bread I have none, yet I hold fast to reason!'.

31 Love the art thou hast learned, and rest therein: and complete thy pilgrimage through life as one who has whole-heartedly entrusted all things to heaven—one who would not be a tyrant over his fellow-man and will not be a slave.

32 Call to mind, say, the times of Vespasian. It is the same old spectacle—marriage and child-bearing, disease and death, war and revelry, commerce and agriculture, toadyism and obstinacy; one man praying that heaven may be pleased to take so-and-so, another grumbling at his lot, another in love or laying up treasure, others, again, lusting after consulships and kingdoms.

All these have lived their life, and their place knows them no more. So pass on to the reign of Trajan. All again is the same, and that life, too, is no more.

Similarly contemplate all the other great eras of time and nations, and note how many after some supreme effort fell and were resolved into their elements.—Chief of all, recall to mind the multitudes thine own eyes have
seen dragged hither and thither in vain emprizes, all because they refused to do the work they were formed to do, to hold fast to this, and rest content.—And here it is needful to remember that a law of value and proportion sanctions the amount of attention to be bestowed on every action. For so it will cause thee no qualm, shouldst thou treat the things of lesser moment with no more seriousness than they deserve.

The everyday words of an earlier generation need a glossary now, and similarly the famous names of old—Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, and Leonnatus—ring strange to a modern ear. Scipio and Cato will soon follow, and in a little while Hadrian and Antoninus will share the same fate. So quickly does human glory fade into the legendary; so quickly is it merged in absolute oblivion.

These instances of mine have been men to whom circumstances have lent a sort of meteoric splendour; as for the rest, let the breath but quit their body and they vanish 'unhonoured and unsung'. And what is this 'undying fame' at the best? A vanity of vanities.

What then is left towards which a man is justified in bending all his energies? Only this; a mind attuned to justice, action devoted to the good of the community, a tongue that knows not falsehood, and a disposition that hails every turn of fortune as necessary, as foreknown, and as proceeding from the same first cause and flowing from the same fount.

Submit thee to Fate of thine own free will, that she spin the threads of thy life to whatever end it please her.
35 All is ephemeral, the remembering alike with the remembered.
36 Ever reflect that the existent exists solely in virtue of change; and let the thought be familiar to thee, that there is nothing so dear to the universal Nature as to change the old order of things and make new like to them. For all that is may be regarded as the seed of that which shall come after it; though to thy mind there is no seed save that which fructifies the earth or the womb,—a popular philosophy in all truth!
37 Death is hard upon thee;—and thou as far removed as ever from simplicity, quietude, and peace with all men; still suspecting harm from things without thee, still unable to see that the only wisdom is to do the right!
38 Look into the governing principles of men, even the wisest, and see what manner of things they pursue and avoid!
39 The root of what is to thee evil is not situate in the mind of another, nor yet in the changes and vicissitudes of thy fleshly dwelling.—Where then?—Simply in whatever part of thee lies the faculty which pronounces this or that an evil. Let this court, then, suspend its verdict, and all will be well. Though its nearest neighbour, this poor body of thine, should be cut and cauterized, should fester and decay, still let the power that passes judgement on these hold its peace; in other words let its verdict be, that nothing can be either good or evil which is calculated to befall the evil and good alike.
For whatever indiscriminately falls to the lot of the man who lives in harmony with Nature and the man who lives in discord with her, is neither for Nature nor against her.

Let this thought be ever present to thee: that the universe is a single life comprising one substance and one soul. Observe how all things have reference to this one universal perception, all acting with a single impulse, all co-factors in the creation of all that is, and all threads indissolubly united in one web.

Thou art, as Epictetus said, a little soul burdened with a corpse.

It is no more an evil to suffer change than a good to come into existence through change.

Time is a rushing torrent, a stream fed by life and its changes. One thing swims into sight and is swept away, another comes fleeting past, and a third will anon be here to take its place.

All that can happen is as natural and trite as the roses in spring or the fruits of autumn. In this category fall disease and death, evil-speaking and double-dealing,—in a word, all the joys and sorrows of the fool.

In the chain of events, what follows is always a natural sequel to what preceded. Life is not an irrational arithmetical series with one term independent of the other and no principle save necessary sequence, but a reasoned progression; and precisely as all that is ordered harmoniously, so all that comes into being is signalized, not by bare succession, but by a marvellous unity of purpose.
Ever remember that, as Heraclitus said, the death of earth is the birth of water and the death of water the birth of air, while the same holds true of air and fire, and conversely. Remember too the plight of him who cannot recall whither his way leads, and reflect that man is forever falling out with what is closest to him all life through—the reason that governs the universe; while the phenomena that meet his eyes each and every day still seem to him strange and unfamiliar. Be-think thee, our part is not to imitate the dreamers who in their sleep still seem, in a sense, to act and speak, but to be awake in word and deed;—† no children, at every instant in need of their parents; but men, untram-melled by tradition and self-reliant.†

Were some god to speak to thee: 'To-morrow thou shalt die, or at most on the third day'; this respite of a day would seem a thing of naught, did a spark of nobility redeem thee.—For what a difference!—Then deem it no great matter whether thy end shall come after untold years, or with the morrow's dawn.

Bethink thee, time and again, how many leeches that bent their solemn brows on patients innumerable have followed them to death; how many astrologers that magnanimously foretold the end of others; how many sages that discussed at portentous length mortality and immortality; how many captains that slew their thousands; how many tyrants that breathed terror and insolence and metered out life and death, as though exempt from the common lot! Nay, how many entire cities have, so to say, given up the ghost—Helice,
Pompeii, Herculaneum, with untold others! Add to the tale all thou thyself hast known, one by one. This man closed his neighbour's eyes, was himself laid low, and another paid him the selfsame tribute—and all within how brief a space! In a word, scan the things of life and know that they are ephemeral and worthless; yesterday an embryo, to-morrow a mummy or a little dust.

 Traverse therefore this little moment of time at peace with Nature, and reach thy journey's end in all content, as an olive that ripens and falls, blessing the Nature that bare it and giving thanks to the tree whereon it grew.

 Be as a cliff at whose foot the billows break, and break again; but it stands firm, and by-and-by the seething waters about it sink to rest.

 'Woe is me, that I should have lived to see this day!' Nay, say rather, 'Happy am I, that under this stroke I remain of good cheer, uncrushed by the present and unappalled by the future!'—For such a blow might have fallen on any man, but how few could have sustained it with equanimity! Why then count the one a disaster rather than hail the other as a blessing? Wilt thou say that human misfortune can consist in aught save deviation from man's nature? Or thinkest thou that what is in accord with Nature's will can be a deviation from that selfsame Nature? What then? Thou hast but learned what her will is. And can this mischance rob thee of justice, high-mindedness, temperance, good sense, caution, truthfulness, decency, free-
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don, and all the rest whose presence it is that enables
this nature of man's to come by her own?

In conclusion, then, remember, if aught chance which
tends to drive thee into grief, to apply this principle:
'This thing is no misfortune, but the ability to bear it
with fortitude is a blessing indeed.'

50 A somewhat unphilosophical, but still efficacious,
help towards contempt of death, is to review those who
have clung most tenaciously to life. What has it prof-
ited them more than those who were cut down before
their prime? Somewhere or other they all lie in dark-
ness—Caecilianus, Fabius, Julian, Lepidus, with all
their ilk, who carried forth many to their graves, only to
be at last carried forth themselves.

In sum, the difference in time is small; and look
how it must be spent! What an infinity of trouble;
what scurvy companions; how frail a body must we
expect! So think not life a treasure to be lost with
tears, but look to the abyss of time behind thee and the
unbroken tract ahead, and ask: In this what differs
three days or thrice the years of the Gerenian sage?

51 Make for the shortest path, which is that of Nature;
in other words, healthiness in every speech and action.
For a man with this purpose in life is freed from all
loitering and vexation, all thought of ways and means,
and all affectation.
IN the morning, when thou risest sore against thy will, summon up this thought: 'I am rising to do the work of a man. Why then this peevishness, if the way lies open to perform the tasks which I exist to perform, and for whose sake I was brought into the world? Or am I to say I was created for the purpose of lying in blankets and keeping myself warm?'—'At all events, that is the more pleasant theory.'—'So the goal of thy existence is pleasure, and, generally, passivity rather than activity? Look at the tiny plants and birds, at the ants, spiders, and bees: they are all doing their own work, all striving to set their little corner of the universe in order. And thou seest this, and wilt not take up man's burden and run the race that Nature bids thee!'—'But we must have some rest.'—Agreed: but Nature has prescribed limits to that rest, exactly as she has to eating and drinking. Yet these thou art eager enough to overstep; but come to action, and there is no thought of breaking the bounds of the possible!

The truth is, thou lovest not thyself: else wouldst thou love thy nature with all that she wills. The artist who loves his art throws heart and soul into his work, unwashed and unfed; but thou hast less reverence for thine own nature than the graver for his graving, the dancer for his dancing, the miser for his hoard, or the notoriety-hunter for his crumbs of glory. Let the master-passion once take hold of one of these, and what cares he for food or sleep, or for aught save to perfect
his beloved work? Shall then thy duty as man to man appear in thy sight as a thing of lower caste in whose quest all such zeal is out of place?

2 How easy it is to put from us and wipe away every alien, every disturbing thought, and straightway find ourselves in the midst of a great calm!

3 Make bold to follow Nature in every word and deed, and let not the unreasoning disapproval of others divert thee from thy purpose; but if this or that ought to be done or said, be true to thyself and do it or say it. For those who sit in judgement on thee are guided by their individual reason and swayed by individual impulse. On these cast no glance, but go straight on thy way, whithersoever thine own and the universal Nature lead: for the path of both is the same.

4 I walk the way of Nature, till anon I shall fall and be at rest, yielding up my breath to that element from which I draw it day by day, and sinking to the selfsame earth that gave my father his seed, my mother her blood, and my nurse her milk; that earth that has given me food and drink for many a year, and borne with me while I trampled her under foot and abused her at my will.

5 Thou hast no shrewdness of wit for men to admire?—So be it: but much is left thee that admits not the plea 'Nature has given me no aptitude for this'. Then display the qualities that lie wholly within thy power—sincerity, gravity, endurance, indifference to pleasure, resignation to thy lot, contentment with little, kindness, freedom, simplicity, aversion to inane chatter, and
an unassuming bearing. See how many gifts are within thy reach at any and every moment! In none of these does the excuse of natural incapacity avail; yet thou still fearest to rise! Can natural incapacity compel thee to a grumbling, miserly life of toadyism, to abuse of thy poor body, flattery, ostentation, and perpetual restlessness of soul? Heaven forfend! Say, rather, all this might have been banished long ago. The utmost that 'natural incapacity' can do—if even so much as this—is to earn thee a measure of contempt for slowness of comprehension and a certain hebetude of intellect. And it is thy part to minimize even this by careful training, not to look on dullness either as a thing unworthy serious thought or as a fit object for complacent pride.

It is the nature of some men, when they have behaved especially well to a fellow-creature, to sit down and cast up on the spot the debt of gratitude due to them. Others are not quite so premature, yet, in their hearts, look on the beneficiarie as in some sort their debtor, and are perfectly conscious of what they have done. Then comes the man who, so to say, has no conception that he has done anything whatever, but may be compared to the vine that bears her grapes and seeks nothing more when once she has done her work and ripened her fruit.—A man who has done a good deed should be like a horse that has run its race, a dog that has tracked its game, or a bee that has gathered its honey: in other words, he ought not to proclaim it from the house-tops, but go seek an opportunity to do likewise; just as our vine proceeds once more to bear her grapes
in the season.—'Does this mean,' you ask, 'that you would have us all in the class of these people who act and, in a sense, are unaware of their action?'—Yes.—'But is it not precisely this of which they ought to be aware? Man is a social being, and it is the essence of his nature as such that he should be able to see whether he is acting as a social being ought,—nay, more, that he should wish his fellow-socialist to see it too.'—True, my friend; but you are misrepresenting the argument; and I fear me, you will have to fall under one of my former classes. For even they are seduced by some show of reason. But if you will take the trouble to understand what has been said, you need have no apprehension that you will thereby omit any social act.

7 There was a prayer of the Athenians which ran: 'Rain, rain, O Zeus beloved, on the cornfields and plains of Attica.'—If we are to pray at all, let us pray like this, simply and freely.

8 The usual phrase is: 'Aesculapius ordered so-and-so to take horseback exercise, or cold baths, or to leave off wearing shoes for a while.' And it is in strict analogy with this that we say, 'The universal nature ordered that so-and-so should fall sick, lose a limb, or suffer a bereavement, and so forth.' For, in the former case, the word 'ordered' means, roughly speaking, 'prescribed such-and-such a man such-and-such a remedy as conducive to his health': in the latter, the significance is, 'That which befalls a man is so prescribed because it is suitable to his destiny.' For the sense in which we apply the phrase 'to fall', or 'befall', to
events is exactly the same as that in which a mason will say the squared stones in a wall or a pyramid 'fall together' when he has succeeded in arranging them in some sort of mutual relationship.

There is one universal harmony of all things, and precisely as the universe forms a single body compact of all individual bodies, so destiny is one great cause consisting of the sum of all causes. And a proof that the most unmetaphysical of people feel this point, is that they say: 'It brought it on him,'—in other words, 'such a thing was brought to such a man,' 'was ordered or prescribed him.'

Let us then receive these prescriptions in the same spirit as those of Aesculapius. For even that divinity's injunctions are distasteful enough at times; still we accept them in the hope that they will effect a cure.—So learn to look upon the accomplishment and consummation of whatever seems good to the universal nature in the same light as thine own health; and accept with cheerfulness all that falls to thy lot, harsh though it may often seem, in the firm conviction that it leads to that great end, the health of the universe and the well-being and felicity of God himself. And be sure He would lay no burden on any man were it not to serve the purposes of the Whole. For even the nature of the most trivial object ordains nothing, save what shall advantage that little universe over which she holds sway.

Thus two reasons emerge to bid thee rest content with whatsoever may befall thee. Of these the first is, that it was called into being for thy sake, prescribed for thy
good, and had reference to thee from the beginning of things, when it was interwoven with thy destiny among the primeval causes. And the second is, that every visitation of the individual is, to that power which governs the universe, a co-factor in its prosperity and perfection—nay, of its very continuance. For the integrity of the whole is impaired if a man break any link in the unity and coherence of either part or cause. And to murmur at aught that is, and to strive to undo it, is to do all thou canst to sever this chain.

9 Let not nausea, vexation, and despair overmaster thee if thou succeed not in conforming each and every action to the canons of Philosophy; but, when one hope has been dashed, return to the fray, and rest content if but the major part of thy deeds are in line with the nature of man. And hasten as a lover to his love. Turn not to Philosophy as though she were some dreaded pedagogue, but as sore eyes turn to the sponge and egg, or the sick man to his plasters and fomentations. For so obedience to Nature will cost thee no further pang, but thou shalt rest therein and be at peace.

And remember this: the will of Philosophy cannot be in contradiction with the will of thy nature. If it seem so, then say that it was thyself willing what Nature forbids.—'Perhaps; but it is so attractive.'—But is not this merely the favourite fallacy of pleasure? Look and see whether magnanimity, freedom, simplicity, mercy, and holiness possess not greater attractions! Has aught sweeter charms than wisdom, when a man
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can reflect that, in his understanding and reason alike, complete stability is combined with unimpeded progress?

Things in themselves are wrapped in such a veil that not a few philosophers, and those of no mean calibre, have come to the conclusion that they are absolutely unknowable. Even the Stoics themselves admit they are only barely intelligible, and that the mind's assent to perception is fallible in the extreme.—For where shall we look for the infallible man?—Pass on to the objects themselves. How ephemeral and worthless they are!—within the reach of the meanest of mankind, pathics, harlots, and robbers! Then turn to the character of our fellow-men. What an effort it is to tolerate even the most agreeable of them! Not to say, what an effort to tolerate one's self!

In this darkness, then, and mire, this endless flux of substance and time, of motion and the moved, I can conceive naught worthy of honour, or even serious pursuit. On the contrary, it is man's duty to console himself, as best he may, with the expectation of his natural dissolution, repining not at the delay, but resting sure in these principles, and these only: first that nothing can befall him, save what is in harmony with the universal Nature; second, that it is in his power never, in any action, to violate the genius and divinity within him. For this sacrilege none can force me to commit.

'To what purpose am I now employing my soul?' This is a question which it is my duty hourly to put to
myself, and, further, to inquire: What is the present content of that part of me which goes by the name of 'the ruling principle'? To what creature does this soul of mine, as now constituted, properly belong? See that it prove not an infantile soul, a puerile soul, a feminine soul, a tyrannical soul, the soul of an ox or a tiger!

We may gain an idea of the popular notions of the Good by the following considerations. If a man has in his mind the conception of certain things good in the real sense of the term,—for instance, wisdom, temperance, justice, courage,—if, I say, he has formed such a preconception, he will not listen for a moment to the tag 'Alas, I have so many good things that . . . ’—it is so ludicrously inappropriate! But if his preconception of good be that of the vulgar, he will not only listen to it but be quite willing to admit it as an apt hit on the part of the comic poet. And in this way we see that even the man in the crowd feels the difference. Otherwise, the verse would not strike a false note and fall flat in the former case; while we applaud it as a telling and witty jest, when applied to wealth or the emoluments of luxury and notoriety.

Let us go a step further, then, and ask if we are to consider as good, and honour as such, things whose presence as preconceptions in the mind invites and gives point to the stage sarcasm that their possessor is surrounded by so many good things that he cannot find a place to relieve nature!

I am composed of the material and the formal.
Neither of these can perish and sink into nothingness, any more than its existence arose from the non-existent. Hence it follows that every part of me will, through some process of change, find its place as a portion of the universe; and this portion, in its turn, will be transmuted to another part of the same universe, and so on to infinity. And it was in consequence of such a series of permutations that I came into being, and they that begat me, and so on, once more to infinity; for the phrase is permissible enough, even though it be true that the universe is administered in finite periods of death and re-birth.

Reason and the art over which she presides are faculties sufficient for themselves and all their works. Thus they start from a beginning situate in themselves and move straight to the goal set before them; one result of which is, that all such actions are termed 'right' (κατορθώσεις), a phrase reminiscent of the 'right road' (ἡ ὀρθότης τῆς ὁδοῦ).

None of the objects that have no relevance to man, qua man, can be fairly described as proper to man. They are not required of him, they form no part in the programme of his nature, nor do they serve to perfect that nature. Consequently, the end of man cannot lie therein, nor yet the means to that end: in other words, the good. For did any of these accidents, in fact, appertain to man, then obviously for man to contemn them, or rise in revolt against them, would be to violate his own nature, nor could praise attach to any one for rendering himself independent of them: and, equally
obviously, if they are good, he who stints himself of their enjoyment cannot be good at the same time. But, in point of fact, a man's goodness is considered as proportionate to the number of these very things—or their like—of which he can deprive himself; or, again, to the patience he displays when deprived of them by another.

16 As thy thoughts are so will thy mind be also: for the soul takes its colouring from thought. Then dye it deep with a monochrome of such reflections as these: 'Where life is possible, there virtuous life is possible: therefore, as life may exist in a palace, so may virtue also.' And again: 'For whatever purpose anything has been designed, towards this purpose it moves: and whithersoever it moves, there must its end lie; and where the end is, there must its Good, utilitarian and absolute, be also.' Hence the Good of rational life is community; for community, we have shown above, is the object of our being.—For, surely, it was made abundantly clear that the inferior exist to serve the superior, and the superior to serve one another. But the animate is superior to the inanimate, and the rational to the animate.

17 To pursue the impossible is madness. And one impossibility is for the wicked to act otherwise than according to his wickedness.

18 Nothing befalls any man save what is in his nature to endure. The same calamity may overtake another and, whether in sheer ignorance of what has happened or through a desire to play the hero, he remains firm and unsubdued.—Is it then to be tolerated that ignor-
ance and vanity should prove themselves stronger than wisdom?

Things in themselves have no point of contact with the soul; they have no means of ingress, and no control over its changes and motions. For it is self-changing and self-moving; and, whatever the decisions it sees fit to adopt, to these it conforms all that demands admittance from without.

From one point of view, man is nearest and dearest to us of all things; in so far as it behoves us to do good to our fellow-creatures and bear with them. But when these fellow-creatures proceed to put obstacles in the way of my duty, man becomes to me one of the things indifferent—in the same category with sun or wind or the beasts that perish.—True, they may here and there impede an activity of mine, but my impulses and my disposition are beyond the reach of impediment, in virtue of their power of conditional action and conversion. For the mind is able to transfer and transmute each obstacle to its activity into an aid to the same; so that every barrier to action becomes an ally, and every stumbling-block set in our path carries us further on our journey.

Revere what is highest in the universe; that is, the power which administers all things and uses them as means to an end. And, in like wise, pay homage to the highest in thyself,—in other words, to that principle which is kindred to the former. For, with thee also, it is this that makes use of all else, and holds sway over thy life.
That which harms not the state harms not the subject.—In every case of apparent injury apply the following canon: If the state has received no hurt by this, neither have I: if the state has received hurt, it is my part, not to wax indignant with the author, but to admonish him of his error.

Call to mind, again and again, the rapidity with which all things—existent and quasi-existent alike—are whirled past us and withdrawn from our sight. For substance is an ever-flowing stream; action consistent only in mutability; causes subject to ten thousand variations; and nothing, or next to nothing, holds its place; while hard at hand stretches that abyss of past and future time wherein all things are swallowed up.

Who then but a fool, in the midst of all this, will be puffed with pride, distracted by anxiety, or reduced to wretchedness by the belief that his troubles can endure for long?

Remember the universal substance whereof thou sharrest a tiny portion; remember the universal time wherein a fleeting moment hath been set aside for thee; remember the destiny of which thou art an infinitesimal part.

Does my neighbour sin against me? Let him look to that himself. His character and his actions are his own. But I now have that which universal Nature wills me now to have, and am faring as my own nature wills me now to fare.

See that the guiding and governing portion of thy soul remain unmoved by the emotions of the flesh, be
they soft and pleasant or harsh and painful. Let it not
mate with the body, but surround itself as with a wall
and hem the carnal affections within the members they
can influence. Should, however, these affections find
access to the mind in virtue of that other sympathy
which must obtain in a body that is a harmonious whole,
then there is no question of resisting the sensation—
it is a law of Nature—but it behoves the reason not to
label it gratuitously as good or ill.

Live with the gods. For that man lives with them 27
indeed, who, all life long, lays bare his soul to Heaven,
showing that it is a soul well content with the dispensa-
tions of providence, and executing every wish of that
godhead which Zeus has given man, to be his guardian
and his guide—a fragment of Himself. And this god-
head is the understanding and reason of each one of us.

The armpits of this man, and the breath of that, 28
stink in the nostrils? But what profits all this anger?
With mouth and armpits in such a condition, the efflu-
ence must needs be of the same nature!—‘ But the
creature has reason,’ say you, ‘ and, if he would take
a little thought, might see the offensiveness of the
thing.’—Save you, my friend! And you too, for that
matter have reason. So let rational faculty rouse
rational faculty! Speak to him; show him his fault;
and if he take it to heart, why, then you will have
worked a cure; and farewell to all occasion for this
fine frenzy!

... Neither mummer nor harlot ...

As thou purposest to live when thou shalt near thy 29
journey's end, even so, if thou wilt, mayest thou live on earth. But if men prove too strong for thee, why, get thee out of life! And dream not 'tis some great trial to be borne. The room is smoky, so I leave it. Is this some matter of great pith and consequence? —Still, so long as nothing chance to drive me hence, here I will abide, a free man, nor shall any one say nay to aught I will to do. And my will is to do the work prescribed by my nature as a rational being and a member of the community of mankind.

30 The mind of the universe is communistic. Accordingly, it has created the worse to serve the better, and united the better in one common bond. See how it has subordinated and coordinated all things, given each and all their deserts, and brought the best into concord with one another!

31 How hast thou hitherto comported thyself towards Heaven and thy parents; thy brethren and thy wife; thy children and thy teachers; thy guardians and thy friends; thy kindred and thy servants? Canst thou still say of all

'No word, no deed of mine hath caused a pang'?

Remember the trials through which thou hast passed, and the hardships thou hast availed to endure. Be-think thee that the tale of thy life is told, and thy minis-tration done, that full often thou hast looked on beauty, spurned pleasure and pain, cast an unregarding glance at what the world counts glory, and shown mercy to the unmerciful.
Why should souls, destitute alike of art and knowledge, confound the artist and the sage?—But what is the definition of an artistic and wise soul?—It is the soul that knows the beginning and the end, with the reason which pervades all substance and administers the universe through an eternity of ordered epochs.

