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Sir William Monson's Naval Tracts
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AVAILABLE
CONTENTS
OF
THE SECOND VOLUME
BOOK I. {continued)
PAGE
Notes to the Cadiz Voyage {continued) i
The Islands Voyage, a.d. 1597 21
Notes 38
The fleet prepared under Lord Thomas Howard, a.d. 1599 84
Notes ... 87
Voyage of Sir Richard Leveson to the Azores, a.d. 1600 . .112
Notes 114
Sir Richard Leveson in Ireland, a.d. 1601 123
Notes , 125
Voyage of Sir Richard Leveson and Sir William Monson, a.d.
1602 151
Notes 167
Voyage of Sir William Monson, A.D. 1602 177
Notes 183
The fleet prepared under Sir Richard Leveson, a.d. 1603 • • io4
Notes 196
Voyage of the Earl of Cumberland to Puerto Rico, a.d. 1598 . 204
Notes 215
Places taken during the War, A.D. 1 585-1603 .... 226
Private Adventurers and their Prizes, A.D. 1585-1603 . . . 229 The Advantages of keeping a fleet on the Coast of Spain in the
Time of War 232
The names of the ships the Queen left at her Death . . . 235
To Sir Robert Cecyll about the Reformation of the Navy . . 237
viii CONTENTS OF VOLUME II
APPENDICES
A. — Pedro Estrade's account of the Armada voyage, a.d. 1588
B. — The Spanish Treasure Fleets of the XVIth century
C. — Papers relating to the St. Valentine
E. — Sir William Monson's Letters, a.d. 1592- 1602
PAGE
Notes 245
How to get Intelligence on the Coast of Spain and at the Azores 253
Some Observations about the Queen's ships .... 263
The Disasteis of some of King Henry VIII.'s ships . . . 265 The Advice of the Council of War concerning withstanding the
Invasion of A.D. 1588 267
Exceptions to some points of the Advice 276
The Queen's Death and the Advantages of the Peace that ensued 287 A Farewell to the Gentlemen to whom the Author dedicated this
Book 296
299 309 34i 372 376
LIST OF MAPS IN VOLUME II
1. Baptista Boazio's Chart of the Azores, a.d.
1597 (Add. MSS. 1 8 109 H.) To face title
2. Cezimbra Bay To face p. 154
3. San Juan de Puerto Rico .... „ 220
4 Map of the West Indies to illustrate
Book I. of the 'Tracts' .... „ 334
BOOK I. — [continued)
The Cadiz Voyage — (continued.)
[7] It is rather strange that Monson did not consider several incidents of the occupation of Cadiz, such as the debate about holding it and his own knighthood, worth mention here, and only refers to the former point in a later book. The first noteworthy circumstance was an exchange of civilities with the Shereef of Morocco. Marbecke says that thirty-eight Moorish slaves escaped from the galleys during, or after, the sea fight of the 2 1 st and swam to the English ships, and that the Generals clothed them and gave them a small vessel in which to go to Morocco. The resolve to send them off in a ship of their own seems to show that the appearance of three Moorish vessels on the 25th was unexpected, but Don Antonio had been trying for years to obtain assistance from the Shereef, and his son, Don Christobal, now with the English fleet, had been for some time at that ruler's court and may have reopened communications. For many years Elizabeth had exchanged courtesies with the Sultan and the minor Mahommedan Powers, and the arrival of the Moorish vessels awoke alarm as to whether it might not portend the working alliance the Spaniards always dreaded. What the Moors actually came for is uncertain. Herrera says in general terms that they came to offer assistance ; a modern writer says that it was to offer aid and provisions, and with a request that if the English were not going to hold the city they would hand it over to the Shereef.106 Dr. de Quesada attributed the Generals' refusal to his own eloqueij^e,107 but on the 25th it was almost
106 A. de Castro, Hist, de Cadiz, Cadiz, 1845, p. 57. He gives no authority.
107 i Here God inspired me with such fire and eloquence that I per- suaded the Generals that not only would it diminish their glory to
VOL. II. B
2 MONSOJSTS TRACTS
definitely resolved to hold the city, which is a more adequate explanation, although it seems that on the recommendation of Don Christobal they asked the Moors to furnish supplies if necessary. However, the news spread among the townsfolk and put them in mortal terror; after the English had gone they still feared to return to their homes, saying that they had lost their property, ' and now the Moors will come and carry them off.'
The burning question among the English leaders was, now that Cadiz was possessed, what should be done with it ? Was it to be held or evacuated ? Essex, having sailed with the intention of holding it, used all his influence in that direction, but ' some of our sea commanders, and especially my colleague, did not only oppose themselves to that design (whose opposition mine Instruc- tions made an absolute bar), but when we came to see how the forces that should be left there might be victualled until succours came, the victuals were for the most part hidden and embezzled, and every ship began at that instant to fear their wants and to talk of going home.' 108 It seems that down to 30th June Essex's ascendency had been sufficient to silence doubt or opposition, but on that date Sir George Carew wrote that the resolve to hold the city had been altered the previous day on account of a survey of the victuals having shown them to be insufficient to support the garrison until fresh supplies came.109 Still the question was not finally closed, for some were of opinion that if it was found to be impracticable to keep the city it might be then exchanged for Calais, and on 2nd July another council, attended by all the principal sea and land officers, was held at the Munition House.110 The former decision to garrison the city was, we are told, again debated, and some who had previously supported it had now grown doubtful or had quite changed their views. The colonels, especially, had ' almost all ' altered their opinions, but it is remarkable that their chief objection was not so much to the
receive aid from others (they having such a powerful fleet), but much more to receive it from the common enemy of both our religions. The earl answered that in the Crusades his ancestors had behaved valorously, and that as a knight he would do no less than they. Both Generals swore to me not to use their aid, to send them back if they came, and if they would not go to fight them ; and all the nobles standing round loudly applauded this decision.' — Relation of Dr. Francisco de Quesada.
108 Omissions of the Cales Voyage.
109 Cecil MSS. 30th June, Carew to Robert Cecyll.
110 State Papers Dom. Eliz. eclix. 50. Some of the previous councils had been held at Essex's quarters. Visitors to Cadiz may be interested in knowing that the house is now No. 230 Calle de la Palma de Hondillo, then belonging to Pedro de Castro. The earl sent his unwilling host a present of plate from England (De Castro, op. at.).