The time is coming—nay, is all but here—when thou shalt be dust and ashes or a skeleton, a name, or not even a name,—though that name be but an empty sound, a hollow reverberation. The vaunted treasures of life are vanity, corruption, and death. Men are but puppies snarling at each other; quarrelsome children, one moment full of smiles and the next in tears. Faith and modesty, justice and truth have flown

‘Up to Olympus from the wide-wayed earth’.

What then is left to hold thee here, where the things of sense are fleeting and nothing stands, the organs of perception dim and fallible, the poor soul itself an exhalation from blood, and glory, in such a world as this, a thing of naught? Say, wilt thou not await in cheerfulness this end of thine, whether it be extinction or transformation?—But, till that time come, what shall avail me?—What, indeed, save to give reverence and praise to Heaven, to do good to man, to bear and forbear, and to remember that naught beyond the boundaries of this paltry flesh and breath is thine, or can be thine?

Thy voyage will be good if thy ways be good,—if thou hold to the right path in thought and deed.

There are two things common to the soul of God and
the soul of man and all rational life. The first is that neither can be impeded from without; the second, that to both the Good lies in justice of character and deed, and there all desire ceases.

35 If this is neither evil of mine nor effect of evil in me, nor is the good of the community endangered, why should it trouble me? And what harm is it to the community?

36 Be not carried away by appearances, but give every aid within thy power to all men, in so far as they merit it, even should their loss consist of the things indifferent. But take heed thou look not on such loss as an evil. It is a pernicious habit. Rather, treat them like that old man who, on leaving the house, used always to delight his foster-child by pretending to beg his top—though he had no illusions on the point of its being a top!

36 'What profits this bawling on the hustings? Sirrah, hast thou forgotten what all this was shown to be?'—'I remember. Yes. But it is weighty enough in the eyes of my audience.'—'And is that a valid reason why thou too shouldst turn fool?'

36 Say not 'I once was fortunate'. A fortunate man is fortunate under all vicissitudes. For the word denotes one who has chosen for himself 'the better part'. And this better part is the Good in character, in impulse, and in action.
THE universal substance is pliant and compliant, and the reason that administers it harbours within itself no cause for evil-doing. For there is no evil in it, it neither works nor suffers any harm, but all things come into existence and move towards their end by its fiat.

Let it not trouble thee whether thou doest the right in warmth or shivering, drowsy through lack of rest or refreshed by slumber, amid blessings or cursings, at the point of death or in the midst of other work.—For the act of death is but part of our life's business, and it suffices, therefore, here also to do not the work negligently.

Look within: see that the peculiar property and value of no single object escape thee.

All that is must quickly change and turn to vapour, if substance be in truth unity, or, else, be scattered abroad.

The administrative reason knows under what conditions of its own, and in what material, it performs each task.

The most complete revenge is not to imitate the aggressor.

Let one thing be thy sole pleasure and rest, to pass from one service to the community to another, remembering thy God.

The ruling principle is that which is self-moving and self-conditioning; which fashions itself to its own will,
and forces everything external to assume the form it chooses.

9 All things are consummated by the will of universal Nature. There is no alternative; for it is inconceivable they should be administered by some other nature, whether externally comprehending, or internally comprehended, or both external and detached.

10 The universe is either a chaos of involution and dispersion, or a unity of order and providence. If the first be truth, why should I desire to linger in the midst of chance conglomeration and confusion? What matters aught to me, save how I shall, some day, 'return to earth'? Why am I troubled in spirit? The time must come when, willy-nilly, I shall be scattered abroad.

But if this be false, and the other true, why then I put my trust in my Ruler, with all reverence and with all confidence.

11 When force of circumstances has jarred and jangled thee, make haste to return to thyself, and suffer not the bells to ring out of tune longer than that force constrains. For the surest path to perfect harmony is to recur to it ever and again.

12 If thou couldst have at once a step-mother and a mother, thy step-mother would receive thy duty, but thy feet would follow thy mother.—And thou hast them both,—on the one hand, a palace; on the other, Philosophy. Then betake thee again and again to the breast of Philosophy, and there find rest; for by her aid alone canst thou bear with thy court, and thy court with thee.
Precisely as a man, sitting down to a table loaded with food and dainties, might take it into his head to muse: 'Here is the carcass of a fish, here the mortal remains of a bird or a pig'; or again might reflect that his cup of Falernian is a little juice squeezed out of a grape, his purple robe the hirsute covering of a sheep, soaked in the blood of a shell-fish, or that the pleasures of sexual love are derivable from the most grossly animalistic causes;—precisely, I say, as these musings attack the real nature of things and throw their essential character into a clearer light, so ought a man to act all life long. No matter how plausible the credentials of an object may appear, let him strip it naked, tear off the trumpery on which it prides itself, and contemplate it in all its nudity and triviality. For outward show is a great master of fallacies, and rises to its sublimest heights of quackery just when a man is most sure that he is engaged in something well worth his labour. Think of what Crates remarked on Xenocrates himself!

The vast majority of things which excite the admiration of the multitude may be broadly classified as follows. The objects which attract the attention of the completely unenlightened are those in which the bond of union is physical cohesion or natural organization; for instance, wood and stones, fig-trees, vines, and olives. To men on a slightly higher plane of intelligence, the determinative principle is life; and flocks and herds are their theme of praise. Yet a step higher in education, and this principle is no longer life, but rational life;—not rational life, however, in the sense
of a universal soul, but of a soul skilled in the arts or possessed of some other form of dexterity; or even purely and simply that which possesses life and reason; —and these will think it a glorious thing to own a multitude of slaves.

But the man who reverences the soul rational, universal, and civic, cares not a jot for the rest; but his sole aim is to preserve his own soul rational and social, in rest and motion alike; and to this end he co-operates with his fellow-creature.

Of things one part is hastening into being; another, hastening out of being: and, even of that which is but quasi-existent, part is already non-existent. Flux and change are forever renewing the universe; just as the unbroken course of time makes the infinity of ages ever young.

In this stream, then, wherein there is no abiding, what is there, among the multitude of things that go swimming past, on which a man shall set his heart? It is but as if a child should fall in love with the sparrow flitting over his head; and, ere his love be well begun, the bird is out of sight.

Nay, is not man's life itself of that ilk? — A vapour arising from blood, a respiration of air. — For to have once drawn in the breath, then given it up again, as we all do every moment, is an exact counterpart to the loss of the whole respiratory power, when thou shalt yield up to the source, whence thou drewest it, that which has been thine since the yesterday of yesterday that saw thy birth.
Transpiration is not a thing to be valued: we share it with the plants. Nor respiration: we share it with the beasts of field and forest. Nor yet the power of receiving sense-impressions of external objects, nor that of being puppet-led by impulse, nor gregariousness, nor the faculty of nutrition—which last, indeed, is little more creditable than the process of disposing of superfluous nutriment.—What then is valuable? Shall we say the clapping of hands?—No.—Then we exclude the clapping of tongues, which is another name for the applause of the multitude.—So you have disposed of fame: but have you left anything that is really worth the having?—I should say: Movement, and abstention from movement, as regulated by the laws of our being. And this is the goal of all training and all art. For the sole object of every art is that everything made should be adapted to the purpose for which it was made. The husbandman tending his vine, the groom breaking in his horses, and the farmer practising his dog are all seeking this end. Moreover, since the education and teaching of youth have an end, it follows that it must be this self-same end. Here then we have found our pearl of great price; and, if all be well with this, you will have no reason for attempting to secure aught else.—What say you? You will, none the less, continue to assign a certain value to a good many other things?—Then, my friend, you will neither be free, nor self-sufficing, nor superior to passion. You will be bound to cherish envy and jealousy, to suspect all who have the power to deprive you of those 'good many things',

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and hatch plots against those who are lucky enough to possess your beloved treasure.—In short, the man who stands in need of any of these objects must, perforce, pass his life in perpetual turmoil, and, to boot, be eternally murmuring at heaven: whereas respect, and reverence for your own reason, will set you at peace with yourself, in harmony with man, and in consent with God,—that is to say, you will have naught but praise for all His dispensations and all His ordinances.

17 Above, below, around,—everywhere the elements are in motion. But the movement of virtue is in none of these. It is a more godlike thing; and the path is hard to see whereby it moves placidly to its goal.

18 O the folly of men! They have no word of praise for the fellow-creatures who live in their own time and move in their midst. Their one ambition is that they themselves shall be lauded in after ages by men they have never seen, and never will see.

Would it not be fully as sapient to walk in sorrow because thy forbears did not sing thy praises?

19 If a thing be hard for thee to do, think not that it is beyond man's power. Rather, consider that whatever is possible to man, and conformable to his nature, is attainable by thee also.

20 In the gymnasium, our opponent may not only use his nails as weapons of offence, but collide with us and work considerable havoc on our skull. Still we take it all in good part; we bear no malice, nor do we look askance on him, for the rest of his natural life, as an
underhand sort of fellow! And yet we are on our guard against him, though not as an enemy, open or suspect; we simply good-humouredly get out of his way.—And so let it be in other spheres of life: let us make many allowances for our fellow-gymnasts; for it rests with us, as I have said, simply to keep out of the way, without either suspicion or hatred.

If any one is able to convict me of error in thought or deed, I will gladly change. For I seek after truth, by which man was never yet injured.—The injury lies in remaining constant to self-deception and ignorance.

I do my duty. Other things vex me not; for they are either inanimate or irrational, or have strayed from their path and know not whither they go.

In making use of irrational life, and material objects in general, be generous and free; for thou hast reason and they have none. But, in thy dealings with man, treat him as befits a member of the same community; for he has reason as well as thou. And, on all occasions, call in the help of Heaven; and take no thought how long or how short a span shall comprehend these acts; for three hours so spent are time enough.

Alexander of Macedon and his groom are equals now in death. For both have either been received back into the same generative principle of the universe, or dispersed impartially into the atoms.

Think what a multitude of events, corporeal and psychic alike, take place within each of us during the same infinitesimal portion of time; and it will seem to thee no marvel that far more things—nay, all that
comes into being in that One and All which we call the Universe—should exist therein at once.

26 Were an acquaintance to ask 'How is the name Antoninus written?' wouldst thou punctuate each letter with a shriek, and then, should the man begin to lose his temper, proceed incontinent to follow his example? Surely thy method would be, rather, to pass on quietly from one letter to another till all were enumerated.—Remember, then, that in life also every act of duty is a series containing a certain number of terms, each of which it behoves us to take into account, and go on our way to the end set before us, requiting not anger with anger, but calm and unruffled.

27 What an inhuman thing it is to forbid men to strive after what they consider suitable and beneficial to themselves! Yet it is precisely this privilege which you refuse when you wax indignant at their sins. For certainly they are merely pursuing these so-called 'suitable and beneficial' objects.—'Yes,' say you, 'but it is a mistaken quest.'—Very true: then instruct them and point out their error, instead of falling into a passion over it.

28 Death is but a respite from sense-impressions, a severing of the strings of impulse, an intermission of the mind's excursions and alarms, and a discharge from the service of the flesh.

29 It is a shameful thing for the soul to faint in the race of life, while the body still perseveres.

30 Take heed lest thou become a Caesar indeed; lest the purple stain thy soul. For such things have been.
Then keep thyself simple, good, pure, and serious; a friend to justice and the fear of God; kindly, affectionate, and strong to do the right. Reverence Heaven and succour man. Life is short; and earthly existence yields but one harvest, holiness of character and altruism of action. Be in everything a true disciple of Antoninus. Emulate his constancy in all rational activity, his unvarying equability, his purity, his cheerfulness of countenance, his sweetness, his contempt for notoriety, and his eagerness to come at the root of the matter.

Remember how he would never dismiss any subject until he had gained a clear insight into it and grasped it thoroughly; how he bore with the injustice of his detractors and never retorted in kind; how he did nothing in haste, turned a deaf ear to the professional tale-bearers, and showed himself an acute judge of characters and actions, devoid of all reproachfulness, timidity, suspiciousness, and sophistry; how easily he was satisfied,—for instance, with lodging, bed, clothing, food, and servants,—how fond of work and how patient; capable, thanks to his frugal diet, of remaining at his post from morning till night, having apparently subjected even the operations of nature to his will; firm and constant in friendship, tolerant of the most outspoken criticism of his opinions, delighted if any one could make a better suggestion than himself, and, finally, deeply religious without any trace of superstition.

All this do thou imitate, that thy conscience may be as clear as his when thy last hour shall have struck.

Throw off this vinous stupor and return to thyself; 31
rouse thee from thy sleep, and, in the knowledge that it was but a nightmare that troubled thee, look with waking eyes on the things of life as thou didst on the visions of the night.

32 I am compact of body and soul. To the body all things are indifferent, for it cannot distinguish them if it would. To the mind, again, all is indifferent that is not an activity of herself. And all her activities are within her own power. Nay more, even of these, her concern is with the present alone; for things past and future, though activities of herself, are perforce indifferent in the present.

33 The hand and foot may toil to weariness, but, so long as hand and foot do their own work, their toil is in harmony with nature. And, thus, so long as man does man's work, his labour is not in discord with his nature as man. But if it be natural it cannot be evil.

34 What strange things are the pleasures of the robber, the pathic, the parricide, and the tyrant!

35 Observe how the most common craftsmen are, up to a certain point, subservient enough to the uninitiate, yet, none the less, hold fast to the principles of their art and refuse to swerve a hair's breadth therefrom. Is it then to be tolerated, that the master-builder or the leech should have more reverence for the rational basis of their craft than man for his own reason, which he shares with God himself?

36 To the universe, Asia and Europe are two sequestered nooks, the tracts of ocean a drop of water, and Athos a little clod of earth. To eternity, the whole of
present time is but a point. All things are insignificant, mutable, and perishable. All flow from the same fount, either as direct emanations or indirect consequences of the universal reason.

Thus the cavernous jaws of the lion, venomous things, and all objects of harm, down to the bramble and the mud, are by-products of the sublime and the beautiful. Then deem them not alien to that thou reverest, but let them serve to remind thee of the common source of all things.

He who has looked on the things of the present has seen all things; both what has been from time eternal and what shall be during the infinite ages to come. For they are all of one family and one form.

Let thy thoughts turn again and again to the connexion of all objects in the universe, and their mutual relationship. For, in a sense, all things are involved one with another, and in virtue of this involution united by ties of friendship, in that they follow each other as members of a series, in consequence of the centripetal and centrifugal motion and conspiration of the universe and the unification of substance.

Adapt thyself to the things amidst which thy lot has been cast, and love in sincerity the fellow-creatures with whom destiny has ordained thou shalt live.

It is well with every instrument, tool, and utensil when it does the work for which it was designed; although, in this case, its maker is absent. But, with the objects whose co-ordinating principle is Nature, the power that created them is ever present within. To
this power, then, it behoves thee to pay all the deeper reverence, and learn to think that all is well with thee if thou but live and move in harmony with its will. For, if this be so, then all is well with the universe.

If a man take any single one of the objects independent of his will for a good or an evil, it follows necessarily that, when he encounters this so-called evil, or misses this so-called good, he will murmur at Heaven and hate all men whom he considers as the actual or potential causes of his failure or his accident.

And in reality much of the injustice we are guilty of is due to our applying a standard of preference to this class of things indifferent; whereas, should we limit our conception of good and evil to what is in our own power, all occasion for grumbling at providence, or adopting a hostile attitude to man, at once vanishes.

We are all working together for one end; some of us consciously and purposely; others blindly, in much the same way, presumably, as Heraclitus meant, when he said that even dreamers labour and co-operate in all that takes place in the universe. One man’s task lies here; another’s there. Even the grumbler, who is always trying to hinder or undo what happens, incidentally does his share. For the universe has need even of such.—It remains for thee to consider with which class of workmen thou wilt cast in thy lot. The master-craftsman will treat thee well, and receive thee into part of his fellow-toilers and coadjutors. See then, thou choose not such a rôle as Chrysippus assigned to comic relief in the drama!
Does the sun usurp the functions of the rain? Does Aesculapius strive to change places with Demeter—physic seek to fructify the earth? Look at the stars in their courses. Are they not all different, yet all labouring to one end?

If the gods have passed decision on me and my destiny, then their decision is wise. For divinity disjunct from wisdom is impossible, even as a conception. And what possible cause could have determined them to work me harm? What advantage could they think would accrue to themselves or that universe which is their especial care? If, however, they left me, individually, out of their calculations, it is at all events certain that they took thought for the whole; and my duty is to welcome and rest content with whatever befalls me in consequence of that broad decision.

But if they take no thought for anything,—a supposition too impious to find credence: or why not be consistent and give up our sacrifices, prayers, and oaths, with all the various actions of ours that imply the presence of divine powers dwelling in our midst?—; let us admit, however, that they take no thought for us and ours, yet I am still able to take thought myself for myself; I still possess the faculty of deciding what is best for me. Now, that is best for every man which is conformable to his constitution and nature. But my nature is rational and civic: I have a city and a country—Rome, in my capacity as Antoninus; the Universe, in my capacity as man. Therefore only that which is beneficial to these two bodies politic is good for me.
All that befalls the individual is to the interest of the universal. This in itself might have been sufficient: but it is also observable that, as a general rule, whatever profits one man profits others as well as himself. In this case, however, the term 'profit' must be taken in that popular sense, in which it is applicable to things indifferent.

As the sights of the amphitheatre and similar resorts weary through their sameness, and the monotony of the spectacle at last begets disgust, so let thy outlook be all life through. For all things, above and below, are the same and from the same. Quousque tandem?

Let thy thoughts often dwell on the infinity of men, of infinite professions and infinite nations, who have passed away. On this side, descend from the present time to Philistion, Phoebus, and Origanion; then turn to another ilk. We must remove to that bourne which has received so many great orators, so many high philosophers,—Heraclitus side by side with Pythagoras and Socrates,—so many heroes of old, so many captains and kings thereafter! Eudoxus, Hipparchus, and Archimedes swell the tale, with their kindred spirits, bold, soaring, unwearyed, revolutionary, and sublimely confident; scoffers, who, like Menippus and the rest, made this precarious and ephemeral life of man their laughing-stock. Bethink thee, all these have long ago come to dust. But what reck they? Or what reck they whose names perished with them?

In sum, in this life there is but one possession of great price,—to pass thy days with truth and justice,
showing kindness to those who know neither truth nor justice.

When thou wilt rejoice thy soul, think of the virtues of thy fellow-men;—here energy, there modesty or generosity, here, again, some other noble trait. For there is no keener pleasure than to observe these patterns of the virtues, displayed in the characters of those around us, and exhibited as rankly as possible. Let us therefore keep them ever before our eyes.

It seems thou art not cast down if thy weight be so many litres, instead of three hundred. Why, then, should it trouble thee that thy life extends to so many years, and no farther? Thou art content with the portion of matter allotted thee; then why not with thy time?

Do thy utmost by persuasion; but act, even though men say no, if the principle of justice so bid thee. Should one, however, interpose with main force, take refuge in equanimity and tranquillity, and turn this obstacle into an occasion for the exercise of another virtue. Remember that thy attempt was conditional and thy goal was not the impossible.—What then?—Simply the putting forth of such an effort. And this end thou hast attained; and therewith the objects of our existence are realized.

The hunter after fame considers the activity of others his own good; the hunter after pleasure assigns this place to his own sensations, but the wise to his own deeds.

It rests with thee to pass no opinion on this, and to
possess thy soul in peace. For things in themselves are by nature impotent to challenge our verdict.

53 Habituate thyself to pay an earnest attention to another's words, and enter, as far as thou mayest, into the speaker's soul.

54 That which advantages not the hive advantages not the bee.

55 If sailors took to abusing their pilot, and the sick their physician, would they hearken to another, and give him an opportunity to ensure safety to the passengers or health to the invalid?

56 How many who entered the universe with me have already quitted it!

57 To the jaundiced honey seems bitter; to a man bitten by a rabid dog, water is a thing of terror; to children a little ball is the acme of beauty. Why then should anger seize me? Thinkest thou that distorted judgement has less power over its victims than bile and poison over theirs?

58 None can hinder thee from living as thy nature bids: nothing can befall thee, save as the universal Nature wills.

59 How vile are the people men desire to please! what vile ends they have in view! and what vile means they employ to secure them! How speedily shall time hide all things in darkness! How many it has hidden already!
VII

WHAT is evil?—It is that thou hast often seen.—

Nay more, whatever may chance, let thy first reflection be: 'All this have I beheld time and again.' In brief, above and below—everywhere thou wilt find the selfsame things that have crowded histories, ancient, mediæval, and modern, and now crowd every city and every house. There is naught new. Everything is as trite as it is ephemeral.

How is it possible for our principles to perish, save through simultaneous extinction of their correlative thoughts? But it rests with thee to fan these thoughts into flame again.

I have the power of forming whatever opinion I ought to form, on whatever subject presents itself. But if this power is mine, what need to trouble? That which is external to my mind is impotent to affect that mind.—Learn this and thou hast life indeed. Nay, if thou wilt, thou mayest rise from the dead. Look but on things once more as thou wast wont to regard them erstwhile; for this is, in truth, to rise from the dead!

The pompous ineptitude of a show; stage-plays; flocks and herds; perpetual skirmishes; a little bone thrown to puppies, or a piece of bread cast into a fish-pond; toiling, burden-bearing ants; frightened mice scurrying hither and thither; marionettes responding to the showman's strings;—such are the things of life. See then that thou stand in their midst, showing kindliness, rather than contempt, to all; but ever mindful
that a man's value is that of the objects on which his heart is set.

4 In conversation, attend to what is saying; in the inception of each action, pay heed to what is doing. In the latter case look at once to the aim in view; in the former, to the significance of the words.

5 Is my understanding equal to this or no? If it is, then I use it for the work, as an instrument put in my hands by the universal Nature. If it is not, either I hand over the task to a more skilled labourer,—save only when some further consideration of duty bids me persevere,—or do it as best I may, calling in the aid of one able, with the help of my reason, to effect what is at this juncture opportune and beneficial to the community. For all that I do, whether through my own unaided efforts or with the assistance of another, must tend to this one goal,—the public good and harmony.

6 How many, whose fame was once on every tongue, are now given over to oblivion! and how many that sung their praises have long ago passed away!

7 Think it no shame to accept help. Thy work in life is to do thy duty, like a soldier at the storming of a fortress. How then, if being halt and maimed thou canst not, of thyself, scale the battlements, while with another's aid thou mayest?

8 Let not the future trouble thee: thou wilt encounter it, if need be, with the same sword of reason in thy hand that now serves thee against the present.

9 All things are interwoven each with other; the tie is sacred, and nothing, or next to nothing, is alien to
aught else. They are all co-ordinated to one end, and all go to form the same universe. For there is one universe comprising all things, one God pervading all things, one substance and one law; and there is one reason common to all intellectual beings, and one truth; for there is one perfection for all life that is kindred and shares in the same reason.

In a little while, all that is material disappears in the universal substance; in a little while, all that is formal is taken up into the universal reason; in a little while, the memory of all things is swallowed up in eternity.

To the rational being, the same act is in accord with Nature and with reason.

Be right, not set to right.

The rôle played in Unity by the bodily members is played in Disjunction by the separate parts, endowed with reason and created to work together for some one end. The perception of this will strike home more directly, the oftener thou sayest within thyself: 'I am a member of this composite whole of rational beings.' But if thou term thyself 'a part', then thou hast not learned to love thy fellow-man heart and soul, nor to find joy in well-doing for its own sake. It is still to thee a bare duty to be performed, not a benefit conferred on thyself.

Let aught external, that so chooses, befall those parts which can feel the effects of its incidence. They may complain if they will. But I myself have taken no hurt, so long as I refrain from pronouncing what has
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chanced an evil. And this abstention is within my power.

15 Whatever my neighbour may do or say, it is my duty to remain good; much as were a piece of gold, or an emerald, or a purple robe, to take for its motto: 'Whatever man may say or do, my part is to be myself, and retain my colour.'

16 The ruling faculty of reason does not break its own calm: in other words, it does not inspire itself with, say, fear or pain. If, however, there be any one who can inspire it with these feelings, let him do his utmost, if he will. For, left to itself, it will have no occasion to exercise its faculty of opinion, and so betake itself to these vagaries.