THE CADIZ VOYAGE, 1596 3
retention of the city as to Essex remaining ; they expressed them- selves as quite willing to remain if he would go, but to this he would not agree. Darell, the commissary-general of victuals, called in, reported that two months' provisions for the garrison could not be spared ; other objections were that their Instructions did not authorize an occupation, that the ships left there might be attacked by a superior force, and that to allow part of their force to remain at Cadiz would necessarily prevent them carrying out the further object of the expedition— an attack else- where in Spain or a search for the homeward Flota. For these reasons, therefore, the former resolution was to be rescinded and the town and fortifications to be burnt, except the churches and monasteries. The next objective was to be Lagos. Seeing the previous agreement of the colonels to Essex's plan of stopping at Cadiz himself, his reference to the opposition he experienced from the sea commanders, omitting all censure of the soldiers, and the volte-face of the latter unless the earl would consent to return himself and leave them, we may infer that the decision to evacuate was come to rather on grounds personal to Essex and his position at court than of military necessity. Vere tells us that the question was ' long disputed,' and that he offered to remain with 4,000 men until the Queen's pleasure was known, but that Essex insisted on staying in person, ' which the rest of the council would not assent unto.' Howard had ever before him the fear of Elizabeth and her anger, however brilliant the success, if her favourite was not returned to her. It was probably quite as much this terror as any desire to thwart the earl that caused him and his flag-officers to put every obstacle in Essex's path, and to their arguments may be attributed the sudden revolution in the minds of the colonels, whose prospects would also be affected by Eliza- beth's frowns. It will be observed that they thought that if Essex went the place could be held, but that if he stopped sufficient victuals could not be found, a non sequitur which points to the inwardness of their difficulty. The doubt and hesitation existing is indicated by the fact that the Generals did not send off Sir Anthony Ashley with the despatches announcing their success before ist July, and that even then they left the future open, for the Privy Council wrote to them that they found ' no certainty of your resolution by his report.' m It is not easy to understand why Essex, if he had the retention of Cadiz so much at heart, should have allowed a matter he considered so important to be
111 MS. Council Register, 7th August. A covering letter from Essex is dated ist July, but Ashley probably did not leave until later, because in a letter of Ralegh's, dated 7th July, he says that Ashley is its bearer. Ashley did not deliver these despatches until 30th July, little more than a week before the return of the fleet to Plymouth.
B 2
4 MONSON'S TRACTS
affected by his own presence or absence, for there is other evidence besides Monson's to show that there were sufficient provisions.112 He may have been jealous of giving Vere further opportunity to enhance his reputation, and perhaps his touched susceptibilities now were at the root of his misunderstanding with him in 1597.
Between 21st June and 4th July the Generals made sixty-six knights,113 most of them, including Monson, obtaining the honour on Sunday, 27th June, before a solemn service held in the cathedral and a sermon preached by Mr. Hopkins, 'a man of good learning and sweet utterance.' Essex was childishly fond of making knights, a prerogative usually accorded to generals exercising any high command. Howard was much more chary of exercising his right, and in 1588 had made only five, two of them being men of the quality of Hawkyns and Frobiser. Here he was carried away by his colleague, and no doubt would have thought it, in the language of the time, 'foul scorn ' to himself to have knighted a much smaller number than his fellow general, so they set to work to bestow the accolade upon everyone who by any chance of birth, rank, office, or favour could possibly lay claim to it. Knighthood had been considered sufficient reward for Drake, and when conferred on him, in 1581, it was still a high honour ; to Essex must be ascribed the discredit of conferring it broadcast, and thus commencing a practice which has degraded it to its present level.114 In Normandy in 1591 he made twenty- two knights, although in his commission he had been particularly ordered to bestow the dignity sparingly ; of these Elizabeth re- marked that ' my lord had done well to build his almshouse before he made his knights.' The sixty-six heroes now distinguished afforded material for the wits, and it was said of them that
A gentleman of Wales and a knight of Cales
And a laird of the North Countree, A yeoman of Kent with his yearly rent
Could buy them out all three.
Next year, in the Islands Voyage, Essex restrained himself and made only eight knights, but in Ireland, in 1599, he resumed his former practice and constituted eighty-seven of them. This
112 Yor instance, Van Meteren says that the Dutch admirals offered to leave a month's victuals for 2,000 men out of their own squadron alone. See also post, p. 9. Slingsby tells us that Essex argued that unless he remained proper supplies would not be sent out, but he could have ensured their despatch with much more certainty by being in England ; also that Howard 'did absolutely refuse to return' with- out him, not a threat that carried much terror.
113 State Papers Do?n. Eliz. cclix. 83, 84.
114 However, in fairness, it must be added that Leycester helped by making thirty knights in the Low Countries.
THE CADIZ VOYAGE, 1596 5
wholesale creation caused much indignation, and Chamberlain gave expression to the general feeling when he wrote to Carleton, 1 it is much marvelled that this humour should so possess him that, not content with his first dozens and scores, he should thus fall to huddle them up by half-hundreds ; and it is noted as a strange thing that a subiect, in the space of seven or eight years (not having been six months together in any one action), should, upon so little service and small desert, make more knights than are in all the realm besides.' His action in this direction was one of the charges brought against him when he returned from Ireland, and did him considerable harm with the Queen, his enemies maintaining that he distributed knighthoods so liberally not to reward merit but to form a following.115 There can be little doubt that if vanity had been the motive in Normandy some such purpose was now in his mind, and the knights made by the Lord Admiral at Cadiz knew that they were indebted rather to his intention to keep level with Essex than to any inclination of his own.
In pursuance of the resolution of the council of war, Cadiz was fired on 4th July, the churches and religious houses being spared as arranged, and the embarkation was commenced. The firing was not very systematically carried out, for of the 1,200 houses in the city only 250 were destroyed and no damage was done to the fortifications, but some of the churches were burnt, no doubt by the spread of the flames.116 During the fortnight that the English had held Cadiz the Duke of Medina Sidonia had been helplessly watching their proceedings in miserable anxiety. Galleons, Flota, and Cadiz had all gone, and the only matter remaining in suspense was where and how the next blow would fall. Anything seemed possible to observers in Spain, and the Venetian ambassador remarked that everyone was expecting to hear of fresh disasters : ' Had the English, immediately after the capture of Cadiz, pushed on to Seville, they would have found no obstacle to the plunder of that most noble and wealthy city, but, in truth, they could not believe that preparations had been so neglected as they were. ... It is thought the English will not leave these waters until they have seen the end of the India navigation. On this point Francisco Idiaquez, in conversation with me, said that although the English know how to conquer they cannot hold.' 117 Medina Sidonia was firmly convinced for
115 Elizabeth cancelled thirty-eight of these creations in one pro- clamation.
116 Report of Don Cristobal de Rojas to Philip, 27th July. Another statement {Col. de Doc. Ined. xxxvi. p. 410) is that 290 houses were burnt and 685 left undamaged.
117 State Papers Veil. 14th, 15th July, 1596. That the English knew better how to win a success than how to profit by it is true
6 MONSON'S TRACTS
some time that the Generals would go to Lisbon, but Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Tangier were also in his mind, and he was equally unable to assist any of them. Philip was lying ill at Toledo, and on -t\ July the duke wrote that he had not received a word of reply to any one of the letters he had written during the preceding seventeen days. He had no money, no supplies, and could collect no men for any effective purpose, for he had not been able to get together 5,000 reliable troops ; he could not exaggerate, he said, the little help he had received.118 It was not lack of patriotism. Spain was drained of men, poor in money, empty of provisions and munitions, and without capable government. The duke's disquiet was not lessened when he learnt that on 30th June Essex, with a strong force, had appeared at the bridge of Suazo. What his purpose was, unless it were to try the enemy's strength, is not clear, and it must have been a relief to the small Spanish garrison in the fort there when he retired the next day.
During the whole of the occupation the unwearied Dr. de Quesada had been engaged in getting away the civilian popula- tion, and he was still employed in the work when the troops were embarking. He boasted that 8,000 or 9,000 persons had been brought out under his guidance, carrying with them little less than 1,000,000 ducats in money and jewels, and that he did not believe that the English had obtained half a million in plunder of that kind. Vere seems to have had an inkling of the state of affairs, for he one day threatened Quesada with personal violence, saying that the English had been defrauded of 200,000 ducats in ransoms, money, and jewels by those whom the clergy- man had got passed out within two days. Quesada had been the medium of communication between the opposing leaders, but on 30th June Howard wrote direct to Medina Sidonia. He began by reminding the duke that he had been his opponent in 1588, not, perhaps, the most tactful way of recalling himself to memory. The purport of his letter was to offer to exchange his prisoners, not being hostages or held to ransom by particular persons, for those Englishmen in the Spanish galleys. After some negotiation the proposal was accepted, and on 5th July, when the fleet was already under sail, a galley, which had fifty-one English- enough, but the Spanish admission shows a sounder appreciation of the condition of things than that evinced by a predecessor of Idiaquez in 1586, when he wanted to know whether England was not quaking with fear of Spain [ante, i. p. 134).
118 Col. de Doc. Ined. pp. 324, 375, 378. On %\ July, Philip wrote approving the duke's conduct and thanking him. Other people were not so fortunate. Thirty persons connected with the defence of Cadiz were tried and condemned, including Portocarrero (galleys), Soto- mayor (galleons), and Flores (Flota) ; (Fernandez Duro, Arm. Espafwla, iii. p. 128). The city was freed from taxes for ten years (Abreu).
THE CADIZ VOYAGE, 1596 7
men on board, was seen approaching.119 By some mischance the galley, La Fama, was fired upon — only one shot, but it killed one and wounded two men. The mistake being discovered the Lord Admiral ordered a salutation to be sounded with his trumpets, and Essex was furious at the blunder, telling the commander of the galley, Hernando Hurtado, that he would hang the captain of the ship that had fired. He might have found it difficult, but the Spaniards, not to be outdone in courtesy, begged him not to think again about it, the sufferers having been persons of no birth or consequence.
In accordance with the decision of the council of war held on 2nd July, the destination was to be Lagos, and there is no indica- tion in the minutes that action at any other place had been dis- cussed. Seville may have been dismissed as too dangerous,120 although it is difficult to see what attraction Lagos can have pre- sented either as a strategical point or in the way of plunder, while, if the leaders were in earnest about looking in at the other Spanish ports and going after the Flota, and if their stores were really diminishing as rapidly as figures showed, it was sheer waste of limited time. They could not have intended to hold Lagos or any other point on St. Vincent, for if they had no victuals to hold Cadiz they had none to stay elsewhere, but there may have been a reminiscence of Drake's operations in that region in 1587. Calms and head-winds had delayed the fleet,121 which was off Terrubillas, the haven of Faro, on 13th July. Much against Howard's will the troops, chiefly Dutch according to Van Meteren, but the whole army according to Sir George Carew, were landed and marched to the town on the 14th, which was found abandoned. Little booty was obtained, but the place was occupied for two days while the country round was scoured. On the 16th it was burnt and the next day the men were re-embarked. Howard, who had landed with the soldiers, had been obliged to return to his ship, being affected by the heat, but, if he was incapacitated, his flag officers are guilty of neglecting to water the fleet, if Monson's comment on the subject refers to this time. The chief prize from Faro was the library of Jerome Osorio, Bishop of the Algarves, the writer of an ' Epistolary Admonition ' to Elizabeth,
_ 119 Marbecke says that only thirty-nine were received, the others being too far off in Spain. Some had been twenty years at the oar, some had belonged to the Drake-Hawkyns fleet, but, unfortunately, thirty more men belonging to Drake's expedition did not arrive at Seville until September {Cecil MSS. 3rd June, 1597).
120 Apparently it had been considered : ' it was by all our seamen thought a capital offence to name the going over the bar at San Lucar ' (Omissions of the Cales Voyage).
121 Portocarrero's galleys were dogging the fleet and had taken a flyboat. The Swiftsure had been sent home, being leaky.
8 MON SON'S TRACTS
who now retorted after the manner of sovereigns. This library Essex took for himself and presented to the newly-formed Bodleian.1'22 We may infer from Monson that Howard had opposed the original resolution to proceed to Lagos, and he now succeeded in persuading Essex to relinquish it.
[8] On 20th July the fleet was off Lagos and shortly after- wards rounded Cape St. Vincent, having been followed to that point by Portocarrero with his galleys. The intervening days seem to have been passed in prolonged wrangling, under the guise of councils, as to the ensuing proceedings, for here was the parting of the ways between Essex, who thought enough had not yet been done, and those who were honestly satisfied with the success obtained or wanted to get home with their booty. The failure to take the Flota might be explained by the conditions existing on 21st June, and in any case it had been destroyed and was lost to the Spaniards. The attempt to hold Cadiz was, as has been noticed in the Introduction, a serious undertaking and might fairly evoke diverse opinions ; but a cruise for the homeward West Indiamen and the carracks was a normal procedure and the criterion by which to test the earnestness of the principal officers. Essex urged them to stand away from St. Vincent for the Azores, but although seven weeks' victuals were admittedly on board, he urged it in vain. On the 23rd they were in the latitude of Lisbon, and ' there I again pressed the lying for them with a selected fleet.' Essex proposed to send home the troops and sick in any defective or unprovided ships, but Howard and Ralegh, and, by implication, all the other sea officers except Lord Thomas Howard and the Dutch admirals, were in opposition. Essex was supported by Vere, and no doubt other soldiers, but their aid was worth little in an essentially maritime question, to be decided by the seamen. All he could do was to insist that every man should sign his opinion in case their action should be called in question by the Queen. Although the earl and Monson both name Ralegh as a leader of the opposition, it is doubtful whether the former considered him chiefly responsible, or he would scarcely have maintained the improved relations with Ralegh which certainly existed after the return of the expedition. On the other hand, his attitude to Howard became more and more hostile.123 Of course Essex was right in desiring to look for the Flota, which came into San Lucar on \\ September124 with silver
122 Essex's gift has been long since lost in the mass of the Bodleian, but a few of the books are specifically mentioned in Hearne's Reliquice Bodleiance, London, 1703.
123 However, Ralegh was held to have persuaded Howard (Birch, Bacon Papers, ii. p. 122), or the writer, Anthony Bacon, thought so.
124 State Papers Ven. 30th September. Two carracks arrived at Lisbon on 2nd August {Cecil MS S. 12th August)
THE CADIZ VOYAGE, 1596 9
to the value of 12,000,000 ducats, but whether sufficient provi- sions could have been got together to enable him to keep out long enough, since the Spaniards could not have been at the Azores until the beginning of September, is a point not now to be resolved. The only piece of evidence bearing on it is a state- ment made in August by Sir Ferdinando Gorges to Robert Cecyll, that the ships were then turning out at Plymouth ' great stores of all sorts of victuals,' enough, even then, to supply a squadron to go in search of the Flota, and so far as this testimony goes it seems to show that the lack of provisions had been exaggerated all through. Slingsby makes only one casual reference to any scantiness of victuals, but according to him the wind came easterly after doubling St. Vincent, and one of the numerous councils then decided to run for the Azores, subject to any change of wind. It soon changed, and then the squabbles recommenced. It is unfortunate that Ralegh has not left on record his reasons for the course he advised, and his silence may be used as an argument either for or against him. In his case, at least, it can hardly have been a desire to get his plunder home safely, for it is doubtful whether he got anything at Cadiz j he said that he obtained nothing. But besides want of provisions he and others refer to that usual concomitant of Elizabethan voyages, an outbreak of disease in the fleet, which may have been an additional ground for his advice.'2"1 He had every motive to make his peace with Essex ; observers with the fleet noticed that both at Plymouth and during the voyage he had never lost an opportunity of behaving pleasantly to him, therefore it must be assumed that the open opposition at the close was due either to considerations which appeared to him to be of overwhelming force, or that Essex did not hold him to be in the forefront of the obstruction he experienced.