16 Let the body take thought, if it can, that it suffer nothing; if it fail, let it give voice to its suffering. But the soul itself,—that power which experiences pain and fear, and has sole authority to pass judgement on them,—will feel nothing. It will simply decline to confirm the body's verdict.

16 Reason, itself of itself, needs nothing, unless it create the need for itself voluntarily. Similarly, it can neither be perturbed nor impeded, save when it chooses to perturb and impede itself.

17 Happiness is, as its name implies, a good genius; and this good genius consists in goodness of the reason. What, then, doest thou here, Fancy? Hie thee whence thou camest, in Heaven's name! Force of habit brought thee back. I bear no ill-will; only get thee gone!

18 Does any man fear change? Why, what can happen
without change? What is nearer and dearer to the universal Nature? Canst thou thyself take a hot bath without wood undergoing change? Can thy body receive nutriment save by a process of change in the food? Can any useful action whatever be consummated without change? And canst thou not see that this dreaded change in thyself is of the same ilk with these, and equally necessary to the nature of the Whole?

All bodies are passing through the universal substance, as through a wintry torrent; all concrete and co-operative to the whole, as the bodily members to each other.

How many a Chrysippus, how many a Socrates and Epictetus, the tide of time has submerged! Let the same thought arise with reference to every man and everything, be they what they may.

One thing alone troubles me,—the fear lest I take on myself to do what the constitution of man allows not, or how it allows not, or what it allows not now.

The time is near when thou shalt forget all men; and the time is near when all men shall forget thee.

It is a distinctive feature of man to love even those who go astray. And the way to attain this is to be—think thee, if thy fellow-man stumble, that he is thy kith and kin, that he errs through ignorance and against his will, that in a little while you will both be no more, and, chief of all, that he has wrought thee no harm; for he has left the power that rules within thee no whit worse than it was before.
Universal substance is as wax in the hands of universal Nature: she takes it and moulds a horse; she undoes her workmanship and uses the same material for a tree, then for a man, and, again, for I know not what. Each of these creations endures for the briefest of spaces; but what evil is there to a chest in its un-making, or what good in its making?

An angry mien is completely unnatural; yet let it be frequently assumed and the charm of the fairest face will begin to die out, till, at last, every spark of beauty is gone, never to be rekindled.

For this very reason, be vigilant in the detection of aught that is contrary to reason. For if all perception of error shall vanish, what is left to make life worth the living?

The time is all but come, when the Nature that administers the Whole shall transmute all that thou seest, using their substance for new creations, and, again, the substance of these creations for others, that the Universe may for ever renew its youth.

When any man sins against thee, let thy first reflection be: 'With what conception of Good and Evil did he commit this sin?'. When this is clear to thee, astonishment and anger will give place to pity. For if thy conception of the Good be still identical with, or similar to, his, it is a matter of duty to pardon him. But if thou hast passed the stage in which these things seem either good or ill, thou wilt be the more ready to show kindness to one who is yet in darkness.

Dream not of the absent and its greater pleasures,
but review the chiefest blessings of the present, and reflect what eagerness of search their absence would have evoked. At the same time, however, take heed lest this complacency engender the habit of overestimation, so that, when the time comes, and they take their departure, thou shalt be left lamenting.

Retire into thyself. It is the nature of the ruling faculty to find complete content in justice of action and the tranquillity that follows in its wake.

Wipe away all imagination. Put an end to the wire-pulling of passion. Circumscribe thyself within the present. Learn to understand whatever may chance to thee or another. Analyse every object into the material and formal. Think of thy last hour. If a man has sinned, leave the sin where it arose.

Apply thy thoughts to what thou hearest, and let thy understanding enter into both effect and cause.

Make glad thy heart by living in simplicity and modesty, caring not a jot for the limbo of things betwixt virtue and vice. Love mankind and follow in God’s footsteps. The poet says: ‘Nothing is that errs from law.’ But if this apply only to the elements, it is still enough to remember that law claims all things with but a few insignificant exceptions.

Of death. It is but dispersal, if the universe be atomic; or, if it be unity, extinction and change.

Of pain. The pang that cannot be borne soon ends life and itself. That which drags on its course becomes bearable, the mind suspends judgement and preserves its calm, and the rational principle remains unscathed.
As for the parts that suffer, let them give evidence if they can.

34 Of glory. Look at the minds of them that seek it, and observe their nature, with the character of the objects they pursue and flee. Reflect that as, on the sea-shore, one layer of sand is buried from sight under another, so in life the exploits of one age are submerged by those of the next.

35 "So when the soul has scaled these heights, whence it can survey universal time and universal substance, think you the life of man will seem a great thing in its eyes?" "Impossible," quoth he. "Say, then, will our philosopher look on death as a king of terrors?" "Never," was the answer."—Plato.

36 'It is a kingly trait to do good and hear evil.'—Antisthenes.

37 Is it not a matter for shame, that while the countenance, like an obedient subject, regulates and composes its features to the bidding of the mind, that mind refuses to be regulated and composed, itself by itself?

38 'What profit is 't to storm and rail at Fortune?'
Her ears are deaf.'

39 'Give joy to me, joy to the hosts of heaven.'
40 'Life is a harvest to be reaped at season,
And death must follow birth.'

41 'If God has spurned me, with my children twain,
God's will be done; His work is not in vain.'

42 'For truth and justice fight with me.'

43 'Another's voice may wail, let thine be dumb:
Another's heart may throb, let thine be still.'
Marcus Aurelius

'To this I should answer, with perfect justice: My dear sir, you are sadly mistaken, if you suppose that any man, worthy the name, ought to calculate the hazard of life and death, rather than look, in every action, to the one thing needful,—whether his deeds are just or unjust, whether he is doing the work of Good or the work of Evil.'—Plato.

'For the truth is this, men of Athens: in whatever station a soldier finds himself,—whether he has chosen the post of his own will, as best for himself, or whether he has been assigned it by his captain,—there, I conceive, it is his duty to remain and abide the peril, counting neither death nor aught else an evil comparable with the disgrace of desertion.'—Plato.

'But, my dear friend, you had better look and see whether, after all, the noble and the good do not prove to lie in something other than saving and being saved. Are you sure that a man, in the true sense of the term, ought not to dismiss the thought of existence, long or otherwise, from his mind entirely? Ought he not, rather, to hold his life cheap, entrust all such things to Heaven, take heart of grace from the feminine saw "that no man can outrun his fate", and devote his whole attention to the next question; how he can best live out the time he has to live? '—Plato.

Look round on the stars in their courses, as one who has part in their revolutions, and ever ponder the changes of the elements each into other. For these thoughts purify a man from the dross of his earthly existence.
It is a fine thought of Plato's, when he says: 'He who will discourse of man should look on the things of earth from some supra-mundane watch-tower, and pass in review their assemblies and armies, their labours in the field, their marriages and divorces, their births and deaths, the hubbub of their law-courts, the desert places of earth, the heterogeneous clans of savages, (all the changes in international supremacy), feastings and weepings, buyings and sellings,—in a word, this wonderful mixture of all things, this cosmos of opposites!'

Thou mayest foresee the future as well as review the past. For it is bound to be of the same type; it cannot break into a fresh rhythm from that which obtains in the present. Hence, it is all one, whether a man contemplate human life for two score years, or for ten thousand. For what more is there to see?

'The child of earth to earth returns;
The seed of Heaven takes again;'
in other words, death is either a dissolution of atomic involution, or a similar dispersion of non-sentient elements.

'With foods and drinks and incantations fell
Turning aside death’s course a little while.'

'The breeze that blows from heaven
We needs must bear, dry-eyed though heavy-hearted.'

Another may be a greater wrestler than thou; but is he a more useful member of society, more modest,
better disciplined to meet whatever may chance, or more indulgent to the shortcomings of his neighbour?

Wherever it is possible for action to take place in harmony with that reason which man shares with God, there there is nothing to fear. For wherever it is within our power to do good to ourselves in virtue of an activity that moves prosperously on its path, in obedience to the laws of our nature, there we need suspect no harm.

Everywhere and always, it rests with thee piously to acquiesce in thy present lot, to be just in thy present dealings with man, and to expend a labour of love on thy present thoughts, so that no intruder creep in unidentified.

Cast no glance on the minds of others, but look straight ahead to that goal whither Nature leads thee,—the universal nature by the path of the contingent, thy individual nature by the path of duty. Now every man’s duty is to do that which is prescribed by his constitution. But the non-rational is constituted for the good of the rational,—precisely as in all else the worse is created to serve the better,—and the rational is constituted for the good of the rational. That is to say, the first principle in man’s constitution is community.

The second is the power of resisting bodily emotions; for it is the peculiar property of rational and intellectual emotion to delimit itself and to maintain a consistent superiority over sensational and appetitive emotion. For both of these are animalistic in their nature. Hence
the mind determines to reign, and reign alone, and
scorns the status of subject. And with perfect justice;
for Nature has given it the power of using all else as
means to its own ends.

The third principle in the constitution of our rational
being is immunity from error and deception.—So let
but the governing faculty go straight on its path, hold-
ing fast to this trinity, and it must come by its own.

56 Think of thyself as one that is dead,—one whose
existence is now closed, and live the days that are left
thee in harmony with Nature, as though they were but
a sequel to thy life.

57 Love whole-heartedly that which befalls thee and is
spun with the web of thy fate. For what more fitting?

58 Whatever may chance, keep before thy eyes the
example of those men who, when the same lot fell to
their share, were angered, astonished, and reproachful.
Where are they all now?—Where, indeed?—Then why
strive to emulate them? Why not leave all alien agita-
tions to the agitator and the agitated, devoting thyself
wholly to making the best use of the events themselves?
They may be turned to good account as materials for
virtue. Only take heed thou be self-sufficient in all
thou doest, and remember these two things: that the
material wherewith action is concerned is a thing indif-
ferent, and that the action itself is a thing far from
indifferent.

59 Dig within thee. There lies the fount of good;
a fount whose waters will for ever well up, if thou but
for ever dig!
The body, even, ought to be stable, and free from all irregularity, whether in rest or motion. For the part played by the mind, in keeping the countenance within the bounds of the equable and decent, ought to have its counterpart in the whole body. All this, however, should be observed without any element of affectation.

The art of living has more resemblance to that of the wrestler than to that of the dancer, inasmuch as the chief requisite in both is the power of standing firm and ready for any unforeseen onset.

Make it a habit to consider what manner of men are they whose testimony thou desirest, and by what principles they are guided. For if thou look into the sources whence flow their opinions and their impulses, thou wilt neither have blame for their involuntary stumblings nor desire for their approbation.

'No soul,' says Plato, 'is willingly deprived of truth.' We might add, 'or of justice, or temperance, or kindness, or, in short, of any virtue.' Nothing is more vital than to bear this perpetually in mind; for so we shall display all the greater gentleness in our dealings with our fellow-men.

Whenever pain, in any form, attacks thee, have recourse to this reflection: There is no disgrace in suffering, and no detriment to the governing intelligence; for pain cannot injure the mind either in its rational or its social aspect.

In the greater number of cases, however, turn, for additional assistance, to the precept of Epicurus: that pain is neither unbearable nor everlasting, if the victim
will but remember its limits and not add to its terrors by imagination. Bear in mind, moreover, that many vexatious things are, in reality, the same as pain, yet are not observed to be so; for instance, drowsiness, fatigue ensuing on excessive heat, and loss of appetite.

Hence, when any of these prove too much for thy patience, say to thyself: 'Here am I succumbing to pain!'

65 See that thy feelings towards the inhuman be not those of the inhuman towards the human.

66 What ground have we for supposing that Telauges was not a higher character than Socrates? It is not sufficient to point out that Socrates died a more glorious death, that he displayed greater ability in his arguments with the Sophists, and greater powers of endurance in his winter-night vigils, that, when he was ordered to arrest Leo of Salamis, he deemed it nobler to refuse, or even that he strutted through the streets of Athens as the comic poets say,—a point as to the truth of which we may well have grave doubts.—No; the question is this: What kind of a soul had Socrates? Was he able to rest content with showing justice to man and piety to Heaven, without falling into unreasoning anger at vice, or submitting to the bondage of another's ignorance? Did he accept what fell to his lot in the universe, without deeming it strange or enduring it under protest, and without allowing his mind to suffer in unison with its fleshly covering?

67 Nature did not commingle thy body and mind so inextricably, but that she left it in thy power to fix
thine own boundaries, and to subject the things of self to self. For it is possible enough to make ourselves 'godlike men', and no one be a whit the wiser. Ever bear this in mind, with one thing more: that the requisites of the happy life are exceeding few. Moreover, though thou hast resigned all hope of becoming a dialectician or a scientist, there is no reason for despairing of becoming a free man, modest, social, and obedient to the will of heaven.

Live out thy life free from all compulsion, and in joy and peace of mind, though all men shall cry out against thee to their heart's desire, and wild beasts tear the limbs of this concretion of clay piece by piece. Though all this should be, what is there to hinder the mind from preserving herself in all quietude, truthful in her judgements on external things, and quick to use whatever is presented to her?—So that Judgement shall say to the incoming object, 'This thou art in essence, though to opinion thou art other'; and Use shall greet the matter that comes to hand: 'Thou art that for which I sought. To me the present is ever material for virtue, rational or civic, or, in a word, for the exercise of art, human or divine. For all that chances is related to God or man; nor is it either strange or hard of management, but familiar and lightly wrought.'

The mark of a perfect character is this: to pass every day as though it were the last of life, void of all agitation, torpor, or hypocrisy.

It vexes not the Gods, though they live for ever, that
for all eternity they must needs bear with the wicked, whose wickedness is great, and whose numbers legion. Nay, more than this, they aid them in a thousand ways. Shalt thou, then, whose end is all but here, fall weary of bearing with evil-doers?—And this, too, when thou art numbered with them!

71 It is an absurdity not to flee from our own vice, which is possible; yet strive to flee from the vice of others, which is impossible.

72 Whatever the rational and civic faculty finds to be neither rational nor civic, it naturally judges inferior to itself.

73 When thou hast done good, and another received good, why seekest thou, like the fool, a third thing beyond these—reputation or recompense?

74 No man wearies of receiving benefits. But action in harmony with Nature is a benefit. Then weary not thou in receiving benefits, in that thou conferrest them.

75 The universal Nature set out to make a universe. It follows, then, that either all that now happens happens through necessary sequence on the primal creation, or that even the most vital things of all, to which the mind of the universe has directed its own attention, are governed by no rational law,—a supposition that is absolutely incredible. Bear this in mind, and thou wilt reap tranquillity in many things.
AMONG other antidotes to the desire for spurious fame is this reflection: It is now beyond thy power to have lived thy whole life,—or rather the portion subsequent to youth,—as behoes a philosopher. On the contrary, thou hast made it plain to many, thyself in the number, that there is a great gulf betwixt Philosophy and thee. Hence, thy plans are out of joint, and it is now no light task to acquire the repute of wisdom. Moreover, the conditions of thy life are all adverse.

If then thou hast perceived, in truth, where the matter lies, cast away the thought 'What will men think of me?'; and deem it enough if thou shalt live whatever of life be left thee in concord with the will of thy nature. So learn to understand that will of hers, and let naught else distract thee. For experience has shown that in none of thy wanderings hast thou found the good life. It lies neither in logic nor in wealth, neither in fame nor sensual pleasure.—Where then?—In doing what is prescribed by man's nature.—But how shall a man attain this?—Through the possession of principles governing every impulse and action.—And what principles are these?—Those concerned with good and evil, that teach us that nothing is good for man save what makes him just and temperate, brave and free; and that nothing is evil save what effects the reverse of this.

In every action ask thyself: 'What is the character
of this act of mine? Shall I repent of it? The time will soon be here when I must pass away and leave all things. What more, then, need I seek, so long as my present work be that of a rational and social being who acts under the same laws as God himself?

3 What are Alexander, Caesar, and Pompey to Diogenes, Heraclitus, and Socrates? For these contemplated the nature of things, and the material and formal therein, with minds as lofty as their pursuits. As to the others, of how few things they were tyrants! Of how many slaves!

4 Thou mayest swell with anger to bursting, yet men will do as they did before!

5 First of all, trouble not thyself. For all things happen in accordance with the universal Nature, nor will the time be long ere thou, like Hadrian and Augustus, shalt be nothingness, and thy place unknown. Next, look into the heart of things and behold them in their reality; remember that it is thy duty to be a good man; bethink thee what the demands of man's nature are; then carry them out unswervingly, and say what seems just in thy eyes. Only, say it in kindness, modesty, and sincerity.

6 Part of the work of universal Nature is this: to interchange the position of objects and transmute them, taking hence and bearing thither. All is change, yet not such change that we need fear aught new. Rather, all things are familiar, and their allotment just.

7 Every nature is well content when its progress is good. And the progress of rational nature is good
when that nature yields assent to nothing false or obscure in thought, when it directs its impulses to social acts alone, when its appetites and aversions are confined to objects within our power, and when it has a welcome for every dispensation of the universal Nature. For it is itself a part of that universal Nature, exactly as the leaf’s nature is part of the tree’s; the only difference being that, in the latter case, the leaf’s nature is part of a non-sentient, non-rational nature,—one, moreover, that is liable to impediment; whereas man’s nature is part of a nature intellectual, just, and unimpeded; a nature that assigns all things their equal and proper shares of time, substance, form, activity, and the contingent. But look not to find this equality in exact correspondence of one thing with another in every single part, but rather compare the totality of parts in the one with the totality of parts in the other.

It is not given thee to rise to the heights of science, but it is given thee to check arrogance, to gain the victory over pleasure and pain, to rise above all paltry desire of glory, to curb thy anger at the fool and ingrate—nay, to do what thou canst to serve them!

Henceforth let none hear thee speak ill of the life at court; and, if none hear thee, take heed thou hear not thyself.

Repentance is a form of self-reproach, incurred through neglect of something useful. Now the useful must necessarily be a form of the good, and, consequently, an object of peculiar care to the noble and good man. But such a man would never experience remorse
at having let slip some sensual pleasure. That is to say, pleasure is neither good nor useful.

11 Always ask: 'What is this thing *per se*, in its own natural constitution? What part of it is substantial and material, and what formal? What is its function in the universe? What the term of its existence?'

12 When sleep is hard to leave, remember that it is a law of thy being and of man's nature to act as befits a member of the community of living creatures, sleep being merely a faculty we share with the beasts of the field; and, furthermore, that whatever is in harmony with the nature of any individual is, to that individual, nearer and dearer than aught else, more suitable to him, and withal more pleasant in every way.

13 Constantly bear in mind the principles of Physics, Ethics, and Dialectics, applying them, if possible, to every impression.

14 With whomsoever thou shalt meet, let thy prologue run thus: 'Here is a man. What conception has he of Good and Evil? Let me but know his views on pleasure and pain, with their causes, on fame and infamy, or on life and death, and I shall find it no strange and marvellous thing, should his action correspond to those views, but rather remember that he is not a free agent.'

15 Bear in mind that for a man to exhibit surprise if the universe produce some result, which its nature is to produce, is a piece of folly no less disgraceful than to be lost in amazement at the perversity of the fig-tree in bearing figs. Would not a doctor or a pilot blush to
betray astonishment, should a patient fall into a fever or adverse winds start to blow?

Forget not that it is no less consistent with true freedom to change thy purpose and follow him who corrects thee than it is to persist in error. The activity is thine not his; for it is the sequel to an act of conation and judgement on thy part, and is exerted to pleasure thy mind.

If the matter is within thy power, why do it, if it please thee not? If it is in another’s power, what canst thou blame? Heaven? Or the atoms? Madness! Blame nothing whatsoever. If thou canst, correct the cause. If this prove too hard for thee, correct the thing itself. If this succeed no better, what profits this motiveless railing: every action ought to have its purpose!

A body may die, but it cannot fall out of the universe. Here it remains, here it changes, and here it is resolved into its component parts; in other words, into the elements that go to form the universe and thyself. Then these, as well, are transmuted, yet they murmur not.

Everything exists for a purpose. A horse or a vine has its purpose. And what wonder? The Sun-god himself would say: ‘I exist for a purpose,’ and so would his fellow-divinities in the sky. Say, then, what is thy purpose? Pleasure? Look and see whether the idea will bear a moment’s thought!

Nature has kept everything in view, the end no less than the beginning or the intermediate period of
duration; much as a boy who throws up a ball. What advantage then accrues to the ball from its ascent, or what disadvantage from its descent and eventual fall? Is the bubble blest while it holds together, and curst when it parts asunder?

21 Turn out this body of thine and see what it now is, and what it comes to when it grows old, falls sick, and lies gasping at the point of death!

21 Feware the days of praiser and praised, of rememberer and remembered alike. And their home, to boot, is but a little corner of this zone of ours, where not all of them agree,—nay, not one agrees with himself. And the whole earth is no more than a point!

22 Attend to the material object, the principle, the activity, or the word and its meaning, that is before thee.

22 Thou hast merited this fate; for thou wouldst rather achieve goodness to-morrow than to-day.

23 Am I doing aught?—I do it with reference to the good of mankind.—Does aught befall me?—I accept it with reference to heaven and the universal source whence all that chances is derived.

24 Such as bathing is to the sight,—oil, sweat, dirt, sticky water, everything revolting,—so is every part of life and every object about thee.

25 We bury our friends only to be buried ourselves. —Celer, Hadrian; then Celer himself: Lucilla, Verus; then Lucilla: Secunda, Maximus; then Secunda: Epitynchanus, Diotimus; then Epitynchanus: Antoninus, Faustina; then Antoninus:—such is the endless round! Where are the great wits of old? the great
peerers into the future? the classic examples of arrogance? Where are Charax, Demetrius the Platonist, Eudaemon, and all their ilk? All were creatures of a day; all have been dead these many years. The memory of some died with them, others passed into the legendary, others again are now faded out of legend itself. Remember, then, that either this little fabric of thee must soon be broken up into atoms, or else thy breath be extinguished,—or, if not extinguished, taken from thee and allotted another habitation.

A man's most real pleasure lies in doing the acts peculiar to man. And among these are good-will to his own kind, contempt of sensational activity, analysis of plausible impressions, and contemplation of universal Nature with all her works.

We have three relationships: the first, to the bodily vessel that surrounds us; the second, to the divine cause whence proceeds all that is contingent; the third, to our fellow-man.

If pain is an evil it must be an evil either to body or soul. If it be an evil to the body, let the body lodge information. To the soul it cannot be evil; for the soul has power to preserve its calm unclouded by declining to pronounce it such, since every act of judgement, every impulse, appetition, or aversion, is from within, nor can any evil penetrate thither.

Wipe away all imagination, ever repeating to thyself: 'Now it is within my power to ensure that in this soul of mine no wickedness shall have place, no desire, nor any turmoil. Now can I survey all things
and treat each according to its deserts.'—Never forget this authority that Nature has given thee.

30 Speak, whether it be in the assembled senate or in private conversation, with more attention to propriety than eloquence.—Be healthy in word.

31 The court of Augustus,—his wife and his daughter; his descendants and his ancestors; his sister and Agrippa; his kindred, intimates, and friends; Arius with Maecenas; physicians in company with priests;—a whole court is dead! Turn to the cities of old: death no longer claims a single victim but a whole race, as at Pompeii! Consider, again, the legend on the tombs: 'Last of the direct line.' How many searchings of heart the hope of leaving a successor cost their ancestors! But the end came at last, and here too we have a whole race gone!

32 Thy duty is to set thy life in order, action by action, and to rest content if they all, so far as may be, accomplish their proper work. Nor does the man live who can prevent this consummation.—' But something external may block the path.'—Nothing can block the path to a just, temperate, and thoughtful character.—'Still, perchance, some other active faculty will suffer impediment.'—But by taking this very impediment in good part and passing on contentedly to what is allowed thee, another opportunity for action will straightway arise,—an action that will harmonize with this 'ordered life' which is our theme.

33 Receive the gifts of fortune without arrogance, and resign them without a pang.
Hast ever seen an amputated hand?—A foot or a head lopped off and lying separate from the trunk? This is the state to which a man does his best to reduce himself, when he refuses to acquiesce in what befalls him, cuts himself off from his fellow-creatures, and acts without reference to the community.—Thou art lying flung aside, away from the natural unity. For Nature made thee to be a part, but thou hast severed the tie. But here a gracious clause is added. It rests with thee to unite thyself once more. God has granted no other limb this privilege, to be once sundered and hacked away, then to coalesce again. But see the kindness whereby He has distinguished man! He has put it within his power to escape, from the very first, separation from the whole, and, should he separate himself, He allows him to return again, to be reunited, and to take his old place as a member of the universe.