All that Essex could do was to persuade the seamen to look into Coruna and Ferrol, and that he obtained with difficulty ; l to the Groyne with cart ropes I drew them, for I vowed and protested against their refusal and parted company with them when they offered to hold another course.' Nothing was seen in the two ports because Philip's ships were divided between Lisbon, which the Generals had been particularly ordered not to attempt, and Los Pasages, lying in the eastern corner of the north coast of Spain. Finding nothing to do at Coruna and Ferrol, a final council was held, at which Essex tried to persuade his unruly team to run along the northern coast to visit Santander, San Sebas- tian, Los Pasages, and all the other likely ports. Howard refused, 1 complaining of wants, and objecting our being embayed, and I
125 On the other hand, Monson says that it was exceptionally healthy. But see post, pp. 10, 12.
io MO N SON'S TRACTS
know not what. In which opinion Sir W. Ralegh strengthened him, and they were both desirous to take upon them the honour of breaking that design.' Remembering the strong views ex- pressed by Drake's masters and pilots in 1589 on the subject of getting embayed in the bottom of the Bay, we may take it that, in this respect, Howard's fear was a very genuine one. Nothing more could be done to keep the fleet together, and every one seems to have hastened home. Ralegh was first,126 on 6th August, with ' a great and dangerous infection on board,' he says ; the others arrived on the dates given by Monson. They were home before the last of their few despatches, dated 1st August, and sent off after it had been decided not to risk getting embayed, in which the Generals said that ' the best seamen ' thought it too hazardous, but in which appears no trace of Essex's passion.127 They were sorry, they wrote, to be at the end of the service, ' but glad to think we shall so soon come to see your fair and sweet eyes.' It may be a question whether Essex felt as keenly at sea the crosses he afterwards thought so perverse when he sat down to write about them, spurred by the attacks and insinuations of open and secret enemies.
[9] Various rumours of success had reached England, but the first authentic information was that brought by Ashley in the despatches received on 30th July. Howard, Essex, and Ralegh also sent their own individual versions for publication, but the Government decided to print only Howard's account, and stopped any publication of the others. The natural exultation at what had been done was heightened by expectation of further triumphs, and the Queen's first impulse was to despatch a gracefully worded letter of thanks and congratulation. But this mood soon passed. Elizabeth's first thought, as usual, was what profit had been made for her, and an examination of Ashley led her to believe that while extraordinary booty had been gained her interests had been neglected. The Queen's anger was fanned by Essex's enemies at court, who suggested that her money had been spent to give the earl an opportunity of playing the hero at her expense and of gratifying his followers with plunder that should have been hers. Day by day her anger grew, as she was left in ignorance of the movements of the fleet and heard exaggerated accounts of the wealth seized at Cadiz. On 2nd August several vessels, which had left the fleet at the Burlings, came in with the information that the Generals were then intending for Coruna, a piece of intelligence from which she, like the agent at Plymouth who sent
126 But single vessels— merchantmen— had been straggling in for some time.
127 Cecil MS S. 1 st August. Conway delivered these in London on 9th August, so that they can have told Elizabeth nothing new.
THE CADIZ VOYAGE, 1596 n
it up, must have inferred that they had relinquished the cruise after the Flota that she had so much at heart. In consequence of this news Robert Cecyll wrote on 6th August to Sir Ferdinando Gorges at Plymouth to prepare to re-victual certain ships to go to sea again to meet the West India fleet. On the day that Cecyll wrote, Ralegh was at Plymouth. On the 7 th, the day before Howard returned, the Privy Council drew up a long despatch to the Generals, in which the position was reviewed.128 The Queen, they wrote, had heard nothing positive since Ashley's return, and ' hath entered into divers doubts what she might expect from you since your coming from Cadiz, finding no certainty of your resolu- tion upon his report.' She understood from him that they were then debating whether to go after the carracks and Flota, or to stand along the coast of Spain for prizes and destroy the shipping in Coruna, Ferrol, and the northern ports. Since then she had heard from returning vessels that they had taken Faro and marched inland, ' although very hot and inconvenient to make so long a march without any profit arising thereby, as is reported ' ; and hearing that they are now at the Bayona Islands she thinks it well to give them some advice. Then the Instructions ' 29 are recapitu- lated, and the Generals are reminded that they promised that rich towns should not be plundered by the soldiers, whereas she now finds that they have been plundered apparently without check. She then requires them to remember their pledge to cruise for the Flota, and tells them to send home their super- fluous ships and do it ; 'we find her Majesty most earnestly bent to have these, her remembrances and advices, to be carefully followed.' If the Generals are home before they receive this despatch, the Privy Council does not know what course to recom- mend, but suggests that, in that case, they shall fit out a squadron and go to sea again for the Flota, and to that end orders have been sent to Plymouth to prepare victuals. Altogether, both for Essex, who was chiefly responsible for the irregular plunder of Cadiz to private profit, and for Howard, who was answerable for the absence of any attempt on the Flota, it must have been an unpleasant welcome at Plymouth, and have suggested that some disagreeable moments were in store for them. Although his letter is lost, apparently one of Howard's first proceedings after reaching home was to write to Elizabeth for money to pay the seamen's wages, and this was, of course, the one thing required to bring her temper to boiling point. When she wrote to the Generals to congratulate them on the capture of Cadiz she thanked them for making her ' dreadful, famous, and renowned.' Now she could
128 MS. Council Register, 7th August, 1596. It was probably sent off before it was known that Essex and Howard were back.
129 Quoted ante, i. p. 366.
12 MO N SON'S TRACTS
only see ' the inconvenience which we suspected would follow this journey, that it would be rather an action of honour and virtue against the enemy, and particular profit by spoil to the army, than any way profitable to ourself.' 13° The words are note- worthy, read with the other phrase attributed to her, that she would not make war but only arm for defence, as displaying the mental limitations in her comprehension of the objects of warfare. She never understood that the object of war is not to pay expenses or even make a profit, but to crush the enemy, and that to stand on the defensive only is to court defeat.