As universal Nature has given every rational being practically all her other powers, so too we are indebted to her for this: that just as she herself converts every obstacle in her path, and every attempt at resistance, to her own ends, assigns them to their proper place in destiny, and makes them part of herself, so each rational being has the power to convert any impediment into material for itself, and to use it for whatever purpose it had in view.

Trouble not thyself by pondering life in its entirety. Strive not to comprehend in one view the nature and number of the burdens that, belike, will fall to thy share. Rather, as each occasion arises in the present
put this question to thyself: 'Where lies the unbearable, unendurable part of this task?' Confession will put thee to the blush! Next recall to mind that neither past nor future can weigh thee down, only the present. And the present will shrink to littleness if thou but set it apart, assign it its boundaries, and then ask thy mind if it avail not to bear even this!

37 Are Panthea and Pergamus still seated by the grave of Verus? Do Chabrias and Diotimus still keep watch over the remains of Hadrian? The question is absurd. Still, what if they did? Would the dead be conscious? And if they were conscious would it give them any pleasure? Or if it gave them pleasure, would that endow them with immortality? Was it not fated that they, with the rest of mankind, should first become old men and old women, then die? What then was left for the mourners to do when the mourned had passed away? The whole thing stinks in the nostrils, like mortality in its sack!

38 If thou hast keenness of sight, then use it. If not, refer the question to those whom Nature has endowed with greater wisdom.

39 When I look into the constitution of rational life I can espy no virtue designed to correct justice, but I see one to correct pleasure,—continence.

40 Rid thee of thy opinions on apparent pain, and thou wilt find thyself in perfect safety.—'What "self"?'—Reason—'But I am not Reason.'—So be it. Then see that Reason pain not herself, and, if some other part of thee suffer, let it opine for itself.
Hindrance of sense-perception is an evil to animate nature. Hindrance of conation is equally an evil to the same. Similarly, plant-life has its hindrances and its evils. On the same principle, then, every impediment to the intelligence is an evil to an intelligent nature. Now apply all these results to thyself. Does pain or pleasure touch thee?—Then let the senses look to it.—Has some obstacle interfered with conation?—If thy efforts are made unconditionally it is true that this obstacle is an evil to thee as a rational being. But if they are made with reference to the universe and its changes, thou hast so far taken no harm and suffered no impediment.—As for the acts of the mind, there is none but thyself to impede them. The mind remains untouched by fire or sword, by tyranny or by malediction. Let it once become a sphere, and spherical it abides.

It befits me not to pain myself, who have never willingly pained any man.

One man's pleasure lies here, another's there. Mine lies in preserving a healthy mind;—a mind that shrinks from no man, and from naught that befalls man, but beholds all things with a kindly glance of welcome, and uses them as they have merited.

Up and use the present that is within thy gift! He, to whom future fame is all in all, forgets that posterity will be composed of the same type of men as those who awake his disgust in the present, and as far removed from immortality as they. And, at the best, what imports it to thee whether they shall raise their voices
in thy praise or dispraise, and whether they shall think either evil or good of thy memory?

45 Take me and cast me wheresoever thou wilt. For there, too, will the godhead within me abide calm and propitious; content, that is, if it but feel and act in harmony with its proper constitution.

45 Is this thing of sufficient moment that my soul should fall into despondency and sink beneath herself, now dejected, now expanding, now collapsing, now affrighted? Nay, what canst thou find that is worth such a price?

46 Nothing can happen to man save what is incidental to man's nature. Similarly, the vicissitudes of an ox, a vine, or a stone are peculiar to the constitution of oxen, vines, and stones. If then the chances that befall each of us are customary and natural, what ground is there for discontent? Universal Nature bears nothing but the bearable.

47 If the source of thy pain lies without, it is not the external that troubles thee, but thy verdict thereon, a verdict which it rests with thee to annul at any moment. If it lies within thy character, change thy principles. For who can say thee nay? And so too, if thy grief proceeds from the omission of some activity that seems good to thee, why not let the grieving be, and act?—'But an obstacle too strong for me blocks the way.'—Then bid farewell to grief! The responsibility is not thine.—'But life is not worth living with this act undone.'—Why, then, get thee out of life, as a man dies whose activities are in full play, and bear no ill-will to the obstacles that have beset thy path!
Remember that reason puts on invincibility when it retires into itself and rests content with doing not what it wills not, even should its refusal be due to unthinking obstinacy. Then how much more when its decision is founded on reason and reflection?

In virtue of this power a mind untouched by passion is a fortress in itself, nor has man a more impregnable citadel whither he may flee and ever after defy assault. He, then, that has seen not this city of refuge is ill-starred; he that has seen it, and hastes not thither, a fool.

Add nothing of thy own to the reports handed in by first impressions. The report runs: 'Such-and-such a man speaks ill of thee.' That is the whole message. There is no postscript: 'Thou hast sustained an injury.' 'I see my child is sick?' 'True, but I see not that he is in peril of life.'

Thus always abide by the first appearances. Add no epilogue by thyself, and no mischance willbefall thee. Or, rather, add an epilogue, but let it be that of a man who knows by experience all that can happen in the universe.

Is a cucumber bitter? Cast it away. Are there briars in the path? Turn aside. No more is needed. Do not proceed to ask, 'Why was the universe burdened with creations such as these?'

A scientist would laugh thee to scorn, much as would a carpenter or a shoemaker, wert thou to take them to task for the shavings and scraps of leather visible in the workshop. Yet carpenter and cobbler could throw
their refuse elsewhere, if they so chose. But universal Nature has no place external to herself. Nay, here lies the marvellous part of her workmanship: that though she has circumscribed herself within these limits, she is able, if aught within them seems corruptible, old, and useless, to transmute it into herself, and make therefrom new creations; so that she needs neither substance from without, nor space to dispose of the decadent, but can rest content with her own place, her own material, and her own handicraft.

51 Be not desultory in action, confused in conversation, or wandering in thought. See that thy soul be not subject to sudden contraction and as sudden effusion, and let not thy life be one turmoil of business.

51 Let them slay thee, carve up thy limbs, curse thee by all their gods,—what imports all this to the mind, while it can retain its purity, sanity, temperance, and justice? It is but as if a man stood by a sweet and limpid spring and reviled it; but all the while the fresh water keeps welling up. Let him cast clay and dung in it, and within a little space it has dissolved the impurities, washed them away, and not a stain is left.

How then shalt thou have no mere well but a perennial fount within thy breast?—If thou but hourly train thy nature to freedom, forgetting not kindliness, simplicity, and modesty.

52 The man who knows not what the universe is knows not where he lives. He who knows not what the purpose of the universe is knows neither who he is nor what the universe is. And he who fails in one of these
points has no answer to the question, 'For what end was I created?' What thinkest thou, then, of him who shuns the blame, or courts the praise, of this clamorous multitude that knows neither where nor what it is?

Dost desire the praise of a man who curses himself thrice in the hour? Dost wish to please a man who cannot please himself? Does that man please himself who repents of wellnigh every action of his own?

No longer deem it enough to breathe in unison with the surrounding air, but begin at last to think in unison with the all-surrounding Thought. For the intellectual principle is everywhere diffused and permeates all things, for the man who can but breathe it in, no whit less than the aerial for him who can respire it.

Generically, evil works no harm to the universe; particularly, one man's evil harms not another. Its power of harm is limited to him who has been assigned the power to rid himself of it the moment he wishes.

To my will the will of my neighbour is a thing as indifferent as his breath or his flesh. For let it be as true as you wish that we exist each for the sake of other, still every man's mind has an independent jurisdiction of its own; the reason being that otherwise my neighbour's evil would have been my evil as well, a result which God would not have, lest my unhappiness should depend on another than myself.

The sun seems to pour itself down on us, and in truth its diffusion is ubiquitous. Still there is no effusion; for this solar diffusion is merely a form of exten-
sion. And accordingly its rays have received the name ἀκτίνες from the verb 'to extend',—ἐκτείνεσθαι.

What a 'ray' really is may be seen by a simple experiment. Take a darkened room and watch the sunlight stream in through some narrow aperture. It moves in a right line, and directly it meets with a solid object, interposing between it and the air on the other side, it impinges, as it were, and there the beams halt, neither stumbling nor falling.

Analogous to this ought to be the down-pouring and diffusion of the intellect; never effusion, but always extension; no violent and impetuous collision with the impediments it meets, no falling down, but rather a halt, and an illumination of the receiving object. For if this body refuse to transmit the light, it voluntarily deprives itself of the halo that would else play round it.

58 The man who fears death fears either nullity of sensation or change of sensation. But if sensation disappears, so will sensation of evil: and if we acquire a new form of sensation, we shall simply be living beings of a different type, and no cessation of life will intervene.

59 Men exist for mutual service. Then either correct thy neighbour or bear with his errors.

60 The flight of the mind is different from the flight of an arrow: yet the mind, whether exercising its prerogative of caution or engaged in inquiry, none the less speeds straight onward to the goal before it.

61 Enter into every man's ruling faculty, and allow every man to enter into thine.
INJUSTICE is impiety. For if we consider that universal Nature has created all rational beings for mutual service,—that is, to do good to their fellow-creatures in proportion to their deserts, and under no circumstances to do them harm,—it is obvious that a man who transgresses Nature’s will is guilty of sacrilege against the eldest of the gods. And the same sin against the same divinity is committed by the liar. For the nature of the universe is the nature of the existent, and all things existent are intimately related to each other. Now Truth is only a synonym for Nature as the first cause of all that is true. Hence deliberate falsehood is impiety, inasmuch as deception involves injustice: and involuntary falsehood is impiety, in that it is in discord with the nature of the Whole, and a revolt against order as expressed in the power that orders the world. For a man raises the standard of revolt when he betakes himself, of himself, to the antipodes of truth; for he has so neglected the powers with which Nature had endowed him that now he cannot distinguish the false from the true.

Again, another form of impiety is to pursue pleasure as good and flee pain as evil. For it is inevitable that a man so acting will often murmur at the universal Nature as unfair in her dispensations to the just and the unjust, on the ground that nothing is more common than for the unjust to be surrounded with pleasures and richly endowed with means to secure them, while
the just have pain and its causes for their only inheritance. Moreover, the man who fears pain must at times fear something that will come into being in the universe; and this is, *ex hypothesi*, a form of impiety. As for the man who pursues pleasure, he will not stop short of injustice in his pursuit; and injustice is flagrant impiety.

The truth is that to whatever the Nature of the universe is indifferent,—and she would not have created both pleasure and pain had she any preference for either,—to these things, I say, we who desire to follow in Nature's footsteps must show like indifference and submit our opinions to hers. It is plain, then, that whoever fails to regard pleasure and pain, life and death, fame and infamy, with the impartiality displayed by Nature in her use of them is guilty of impiety. And when I say that Nature makes impartial use of all these, I mean that they form a necessary sequel to the products and by-products of that Nature, in virtue of a certain primeval activity of Providence, when she set out, from a definite starting-point, on this work of setting all things in order, having conceived within herself certain principles of all that was to be, and determined certain powers generative of existence, transmutation, and all such succession.

2 It had been the part of a better and wiser man to have made thy exit before tasting any form of falsehood or hypocrisy, of luxury or of arrogance. However, the next best voyage, as the saying goes, is to yield up thy breath now that thou hast sated thyself.
with these. Or hast thou resolved to take up thy abode with evil? And has experience no power as yet to persuade thee to flee from this plague-stricken clime? For vitiation of the mind is a scourge far more deadly than any corruption or change in this surrounding atmosphere. The one is pestilential only to the animate qua animate, the other to man qua man.

Despise not death, but cheerfully acquiesce in it as one of many acts ordained by the will of Nature. For as adolescence is followed by old age, the period of growth by the period of maturity, teeth by beard, beard by grey hairs, generation by pregnancy, pregnancy by birth, and so on with all the rest of our physical activities, each in the proper season of life, so is it with dissolution also.

It is the duty then of a thinking man to be neither superficial, nor impatient, nor yet contemptuous in his attitude towards death, but to await it as one of the operations of Nature which he will have to undergo. And as now thou awaitest the time when thy child shall leave its mother's womb, so await the hour when thy soul shall cast off its earthly covering.

But if this suffices not, and thou must needs have a less philosophic canon to touch thy heart, nothing will tend more to reconcile thee with death than to consider the objects thou wilt leave behind, and the morals of those with whom thy soul will no longer be involved. For though to take offence at these is no part of thy duty,—which is rather to care for them and to deal gently with their errors,—yet it behoves thee to re-
member that thy departure will not be made from the midst of men who share thy principles. One cause alone, if even that, might perchance have plucked thee back and detained thee in life: if that life might have been spent in the company of those who owned allegiance to the same faith. But now that thou seest what utter weariness springs from this discord of man with man, let thy prayer be: 'Hasten thy coming, Death, lest I too forget myself!'

4 The sinner sins against himself; the unjust man is the victim of his own injustice, in that he makes himself evil.

5 Injustice lies as often in omission as commission.

6 It is enough if thy opinion in the present be based on understanding, thy action in the present directed to the common good, and thy disposition in the present one of contentment with all that befalls thee from the cause without thee.

7 Wipe away all imagination; cry halt to impulse; extinguish desire; and confirm the mind in its own power.

8 All irrational life shares in the division of one soul and all rational life has been allotted its portion in one intellectual soul, exactly as all things earthly are formed of one earth, and all of us who have sight and breath see and breathe by the same light and the same air.

9 All things that participate in a common element hasten to rejoin their kin. Earth turns to earth, water flows to water, and air to air, so that main force is needed to hold them apart. Fire on the one hand mounts upwards attracted by the elemental flame; on the other,
so eager is it to blaze in alliance with earthly fire that all matter, if it be but a little dry, is liable to ignition, the reason being that the antipathetic plays only a minor part in its composition.—On the same principle, all that shares in the universal intelligence of Nature is equally ardent to join its kindred, or even more so. For in proportion to its superiority over the rest is its readiness to mingle with whatever comes of a common stock and to be fused with it. Accordingly, in the case of irrational animals its first manifestations were bees swarming, cattle grazing in herds, birds feeding their young, and even a species of love-making. For even this grade of life is possessed of a soul, and consequently the gregarious instinct was more strongly felt than with the still lower types of plants, stones, and trees.

In the case of rational life, these manifestations took the form of the state, friendship, deliberative assemblies, and, in war, treaties and truces. With still higher beings a sort of unity in disjunction arose; for instance, that which prevails among the stars. Whence we see that the ascent towards the higher can create sympathy even in objects separate in space.—And now look at the present! It is the intellectual part of creation alone that has forgotten its mutual love and unity. Here only we see no waters speeding to rejoin the parent stream. And yet, let man flee as fast as he will, he is none the less overtaken, and Nature is too strong for him. Observation will show the truth of what I say: for the seeker will sooner find earth untouched by earth than a single man absolutely divorced from his fellows.
10 Man, God, and the universe all bear fruit; each in its own season. (That usage has limited the term to the vine and so forth, is nothing to the purpose.) But Reason bears fruit both for all and for herself, and her products are similar in character to the mother that gave them birth.

11 If thou canst, show the sinner the error of his ways. If thou canst not, remember that for these occasions the virtue of kindliness was given thee, and that Heaven itself shows mercy to evil-doers. Nay, so great is its indulgence that at times it aids them to secure their ends,—health, wealth, and fame. And this is within thy power as well. Or, come, say who can prevent thee!

12 Endure pain, not as one who craves pity or admiration, but let thy sole wish be to act, in motion or at rest, as thy nature as a civic being demands.

13 To-day I went out from the midst of trouble; or, rather, I cast out all trouble. For it was not without, but within, amongst my opinions.

14 All is the same: in experience, familiar; in time, ephemeral; in matter, sordid; and all in our days is as in the days of those we buried.

15 Things, as such, stand without the door, themselves by themselves, knowing nothing and speaking nothing concerning themselves. What then is it that speaks for them? Reason.

16 Not in passivity but activity lies the good of the rational and civic being, precisely as virtue and vice to the same lie in action not in passion.
The stone we throw up finds no more evil in its descent than good in its ascent.

Enter into their minds and see what are the judges thou fearest and how sapient are their verdicts on themselves!

All things are in the act of change; thou thyself in ceaseless transformation and partial decay, and the whole universe with thee.

Leave another's sin where it arose.

The end of an activity, the cessation and, so to say, death of impulse and opinion,—here is no evil. Turn now to the periods of thy life: infancy, boyhood, youth, old age. Every single change in these is a form of death. Was it terrible?—Take next thy life under thy grandfather, thy mother, and thy father in turn, and when thou hast found all the other differences, changes, and cessations ask 'Were they terrible?'—No more terrible than the cessation, termination, and change of life in its completeness!

Make haste and look into thine own mind, the mind of the universe, and the mind of thy neighbour. Thine own, that thou mayest make it just; that of the universe, that thou mayest remember whereof thou art part; that of thy neighbour, that thou mayest learn whether his sin was the sin of ignorance or knowledge, and reflect withal that it is kindred to thine own.

As thy rôle is that of a part serving to complete a social system, so let thy every act serve to complete the life of a social being. Any act, then, which has no reference, either near or remote, to this end, tears thy life
asunder, renders its unity impossible, and plays the part of a rebel, just as much as the citizen in a state who severs himself, as far as he is concerned, from the general harmony.

24 Childish quarrels, childish delights, little souls laden with corpses,—all that the Death-masque may strike our eyes more clearly!

25 In every object, first take the formal with its quality, abstract it from the material, and contemplate it; then determine the maximum time for which a thing so qualified can exist.

26 Ten thousand troubles have fallen to thy share, all because thou wouldst not rest content with reason doing the work it was formed to do. But let this be the end!

27 When others blame and hate thee, when so-and-so lets fall such-and-such a censure, turn to those souls of theirs, enter, and see what manner of men their owners are. So will the folly be plain of all anxiety for their opinion of thee, be it what it may. But cherish no ill-will; Nature made them to be friends of thine; and Heaven itself deigns to lend them every aid—through dreams and prophecies, for instance—that they may attain their ends; those ends, be it said, on which they have themselves set their hearts.

28 The cycles of the universe are ever the same, above and below, from age to age. Moreover, the universal intelligence must either set itself in motion to produce each single effect,—in which case content thyself with the result,—or it has moved once for all, and all else is
but the sequel to that motion, each thing containing in itself the origin of that which succeeds it, so that this indivisible chain may be regarded as atomic in a new sense of the word. In any case, however, if there be a God all is well; if chance governs all, see that it govern not thee.

In a little while earth will be covering us all. Then earth herself will change and new things arise therefrom, only themselves to change for infinity, and their successors to another infinity. Ponder this; for if a man reflect on the changes and transformations that follow each other like wave on wave, and with equal rapidity, he will have nothing but contempt for all things mortal.

Universal substance is a torrent sweeping all things in its course. And what poor creatures are these dwarfs of men, busied with their weighty matters of state and playing the philosopher to their own satisfaction! Children in need of their nurse!—Sirrah, what wilt thou? Do the work that Nature now demands of thee! Set about thy task as best thou canst, and look not round to see if thy neighbour observe thee! Hope not for Plato's Utopia, but rest content with the smallest progress made, remembering that this consummation is no small thing. For who can change men's opinions? And yet, if their opinions remain unchanged, what have we save slaves groaning in their bondage and simulating willing obedience? Go now, and prate to me of Philip and Alexander and Demetrius! I will follow them if it appear they had a clear
vision of what universal Nature willed, and trained themselves to execute that will. But if they were mere stage-heroes, I am under no sentence to ape them. The work of philosophy is simple and modest. Strive not to seduce me to insolence and arrogance!

30 Look down from a higher sphere on the countless herds of men, their myriad rituals, their chequered voyagings in calm and in storm, and all the vicissitudes of mortals from birth to manhood, and from manhood to the grave. Survey, moreover, the life that was lived by the men of old time, that will be lived when thou art gone, and is lived now among the savages. Reflect how many there are that know not so much as thy name, how many that know it will anon have forgotten it, and how many of thy panegyrists will soon change their blessings into cursings! Then know that neither after-fame nor present glory,—nay, nothing that is,—is worth a moment’s thought!

31 Calmness wherewith to meet all that comes from the cause without thee; justice in every act proceeding from the cause within thee:—that is, impulse and action finding their end in doing the work of the community, as being a law of thy nature.

32 Thou canst remove many a superfluous trouble that lies wholly within the jurisdiction of thy opinion, and straightway make for thyself ample room to comprehend the whole universe in thy thoughts, to contemplate the eternity of the ages, and to reflect on the speed wherewith every single object changes, how short is the space from birth to dissolution, how vast the un-
broken tract of time before our birth, and how equally infinite the period that will follow our death.

All things thine eyes can see will quickly perish, while they who have witnessed their end will anon share their fate, and he who dies full of years be made equal with him who was taken before his time.

Look at their minds! See the objects of their pursuit, the motives that excite their love and honour! Imagine thou seest these pitiful souls of theirs in their nakedness. And yet they think their blame does harm and their laudations good! The presumption of it all!

Loss is nothing else than change. But change is a favourite process of that universal Nature, in virtue of which all things are now done as they have been done from time eternal, and will be done for the endless ages to come. What then sayest thou? That all things have for all time been done ill, and for all time will be done ill? That in all the hosts of Heaven not one god could be found with power to correct these errors, but the universe is condemned to be enchained in unintermittent evil?

What sheer rottenness is the material basis of us all, —water, dust, a few bones, and filth! Again, our marbles are but callosities of earth; our silver and gold sediments of the same; our clothing pieces of wool; our purple a shell-fish's blood! And so with all things, even this scanty breath of ours which is ever changing from this to that!

Enough of this wretched life with its grumbling and its apish trickery! Why art thou troubled? What
is there new in all this? What is it that drives thee dis-
traught?—The formal?—Look at it.—The material?—
Look at that. But beyond the material and the formal there is nothing. Rather, at this eleventh hour, become a simpler and a better man in thy relations with Heaven!

37 It is all one, to have learned the same lesson in a hundred years or in three.

38 If he has sinned, the evil lies with himself. But, perchance, he sinned not!

39 Either all things flow from one intellectual fount and meet, so to say, in one body,—in which case the part has no right to murmur at that which is done for the good of the whole,—or the atomic theory holds good and there is nothing save chaos and dispersion. Why then all this trouble? Rebuke thy reason: 'Thou art dead and decadent, thou hast made thyself a wild beast and a hypocrite, an ox that must move and graze with the rest of his herd!'

40 Either the gods have power or no. If they have not, why pray to them? If they have, why not pray for them to give thee strength to fear not the things thou fearest, to desire not the things thou desirest, and to grieve not at anything, rather than implore them to give or withhold the occasions of these feelings? For be sure, if they are able to aid man at all, they are able to aid him even in this. But, belike, thou wilt say: 'All this the gods have put in my own power.' So be it. Then would it not be better to use what is in thy power as a free man should, instead of hankering after
what is without thy power, like a slave or the meanest of mankind? And what authority hast thou for thinking Heaven cannot aid us to secure even that which is within our power? Begin so to pray and it will soon be plain. One man prays: 'How shall I lie with that woman?' Pray thou: 'How shall I have no desire to lie with her?' Another: 'How shall I be rid of that man?' Thou: 'How shall I have no wish to be rid of him?' A third: 'How shall I avoid the loss of my child?' Thou: 'How shall I have no fear to lose him?'—In sum, reverse thy petitions to Heaven, as I have said, and contemplate the result.

'When I was ill,' says Epicurus, 'my conversation was not devoted to my bodily ailments, nor did I inflict them on my visitors. I simply carried on our old discussions on science, dwelling chiefly on this very point: how the mind, which is immune from none of the movements of the flesh, can still maintain its own calm and guard its proper good. As to the doctors,' he goes on, 'I gave them no opportunity for airing their professional dignity, as if, forsooth, they were doing something of importance; my life merely went on its course well and happily.'

Do thou then emulate Epicurus in sickness, if sickness be thy lot, and in every other trouble. For it is a principle common to every school of thought that no accident, be it what it may, should be allowed to distract the sufferer from his philosophy, or drive him to chatter nonsense with the uneducated and unscientific; but rather that he should remain intent solely on his
action at the time, and the means whereby he is performing that action.