From the time that the idea of cruising to the Azores was abandoned Essex appears to have taken up another plan, either of his own initiative or suggested by Vere, that of using the troops before they were disbanded for ' the recovery of Calais. On 28th July he wrote to his secretary, Edward Reynolds, directing him to go to the French and Dutch residents and propose to them to get their masters to bring forward the proposition. The London citizens also were to be moved to offer some aid, but, before all things, Essex's hand was not to be seen, for ' I must, like the watermen, row one way and look another,' 131 meaning that his enemies at court would oppose the scheme in every way if he were known to be the author. The two residents promised their co-operation, the City communicated with Burghley, but Elizabeth was in no mood for fresh adventures, especially one which seemed to be principally for the benefit of Henry IV., and perhaps Essex found on his return that his personal interests required his presence at court to secure his footing. At any rate he seems to have accepted, without further contest, a letter from Robert Cecyll, of 12 th August, in which he was told that there were not three ships available, that there was a ' great infection ' 132 in the fleet, that the seamen had deserted and the soldiers were disbanded, ' and so nothing left for you to do.' If anything more was to be done Elizabeth's desire was that it should be a squadron to meet the Flota, but there was no willingness on the part of those who were expected to undertake the duty. Essex was now interested in Calais, Howard and Ralegh wanted to be near the Queen to defend themselves, and the officers and men wanted to get away to spend their prize money. On 8th August Sir Ferdinando Gorges wrote that many excuses were being made, but that the squadron might be got ready, and that the returned fleet was putting ashore large quantities of provisions. He and his colleague
130 Cott. MSS. Otho E. ix. f. 363.
131 Birch, Bacon Papers, ii. p. 77.
132 So far this supports Ralegh and others, and contradicts Monson ; but Cecyll was only repeating what was told him by the Lord Admiral, confirmed, it is true, by Lord Thomas Howard, who had hitherto seconded Essex, and who might expect the command of a new squadron.
THE CADIZ VOYAGE, 1596 13
at Plymouth, William Stallenge, thought that a score of ships, including ten of the Queen's, with 3,800 men, might be fitted out in three weeks. But on nth August Stallenge wrote again to the Privy Council that Howard was against going to sea, and that the fleet had gone up Channel, so that he had given up all hope of getting a squadron ready, especially as the victuals were being wasted to make an excuse for those unwilling to sail. On the same day the Council were writing to Howard pressing him again on the subject, ' so desirous we find her Majesty to have some adventure,' but he, saying that there were no ships fit for sea, nor provisions for them, had taken the matter into his own hands and gone up Channel to the Downs.
Elizabeth's preoccupation now was to recover some of the plunder brought home from Cadiz and to get rid of the soldiers and seamen, if possible without paying them. The troops from the Low Countries were to be sent back again, but before they went, and before the others were disbanded or sent to Ireland, they were all to be searched and the value of any booty found was to be deducted from their wages. The Council wrote that the Queen believed that if the ships were searched so much pillage would be found that she ' need not pay wages.' 133 The Dutch squadron was not to be put to this test, but the word of the officers taken, and on the 14th August Elizabeth wrote a cordial letter of praise and thanks to the Admiral Duyvenvoord. A month later Essex sent gold chains to Duyvenvoord and Gerbrandtsen, and, to the former, a diamond ring as well. Not withstanding the efforts of Elizabeth's commissioners not much plunder could be found, and of that found little could be claimed for the Crown, because most of the owners produced licences from the Generals for things of value, and the commissioners therefore could not seize but could only schedule. Ashley, as the Queen's representative on the spot, was held chiefly re- sponsible for neglecting to secure her interests, and as he was also suspected of private peculation on his own account he had a rather unhappy time. On 10th August he wrote to Sir Gely Meyricke, Essex's steward, that what had happened to him was too painful to dwell upon, but as Meyricke was an associate he hoped there would be honour between them : ' I do hope, not- withstanding these storms, you will, in all respects, proceed gentlemanlike with me. I pray conceal all for fear of the worst, nor be it not known I have writ to you.' Within a fortnight Ashley and Meyricke had fallen out, and the former had to admit various things, including a chain sold here for 530/. He now took a more manly tone : * If it be not lawful to take things of
133 Cott. MSS. Otho E. ix. f. 337. She had promised to allow the men a third of all plunder, not being treasure or jewels, ante, i. p. 376.
i4 MONSON'S TRACTS
that nature but with caution to restore, I should think it (under correction) scarce warrantable to offend the public enemy.' 134 The Council had already expressed ' how ill the Queen took it that there was so much spoil and so little reckoning made for her,' but the soldiers could not have made a cleaner sweep or have shown greater skill in concealing their more valuable acquisitions had they been practised in sacking Spanish cities for a genera- tion. Bedsteads, pots, pans, kettles, tusks, sugar, green ginger, scrap iron, bales of paper, linen, and the like were of course noticed, but money and jewels evaded the commissioners. We get a reference to seventy-nine bags of money taken out of a fly- boat by Monson and delivered to Meyricke, but if it puzzled the commissioners at the time to follow the trail we are scarcely likely to be more successful now. An abstract of plunder sent in by the officers of the customs at the port towns is made up of heavy articles of little value, but the commissioners at Plymouth obtained admissions to the amount of 12,800/. ; Vere owned to 3,628/., Ralegh to i,769/.,136 and Conyers Clifford to 3,256/. Elizabeth claimed the ransom money for private individuals and for the city, as security for which some forty of the hostages had been brought home, and called Burghley ' a miscreant ' because he supported Essex. In March 1597 the hostages were at Ware, complaining of their ' new and harsher treatment,' and saying that they expected the remittances from Spain in a month. The Venetian ambassador says that Philip was so dissatisfied with the defence of Cadiz that he refused to assist in recovering them, and they remained in England until July 1603, when the acces- sion of James I. freed them, the latter part of their sojourn having been passed in the Bridewell prison.126
Although more might have been attempted by the Generals,
134 Cecil MSS. 10th, 23rd August, 14th September. Ashley's last letter was written from the Fleet prison.
136 But on 7th July Ralegh wrote to Cecyll, ' I hope her most excellent Majesty will take my labours and endeavours in good part. Other riches than the hope thereof I have none ; only I have received a blow,' referring to his wound {Cott. MSS. Vesp. C. xiii. f. 290). And in his Relation, after saying that he does not know what the other officers got, ' for my own part I have gotten a lame leg and a deformed. For the rest either I spake too late or it was otherwise resolved. . . . I have possession of naught but poverty and pain.'
136 Abreu, Saqueo de Cadiz, p. 45 j Cecil MSS. ££ March, 1597 ; State Papers Ven. \% July, 1596. The Cadiz expedition cost Elizabeth 78,000/. {State Papers, cclvi. 107), nor was that the whole cost, for it did not include the ships sent by the port towns at their own expense. So far as the direct, obvious profit in which she delighted, was con- cerned, Elizabeth must have considered it a bad speculation. The Dutch squadron cost the States-General 500,000 florins (Meteren).
THE CADIZ VOYAGE, 1596 15
perhaps further proceedings would not have added materially to their success, which, so far as it went, was complete enough. Less ambitious in intention than the voyage of 1589, the Cadiz journey stood out in striking contrast, in design, execution, and results, to the former ill-considered enterprise. English wealth had not been greatly increased directly, but the weakness, poverty, and incapacity existing in Spain had been advertised to the world, and the prospects and self-reliance of its enemies proportionately strengthened. If we may believe the reports sent home to Essex by one of his spies, the fall of Cadiz almost maddened Spain into revolt ; we are told of secret meetings of the grandees to debate the advisability of replacing Philip by his son, of proceedings against the two secretaries, Juan de Idiaquez and Christovao de Moura, of insults shouted at Philip in public, and of a shower of lampoons and epigrams, directed at him and those responsible, nightly affixed in the streets and public places. Another correspondent, perhaps more reliable, for Philip was never within measurable distance of losing the affection of his Castilian subjects, simply says that the effect was to induce those surrounding him to urge him to resume more active measures. The King required little urging, for although worn out with work and disease, his one object for the moment was revenge, and he told the Papal Nuncio that he would pawn the very candlesticks on his study table to obtain it. It seemed likely that he would be reduced to some such straits before long, for the tottering edifice of Spanish credit, long supported with difficulty by means of loans, assignations of revenue, forced advances of the silver from the Indies belonging to private owners, and similar expedients had come down with a crash as one effect, and not the least, of the events at Cadiz. The possibility of Philip's eventual defeat had long loomed before the European financiers, but the ease with which the English had conquered, and the inability of the Spaniards to make any effective resistance, was a surprise even to those to whom Spain was no longer a political Behemoth, and one of the first consequences was that Philip found it yet more difficult to raise money. But money was the one essential for his new offensive, and he cut the knot of his embarrassments in November 1596 by a general repudiation of his debts, thus freeing the mortgaged revenues.137 Men were
137 Repudiation was not found to be the easy remedy it appeared, and in 1597 an arrangement was come to by which creditors sacrificed part of their capital and interest. Besides smaller trickeries Philip had already executed a State bankruptcy in 1575, and made a settle- ment which Ranke calculates as a dividend of 58 per cent, of the capital involved. After the revolt of the Netherlands, Castile and Sicily were the only provinces of the Empire which produced any
1 6 MONSON'S TRACTS
ruined in all the chief commercial cities in Europe, and the armies of the Archduke Albert reduced to impotence, but, for the moment, Philip was at ease and enabled to pay his way.
While Essex was at Cadiz, Brochero de Anaya had proposed a counter raid with ten galleys to the English coast, but Philip had refused permission, saying that he wanted a more complete revenge. The usual preparations for the usual invasion had been leisurely going on in the Spanish ports, and would no doubt have finished with the customary postponement, had not the insult to his coasts stung Philip into action at any cost, and decided him upon Ireland. During the autumn months information pointing to a pending invasion came in from various quarters, and moderate pre- parations were made afloat and ashore to meet it : the land forces were ordered to be ready for mobilization, the Hope, Vanguard, Tramontana, Charles, Quittance, and Moon were commissioned in October and November, additionally to the weak Channel Guard,138 and a pinnace under Captain Legatt, Monson's companion in captivity in 1 592,139 was sent down to watch off the Burlings, another off Finisterre, and a third at the Scilly Islands. The Spanish armada was under the command of Don Martin de Padilla Conde de St. Gadea, Adelantado of Castile, with Diego Brochero de Anaya as his Vice- Admiral, and to the latter is assigned the drafting of the plan of action, which was primarily to seize an Irish port in aid of the rebels in Ireland,140 or, if forced by stress of weather to the English coast, to occupy Milford Haven, where Philip expected to be helped by sympathisers. After the departure of
surplus of revenue when the expenses of administration had been defrayed. The whole dependence of the Government was upon the treasure from America.
138 pipe Ojjice Accounts, 2,234. Only the Antelope, Answer, Advantage, Adventure and Aid were already in commission.
139 Legatt, after his return, was sent out again, and spent Christmas Day off Coruna in very bad weather. He said that he would not repeat his experience for a rich India ship {Cecil MSS. 6th January, 1597).
140 In September 1595 the Earl of Tyrone had written to Philip that the only hope of freeing Ireland from the English yoke lay with him, and that now or never was the time for Spanish help. He asked for 2,000 or 3,000 men, and stores, not later than May 1596, and with them had no doubt of success within a year. In January Philip promised him the aid requested (Carew MSS. iii. pp. 122, 131). See also ante, i. p. 377. As early as 1593 Philip had sanctioned the despatch of small assistance to the Irish patriots. At the same time, as declared in Parliament that year, he was considering the offer of Scotch ports made by the Catholic malcontents of that country, but being necessarily an ardent believer in a short sea passage, for every mile of distance greatly increased the risks of his fleet, the tender was never considered really seriously. There were political reasons besides for hesitation to act through Scotland.
THE CADIZ VOYAGE, 1596 17
Essex and Howard the preparations were pressed on, until towards the end of September Padilla had about 100 ships and pinnaces, and 16,500 troops ready.141 But only some twenty of his fleet were men-of-war, and to obtain these the Venetian ambassador tells us that Spain had been ransacked of the last ship and the last gun. Fifty-three of the vessels were Flemish or Easterling merchantmen, used as transports or store ships, and the composition of the fleet is an effective commentary on the impotence of Spain and the policy of uninspired caution which is usually considered a merit in Elizabeth. If, after eight years of preparation for his second invasion, Philip could only get together twenty fighting ships,142 it is sufficient proof that he should never have been allowed to get a fleet together again at all, and could not have done so had Elizabeth struck hard with her always efficient navy, as those who understood the real conditions con- tinually advised her to do. The want of men was as marked as the want of ships, and nearly every language in Europe was to be heard in the fleet, 'mariners of all nations are constrained to serve ; the Dutch assembled and went to the Adelantado demand- ing pay, but were driven aboard with weapons ' ; another witness, who had also been present, said, ' no mariner, of what nation soever he be, is suffered to depart, but is constrained to serve.' 14i The general equipment of this compound armada was very poor in every respect, but such as it was it was ready, and Philip ordered it to sail, notwithstanding the lateness of the season. His admirals understood the risks better than he did, and a council decided to send a memorial protesting against the order, but the protest was made in vain and only evoked an imperative command to sail. After two or three attempts Padilla got to sea from Lisbon on T8¥ October, and on ^th was off Finisterre, where he was struck by a south- westerly gale which ended the second invasion, and when the weather cleared and the shattered remains of the fleet had recovered shelter, it was found that between thirty and forty ships, including seven men-of-war, with at least 2,000 troops, had been lost. ' The Adelantado's fleet is so ruined,' wrote the Venetian ambassador, 'that out of the 12,000 and upwards who were on board, not more than 2,500 remain. The larger number of the sailors have deserted ; if his Majesty intends to use his fleet next year he will have to reconstruct it.'
141 State Papers Ven. -^ November, 1 596.
142 The Venetian ambassador says twenty-four ; an English pilot, who was with the fleet, says twenty (State Papers Eliz. cclxii. 37). According to Fernandez Duro there were eleven more galleons avail- able (Arm. Espafwla, iii. p. 129).
143 State Papers Dom. Eliz. cclx. 87 ; Hist. MSS. Com., App. to 1 5th Rep. pt. vii. (Somerset MSS.), p. 22.
VOL. II. C
18 MONSON'S TRACTS
What operation Philip had precisely in his mind is not quite plain j if the object of the fleet was an evasion raid — that is, to throw troops into Ireland to assist the rebels, the fleet at once escaping and leaving the army to hold its own with the help of the rebels — the movement was a quite legitimate one, if the possibilities of the combined force being self-supporting, or dependent on only occasional and chance supplies of stores and reinforcements, had been accurately calculated. But the alternative plan of seizing Milford Haven was to repeat the strategy of 1588, under more unfavourable circumstances. In both cases Philip contemplated a fleet action, but in 1588 it was to be fought in the Channel within striking distance of London, and with Parma's army to follow up a victory ; here, it was to be fought in the Bay of Biscay or in St. George's Channel by a much smaller fleet with- out any supporting army, and with a port on the confines of the kingdom, the possession of which promised no decisive result, as the prize. Nor, in the event of a first victory, was either fleet or army strong enough to continue the invasion without reinforce- ments, yet Philip had no reserves and could not hope to keep open communications in face of an English land and sea force which would grow larger day by day. The truth was, although few Englishmen or Spaniards appreciated it, that invasion had long been impracticable. England had grown in strength since 1588, while Spain had weakened; invasion was feasible in that year with the force Philip had at command, and under the strategic conditions then obtaining in the Low Countries and in France. Those conditions no longer existed, and to compensate for their absence the King would have to set forth a much larger fleet and army than that of 1588 ; but as the preparation of the Armada had strained his resources to breaking- point, and as Spain was infinitely poorer and weaker in every respect than in the Armada year, the equipment of an expedition on the scale required was impossible to an exhausted nation.