42 When a man's shamelessness grates on thee, let thy first question be: 'Can the universe exist without a certain proportion of the shameless in its inhabitants?' Clearly not.—Then why cry for the impossible? The offender is only one of a number whose existence in the world is a matter of necessity.—Keep the same considerations in readiness for application to unscrupulousness and treachery; in a word, to every type of sin. For with the recollection that this class of men is inevitable will come a kindlier feeling for every member of the class. It is useful, also, to consider without delay what virtue Nature has assigned man as a counterblast to this particular vice. For she has given us, so to speak, antidotes,—against the unmerciful, meekness; against others, another corrective quality.

Again, in each case, it rests with thee to show the wanderer his error. For every sinner is a wanderer, inasmuch as he has strayed from the goal set before him. Nay, what harm has he done thee? Thou wilt find that not one of those who rouse thy anger has committed any offence that could change thy mind for the worse. But it is in the mind alone that evil and injury have existence for thee. And why, forsooth, regard it as some strange and evil thing that the fool should act according to his folly? Look to it, lest it be rather a matter of self-reproach that thou couldst not foresee this man would fall into this sin! For reason endowed thee with the means of concluding that his
error must needs take the course it did; but thou, oblivious to her warnings, art lost in amazement he should err at all! But, before all, when thou brandest thy fellow-man as traitor or ingrate, turn to thyself. For plainly the fault is thine, whether thou wast credulous enough to believe that a man, with such a character, would keep faith, or whether in bestowing thy favour thou didst not bestow it once for all, deeming the action itself reward enough. For what more wilt thou, when once thou hast done a good deed to a fellow-creature? Is it not enough for thee to have acted in obedience to thy nature, but thou must look for payment? Much as if the eye were to demand its price for seeing and the foot for walking! For precisely as these members exist for a special purpose, and when they have accomplished this purpose come by their own, so man was created to do good, and when he confers a benefit, or performs any action that furtherers the common welfare, he simply does the work Nature framed him to do, and in that receives the reward due to him.

X

O MY soul, my soul! wilt thou never attain to goodness and simplicity, oneness and nakedness, and shine through the bars of thy bodily prison? Wilt thou never taste the sweets of a character loving and affectionate? never know satiety and self-sufficiency, with every craving gone and not one lingering desire
for aught, quick or dead, that serves the lusts of the flesh; seeking no temporal respite for their longer enjoyment, no pleasant places, no favoured clime, and no congenial society; but content with thy present state, delighted with all about thee, and persuaded that thou holdest all things needful in fee from Heaven, that all is well with thee, and all will be well that God wishes, together with every gift He purposes to bestow for the conservation of that perfect Being, good, just, and beautiful, which gives life and continuance to all things, comprehends them all, and receives them all to itself on their dissolution that it may create others like to them? Say, will thy nature be ever such that thou canst live in communion with God and man, and thou have no word of complaint for them and they no hint of condemnation for thee?

2 Observe the demands of thy nature in so far as thou art a being governed merely by the natural principle of growth. Next accept these demands, and satisfy them if they involve no injury to thy nature as an animate being. Then observe, in their turn, the demands of this animate nature, and admit them all, if it may be done without detriment to thy nature as an animate and rational being. But every rational being is, ipso facto, a civic being. So use these canons and let all else take care of itself.

3 All that happens happens in one of two modes: either as Nature has fitted thee to bear it, or as Nature has not fitted thee to bear it. If the first be the case, trouble not thyself but bear it with Nature's aid; if
the second, I say again: Trouble not thyself, for pain cannot survive its victim’s death. But forget not that thy nature enables thee to bear everything over which the faculty of opinion has authority to make it tolerable and sufferable, by pronouncing it a matter of interest or duty to take up the burden.

If thy neighbour go astray, instruct him in kindliness and show him his error. If the task prove beyond thee blame thyself,—or rather blame not at all.

Whatever may happen thee was prepared for thee from all eternity, and the complex series of causes from time everlasting intertwined the threads of thy destiny with the incidence of this chance.

Whether the universe is an aggregation of atoms, or a natural organism, let my first principle be that I am part of a whole governed by Nature; my second, that a certain intimate connexion prevails between myself and my kindred parts. If I bear this in mind I shall experience, in my capacity as part, no dissatisfaction with aught allotted me from the whole: for nothing can be beneficial to the whole and detrimental to the part. And the whole contains nothing save what is beneficial to itself,—a property common to all natures, and combined in universal Nature with immunity from all external compulsion to create anything deleterious to itself. Accordingly, by never forgetting my position as part of such a whole, I shall have nothing but contentment for every contingency that befalls me. But inasmuch as I am united by ties of intimacy with my kindred parts it follows that no action of mine must
be directed against the community. On the contrary, I shall always bear in view the interests of my kith and kin, devoting every impulse of myself to the common welfare and checking all that may tend to the reverse. But with action so regulated the course of life must needs run smooth; in much the same way as we conceive every member of the state a happy man, when he goes on his way doing good to his fellow-citizens and welcoming every dispensation of the commonwealth.

Every part of the whole,—in other words, all things naturally comprehended in the universe,—is doomed to perish, if we take the word as a synonym for change. Now, if this is at once a necessity and an evil, the whole administration of the universe must be bad, with all the parts moving towards change and liable to every form of destruction. What then are we to say? That Nature deliberately planned how she could inflict most injury on these parts of herself, by making them not only subject to evil but powerless to escape it? Or that all this happens without her knowledge? Both theories are equally incredible. But if we drop the idea of Nature as an active agent altogether, and explain matters by saying that all these things are 'natural', it is sheer absurdity to maintain that it is 'natural' for the parts of the whole to change, and, the next moment, to be lost in wonder or vexation at some change, as though it were a violation of Nature;—especially when every dissolution is merely a resolution into the elements of which the dissolved is composed! For there must be either a dispersal of the elements of which I am
compound, or a change in which the solid turns to earth and the spiritual to air, both being taken back into the generative principle of the universe; whether that universe periodically perishes by fire or renews its youth by an unending process of change.

But by the terms 'solid' and 'spiritual' beware of understanding a solidity and a spirituality belonging to us from the hour of birth. For all we have is an accretion dating from yesterday or yesterday's yesterday, and due to the nutriment we have taken or the air we have breathed. This accretion, then, is what changes, not what our mothers bare. Assume, if you will, that what we received at birth implicates us to a great extent with that part of us which possesses this peculiar power of change, still, I conceive, the truth of the argument is not affected.

When once thou hast assumed the name of a man good, modest, and truthful; wise, harmonious, and lofty in mind; take heed thou change not thy style, and shouldst thou ever forfeit these titles, hie thee back to them. And remember that 'wisdom of mind' implies the discriminating consideration of individual cases, with the absence of the desultory in thought; 'harmony of mind,' the voluntary acceptance of all dispensations of universal nature; and 'loftiness of mind,' the elevation of the thinking part of man above the smooth and pleasant, or harsh and painful, movements of the flesh, above all thoughts of fame, all fear of death, and all their congenerers. Then confirm thyself in thy right to these titles, without craving to hear them from the
lips of others, and thou wilt become a new man and enter on a new life. For to remain the man thou hast hitherto been, and to cling mangled and defiled to the life thou hast hitherto led, is the part of a fool and a coward, of a thing on the level of those half-devoured wild-beast fighters of the arena, who, though one mass of wounds and gore, still clamour to be kept till the morrow's show, to be flung once more, in all their wretchedness, to the same teeth and claws. Then enter into possession of these few names, and, if thou avail to abide by them, abide as one who has made his crossing to the Isles of the Blest; but if it break on thee that thou art falling away and slackening hold, depart un-daunted into some nook, there to tighten thy grasp; or even betake thyself out of life once for all, not in anger but in simplicity, freedom, and modesty, having done at least one good act in life,—to have quit it thus!

One great aid, be it said, towards remembering these names of thine, lies in mindfulness of Heaven and in the reflection that God desires not flattery, but only that all men should be made like to Himself, and that as the fig-tree does the work of the fig-tree, the dog the work of the dog, and the bee the work of the bee, so should man do the work of man.

9 Hatred and warfare, timidity, torpor, and slavery, will day by day blot out all those sacred principles which receive from thee a curt, unscientific consideration, and are summarily dismissed; whereas thy duty is so to contemplate every object, and perform every action, as simultaneously to perfect the power of dealing with
circumstances, and exercise the faculty of reflection, preserving withal that confidence, which arises from an accurate knowledge of each subject, unobserved yet unconcealed.

When wilt thou enjoy the pleasures that spring from simplicity, dignity, and acquaintance with the nature of everything,—what is its substance and place in the universe, what the natural period of its existence, and what the elements of which it is compound, who are its possible owners and who the arbiters of its bestowal and withdrawal?

A spider is vastly proud of itself when it has caught 10 a fly, one type of man when he has trapped a hare, another when he has caught a tiny fish in a net, a third when he has speared a boar, a fourth when he has hunted down a bear, and a fifth when he has routed the Sarmatians. For, if we examine their principles of action, the one is just as much a robber as the others.

Strive to acquire a systematic method of contemplating the changes of all things each into other, and pay continuous and unflagging attention to this branch of Philosophy; for none is more calculated to produce greatness of soul. The man who has attained this goal puts off the body, and, in the sure knowledge that the time is all but here when he shall set out on his journey from this world, leaving all things behind him, he consecrates himself wholly to Justice in every action of his own, and, in every other contingency, resigns himself to the will of universal Nature, never wasting a thought on what another shall say, think, or do, with respect
to himself, but content with these two things:—if his own deeds in the present be just, and his attitude towards his lot in the present one of love and thankfulness. As for all the toiling and moiling of life, he simply puts it aside; for his only wish is to go straight on his path, walking by the law and thereby following in the footsteps of God.

What profits timidity and suspicion when it is within thy power to consider where thy duty lies? If this be clear to thee, go on thy way in kindliness, but turn not back. If thou art in the dark, suspend judgement and call in the best advisers thou canst. If obstacles arise to prevent even this, then advance as far as thy resources allow thee, thoughtfully and holding fast to whatever seems just. For it is best to attain this, since thereby thy success or failure must be judged.

The man who follows reason in all things is at once leisurely and active, cheerful and composed.

The moment sleep leaves thy eyes, ask: 'What will it signify to thee whether another praise the just and beautiful, or no?' Nothing. For surely thou hast not forgotten the nature of these arrogant dispensers of praise and blame,—what manner of creatures they are at bed and board, the character of their actions, the objects of their avoidance and pursuit, and all the larcenies and robberies they perpetrate, not with hand and foot, but with the most precious part of themselves; that part which brings forth, when a man so wishes, faith and modesty, truth and justice, and the happiness of a good genius!
For Nature who bestows all things and takes them again, a man of true culture and modesty has but one word: 'Give what thou wilt and take what thou wilt.' And this he says in no thrasonical spirit, but purely in obedience and cheerful acquiescence in her wishes.

Brief is the span of life that remains to thee. Then live in thy palace as thou wouldst on a mountain. For it matters naught whether our lot be cast here or there, so long as a man, wherever he may be, remembers that the universe he lives in is a body politic.

Let men search till they find a true man living in harmony with Nature. Then, if they cannot endure him, let them slay him. For he will choose death rather than change his life.

Cease thy disquisitions on the ideally good man, and become good!

Let thy thoughts ever run on universal time and universal substance, and remember that all individual things are in substance as a fig-seed, in time as the turning of an auger!

Contemplate each object and reflect that it is even now in process of dissolution; nay, putrefaction and dispersal, or whatever is the precise mode by which, so to say, its nature is to die!

Think what revolting creatures men are in eating, sleeping, sexual intercourse, and all the other operations of nature. Then look at them in their pomp and arrogance, quick to anger, and lordly in rebuke! And yet, but a little while ago what a multitude of masters called them slaves! and for what vile ends that slavery was
incurred! And once more a little while, and where will they be?

20 Whatever the universal Nature assigns to any man at any time is for the good of that man at that time.

21 'Earth loves the shower, love rules the solemn air,'—and the universe yearns as a lover to produce whatever is to be. Therefore I say to the universe: 'Thy love is mine.' And might we not argue that this is the inner significance of the phrase 'It loves to happen' (φιλεῖ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι)?

22 Either thy life is spent here and custom has rendered it sweet, or thou goest forth to satisfy thy wish. Or, again, thou diest and thy service is over. There is naught besides. Therefore be of good cheer.

23 Let nothing bedim the conviction that in a man's own breast lies the real country retreat, and that here is all the peace that can be found on mountain-tops, by the sea-shore, or where thou wilt. For so thou shalt surely find the truth of Plato's words: 'Girt with city walls as a swain that milks his flocks in the hill-side fold.'

24 What is my reason to me? What are the qualities with which I am now endowing it? What the use to which I am turning it at this moment? See that it be not void of wisdom, disjoined and divorced from the community, and so molten and mingled with this paltry flesh as to echo its every change!

25 He who flees from his rightful lord is a renegade; and law is our lord; therefore its transgressor is a renegade. But every man who is subject to pain or anger or fear is bound to desire the abrogation of some
decision, past, present, or future, of that power which
governs all things;—in other words, of that law which
metes out his due to every man. So that fear, pain,
and anger brand their possessor as a renegade!

The seed is deposited in the womb; the depositor departs, and a fresh cause takes it, operates on it, and
moulds a child. What a marvellous result from such
a material! Then the child passes food down its throat;
a second cause comes into play, and this time the result
is perception and motion: in a word, life and strength
with all their concomitants, so many and so strange.
Strive then to contemplate the processes that go on
behind the veil, and their powers, even as we view the
force that brings one thing down and carries another up
—not with the eyes, but no whit less clearly.

Let this thought be ever present to thy mind: that all that now takes place took place in time past in
exactly the same fashion; and doubt not the future
will see the like. Nay more, conjure up to sight whole
dramas with their staging to match;—all thou hast
learned from experience or the pages of history: say,
the entire courts of Hadrian and Antoninus, of Philip
and Alexander or Croesus. The plays are all the same;
the cast only is changed!

Look on every man, who evinces pain or dissatis-
faction at any event, as on a level with the pig that is
led out to sacrifice, kicking and squealing. And so too
is it with the invalid who lies moaning on his couch,
instead of reflecting in silence that our hands are bound,
and that it is a prerogative bestowed on rational life
alone to yield voluntarily to whatever befalls us, whereas to yield simply is the common doom.

29 In every single act of thine pause and ask: 'Is it the loss of this that lends death his terrors?'

30 When thy neighbour's errors offend thee, straightway turn to thyself and consider what similar sin may be laid to thy charge,—classification, it may be, of wealth, pleasure, fame, and their like as goods. Attend to this and thy anger will soon be forgotten and give way to the reflection that the sinner acts under compulsion. And what is he to do?—Then bear with him, or, if thou canst, release him from his bondage!

31 Let the sight of Satyrion call up the thought of Socraticus or Eutyches or Hymen; the sight of Euphrates, the thought of Eutychion or Silvanus; let Alciphron bring to mind Tropaeophorus; Severus, Xenophon, or Crito; the contemplation of thyself, the image of some departed Caesar; and analogously let every man have his attendant ghost. Then let the question arise: 'Where are they all now?' Nowhere, or where you please.—So shall it be ever clear to thee that all things mortal are vapour and nothingness; and most of all, if thou forget not that what has once changed can never exist again in all the endless ages to come. Why then strain and struggle? Why not count it enough to pass the brief span allotted thee in decency and quiet? Bethink thee what great materials, what a splendid theme for thought, are the things wherefrom thou fleest! For what are they all save exercises for a reason that has turned a searching scrutiny on life and
penetrated into its nature? Then endure till thou shalt have made even these thine own, as the healthy stomach turns every form of food to its own purposes, or a blazing fire converts whatever we cast therein into light and heat.

Let it be in no man's power to say that in thee there is no simplicity and no goodness, and yet speak the truth: but look to it that none but a liar shall be able to voice these opinions. Thou hast full power so to do. For who can hinder thee from attaining both goodness and simplicity? Only resolve if thou attain them not to live no longer. For reason prohibits existence on such terms.

What is the soundest deed or word possible with the materials at thy command? Whatever it be, its performance or utterance rests wholly with thyself, so let us hear nothing of 'impediments in the way'!

Thy laments will cease only with the knowledge that the position occupied by luxury in the hedonist's eyes is, for thee, filled by the power of turning the subject matter presented thee to a use consistent with the nature of man. For it is our duty to regard every action, that it is within our power to perform in accordance with our own nature, as the keenest form of enjoyment. And this power is ubiquitous. It is true that a cylinder is not capable of unrestricted movement simply in virtue of its own faculty of motion, any more than is water, or fire, or any of those other objects which are governed, either by the simple principle of growth, or by life, minus reason. The impediments
and obstacles in their way are too numerous. But mind and reason pass through all opposition as their nature and wish impel them. Therefore bear in view the facility with which the rational principle traverses all things, as readily as fire flames upwards, or a stone descends to earth, or a cylinder rolls down an inclined plane; and seek for nothing more. For all other forms of hindrance either affect this lifeless flesh of ours or are powerless to crush us, or work us any harm, save by means of our own opinion or by the voluntary surrender of Reason herself. For if the case were otherwise the sufferer himself would deteriorate.—Now with all other creations, whatever harm may befall any of them, the one affected degenerates in consequence. But with us, man is so far from degenerating thereby, that we might even say he rises to greater and more glorious heights simply by making a right use of the accidents that chance to him. And, in general, remember that nothing can harm the man, who is by nature a member of a state, save what harms that state; and nothing can harm the state if it harm not the law. But the law remains unscathed by all these so-called 'mishaps'. Hence if the law is safe, state and citizen are safe as well.

34 To a mind whetted by true philosophy, the briefest and most hackneyed phrases serve as a reminder of the vanity of pain and fear. For instance, the Homeric

'As leaves that the wind strews on the ground so is the generation of man.'
And what are thy children but leaves in the forest of life? What but leaves the multitude with its plausible clamour of approval, its open imprecations, and its smothered curses and revilings? Leaves too are they who shall hereafter pass judgement on thee. For all these 'blossom in the springtide', the wind lays them low, and the forest bears others in their stead.

All things alike are ephemeral, but thou shunnest and pursuest all things as eternal. Yet a little while and thine eyes shall be closed, and for him who beareth forth thy bier another shall anon be mourning.

The function of the healthy eye is to behold the whole visible world, not to murmur: 'I would fain see the green alone'; for this is naught but a token of disease. So too the function of the senses of hearing and smell, in their healthy state, is to hear and smell all things. The healthy stomach must not pick and choose, but accept all food, as a mill grinds everything it was designed to grind.

Thus the healthy mind will cheerfully accept all vicissitudes of fortune, while that which repines: 'O let my children live,' or, 'Let all men praise my doings,' is on a level with the eye that will see naught but green, or the teeth that refuse all but the tenderest foods.

There is no man so blest but that some who stand by his deathbed will hail the occasion with delight. Let him have been virtuous and wise;—at the end there will be found one to mutter: 'Are we then at last to be rid of this pedagogue?' True, he did no harm; yet I
always felt that in his heart he despised us.'—Such was the lot of the truly good. With the rest of us, what an infinity of reasons swells the number of those who would fain see us gone! Therefore, when thou comest to die, depart with cheerfulness, pondering thus: 'The life that I leave behind is one in which those fellow-creatures for whom I have so often struggled, watched, and prayed are the first to wish me out of the way, hoping, 'tis like, to be quit of a kill-joy.' What then will it profit thee to cling to length of days?

But take heed thou depart not in anger, but as thou hast lived, in all friendship, good-will, and charity;—not as one who is plucked away by violence; but rather, as one whose body and soul a kindly death painlessly divorces, so do thou quit the things of this life. For Nature joined thee to these and made thee one with them, and now she unites the knot.—And I obey! I go from friends, it is true, but without a struggle and without a qualm. For this act also was ordained by Nature.

37    Let it be thy habit, so far as possible, when any man performs any act, to inquire within thyself: 'To what end is he referring this?' And begin with thyself, and be the first to appear at this tribunal.

38    Remember what the power that pulls the strings of impulse is: it is that which is hidden within us, it is rhetoric, it is life, nay, we might even say it is man himself. But in thy conception of man never include this outer vessel with the tools attached to it. For tools they are, no less than the carpenter's axe; the one
difference being that they grow to the body. For, in themselves, our members, when disjunct from the cause that sets them in motion and puts them to rest, have no more value than the weaving-woman’s shuttle, the writer’s pen, or the driver’s whip without their owners.

XI

T

HE properties of the rational soul are these: it sees itself, forms itself, renders itself what it will, and enjoys itself the fruit it bears itself, whereas plant-life and animal-life bear fruit or its counterpart only for others to reap the benefit. It attains its own goal, let the boundaries of life be fixed where you will. With it the case is the reverse of a dance or a play, in which the whole action is left fragmentary and incomplete when anything occurs to cut it short. Rather, in every part of the whole, no matter where the end may overtake it, it completes the work before it so thoroughly that nothing more is needed and it can say: ‘All that is mine I have.’

Again, it traverses the whole universe and the surrounding void, views its form, stretches out into infinite time, comprehends and considers the periodical death and re-birth of all things, and discerns that the men who come after us shall see no new thing, and that they who lived before us saw nothing more than we, but that, so to say, every man who reaches two score years, and has been gifted with average intelligence, has contemplated
all things past and all things future in virtue of the law of uniformity.

Another property of our rational soul is love for its neighbours, truth and modesty, and the habit of holding nothing in higher honour than itself,—this last characteristic being peculiar to law as well; whence we may conclude that in essence right reason and justice are the same.

2 The way to acquire contempt for the charms of song, for dancing, or athletics, is to take the voice singing in tune, resolve it into its component sounds, and ask thyself of each: 'Is this too much for thee?' Assent would put thee to shame! Then treat the dance in like manner, subdividing it into its several motions and attitudes; and so too with athletic exhibitions. In short, with the sole exception of virtue and her works, remember always to consider every object through its parts, and by this analytic process learn to despise them all. Nay more, transfer the habit to life itself in its totality.

3 How blest is the soul that is ready, if needs be, to quit the body at this very moment, equally prepared for extinction, dispersal, or continuance! But let this readiness be the result of its own judgement, not of sheer obstinacy as in the case of the Christians. Rather let us meet death with such reasonableness, dignity, and unaffected simplicity as to persuade even the beholder to do likewise.

4 Have I done an act that benefits the community? Then I have received my reward!—Let this thought be ever near to thee, and cease not from well-doing.
What is thy art?—Goodness of life.—But how can this be thine, save through contemplation of universal Nature, on the one hand, and of the proper constitution of man, on the other?

Tragedy was the first form of dramatic representation; its aim being to remind men of the chances that befall them, show that they are natural, and point the moral that what is a cause of pleasurable excitement on the stage is not a matter for vexation on the greater stage of life. For the spectator sees the catastrophe is inevitable, and that though Oedipus may cry 'Woe, woe, Cithaeron!' he still must bear his burden. Incidentally, too, there are not a few helpful lines in the tragedians; most of all, perhaps, the verses:

'If God has spurned me and my children twain,
   God's will be done: He doeth naught in vain.'

Or again,

'If profits not to storm and rail at Fortune,'

and

'Life is a harvest to be reaped at season,'

with many similar sentiments.

Tragedy was followed by the Old Comedy, which indulged in a magisterial freedom of language and did good service through its very outspokenness, inasmuch as it uttered a wholesome warning against arrogance;—a purpose kept in view by Diogenes, when he adopted the same licence of diction.

Next consider the nature of the Middle Comedy, and, again, the reasons which led to the introduction of the
New Comedy, which little by little degenerated into mere artistic mimicry. It is, of course, common knowledge that even these produced a few fine lines; but what was the goal to which the whole purpose of this form of poetry and dramaturgy was directed?

7 How clear it is that there is no other condition of life so well adapted for philosophy as that in which thy lot is cast!

8 A branch lopped from its adjacent branch must of necessity be severed from the whole tree at the same time. And in exactly the same way, the man who sunders himself from any single one of his fellow-creatures drops out of the community. Now the branch is cut down by another; but man separates himself from his neighbour by his own action, that is, by conceiving hatred or aversion for him, though he does not realize that he has thereby broken with the whole body-politic. But there remains to him one great privilege granted by God, the founder of the community of mankind. It is in our power to grow once more to the branch we quitted, and resume our place as active members of the Whole. Still this process of separation, oft repeated, renders it more and more difficult for the seceding part to return to unity and take up its old station. And, altogether, the branch that has from the first grown with the parent tree and continued to share one common life with it, is far different from the branch once lopped off and then re-grafted, as the gardeners say.—It may be one with the tree, but it is alien in principle.
As all who strive to obstruct thy progress in the path of right reason must fail to divert thee from the healthy in act, so let them fail to buffet thee out of thy kindliness towards themselves. Rather hold the two posts at once,—not only firmness in judgement and deed, but meekness in thy dealings with those who would fain block thy way or otherwise molest thee. There is as much weakness in falling into anger with them as there is in abandoning the action and being terrorized into surrender. For the desertion is there in either case; and it matters little that with one man the cause is cowardice; with the other, alienation from him whom Nature framed to be his kinsman and his comrade.