The scheme of an Irish descent may have been Brochero's, but Philip's sequel to its failure must have been his own; in December he wrote to the Cardinal Archduke Albert, sug- gesting that the latter should collect troops at Calais and invade England forthwith, transporting the army across the Channel in light vessels. Philip can only have hoped for the success of such an attempt on the supposition that, as prudence and forethought had failed to win a prosperous issue, he might now anticipate a miracle. More disastrous to Spain than mere defeat, as a sign of the causes sapping national life, was the spirit of Herrera's comment, written a few years afterwards, on the 1596 failure : 'This, and the other misfortunes which happened to this country during the war with England, did not proceed rom want of human foresight, nor from the valour of the enemy,
THE CADIZ VOYAGE, 1596 19
but from the will of God, who was pleased to permit it for His ends.' 144 In a religious race God's will is the equivalent of the explanation of betrayal offered by a people of another type ; both equally imply loss of prestige, power, and self -respect, and degene- ration of national fibre.
On 2nd November, a little more than a fortnight, allowing for the difference between the English and Spanish calendars, after one of those fortunate winds which have so often blown for Eng- land had destroyed the Spanish fleet,145 the Queen authorized the calling together of a committee of experts to discuss the best measures to be taken for the national defence. Elizabeth's reso- lution was rather late, for, if things had gone as the Spaniards hoped, Padilla should have been in Ireland or at Milford Haven before she had made up her mind. The committee consisted of Burghley, as president, Essex, Lords Willoughby, Burgh, North, and Norreys, Ralegh, Sir Conyers Clifford, Sir William Knollys, Sir Francis Vere, and Sir George Carew. The committee could by no means agree as to what might be expected ; some thought that a serious invasion was intended, others that only a raid on a southern port in revenge for Cadiz was to be feared. All the Channel ports, the Thames, Holland, and Scotland were dwelt on as in danger j only Lord Willoughby thought of Ireland.146 Ralegh delivered an opinion which was unimpeachable in its reasoning, and therefore, dealing as it did with such a mediocrity as Philip, wrong in its conclusions. Seeing that it had taken the King three years to prepare for the conquest of Portugal, and three years to prepare the Armada, he could not understand how Philip could have ships or stores or men enough for invasion. In other words, he could not conceive that Philip would send a fleet to sea just strong enough to fight once, but not strong enough to conquer, nor to stand the strain of the continued fighting that might be expected. He did not believe that the Spaniards would dare to seize any southern port before gaining the command of the sea, and thought that there was no need of fortifications anywhere but in the
144 Historia General, iii. p. 645.
145 i fortunate ' in the sense that, with the exception of the Dutch, we have always fought worse sailormen than ourselves. Gales have not blown providentially, but the instinctive adaptability of the English- man to the sea has been most clearly brought out under unfavourable conditions of weather which were therefore more to be desired by, and more fortunate for, us than for our adversaries. The student of naval history will recall the numerous instances in which heavy weather has destroyed the enemy or intensified his difficulties, while the Englishman, equally exposed to it, has skilfully used it to obtain or complete a success. The sum of offensive advantage thus gained has been incalculable.
14,i State Papers Dom. Eliz. cclx. 82, 83, 93.
C 2
20 MONSON'S TRACTS
Thames.147 Ralegh fell into the error of assuming that Philip and the Spanish officers possessed his own clearness of perception and grasp of strategical principles.
If we may judge from the information given by prisoners to the Spaniards, there was a general belief in the Cadiz fleet that the Earl of Cumberland was coming with reinforcements, but in reality there was no such intention. On 21st December, 1595, he was at Portsmouth preparing for sea, and desired that his commission of the previous summer might be continued ; this was granted, and on the following 16th January he wrote to Robert Cecyll, from on board his new ship the Malice Scourge, that he hoped to be back by the end of March, but was delayed at present by foul weather.148 In the beginning of February he put to sea, but was forced back with his mainmast sprung, and bad weather kept him in port until March, when he was stayed by the Queen's order.149 He did not go to sea again himself during 1596, but fitted out the Ascension (400 tons, 34 guns), Captain Francis Slingsby, 'chiefly to look for such ships as should come from Lisbon.' Instead of falling in with rich prizes, Slingsby was unlucky enough to come upon a Spanish squadron under Pedro de Zubiaur, and the Ascension had a desperate fight with two of the Spaniards, losing twenty-two men, before she escaped.150 She then returned, having made a profitless voyage.
147 Works, Oxford, 1829, viii. p. 677. Ralegh was a c pure navy ' man, ' either the enemy will give us time to prepare our navy and then it (fortifications) shall not need, or he will give us no time, and then we shall but begin a work of our own perils.' But it is doubtful whether Ralegh meant that he would leave places like Portsmouth and Plymouth open to a raid ; he probably had others, such as Falmouth and Milford Haven, in mind, which then offered a secure roadstead but nothing more.
148 Cecil MS S. 2 1 st December, 1595 ; 16th January, 1596.
149 Ibid. 17th March.
150 Purchas, Pilgrimes, iv. p. 1149.
21
A Voyage to the Islands, the Earl of Essex General, a.d. 1597. [1]
Ships. The Merhonour, after in the Repulse
The Lion . The Warspite The Garland The Defiance The Mary Rose The Hope . The Matthew The Rainbow The Bonaventure The Dreadnought The Swiftsure . The Antelope . The Nonpareil . The Andrew
Commanders.
The Earl of Essex. Captain under him, Sir Robert Man- sell.
The Lord Thomas Howard.
Sir Walter Ralegh.
The Earl of Southampton.
The Lord Mountjoy.
Sir Francis Vere.
Sir Richard Leveson.
Sir George Carew.
Sir William Monson.*
Sir William Harvey.
Sir William Brooke.
Sir Gely Meyricke.
Sir John Gilbert ; he went not.
Sir Thomas Vavasour.
Captain Throckmorton.
Her Majesty having knowledge of the King of Spain's drawing down his fleet and army to Corufia and Ferrol, which intended some action against her ; and that notwithstanding the loss of thirty-six sail of his ships that were cast away upon the North Cape, in their coming thither, he prepared with all possible means to revenge the hurts and disgrace we did him the year last past at Cadiz, her Majesty likewise prepared to defend herself, and fitted out the most part of her ships for the sea. But
* A has ' Sir William Monson was put into the Rainbow because my Lord of Essex resolved to come on board him, and to give the attempt upon the ships in Ferrol with the Rainbow and the rest of the fleet, the Queen's excepted.'