No nature is inferior to art; for the business of every form of art is to mimic a corresponding form of Nature. If this be granted, it follows that the most perfect and comprehensive of all natures cannot fall short of the skill of art. But all arts create the worse to serve the better: hence, the same must be true of universal Nature. And it is this principle that gives rise to justice, which is the parent of all other virtues. For it is impossible to observe justice if we either treat things indifferent as things vital, or remain in our credulity, rashness, and fickleness.

Those objects, whose pursuit and avoidance are so harassing, come not to thee: it is thou who settest out in quest of them. So let thy judgement which passes verdict on them hold its peace, and they will rest calmly without, and thou thyself wilt no more be seen hurrying in pursuit or flight.
The soul is a uniform sphere when it neither stretches forth to grasp the external nor recedes inward; when it neither flings itself abroad nor suffers collapse, but radiates with the light whereby it beholds the truth of all things, and that truth which dwells within itself.

Will a man despise me? Let him see to that himself, and I will look to it that he find no deed or word of mine that merits his contempt. Will he hate me? Again let him see to it! My part will be to remain kindly and benevolently to all men and ready to show this particular man his error, not reproachfully nor as an advertisement of my forbearance, but unfeignedly and benevolently, as did the great Phocion,—unless that too was a piece of acting.

This it is that should be the content of thy heart, so that Heaven may see thou art a man to whom nothing seems just cause for anger or pain. For what evil can touch thee if thy present task is to do the work that befits thine own nature, and to welcome whatever is now to the advantage of universal Nature,—a man striving manfully for the accomplishment, by one means or another, of the common welfare?

They despise one another, yet fawn on one another; long to surpass one another, yet crouch before one another!

What a rotten and counterfeit creature it is that says: 'My intention is to be quite straightforward in our dealings!'-What is this, my good sir? There is no need to give such notice! The event will make all plain. For a man's words ought to be writ on his fore-
head for all to see, and his character should dawn clear in his eyes, even as the beloved instantly reads every secret in the lover's glance. In brief, goodness and simplicity should, so to say, resemble those unpleasant odours that the bystander must be aware of, willy-nilly. But affectation of simplicity is like the crooked branch,—once bent, always bent. Nothing is more repulsive than the wolf's friendship for the lamb. Before all things shun this, remembering that true goodness, simplicity, and kindliness are not hid under a bushel but shine in their possessor's eyes.

The power of living a perfect life lies in the soul, if a man will but treat things indifferent as indifferent. And this indifference will be his if he contemplates them one by one, not in the sum, remembering withal that none of them can force an opinion from us, but that all remain quiescent while we ourselves are the parents of our judgements thereon and inscribe these judgements, so to say, on the tablets of self, though it is within our power to write not at all, or, should they have effected a stealthy entrance, to delete the inscription forthwith. And let him bear in mind also that this caution is needed for but a brief space, and then life will be over.—Though, after all, what trouble can these things give us? If they are in accordance with Nature, rejoice in them, and they will soon be easy to thee. If they are against Nature, then seek out what is prescribed by the nature of thyself and haste to attain it, however inglorious it may be. For there is forgiveness to every man that pursues his own good.
17 Consider the origin of each object, the character of each of its parts, the state into which it changes, and its condition after that change, and forget not that it will suffer no ill thereby.

18 When thy neighbour sins against thee, consider first what is thy relationship to mankind, reflecting that we all exist to serve each other, and that, in especial, thy life-work is to champion thy fellow-creatures as the bull defends his herd and the ram his flock. Again, approach the matter from the first principle that, if the atomic theory is false, Nature must be the power that governs the universe; and, in this case, the worse is created for the good of the better, and the better for the good of one another.

Secondly, call to mind what manner of men these sinners are, at their tables, on their couches, and in the rest of their life. Chief of all, remember the many forms of constraint laid on them by their principles, and the foolish pride with which their very sins inspire them.

Thirdly, reflect that, if these actions of theirs are right, it is no duty of thine to take them amiss; while if they are wrong it is clear they err through ignorance, not of free-will. For as no soul is willingly deprived of truth, so neither is it willingly deprived of the power of treating every one according to his merits. Whence it comes that nothing pricks a man more than to be spoken of as unjust, cruel, avaricious, or, in a word, as a bad neighbour.

Fourthly, bethink thee thou hast vices enough of thine own, and art a sinner with the rest. True, thou
holdest aloof from certain errors, yet thy character is prone to fall into them, though cowardice, love of reputation, or some equally despicable motive may save thee from such overt commission.

Fifthly, remember thou hast no sure knowledge that they sin at all. For many acts are merely means to some hidden end, and, in general, much is to learn before one man can pronounce with certainty on the action of another.

Sixthly, when utter vexation and impatience overpower thee, take refuge in the thought that man’s life is but for a moment, and anon we shall all be under the sod.

Seventhly, consider that it is not men’s actions that trouble us,—for they are situate in the agent’s ruling faculty,—but purely our own opinions on them. Then take this judgement of thine that pronounces this or that an object of terror, dare to cast it out, and anger vanishes with it.—‘ How is this to be done?’ you ask. —By reflecting that another’s sin is not thy dishonour. For, unless dishonour be the sole evil, it is inevitable that thou must commit untold sins and turn robber, or what not, at the same time as thy neighbour.

Eighthly, bear in mind how much harder to endure are the consequences of the anger and grief that ensue on an act than is the act itself which evoked these feelings.

Ninthly, reflect that kindliness is invincible, provided only it be genuine and not the specious grin of hypocrisy. For how can the extremity of insolence touch
thee if thou preserve thy good will to the sinner, meekly admonishing him as opportunity offers and quietly pointing out the error of his ways at the very moment he is meditating thy injury? ‘Not so, my son; this is not the end for which we were created. True, it will harm me not; but, child, it is harming thee.’ And show him with tactfulness and friendliness that the case is so, and that not even the bees or the cattle in their herds act as he does. But set about thy demonstration without trace of irony or rebuke, relying simply on affection and a soul free from rancour. Neither treat him as a pedagogue treats his pupil nor strive to inspire the bystander with admiration of thy magnanimity; but, whether alone with him or in the presence of others, be gentle and unaffected.

Remember these nine rules and guard them as though they were so many gifts from the Muses. Begin even now, while life is still left thee, to be a man. But shun flattery as diligently as thou shunnest anger. Both are detrimental to the community and both lead to harm. And in anger let the thought be ever present that indignation is not a form of courage, but that meekness and gentleness are not only more human but also more manly, and it is he who possesses these that has strength, nerve, and bravery, not the angry and discontented. For, the nearer patience is to dispassionateness, by so much is it nearer strength; and as pain is a characteristic of weakness, so is anger. For their victims have both received their wounds and both succumbed.
And, if thou wilt, receive this tenth gift from the Muses' presiding god. To ask that the wicked shall not sin is an act of madness, inasmuch as it aims at the impossible. But to give them leave to sin against others and demand they shall not sin against thee is not madness, but cruelty and tyranny.

There are four principal vagaries of the intellect ever to be guarded against and deleted, whenever detected, with a few words on each by way of epitaph; for instance: 'This thought is unnecessary; this action tends to dissolve the community; this speech does not represent my thoughts.'—For insincerity of word ought to be classed among the most unnatural of vices. —The last of our four vagaries is whatever may compel thee to reproach thyself for allowing the celestial part of thee to be defeated by, and succumb to, that base and mortal part the body, with its gross pleasures.

Thy breath and all the fiery element in thy composition tend naturally to fly upwards, yet none the less, in obedience to the arrangement of the whole, they are constrained to abide below in the compound. Similarly, the earthy and fluid parts of thee, though their tendency is the reverse, still hold up and maintain a position alien to their nature. That is to say, even the elements obey the universal order and remain at whatever post has been assigned them, till at length the bugle of dissolution shall sound the recall.

Is it not strange, then, that the intellectual part of man should stand alone in mutiny and dissatisfaction with its station? Nay, though no tyrannical com-
mands are imposed on it, but simply the injunction to obey its own nature, it refuses to submit and takes the directly opposite course. For all its movements towards injustice, unchastity, anger, pain, and fear are neither more nor less than a revolt from Nature.

Again, when Reason murmurs at aught that happens she is once more deserting her post. For she was created for holiness and piety no less than for justice; these qualities being comprehended in the general virtue of contentment with the constitution of things, and, indeed, being prior to justice in act.

21 The man whose aim in life does not remain for ever one and the same cannot himself continue one and the same throughout life. This maxim, however, is not sufficient in itself. It needs an added definition of the proper nature of this aim. For as the majority of mankind cannot agree in their opinions on the totality of things that seem to them 'good', in some sense or other, while uniformity prevails with regard to a few of them,—that is to say, such as concern the common welfare,—so ought we to set up for our goal the social and civic good. For he who directs every impulse of himself to this end will be consistent in all his deeds, and, thereby, ever remain the same.

22 When thou lookest on the pursuits of man, think of the two mice from country and town, and their terrified hurrying and scurrying!

23 Socrates' name for the opinions of the average man was 'Lamias'—bugbears to frighten children.

24 The Spartans used to assign the foreign spectators
at their public festivals seats in the shade, and contented themselves with what accommodation they could find.

When Perdiccas invited Socrates to his court, the answer was: 'No, lest I meet the worst of fates and receive benefits without being able to repay them!'

There was a precept in the Epicurean manuals, ever to remember some man of old who practised virtue.

The Pythagoreans bid us every morning look heavenwards, that we may remind ourselves of those bodies that forever perform their own work under the same conditions and by the same methods,—their orderly array, their purity, and their nakedness. For no veil hides a star.

Think of Socrates as he was when he girt himself with the blanket after Xanthippe had hurried out of the house, taking his clothes with her. And remember the answer he made to the friends who blushed and retreated when they saw his apparel!

In reading and writing we must be ruled ere we can rule others. Far more so in life!

'A slave thou art: speech was not meant for thee.'

'And my dear heart laughed within me.'

'They shall speak scorn of Virtue, bitter-tongued.'

None but a madman looks for figs in winter; and none but a madman looks for children when it is too late.

'When thou kisdest thy child,' says Epictetus, 'whisper within thy heart: "To-morrow, belike, thou wilt die."'—'A hard saying!' quoth one.—'No saying,' was his answer, 'can be hard that gives expression to
some act of Nature: else we must call it hard and ill-omened to speak of the ears of corn as garnered.'

35 The sour grape; the ripe cluster; the raisin,—all are changes, not into the non-existent, but into that which is non-existent to the present.

36 Free-will, as Epictetus said, is a treasure beyond the reach of the robber.

37 'It is our duty,' says the same philosopher, 'to reduce our assent to a science, and to keep the attention on guard over our impulses, so that none shall be unconditioned, and all shall be regulated by the good of the community and the value of the object in view. We ought, moreover, to abstain from desire in any form, and limit our aversions to that which is in our own power.'

38 'So it proves,' said he, 'that the point at issue is no trivial matter, but sanity or insanity!'

39 'What will you have?' asked Socrates. 'Souls of rational beings or irrational?—Souls of rational beings.'—'And of what kind of rational beings? Sound or sick?'—'Sound.'—'Why then do you not search for them?'—'Because we have them.'—'Why, then, this fighting and bickering?'

XII

1 ALL the objects thou prayest it may be thine to reach after many days are, even now, within thy power, if thou wilt but stretch forth thy hand to take
them: in other words, if thou wilt leave the past to itself, entrust the future to Providence, and content thyself with conforming the present to holiness and justice. Holiness, that thou mayest rest content with the lot Nature assigns thee; for she bare it for thee and thee for it. Justice, that thy words may be the words of truth, free and undisguised; that thy every act may conform to law and equity; and that naught may impede thee, whether it be another’s wickedness, his thoughts of thee and his words, or the sensations of this circumscribing flesh, which, being the sufferer, may be left to look to itself. Accordingly, whenever thou shalt draw nigh to thy journey’s end, leave all else behind thee, reserve thy reverence for reason and the celestial part of thyself, and fear not because sooner or later thou must cease to live, but rather lest life by Nature’s laws be yet to begin:—this do, and thou wilt be a man worthy of the universe that gave thee birth, no longer a stranger on thy native soil, no longer a dullard to whom the events of every day are marvels of the unexpected, and no longer a mere dependent on this thing or that!

God views the minds of all men in their nakedness, stripped of the casings and husks and impurities of the material. For, solely in virtue of the intellectual part of Himself, He touches directly the human intellect that emanates from Him and has flowed into these bodies of ours. So train thou thyself to do likewise, and thou shalt be quit of this sore distraction of thine. For he who has no eyes for our fleshly covering surely
will not trouble himself with the contemplation of a man's house, raiment, fame, or aught else of these outer trappings and stage decorations!

3 There are three things whereof thou art compound: body, breath, and mind. Of these the first two are thine in so far as it is thy duty to assume their stewardship; but the third alone is thine absolutely. Wherefore, if thou wilt put away from thyself and thy mind all that others do or say, all thou thyself hast said or done, all disturbing thoughts of the future, all the vicissitudes of thy fleshly garment and its conjunct breath, with all that the circumfluent vortex whirls along, so that the intellective power, exempt and purified from the things of destiny, may dwell free and master in its own household, practising justice of action, resigned to all that chances, and speaking the truth,—if, I say, thou wilt put aside from this reason of thine all accretions born of the fleshly affections, all time to come, and all time past, likening thyself to the Empedoclean globe—that 'perfect sphere rejoicing with great joy in its stability',—and striving to live only the life thou livest, in other words the present, then the power will be thine to pass the span that is left between thee and death in calmness and cheerfulness and content with the godhead that resides within thee.

4 I have often marvelled how it is that every one loves himself more than the rest of human kind, yet values his own opinion of himself less than that of others. At all events, were some god or some sage to stand by a man and bid him entertain no idea, no thought, within
himself without simultaneously uttering it aloud, he could not abide the ordeal for a single day. So true it is that we have more respect for our neighbours and their thoughts of us than we have for ourselves!

How comes it that Heaven, after ordaining all things well and showing singular kindness to mortals, has been guilty of this single omission: that some men, and they of the noblest cast,—men who, so to say, have had many and intimate dealings with God, and through righteousness of deed and frequent acts of worship have rendered themselves familiar with Him,—once dead never revisit life, but are swallowed up in impenetrable darkness?

But if this be so in truth, then rest thou assured that, ought it to have been otherwise, Heaven would so have ordered it. For had it been just it would have been possible; and had it been in accord with Nature, Nature would have brought it us. But since none of these things seem to be, let this very fact be proof sure enough for thee that neither ought they to have been. For thou thyself canst see that in this bootless disquisition thou art arguing justice with God; and the nature of such disputation presupposes His perfect goodness and justice. Grant this, then, and it is plain that He would never have tolerated any unjust, any irrational oversight in the ordering of the universe.

Practise even that thou despaires't to acquire; for the left hand, useless as it is for all other purposes through lack of training, still takes a firmer grip of the reins than does the right. For here custom stands it in good stead.
7 Ever remember the state of body and mind in which it is our duty to await death, the brevity of life, the unbroken tract of time behind us and before, and the debility of all that is material.

8 Contemplate the formal stripped of its material shell; the end whereto every act is referred; the vanity of pain and pleasure, of death and glory; the wretchedness of him who is sole cause of his own turmoil; the truth that no man can be impeded by another, and that all is opinion.

9 In the application of our principles it is our duty to imitate the boxer rather than the gladiator. For let but the latter drop the sword he uses, and death is sure; whereas the former has always his hand in readiness, and all he has to do is to clench it.

10 View things in themselves, analysing them into form, matter, and purpose.

11 What a wonderful power is man's, to do naught save what will receive the approval of God, and to welcome every dispensation He sends us!

12 A result of Nature is not to be imputed to the gods for blame;—for they sin not at all, whether willingly or unwillingly;—nor yet to men, for all their sins are involuntary. Therefore blame nothing whatsoever.

13 How ludicrously a stranger in the universe is he who marvels at aught that happens in life!

14 The universe must be governed either by a foreordained destiny,—an order that none may overstep,—by a merciful Providence, or by a chaos of chance devoid of a ruler. If the theory of an insuperable fate
be true, why struggle against it? If Providence watches over all and may be inclined to mercy, render thyself worthy of celestial aid. But if leaderless chaos be all, rest content that in the midst of this storm-swept sea Reason still dwells and rules within thee. And if the tide swirl thee away, let it take thy flesh and spirit, with all the rest; for Reason it cannot take. Or shall the light in the lanthorn shine and its radiance be dimmed only by extinction, and the truth, the justice, the temperance, that abide within thee, die out in darkness before death shall overtake thee?

If a man seem to thee to have sinned, ask: How do I know whether this deed of his be a sin or no? But granted he has sinned, is it certain that he has not voluntarily condemned himself? For remorse may be genuine without finding vent in tears and tearing of cheeks.

Reflect, moreover, that he who will not have the vicious man indulge his vice is on a level with him who would forbid the fig-tree’s juice to be bitter, prohibit the child from crying, or the horse from neighing, and veto all else that is inevitable. For what can the man do but sin, with a character such as he has? If then thou hast strength and skill, heal this!

If the act become thee not, do it not! If the word be false, say it not! . . .

In everything look and see what is the object that gives rise to the impression in thee, and simplify it by resolution into its formal and material parts, its purpose, and the time within which it must cease to be.
19 Learn, late as it is, that thou hast within thee something higher and more divine than the objects that are the causes of passion, and, in general, drag thee puppet-like whither they will.

19 What is the present content of my mind? See that it be not fear, suspicion, desire, and their like.

20 First, do nothing at random or without a purpose. Second, let that purpose have no goal save the good of the community.

21 Reflect that, in a little while, thou shalt be nothingness and no place shall know thee, nor shall anything be of all that now thou seest, nor any man of those who are now in life. For all things are by nature framed to change, transmute, and decay, that others may rise to fill their places.

22 Forget not that all is opinion, and that opinion subject to thee. Then cast it out when thou wilt, and like the mariner who has doubled the cape, thou wilt find thyself in a great calm, a smooth sea, and a tideless bay.

23 Cessation is no evil to any single activity, be it what it may, when that cessation takes place at the appointed time; nor is the agent himself affected unfavourably by the opportune termination of his act. On this principle it follows that it is no disaster for the sum of all actions whatsoever—in other words, life,—to be brought to a close when its hour arrives; nor has the man who terminates this series at the proper period been harshly dealt with. But the time and its limits are fixed by Nature; this Nature, though on occasions
coinciding with the individual, as in old age, being always the universal Nature, the changes of whose parts enable the universe in its entirety to preserve perpetual youth and vigour. And all that tends to the well-being of the Whole is ever good and ever timely. Whence, to man, the end of life is not an evil: for it is no dishonour, being independent of our will, and in no way detrimental to the community. And it is a good, inasmuch as it is opportune, advantageous, and congruent to the universe.

And so that man may be said to be borne of God, who walks the same path with Him, and whose thoughts are directed to the same goal as His.

There are three things ever to be kept in mind. First, whatever thou doest, see it be done not at random, but so that Justice herself could not have acted otherwise; and remember that all external contingencies are dispensations either of chance or Providence, and that it is folly to blame the former, and impiety to accuse the latter. Second, ponder the progress of every being from its generation to the hour when it receives a soul, and thence again to the time when it renders back that soul, together with the elements whereof all things are compound, and into which they must be dissolved. Third, reflect that were some sudden power to bear thee aloft to a pinnacle, whence thou couldst survey human life in all its multifariousness, after gaining withal a glimpse at the multitude of creatures that people the surrounding air and ether, the sight would inspire thee with contempt; and, oft as the ascent
might be repeated, the same spectacle would always meet thy gaze: monotony of form and brevity of time. These are the objects of our pride!

25 Cast out opinion and thou art saved. Who, then, can forbid thee so to do?

26 To show vexation at aught is to forget that all things take place by the fiat of universal Nature; that the sin which troubles thee is another's, not thine; and that all that happens always has happened, always will happen, and everywhere is happening in exactly the same way. It is to forget the ties of kindred that unite the individual to the rest of his kind;—a kindred based not on community of flesh and blood and seed, but of reason;—to forget that the intelligence wherewith every man is endowed is divine, and an emanation from the Deity; that nothing belongs to ourselves alone, but children, body, and even soul are all sprung from the same source; that all is opinion; and, finally, that each of us lives the present moment alone, and that this is all he loses.

27 Continually revolve the fate of men whom circumstances have driven to bitterness; men who have known the heights of glory, the depths of calamity and enmity, or any extreme of fortune you will. Then ask: 'Where is it all now?' Vapour, dust and ashes; a tale that is told or a tale that has ceased to be told!

And let this bring up all the stories of the life Fabius Catullinus led in the country, Lucius Lupus in his parks, Stertinius at Baiae, Tiberius in Capreae, and Rufus at Velia,—in a word, all the classic instances of
arrogance pursuing its ends. Reflect how vulgar all their efforts were, and how much more philosophic it is for a man to use the materials at his disposal in order to render himself just and temperate, and a follower in the divine footsteps. But let this be done in simplicity; for, of all forms of pride, the most intolerable is that which smoulders under a self-styled humility.

When men ask: 'Where hast thou seen these gods thou art so eager to worship? Or what proof hast thou that they exist?' My answer is: 'First of all, they are visible even to the bodily eye; and in the second place, I have not seen my soul, yet I have none the less veneration for it. And so it is with the gods. From all the instances, in which I am every moment experiencing their power, I conclude they exist and bow before them.'

The salvation of life is to contemplate every object in its entirety, and see what it is in essence, what is the formal element in it, and what the material; and to do the right, and speak the truth, in all sincerity of heart. What then is left, save to enjoy life, adding one good deed to another so that not the briefest interval is left bare of good?

There is one light of the sun, though it be interrupted by walls, mountains, and impediments innumerable. There is one universal substance, though it be broken up into a myriad bodies, each with its peculiar qualities. There is one soul, though the natures and the limits of the individual among which it is distributed are legion. And there is one intellective soul, though it seems divided.
Now the other parts of the objects enumerated,—for instance, spirit and matter,—lack sensation and have no natural connexion one with the other. Yet even these are held in unison by the intellectual faculty and that power which compels them to gravitate towards the same point. But it is a peculiar property of the mind that its motion is ever to its kindred mind; with this it combines, and the feeling for community suffers no interruption.

31 What seekest thou?—Life?—But what wilt thou have? Perception? Impulse? Growth? The ensuing cessation of growth? The power of speech? Or the faculty of thought?—Which of these seems worthy of thy desire? Then, if they are all despicable, turn to the one thing left, and follow Reason and God. But it is directly antagonistic to this resolve for a man to value the things of life, or to shrink from the thought of being deprived thereof by death.

32 What an infinitely little part of the endless, unbroken tract of time has been allotted each of us! What a trifling section of the universal substance and the universal soul! And what a tiny clod of the whole earth is the space whereon thou creepest! Think of all this and deem nothing great, save to do whatsoever the nature of thyself prescribes, and to suffer whatsoever the nature of the Whole brings thee.

33 To what end is thy ruling faculty applying itself? Herein is all. For the rest of things, be they subject to our will or independent thereof, are but death and vapour.
It is a potent stimulus to contempt of death to reflect that even they who class pleasure as a good, and pain as an evil, have dared to despise it.

The man who counts nothing good save that which comes in due season, who recks not whether the sum of his actions according to right reason shall be greater or less, and who cares not a jot whether he has viewed the universe for many years or few, cannot look on death as a thing of terror.

Friend, thou hast been a citizen in this great city; and what matters it whether for five years or three? The law is the same for us all. Where is the hardship, then, if it be no tyrant's stroke, no unjust judge, that sends thee into exile, but the same Nature that brought thee hither, even as the master of the show dismisses the mummer that he put on the stage?—'But my rôle is unfinished. There are five acts and only the three are gone! '—Thy words are true; but in life three acts are all the play. For He decrees it shall end, who was once the author of thy existence, and now of thy dissolution. But thou art guiltless of both. Then depart at peace with all men; for He who bids thee go is at peace with thee.
NOTES

In this translation I have had in view mainly those readers to whom the original is perforce a sealed book. Hence, in the version itself, I have endeavoured, even at some sacrifice of accuracy, to avoid those phrases—almost inevitable in a literal rendering—which would be barely intelligible without reference to the Greek. In the few notes, on the other hand, I have usually assumed some knowledge of the two classical tongues. These notes have, of course, no claim to originality, and are chiefly designed for the reader who merely desires a rough knowledge of some of the leading principles of Stoicism.

So too with regard to the text, which the great Salmasius considered the worst of all Greek texts, when a passage was corrupt, or appeared so to me, I have generally adopted an emendation which seemed to give a tolerable sense, without much regard to critical probability. My own hariolations are, needless to say, not intended for a serious attempt to amend the text of Antoninus, but merely for makeshifts in such passages as seemed to yield an unsatisfactory sense in their traditional form.

I. 14. Severus: For Severus, who is known only from this passage, Scaliger conjectured Verus, which would refer to L. Aurelius Verus (L. Ceionius Commodus), brother of M. Aurelius by adoption and his colleague in the empire from 161–9 A.D. If this is so, it would seem the Emperor had been as much mistaken in his character as in that of Faustina. Certainly
Marcus Aurelius

Helvidius and Cato were not likely heroes to occupy the thoughts of Verus. But the brother here spoken of seems to have been older than Marcus, and to have exercised considerable influence on the formation of his mental and moral character.

II. 7. ['Distract.'] The word περίστραφώ is strictly applied to the simultaneous sensations which in every act of perception tend to divert us from that perception with whose consideration we are immediately concerned, the φαντασία being ἀπεριστατόσ when these prove to be in harmony with it (v. Dr. Reid on Cic. Acad. ii. 33). In Marcus Aurelius little of the technical sense seems to remain, though he uses the word some half dozen times.

II. 13. 'The things of the nether realms' (tà νέρθεν γάς) is a quotation from Pindar employed by Plato (Theaet. 173 E) in a not very dissimilar context. ['At times perchance pity them.'] This is, strictly speaking, a deviation from Stoic orthodoxy and is repeated (vii. 26) without the qualifying τρόπον τινά. Zeno's view, of course, was 'neminem misericordem esse nisi stultum et levem' (Cic. pro Mur. xxix. 61), and Seneca stigmatizes pity as 'the vice of a little mind' ('est enim vitium pusilli animi'). The part of the wise man is simply to aid the suffering, not to degenerate from his own state of apathy,—'non miserebitur sapiens sed succurret.' In Epictetus and M. Aurelius the distinction becomes almost obliterated, both agreeing with modern sentiment in subscribing to Phocion's dictum: οὔτε ἐξ ἕρωτι βωμόν οὔτε ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἀφαιρετέω τὸν ἔλεον.

II. 15. The Cynic Monimus, a follower of Diogenes and Crates, inclined to Pyrrhonism, and is classed among τοὺς τὸ κριτήριον ἀνελόντας. The saying here alluded to seems to have been τυφων εἶναι τὰ πάντα, i. e. οἷς τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ὃς ὄντων, while the reference
to his style is explained by Laertius who says γέγραφε παίγνια λεληθείς σπουδῆ μεμυμένα.

III. 1. ['The breath will not leave his body.'] δια-πνεῖσθαι (vi. 16), of course, refers to the ancient theory that the arteries, which collapse at death, served as air-channels during life.

['If the time has come to put an end to life.'] Suicide, to the Stoics, was in certain cases not only justifiable but a matter of duty. The wise man, in Seneca's words, lives not so long as he can, but so long as he ought. A sufficient cause for self-destruction may be to serve others, to avoid compulsory dereliction of duty, or to escape from poverty, sickness, and, as here, the incipient imbecility of old age. The obvious objection that all these reasons are connected with the 'things indifferent' is met, as Zeller points out, by the answer that life and death are equally indifferent. That the theory had its practical side is shown by the fact that Zeno, late in life, hanged himself because he had broken a finger, while Cleanthes, who had started a hunger-cure, thought he might as well go the whole way to death, and did; while the example of Cato became a stock instance of the crowning act of virtue.

III. 2. This section, like vi. 36 and viii. 50, is an attempt to answer the objections which might be brought against the Stoic theory of the perfection of the universe. Here Antoninus merely extends the view of Chrysippus, that many things were created for their beauty alone; and his examples are certainly more striking than those adduced by Cicero (de Fin. iii. 5.18), who instances the peacock's tail, the changing hues of the dove's plumage, and the beard in man—' ut cauda pavoni, plumae versicolores columbis, viris mammae atque barba.' In viii. 50, his position approaches more closely the other plea of Chrysippus, that Nature, in creating the sublime and the useful, was bound to
admit certain minor drawbacks—'per sequellas quasdam necessarias,' i.e. κατὰ παρακολούθησιν,—the instance cited by Aulus Gellius (vii. i. 10–13) being the human head, in the construction of which it was necessary to use small and delicate bones, whence the lamentable sequel that it is so easily broken; and, in general, these 'by-products' are not τέχνης ἔργα but ὄλης πάθη.

III. 3. ['Democritus.'] There seems no other authority for this account of Democritus' end, Laertius saying that he died exhausted by old age, and Lucretius (iii. 1039 sqq.) that he committed suicide on noting the decay of his mental powers. The 'other vermin' that proved fatal to Socrates are apparently Anytus and Meletus. Gataker quotes the remark of Epictetus οἱ μὲν ἡμῶν μεγάλα θηρία εἰσίν, οἱ δὲ θηρίδια κακοθῆ καὶ μικρά, ἐφ' ὅν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν Λέων μὲ καὶ φαγέτω.

III. ii. ['A citizen of that highest state.'] Cosmopolitanism is a distinctive feature of the Stoic creed, though it had its analogy among the Cynics. It is true that many isolated sentences in Greek poetry show that the idea was not altogether foreign to the classical period (though the sentiment was usually that of the 'Teucri vox... patria est ubicumque est bene'), e.g. Eur. Phaeth. fr. 774 ὃς πανταχοῦ γε πατρὶς ἦ βόσκουσα γῆ, fr. inc. 1034 ἄπας μὲν ἁγρὶ ἄστῳ περάσιμος, ἀπασα δὲ χθῶν ἄνδρι γενναῖῳ πατρίς, but that such utterances were looked on with suspicion is shown by Lysias: καὶ γὰρ οἱ φύσει μὲν πολίται εἰσὶ γνώμη δὲ χρώνται ὃς πᾶσα γῆ πατρίς αὐτοῖς ἔστιν... οὕτω δὴλοι εἰσίν ὅτι ἄν παρέντες τὸ τῆς πόλεως κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐαυτῶν ἰδιον κέρδος ἔλθοιεν, while to Plato and Aristotle the inferiority of Barbarian to Greek is still indisputable (cf. e.g. Ῥεπ. 470 C). But the conquests of Alexander naturally tended to eliminate or at least weaken the old local patriotism of Greece, and it
is significant that the great masters of the Stoic school were none of them natives of Hellas proper. Zeno hailed from Cyprus, Cleanthes from Assos, Herillus from Carthage, Chrysippus from Soli, the second Zeno from Tarsus, Panaetius from Rhodes, and Posidonius from Syria; while Epictetus was a Phrygian, and Seneca and Marcus Aurelius Romans. Still, the doctrine that the universe is one great state of which all men are members is a natural consequence of their first principles. All share in the universal reason of God—the soul of the world—and are thus brethren (ii. 1), subject to one law (iv. 4), and consequently fellow citizens (ib.). On this point and on the duty of man as a member of the kouνονία M. Antoninus insists repeatedly, e. g. vi. 14, 23, vii. 13, 55, viii. 7, 34, ix. 23, using, in fact, the word κοινός and its compounds over eighty times.

III. 11. [The true value of things indifferent.] A reference to the subdivision of the ἄδιάφορα into προηγμένα (praesposita) and ἀποτοπηγμένα (reiecta), the former being κατὰ φύσιν and possessing a certain value (ἀξία), the latter παρὰ φύσιν and worthy only of ἀπαξία; while a third class, again, is absolutely indifferent (τὰ καθάπαξ ἄδιάφορα)—e. g. whether the number of hairs on a man’s head is odd or even.

III. 15. The section is obscure and was considered corrupt by Coraës, as by Polak. The point in κλέπτειν may be explained by a comparison with x. 13 οἴα κλέπτουσιν... οὐ χεροί καὶ ποσίν, ἀλλὰ τῷ τιμωτάτῳ έαντῶν μέρει κτέ; while στείρειν seems to refer to the use of στέρμα vindicated in iv. 36.

IV. 1. [Conditional.] The Stoic phrase μεθ’ ὑπερέξαρέσεως, cum exceptione, is used to denote the frame of mind in which the Sage approaches everything, viz. prepared for disappointment. ‘I shall make a voyage, if nothing prevents me; I shall be made a magistrate, if
nothing comes in the way.' For ' sapientis est semper de fortuna cogitare et sibi nihil de fide eius promittere' (Seneca).

IV. 14. The 'generative principle' is simply a name for the Deity—the fiery and rational ether—regarded as the creative power of Nature, the 'Urzeuer' being the σπέρμα from which all things come into being. In man it is the power of procreation, standing in the same relation to the universal λόγος σπερματικός as the individual soul to the world-soul.

IV. 21. The Stoics allowed only a limited immortality to the soul. It continues to exist after death, but being part of the world-soul obviously cannot survive the universal conflagration as a separate entity but must be reabsorbed in the whole—'parva ruinae gentis accessio.' Cleanthes held that all souls enjoy this term of existence; Chrysippus, on the other hand, according it only to those of the wise. Seneca at times approaches very closely to the Christian doctrine of immortality, as in the well-known passage of Ep. cii 'Sic per hoc spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senectutem, in alium maturescimus partum. Alia origo nos expectat, alius rerum status; nondum caelum nisi ex intervallo pati possumus . . . Dies iste quem tamquam extremum reformidas aeternis natalis est.' Elsewhere he has nothing better to offer than the cold comfort that death will restore us to the tranquillity which was ours before birth—'utrimque alta securitas.' Nor is Marcus much more definite. In this passage he abridges even the span that Cleanthes and Chrysippus had left us; in iii. 3 he gives us the alternatives ei μὲν ἐφ' ἐτερον βίον . . . ei δ' ἐν ἀναισθησία, in viii. 58 ἀναισθησία and αἰσθησίς ἑτεροία, in vii. 32 σβέσις ὡμετάστασις or, si placet, σκέδασις; and so frequently, in all of which the soul may be said to be immortal, but only with the depressing reservation of Demonax—
so that in reality we are left with nothing more definite than the words of Socrates (Apol. fin.) ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡδη ὁρα ἀπείναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανοῦν-μένο, ύμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐτὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἀδηλὸν παντὶ πλῆν εἰ τῷ θεῷ.

IV. 24. ['Do little.'] The author of this remark was Democritus.

IV. 33. ['Unheralded and unsung.'] Hom. Od. i. 242 οἴχετ' αἰστός, ἀπιστός, ἐμοὶ δ' ὀδύνας τε γόους τε | κάλλιτεν.

V. 12. The verse referred to here is a fragment of Menander as emended by Cobet: οὐκ ἔχεις ὁ〈ποι χέσις〉 ὕπο τὸν ἁγαθῶν, εὖ ἱσθι. 'Veretur M. Antoninus obscenum versum perscribere, donec in fine eum paulullum immutans refert.' Stich.

V. 27. ['A fragment of Himself.'] That the human reason is part of the divine is insisted on throughout by M. Aurelius. Here it is an ἀπόστασις of the Deity; in ii. 1, an ἀπόμοιρα; and in ii. 4, an ἀπόρροια, cf. ix. 8, xii. 26, 30; Sen. Ep. xli 'in unoquoque virorum bonorum "quis deus incertum est, habitat deus."' And to the Stoic the phrase is more than a mere figure of speech; for the universal soul, a fiery ether, is the substance of which the individual soul is composed. (Zeller, iii, p. 200 n.)

V. 29. ['The room is smoky.'] An allusion, according to Gataker, to the proverb that there are three things which drive a man out of the house—smoke, a leakage in the roof, and a quarrellsome wife. He compares Epictetus' words κατὸν πεποίηκεν ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι ἄν μέτριον, μένοι ἄν λίαν πολύν, ἐξέρχομαι.

V. 31. ['No word, no deed.'] Hom. Od. iv. 689 οἶδος Ὀδυσσείς ἐσκε μὲθ' ὑμετέρωσι τοκεῦσιν, | οὔτε τινὰ ῥέξας ἐξαίτιον οὔτε τι εἰπὼν.

An exhalation from blood. Heraclitus was responsible for the statement τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίασιν εἶναι. In the Stoic system, the human soul is located in the breast and supposed to derive sustenance from the warm exhalations of the blood, in the same way as the kindred fire of the stars is nourished by the vapours rising from earth.

VI. 10. [‘Return to earth.’] Il. vii. 99 ἄλλ' ἵματι μὲν πάντες ὤδορ καὶ γαῖα γένουσθε | ἄμετροι αthenReturn, ἀκήρυιοι, ἀκλεῖες αὗτως. Plutarch, discussing the same line, remarks that it is precisely this return to a non-sentient state which human nature most dreads—αὐτὸ γὰρ τούτῳ ἔστιν ὃ δεδοικεν ἡ φύσις . . . τὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ φρονοῦν μὴ' αἰσθανόμενον διάλυσιν.

VI. 14. [‘Physical cohesion.’] According to Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math. viii. 2) the ἤνωμένα σώματα are divided into those held together ὑπὸ ψυλῆς ἔξεως, e.g. wood and stones; ὑπὸ φύσεως, as plants; ὑπὸ ψυξῆς—animals.

VI. 35. Gataker quotes elsewhere ancient anecdotes to illustrate the independence of the artist. A fair specimen is the retort of Stratonicus to Ptolemy who contradicted him on a point of music: ‘Your majesty’s hands may be good enough to hold a sceptre, but not a lyre’—ἐτερόν ἔστιν, ὁ βασιλεὺς, σκήπτρον, ἐτερον δὲ πληκτρον—and of Apelles to the courtier Megabyzus, ‘You see these boys mixing colours: they were awe-struck by your purple and gold so long as you held your tongue, νῦν δὲ σου καταγελᾶ περὶ δὲν ὅμω μεμάθηκας ἀρξάμενον λαλεῖν.

VI. 38. [‘Centripetal and centrifugal.’] ‘The Stoics assume two forces, or rather two forms of motion, one rarifying, the other densifying; the latter, which is
inward, being the cause of existence (solidarity), and the former, which is outward, giving rise to the qualities of matter.' Simplicius (quoted by Zeller, iii. p. 131, 3). Censorinus (ib. p. 119, 2): 'Initia rerum eadem elementa et principia dicuntur. Ea Stoici creaturen temen (i.e. τόνος) atque materiam: tenorem qui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem concrescente rursus a summo referatur ad medium.'

VI. 42. ['Heraclitus.'] A striking saying of Heraclitus, though apparently to the opposite effect, is recorded by Plutarch, that 'in their waking moments all men share in one and the same universe, but the sleeper at once enters into a world that is his own undivided property'—τοῦς ἐγγρηγοροσίν ἑνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμου εἴναι, τῶν δὲ κοιμωμένων ἑκαστὸν εἰς ἰδίων ἀποστρέφεσθαι.

['Comic relief in the drama.'] The words of Chrysippus are preserved by Plutarch: 'As poets introduce into their comedies absurd jests, which are bad in themselves, yet lend a sort of charm to the whole poem, so, in itself, evil is reprehensible, yet it has its use for that which is not evil.' St. Augustine himself says, in the De Civitate Dei, that God would have created no man or angel bad, if He had not known at the same time the way in which He could turn their evil to the use of the good, and thus adorn the cycle of the ages, like a beautiful poem, with a few antitheses—'atque ita ordinem saeculorum tamquam pulcherrimum carmen etiam ex quibusdam quasi antithetis honestaret.'

VI. 55. Perhaps a reference to the parable of the mutinous sailors in Plato (Rep. vi. 488).

VII. 13. ['Unity . . . disjunction.'] The ancients distinguished three classes of σώματα: ἕνωμένα (contina), τὰ ἐκ συναπτομένων (composita), and τὰ ἐκ διεστῶτων (ex distantibus). The first class included plant and animal life (τὰ ἕπο μᾶς ἐξεως κρατοῦμενα), the
second such objects as buildings and ships (τὰ ἐκ τῶν παρακειμένων καὶ πρὸς ἐν τῷ κεφάλαιον συνενότων), and the third those bodies of which the members are separate, e. g. an army or a people (τὰ ἐκ διεξευγμένων καὶ ἐκκεχωρισμένων καὶ καθ’ αὐτὰ ὑποκειμένων συγκείμενα).

VII. 17. ['Happiness.'] The passage is one of the frequent etymologizings of the Stoics (cf. v. 8, x. 21, viii. 57). Ἐνδαιμονία is obviously nothing else than an ἀγαθὸς δαίμων; but the mind (ἡγεμονικόν) is also a δαίμων, being part of the divine reason; therefore Ἐνδαιμονία is an ἀγαθὸν ἡγεμονικόν.

VII. 33. ['The pang that cannot be borne.'] This is the well-known dilemma of Epicurus, to which M. Aurelius refers again in vii. 64 and x. 3. Plutarch, discussing it, quotes a verse of Aeschylus (fr. 352 Sidgwick) θάρσει πόνον γὰρ τὰκρον οὐκ ἔχει χρόνον. Seneca turns it neatly: 'Nemo potest valde dolere et diu,' and: 'Dolor levis est si ferre possum, brevis est si ferre non possum.'

VII. 35. Plat. Rep. 486 A, B.

VII. 36. The same saying is attributed to Alexander the Great by Plutarch.


VII. 39. The origin of this line seems unknown.

VII. 40. Eur. Hypsip. (fr. 752 Dind.). The words are spoken by Amphiaras to console the mother of the dead Archermorus.

VII. 41. Anonymous.

VII. 42. Aristoph. Ach. 661.

VII. 43. Apparently a quotation; probably from some drama. The word σφιζέω occurs in a trimeter
preserved by Suidas σφύζεις, Ἀχιλλεὶ, κἀὶ μεθύσκη τὰς φρένας.

VII. 44. Plat. Apol. 28 B.
VII. 45. Ib. 28 D.
VII. 46. Plat. Gorg. c. 68 (p. 512).
VII. 48. Apparently not to be found in Plato.
VII. 50. Eur. Chrysipp. (fr. 833 Dind.). Cf. Lucr. ii. 999 'Cedit item retro, de terra quod fuit ante, | in terras, et quod missumst ex aetheris oris, | id rursum caeli rellatum templa receptant.'

VII. 51. The first two lines are from Eur. Suppl.

VII. 56. 'Sic ordinandus est dies omnis tamquam cogat agmen et consummet atque expleat vitam. Pacuvius ... sic in cubiculum ferebatur a cena ut inter plausus exoletorum hoc ad symphoniam caneretur, Βεβίωκε, Βεβίωκε. Nullo non se die extulit. Hoc, quod ille ex mala conscientia faciebat, nos ex bona faciamus, et in somnum ituri laeti hilaresque dicamus "Vixi et quem dederat cursum fortuna peregi"... Quisquis dixit Vixi ad lucrum surgit.' Sen. Ep. xii. § 9.

VII. 63. The reference seems to be to the Republic (iii. 412 fin.) φαίνεται μοι δόξα εξείναι έκ διανοίας ἡ ἐκουσίως ἡ ἀκουσίως, ἐκουσίως μὲν ἡ ψευδής τοῦ μεταμανθάνοντος, ἀκουσίως δὲ τάσα ἡ ἀληθής κτέ.

VIII. 37. The 'sack' is of course the human body; the most famous instance of the phrase being the remark of Anaxarchus, who was pounded to death in a mortar by order of Nicocreon, the Cyprian tyrant: πτίσσε τὸν 'Αναξάρχον θύλακν' 'Ανάξαρχον δὲ οὗ πλάττεις.

VIII. 42. 'It was a habit with Antoninus,' says Capitolinus, 'to punish offences more leniently than was prescribed by the law, though in cases of grave and manifest crimes he sometimes showed himself inef-

orable.
VIII. 45. Gataker quotes Seneca (ad Helv. 5): 'Duo quae pulcherrima sunt, quocumque nos moverimus, sequentur: natura communis et propria virtus.' Cf. Epict. (ii. 16): 'When shall I behold Athens and the Acropolis once more?—Fool, will not the sights of every day suffice thee? Canst thou have a greater and nobler spectacle than sun, moon, stars, earth, and ocean?'

IX. 2. ['The next best voyage.'] The δεύτερος πλοῖος takes place when the wind sinks and recourse must be had to the oars. (To the examples given by Gataker may be added Naumachius Γαμικὰ Παραγγέλματα 10 ἐρέω πῶς κρύ ςε περῆσαι | τὸν πλοῖν, ὃς φανεί, τὸν δεύτερον ἐμφρον θυμῶ.) The same circumstance gave rise to the proverb ὅταν ἀργυρῶν ἦ πάντα θεὶ καλαίνεται. (Schol. Aristoph. Eccl. 109.)

IX. 27. ['Through dreams and prophecies.'] The older Stoics made great efforts to harmonize the popular religion with their own tenets. Prophecy they regarded partly as a contributory proof of the existence of the gods, partly as a necessary sequel of their existence, the divine nature being so benevolent that it would not have denied man this precious gift. Antoninus appeals to his own experience in i. 17, though in i. 6 he professes incredulity with regard to the popular superstitions, and elsewhere (vi. 30) praises the freedom of Pius from δεισιδαίμονια. But he nowhere attempts any reconciliation of these phenomena with his own system.

X. 7. ['Assume if you will.'] The end of this section is exceedingly obscure.

X. 10. The Sarmatians were one of the nations with which Antoninus had to deal during his troubled reign. That great conquerors are only robbers on a large scale is a conclusion that antiquity was fond of applying to Alexander the Great; as in the story of the pirate who, asked by that potentate by what right he infested the
high seas, replied, ‘By the same as you infest continents; but because I do it with a little ship, and you with a great fleet, I am called a pirate, you an emperor’; a similar answer being attributed by Q. Curtius to the Scythians. (Lucan, x. 20 ‘illic Pellaei proles uesana Philippi, | felix praedo, iacet.’) Gataker quotes the moral drawn by St. Augustine from the foregoing story: ‘Sane remota iustitia quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia?’


X. 23. The beginning of this section is corrupt, and, probably, the end. The allusion is to the Theaetetus of Plato (174 D, E), where the philosopher hearing a tyrant or king eulogized ‘fancies he is listening to the praises of some keeper of cattle—a swineherd or shepherd, or perhaps a cowherd who is congratulated on the quantity of milk he squeezes from them’, and, again, observes ‘that the great man is, of necessity, as ill-mannered and uneducated as any shepherd, for he has no leisure and is surrounded by a wall which is his mountain-pen’—σηκὸν ἐν ὀρεὶ τὸ τεῖχος περὶβεβλημένος. What the point is here is not very plain.


X. 34. ['Leaves that the wind.']. Hom. Ili. vi. 145
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Obstinacy was the usual charge brought against the Christians (e.g. by the younger Pliny in his famous letter to Trajan), as against the Jews by Tacitus ('fides obstinata,' Hist. v. 5), and Tertullian is at pains in his Apology to prove that it was not due to ἐπιγίγνεται ἁρπῃ.

XI. 3. Obstinacy was the usual charge brought against the Christians (e.g. by the younger Pliny in his famous letter to Trajan), as against the Jews by Tacitus ('fides obstinata,' Hist. v. 5), and Tertullian is at pains in his Apology to prove that it was not due to ἐπιγίγνεται ἁρπῃ.

It is well known that violent persecutions took place in the reign of M. Aurelius; Polycarp, among others, suffering at Smyrna.


XI. 13. ['Phocion.'] Gataker enumerates three incidents in the life of Phocion to which Antoninus' words might apply. The first is scarcely striking; the second is that when he was being led out to death some one after abusing him spat in his face, on which he turned to the magistrates and asked, 'Will no one prevent this man from disgracing himself? —οὗ παύσει τις τούτων ἁγχημωνοῦντα; But the allusion is, most probably, to his words after drinking the poison, in which he recommended his son to bear no ill-will to the Athenians, 'for the sake of this loving-cup which now I drink' — ὑπὲρ τῆς παρ' αὐτῶν φιλοτητίας ἡς νῦν πίνω. The qualification in Antoninus would presumably indicate that he suspected some irony in the last words.

XI. 15. ['The...branch,—once bent, always bent.']
Salmasius’ conjecture for σκάλμη. An allusion to the proverb σκαμβὸν έγιλον οἰδέτοι ὅρθον. For ‘the wolf’s friendship’ cf. the line (Plat. Phaedr. 241 D) ως λύκοι ἄργον ἀγαπώσω, ὄσ παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί.

XI. 18 (5). ['Means to some... end.'] So to Plato falsehood is useful ‘as a medicine’ (Rep. ii. fin.); and the Stoics, in spite of their lofty morality, admitted that the end often justified the means. ‘The sage,’ says Seneca, ‘will perform acts of which he must disapprove, in order that he may pave the way to a greater purpose. He will not abandon goodness, but adapt himself to circumstances. The means that others employ for the attainment of fame or pleasure, he also employs, but for his own ends.’ So, according to Quintilian (xii. i, 38), the most rigid professors were of opinion that the good man may occasionally lie, and sometimes for a trivial reason. And Seneca, again, held that it was permissible to do all that the epicure and fool do, but not in the same way or with the same end in view,—a part of his philosophy which presumably explains that sage’s possession, inter alia, of 500 tables of citrus wood and ivory.

XI. 22. The history of these two animals has been charmingly narrated by Horace (Sat. ii. 6. 79-117).

XI. 25. Either Antoninus or his scribes seems at fault here; for it was Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who sent the invitation to Socrates, offering him, says the generous author of his letters, part of his kingdom!

XI. 26. The manuscripts give ‘Ephesian’ instead of ‘Epicurean’. Gataker’s alteration is rather violent, but seems necessary in view of Seneca’s words—‘aliquis vir bonus nobis eligendus est ac semper ante oculos habendus.... Hoc Epicurus praecepit.’ The change may possibly be one of the class to which must be assigned, e.g. ‘gratia Christi’ for ‘gratia ponti’, Manil. Astron. iv. 422.
XI. 28. The incident seems to be known only from this passage.

XI. 30. There is apparently a play on the two senses of λόγος = 'reason' and 'speech'. For the literal meaning cf. Soph. Τ. 52–3 with Blaydes' note. In the second sense δοῦλος, of course, must be metaphorical. The wise man, in the Stoic's estimation, is alone free. To all others—'intus et in iecore aegro | nascuntur domini.'

XI. 31. The moral of this quotation is not very obvious. It was Odysseus' heart that laughed within him, after his drastic treatment of Polyphemus, ὡς ὁνομένοι έξαιτήσεν ἐμὸν καὶ μῆτις ἀμύμων (Od. ix. 413–14).

XI. 32. Apparently a curious slip of the memory, the original running μέμψονται δ' ἄρα τοὺς χαλεποὺς βάλουτες ἐπεσοῦ. Ἡσ. Ὄρ. et D. 184.

XI. 33–37. Quotations, more or less accurate, from Epictetus.

XI. 38. Hor. Sat. ii. 3. 43 'Quem mala stultitia et quemcumque inscitia veri | Caecum agit, insanum Chrysippi porticus et grex | Autumat. Haec populos, haec magnos formula reges | Excepto sapiente tenet.'

XII. 24. ['The hour when it receives a soul.'] The embryo was supposed by the Stoics to possess only a vegetative soul, this being condensed at birth into an animal soul, through the cold (ψυξεις—ψυχή).

XII. 28. ['They are visible.'] Since the universe, the sun, and stars were looked on as divine by the Stoics, the answer of Antoninus is intelligible enough. Gataker cites the lines of Menander (iv. 265) Ἡλις, σὲ γὰρ δὲι προσκυνεῖν πρῶτον θεῶν, | δὲ ὅν θεωρεῖν ἐστὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς.

XII. 34. Epicurus disposed of the fear of death by the summary syllogism: 'While we exist, death is not present; when death is present, we do not exist; therefore death is nothing to us.' And again: ὁ θάνατος
οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεὶ· τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. v. Aul. Gell. ii. 8.

XII. 36. So Epictetus: μέμνησο ὅτι ὑποκριτὴς εἶ δράματος οἰον ἂν θέλῃ ὁ διδάσκαλος· ἂν βραχύ, βραχέος· ἂν μακρόν, μακροῦ ... σὺν γὰρ τούτῳ ἐστι, τὸ δὲ θεῖν ὑποκρίνεσθαι πρὸςωπὸν καλῶς, ἐκλέξασθαι δὲ αὐτὸ ἄλλου (Man. xvii.).
CRITICAL NOTES

The following are the more important deviations from Herr Stich’s text, such variants as merely affect the grammatical structure being for the most part omitted. It is scarcely necessary to point out the improbable nature of some of the conjectures adopted; but in a translation intended mainly for a class of readers to whom such matters would fall under the ἀδιάφορα, I have thought it needless to retain readings manifestly or probably corrupt, merely because no certain remedy has been discovered.

The Roman numerals refer to the sections; the Arabic to the lines of the Teubner (1903) text.

Book I.


VII. 18. ἐνεργητικῶν Xylander: ἐνεργ. vulg.

IX. 23. καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀδεώρητον οἰομένων Polak: καὶ τὸ ἀθ. οἰομ. vulg.

XIV. 7. Οὐήρον Scaliger: Σεοῦρον vulg.

XVI. p. 7 (l. 14). παρεῖχε would seem aper than παρέχει.

XVI. p. 8 (l. 10). τὸ τὰ πάτρια φυλάσσειν was deleted by Polak.

XVI. p. 8 (l. 22 sqq.) This passage is hopelessly corrupt. Beyond the fact that χιτῶν (Salmasius) and φελώνη (Coraës) should be read for καὶ τῶν and τελώνη, nothing is certain. I have given a paraphrase that might approximate to the meaning.
XVI. p. 9 (l. 8). ὁι αὐτοῖς Scaphidiotes.
XVI. 10. ἐγκαρτερεῖν Reiske: ἐτὶ καρτερεῖν vulg.
XVII. p. 10 (l. 23). ἐπιπνοίαις Gataker and Casaubon: ἐπιπνοίαις vulg.
XVII. p. 11 (l. 17). I have translated the old conjecture ὅπερ χρησμὸν, in spite of its manifest improbability.

Book II.

II. p. 12 (l. 17). I have followed Stich in omitting ἀφῄς ... ἀλλ', as alien to this passage.
II. p. 13 (l. 3) ἐπιδέσθαι Wilamowitz: ἐποδύεσθαι vulg.
III. 12 αἰτεῖς Polak: ἐστὶ, sim., vulg.
IV. 21. We ought apparently to read οἰχύσεται, καὶ οἰχύσῃ (οὐ), καὶ αὐθὶς οὐχ ἦξετε. The MSS. omit οὗ, which Stich suggests, and have ἦξεται, which Coraës emended to ἦξεται.
VI. 15. The reading βραχὺς γὰρ κτέ rests only on an interpolated MS., the others having οὐ (or εὖ) γὰρ ὁ βίος ἐκάστῳ. Boot conjectured εἰς γὰρ κτέ, which seems favoured by τοῦτον. Perhaps οὐκέτι καίρον ἦξεις (ἐξ ἵνα) οὐ, ὁ βίος γὰρ (εἰς) ἐκάστῳ.
XV. 22. πρὸς τούτῳ Ἐκείνου Μονίμου Menagius: πρὸς τὸν κτέ vulg.
XVII. 17. ἦ δὲ ψυχῇ δυστέκμαρτον, ἦ δὲ τύχῃ ῥάμβος Schultz: ἦ δὲ τύχῃ δυστ., ἦ δὲ ψ. ῥ. vulg.

Book III.

IV. p. 22 (l. 23). The text is corrupt though the meaning is fairly clear. τί γὰρ ἀνθρώπου (ἀνου) ἔργον στέρῃ τοιοῦτο τι φανταξόμενος would be intelligible.
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IV. p. 23 (l. 17). ἀτρωτον Valckenaer: ἀτρωτον vulg.
XII. 1 (p. 29). ἐβροίκῃ Rendall: ἣρωικῇ vulg.
XVI. 24 sqq. I have adopted Gataker’s transposition.

Book IV.

III. 5 (p. 32). I have written τι for έτι, which Stich deletes.
XIX. 8. καὶ μεμνημένων should, I think, be added after ἐπτομένων.
XIX. 13 sqq. The words are corrupt. I have taken Gataker’s παράγης and ἐχόμενος, though alteration and version are alike improbable.
XX. 21. ἐπαίνον was added before τινος by Schultz.
XLVI. 12 sqq. Stich prints καὶ ὅτι οὐ δέι <ὡςπερ> παίδας τοκέων, ὃν τούτ’ ἐστιν κατὰ ψυλόν, καθότι παρειλήφαμεν, in which ὡςπερ is due to Gataker, the rest to the MSS. It seems to me that the passage should be thus punctuated καὶ ὅτι οὐ δέι ὡςπερ παίδας τοκέων ὃν τουτέστι κατὰ ψυλόν, καθότι παρειλήφαμεν, <πράσσειν καὶ φάναι ἃ πράσσομεν ἡ φαμεν.> The words ὡςπ. παίδ. τοκ. ὃν are apparently the end of an hexameter, as the emperor’s word for ‘parents’ is elsewhere always γονεῖς. After παρειλήφαμεν something seems to have been lost.

Book V.

I. 11. I have written ὅλως δὲ πρὸς πείσιν, οὐ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν. The vulgate is ὅλως δὲ οὐ πρὸς ποιεῖν (πείσιν Α) ἡ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν, in which <τὸ> ποιεῖν (Coraës) would be necessary, and ὅλως δὲ (ὁ λῶστε Wilamowitz) seems to have little meaning. For the opposition between πείσις and ἐνέργεια cf. e.g. VI. 51, IX. 16. In the beginning of the section Menagius’ τί οὖν for έτι οὖν is required.
Critical Notes

III. 17. περισσάτω Coraës: παρεισπάτω vulg.

III. 18. For μέμψις ἡ λόγος (ψόγος Junius), I have ventured on μέμψις ἀλόγος. Cf. I. 13 κἂν τὺχη ἀλόγως αἰτιώμενος.

V. 13. Either ἀμεγαλεῖον (Rendall) or <μή> μεγαλεῖον seems required.

VI. 8 sqq. The text is confused, but Coraës' conjecture ποιήσασα οὐκ ἐπιβοᾶται οὐδ' ἀνθρωπος οὐν εὗ ποιήσας, ἀλλὰ κτέ doubtless represents the sense.

VI. 14. φύσει Rendall: φησὶ vulg.

IX. 8. έτι δήζει Coraës: ἐπιδείξῃ vulg.

X. 20. καὶ παντάπασι ought perhaps to be read from the ἥ παντάπασι of P.

X. 24. δυνάμενα καὶ would seem preferable to καὶ δυνάμενα.

XV. 10. ἐπεί Coraës: έτι vulg.

XVIII. 14. <οῦ> δεινὸν οὖν . . . φρονήσεως;

XXII. 18 sqq. εἰ δὲ ἡ πόλις βλάπτεται, οὐκ ὅργιστεν, ἀλλὰ δεικτέον τῷ βλάπτοντι τὸ παρορώμενον, modifying Gataker's conjecture.

XXIII. 25. καὶ σχέδον οὖδὲν ἐνεστώς καὶ τὸ πάρεγγυ τὸδε ἀπειρον, τοῦ τε παρωχηκότος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ἅχανές Coraës.

XXXVI. This desperately corrupt section I have divided into three, writing εἰπὲ, τὶ γίνη λαλῶν for ἐπεί τοι γίνη καλῶν, and inserting μὴ λέγε between γένῃ and ἐγενόμην. The changes have, of course, no sort of merit save that of rendering some form of translation possible. Casaubon's καταληφθεῖς and Stich's ἀγαθὴ δὲ μοῖρα for καταλειφθεῖς and ἀγαθαὶ δὲ μοῖραι seem necessary.

Book VI.


XIV. 7 sqq. τὰ πλείστα δὲν ἡ πληθὺς θαυμάζει eis
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The words I have supplied seem to me necessary both for sense and construction. (οἱ τέλεον ἰδιώται, V. 8.)

XIV. 13. ἢ <καὶ> κατὰ ψιλόν, <ὁιν> κτε partly with Morus.


XVI. 26 sqq. There seems a gap in the argument. ? αἱ δὲ παιδαγωγοὶ καί αἱ δίδασκαλίαι ἐπὶ τὶ σπεύδοντιν. <ἐπὶ ἐκεῖνο οὐν σπεύδοντιν,> ὥδε οὖν κτε.

XXXIII. 2 sqq. ? εἰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ οὖκ ἐστιν, <οὐκ ἐστιν> οὗδε κακὸν αὐτῷ. All the MSS. but one have οὗδε κακὸν οὖκ ἐστιν αὐτῷ. The usual course is to omit οὖκ.

XXXV. 9. οὐ δεινὸν <οὖν> κτε.

XLIV. 5 (p. 76). I have recalled the old punctuation, with ἢ for ἤ.

XLIV. 8. ἀ παρ' ἐκαστα Coraës: ἀπερ ἐκαστα vulg.

XLVII. 5. τοῦτο <μὲν> μέχρι κτε. Cf. e. g. V. 12.

XLVII. 17. τοὺς μηδ' ὄνομαζομένους; ὅλως, ἐν κτε for τοὺς μηδ' ὄνομαζομένους ὅλως; ἐν κτέ.

LV. 1 (p. 79). ἄλλω τινὶ ἀν προσεῖχον, εἰ πῶς for ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἀν προσεῖχον; ἢ πῶς κτε.

Book VII.

II. 6. I have adopted what is virtually the reading of A: ὁρθὼς εἰ.

IX. 1 (p. 82). <εἰς> λόγος Menagius.

XII. 11. μῆ Casaubon: ἢ vulg.

XVI. 6. In this corrupt passage I have followed
Schultz in adding οὗ λυπεῖ έαυτό after οὗ φοβεῖ έαυτό, and have placed εἰς επιθυμιάν before ποιεῖτο.

XVI. 13. ἄξει έαυτό Coraës: ἄξεις αὐτὸ vulg.
XXIII. 6. δευδρύφιον Nauck: δενδρού φύσιν vulg.
XXIII. 9. I have added ἀγαθόν after συμπαγῆναι.

Cf. IV. 42, VIII. 20, IX. 17.

XXIV. 10. The MSS. have τὸ ἐπίκοτον τοῦ προ- σώπου λάν παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν πολλάκις ἐναποθνήσκειν ἧ πρόσχημα, ἥ τὸ τελευταῖον ἀπεσβέσθη, for which Coraës conjectured ὅταν ἃ δὲ πολλάκις γένηται ἐναποθνήσκει τὸ πρόσχημα καὶ τὸ τελ. ἀπ. The passage seems certainly mutilated. I have translated ὅταν δὲ πολλάκις καὶ καλλίστη ὅψει ἑντακῇ ἐναποθνήσκει καὶ ἑντακῇ τὸ πρ. καὶ τὸ τ. ἀπ. The words I have supplied seem the minimum, as πρόσχημα needs something to define it, and ἐναποθνήσκει a dative.

XXIV. 13. The sense, I think, requires ὅ τι for ὅτι.
XXVII. 4. ἥδει Rendall: ἥδη vulg.
XXXI. 24. No plausible emendation of this passage has yet been found. The translation follows Gataker chiefly.

XLVIII. 13. ἀνωθὲν κατὼ Casaubon: ἀνωθὲν, κατὰ vulg.

XLIX. 18. The words τὰς τοσαῦτας τῶν ἑγεμονίων μετὰβολάς seem to me alien to the argument, which is the same as in VI. 37. I have therefore transferred them to the preceding section, after ποικίλα, so that the text here runs τὰ προγεγονότα ἀναθεωρεῖν ἤξεστι, καὶ τὰ ἔσομενα προεφοράν.

LII. 11. I have added ἃ τὸν ἄτερον after καββα- λικότερος. ἃ τοῦ ἄτετ τὸς Gataker: ἃ τοῦ τίς ἄτετ Coraës.

LVIII. 6. I have written καὶ μέμνησο ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ ὅτι ἀδιάφορον ἐφ’ ὑπ’ ἡ πρᾶξις ὅτι καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀδιά- φορον ἡ πρᾶξις. Cf. Epict. ii. 5 αἱ μὲν ὅλαι ἀδιάφοροι, ὑμὲν χρῆσις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀδιάφορος. In
the preceding line καλός seems barely intelligible.

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LIX. 8. σκάπτε Schultz: σκέτε Α, βλέπε Ρ.
LX. 12. For συνετόν Casaubon's συνεστός or, perhaps, σύμμετρον would seem more appropriate.
LXIV. 7. λογική Casaubon: ὑλική vulg.
LXVI. 4 (p. 94). εἰκῆ Ρ: ἐκεῖ ΛΧ.

Book VIII.

I. 18 sqq. ἀρκέσθητι δὲ, εἰ κἀν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ βίον, ὃςν δῆποτε, ἤτοι φύσις θέλει, βιώσῃ.
III. 15. ὃσων πρόνοια seems impossible. ὃσων τυραννεία (τυραννία). Cf. IV. 31 μῆτε τύραννον μῆτε δούλων σεαυτὸν καθιστάς.

VIII. 24. ἀναγινώσκειν can scarcely be right; ἀνα-βιώναι Nauck: πάντα γιν. Stich. I have risked τάνω γινώσκειν. Cf. VII. 67 μή, ὅτι ἀπήλπικας διαλεκτικός καὶ φυσικός ἐσεσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἀπογνώς καὶ ἐλεύθερος κτέ. Also I. 17.
X. 7. ἄγαθὸν and χρήσιμον were transposed by Reiske.

XVIII. 20. I have deleted εἰ as merely a repetition of the last syllable of πίπτει.
XX. 9. τὰ ὀμοια δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ λύχνου was deleted by Stich.

XXI. 11. The MSS. have γηράσαν δὲ οἶον γίνεται, νοσήσαν δὲ, πορνεύσαν, for which Gataker conjectured νοσήσαν τε καὶ ἀποτυνεύσαν, Coraës νοσήσαν καὶ πυρέξαν. I have written νοσήσαν, πορνεύσαν, i.e. προνωπτές, προποτές. Cf. Schol. on Soph. Trach. 976 ζῆ γὰρ προποτῆς' ες τον θάνατον προνευκὼς. Eur. Alc. 143 ἤδη προνωπτῆς ἐστὶ καὶ ψυχορραγεῖ, &c.

XXV. 7. The words κέλερ . . . εἰτα κέλερ were transposed by Stich to the beginning of the section. δριμέως μὲν was deleted by Rendall.
XXXI. 15. μηκεν ἕνος ἀνθρώπου θάνατον ᾧ λοις γένους θάνατον with Capel, Lofft, and Coraës.

XXXII. 25. ἀδιακείσθαι δικαίως Rendall.

XXXV. 20. λογικῶν must be altered into δλων with Coraës, though the text still remains faulty. Probably it ran somewhat as follows ὀστερ τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἐκάστω (A.) τῶν λογικῶν σχέδιον ὡσον (ἐφ' ἐαυτὴ ἐμέρισεν) ἢ τῶν δλων φύσις κτὲ.

XXXVIII. The section is ei δύνασαι ὡξ βλέπειν βλέπε, κρίνων, φησί, σοφωτάτους. Salmasius conjectured Kρῖτων ... σοφωτάτος, Scaphidiotes κρίνων ἐν τοῖς σοφωτάτους. The passage seems to me mutilated. ? ei δύνασαι ὡξ βλέπειν βλέπε (ei δὲ μή, ἐπίτρεπε) κρίνειν φύσει σοφωτέροις. Cf. X. 12.

XLVIII. 18. I should prefer to transpose ἀμαθῆς and ἀτυχῆς.


LII. 10. The sentence is doubtless corrupt. Gataker’s conjecture is extremely violent, but gives good sense.

Book IX


XXVIII. 22. The paraphrase in the translation is virtually that of Salmasius. It is quite impossible, but no plausible emendation of the text is forthcoming.

XXVIII. A. 2. ? ἦν καὶ καὶ καίνα γενήσεται) ἥ κάκεινα κτέ.


XXXV. 7. I have omitted καλῶς, which seems to me to ruin the whole argument, as probably a marginal explanation of ἄμειδὼς.

XLII. 21. τῶν ἀναισχύντων was ejected by Nauck.

XLII. p. 127 (l. 8). ὁπερ Menagius: ἄπερ vulg.
IX. 15. μύσος Coraës: μύμος vulg.

Ⅹ. 14. I have written δύο τούτων ἄρκούμενος, εἰ αὐτὸς δικαιοπράγει τὸ νῦν πρασσόμενον καὶ φιλεῖ κτὲ, from A which has ἄρκούμενος εἰ αὐτὸς δικαιοπράγει ... καὶ φιλεῖ.

XIII. 6. For γένηται the argument seems to require ἑπανήται.

XV. 19. ἦ γῆσον ἦν αἰλῆ ὥς ἦν ὁρεί.

XV. 24. For ἥ, which involves an extremely harsh ellipse, I have translated ἥ ὃς. Cf. infra, § 32.

XIX. 10. The vox nihil ἄνθρωπούμενοι (ἄνθρωπο-μενοι Coraës: ἄβρωνόμενοι Reiske) may perhaps have come, via ἄνθρωπομενοι, from λαμπρωνόμενοι.

XXV. 10. οὖν ought apparently to be added after παρανομων.

XXVI. 19. καθήκε would seem to be required for ἄφήκε.

XXVIII. 14 sqq. The MSS. have ὀμοίων καὶ ὁ οἰμώζων ἐπὶ τοῦ κλινεῖ οὖν σιωπῆ τῇν ἐνδεσίν ἡμῶν καὶ ὁτί κτέ. This reading seems utterly absurd. In μόνος, I think, lurks some participle, e. g. ὁ οἰμώζων ἐπὶ τοῦ κλινεί, ὃν ἐνθυμοῦμενος σιωπῆ τῇν ἐνδεσίν ἡμῶν, καὶ ὁτί κτέ.

XXXIII. 7. μάθης Coraës: πάθης vulg.


XXXIII. 25. αὐτὸς Rendall: αὐτὸ vulg.

XXXVIII. 19. μέμνησο ὃ τι τὸ νευροστατοῦν ἐστιν' ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἔνδον ἐγκεκριμένον' ἐκεῖνο κτέ seems to me preferable to the vulgate μέμνησο ὅτι τὸ νευρ. ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ κτέ.
Book XI.

V. 20. ἄλλως Coraës: καλῶς vulg.
VI. 25. The passage is faulty, but its meaning scarcely in doubt.
XI. 13. εἰ μὲν seems merely a dittography of ὅμεν.
XV. 15. No certain, or probable, emendation has yet been discovered.
XV. 22. σκαμβή for σκάλμη Salmasius.
XVII. 18. ἐκ τίνων ἐκάστων συγκείμενον. ἐκ τίνων ἐκάστων ὑποκειμένων MSS.: συγκείμενον Coraës.
XVIII. 26. ἦ Schultz: καὶ MSS.
XIX. 2 (p. 153). I have given the usual translation of the old reading παχείας ᾧδοιαίς (βραχείας ᾧδ. Nauck).
AX have παχείας ἰδέαις, which appears unintelligible. In view of the frequency with which words are omitted in all these MSS., it is, I think, possible that both these readings are attempts to correct παχείας ἰδέαις, and that the original was nothing more recondite than παχείας ἰ λείαις (κινήσεων).
XXXVII. 3. I read τέχνην, ἐφη, δεῖ from A, which has τέχνην ἐφη δεῖ. The vulgate is τέχνην δε ἐφη.

Book XII.

IX. 7. I think the true reading would be ὁμοίον ὅ (εἰ) εἶναι. ὁμοίον ὅ εἶναι δεῖ vulg.: Reiske expunged ὅ, and Rendall wrote ὁμοίον σε εἶναι δεῖ.
XXVII. 20. ἐν Οὐηλία Ῥουφὸς Barberini.
Cf. III. 1, VI. 16.
Aurelius Antoninus, Maruus,
Emperor of Rome
Meditations