22 MONSON'S TRACTS
at length, perceiving his drift was more to affright than offend her, though he gave it out otherwise, because she should provide to resist him at home rather than to annoy him abroad, she, perceiving his intention and what expense she was driven into, augmented her charge and converted her prepara- tions upon him. [2]
The project of this voyage was to assault the King of Spain's shipping in the harbour of Ferrol, which the Queen chiefly desired to do for her own security at home, and afterwards to go to the island of Terceira to take it and keep it, and there to expect the coming home of the Indian fleet : but neither of these two designs took that effect which was ex- pected. For in our setting forth, the same day we put to sea * we were taken with a most violent storm and contrary winds, and the General was separated from the fleet, and one ship from another, so that of force one half of the fleet was compelled to return home. And the rest that kept the sea, having reached the coast of Spain, were commanded home, by order of the Lord General.
Thus, after their return, they were to advise upon a new voyage, finding, by their ships unable and victuals spent, that they were unable to perform the former. Whereupon it was thought convenient all the army should be discharged for saving of victuals for the rest, except a thousand of the prime soldiers of the Low Countries, who were carried principally to put into her Majesty's ships if they should chance to encounter the Spanish fleet. Thus the second time they departed England, though not without some danger of the ships by reason of the winter approaching, which upon their return they were sure to taste. [3]
* A, B, and R read ' a day or two after we put to sea.'
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 23
The first land in Spain we fell in withal was the North Cape, the place whither our directions led us if we happened to lose company. Being there descried from the shore, and not above twelve leagues from Coruna, where the Spanish armada lay, we hoped to have enticed them out of the har- bour upon indifferent * terms to have fought with us. But spending some time thereabouts, and finding no such disposition in them, it was thought fit no longer to linger about that coast lest we should lose greater opportunity upon the Indian fleet. Therefore every captain received his directions to stand his course into thirty-six degrees, there to spread our- selves north and south, it being a height that commonly the Spaniards halef in from the Indies.
At this time the Lord General complained of a leak in his ship, and two days after, towards night, he brought himself upon the lee to stop it. Sir Walter Ralegh, and some other ships, being ahead of the fleet, and it growing dark, they could not discern the Lord General's working, but stood their course as before directed ; and through this unad- vised working of the master of my Lord's ship, they lost him and his fleet.
The day following, Sir Walter Ralegh was in- formed, by a pinnace of Plymouth he met, that the great armada, which we supposed to be in Coruna and Ferrol, was gone to the Islands for the guard of the Indian fleet : this pinnace, with this intelligence it gave us, Sir Walter Ralegh imme- diately sent to look out the General. My Lord had no sooner received this advice but at the very instant he directed his course to the Islands, and despatched some small vessels to Sir Walter Ralegh to inform him of the sudden alteration of his course
* I.e. equal, impartial.
t The early form of ' haul ' in the sense of direction.
24 MONSON'S TRACTS
upon the news received from him, commanding him with all expedition to repair to Flores, where he would not fail to be. At our arrival at the Islands we found this intelligence false ; for neither the Spanish ships were there, nor were expected there. We met likewise with divers English vessels that came out of the Indies, but they could give us no assurance of the coming home of the fleet ; neither could we receive any advertisement from the shore, which made us half in despair of them.
By that time we had watered our ships and refreshed our men at Flores, Sir Walter Ralegh arrived there ; who was willed by the Lord General, after he was furnished of such wants as that poor island afforded, to repair to the island of Fayal, which my Lord intended to take. Here grew great questions and heart-burnings against Sir Walter Ralegh. For he coming to Fayal, and missing the Lord General, and yet knowing my Lord's resolution to take the island, he held it more discretion to land with the few forces he had than to expect the coming of my Lord, lest that in delaying of time the island might be better provided : whereupon he landed, and took the town and castle before my Lord's approach. This act was held such an affront and indignity to my Lord, and urged with that vehe- mence by those that loved not Sir Walter, that I believe he had smarted for it if my Lord had not been a man of mild and flexible nature * and per- haps might fear it would not be well taken in England. [4]
From this island we went to Graciosa, which did willingly relieve our wants with such succour as it could ; yet with humble entreaty to forbear landing with our army, especially because they understood
* C, D, and SI. 1 read ' timorous and flexible nature ' ; SI. 2 < kind and timorous ' ; A, B, and R as in the text.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 25
there was a squadron of Hollanders amongst us, whose condition was to use all manner of cruelty where they overcame. And here it was that we met the Indian fleet, which in manner following unluckily escaped us.
The Lord General having sent some men of good account into the island to see there should be no evil measure offered to the Portuguese, he having passed his word to the contrary, those men adver- tised him of four sail of ships descried from the shore, and one of them, looming greater than the rest, seemed to be a carrack. My Lord received this news with great joy, and divided his fleet into three squadrons, to be commanded by himself, the Lord Thomas Howard, and Sir Walter Ralegh. The next ship to my Lord, of the Queen's, was the Rain- bow, wherein Sir William Monson went, who received direction from my Lord to steer away south that night, and if he should meet with any fleet, to follow them, carrying lights, or shooting off his ordnance, or making any other sign that he could to give warning ; and if he met with no ships, to direct his course the next day to the island of St. Michael, but my Lord promised that night to send twelve ships after him. Sir William besought my Lord, by the pinnace that brought him this direction, that above all things he should have a care to de- spatch a squadron to the road of Angra in the island of Terceira, for it was certain, if they were Spaniards, thither they would resort.
Whilst my Lord was thus contriving his business, and ordering his squadron, a small bark of his fleet happened to come to him, who assured him that those ships discovered from the land were of his own fleet, and that it came in immediately from them. This made my Lord countermand his former direction, only Sir William Monson, who was the
26 MONSON'S TRACTS
next ship to him and received the first command, could not be recalled back. Within three hours of his departure from my Lord, which might be about twelve of the clock in the night, he fell in company of a fleet of twenty-five sail, which at the first he could not assure himself to be Spaniards because, the day before, that number of ships was missing from our fleet. Here he was in a dilemma and great perplexity with himself. For in making signs, as he was directed, if the ships proved English it were ridiculous, and he might be held a scorn ; and to respite it till morning were as dangerous if they were the Indian fleet, for then my Lord might be out of view, or of the hearing of his ordnance ; there- fore he resolved rather to put his person than his ship in peril. He commanded his master, on his allegiance, to keep the weather-gage of the fleet, whatsoever should become of him ; and it blowing little wind he betook himself to his boat and rowed up with this fleet, demanding whence they were. They answered, of Seville in Spain, and asked of whence he was. He told them, of England ; and that the ship in sight was a galleon of the Queen of England's, single and alone, alleging the honour they would get by winning her, urging them with daring speeches to chase her. This he did in policy, hoping to entice and draw them into the wake of our fleet if they should follow him, where they would be so entangled as they could not escape. They returned him some shot and ill language, but craftily kept on and would not alter their course to Terceira, whither they were bound, and where they arrived, to our misfortune. Sir William Monson, returning aboard his ship, again made signs with lights, false fires, and report of his ordnance, but all in vain ; for my Lord altering his course, as you have heard, stood that night to St.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 27
Michael, and passed by the north side of Terceira, a farther way than if he had gone by the way of Angra, where he had met the Indian fleet.
When day appeared, and Sir William Monson was in hopes to find the twelve ships promised to be sent to him, he might only discern the Spanish fleet two miles and a little more ahead of him, and astern him a galleon, and a Spanish frigate betwixt them ; which galleon, putting forth her flags, he knew to be the Earl of Southampton in the Garland. The frigate of the Spanish fleet took the Garland and the Rainbow to be galleons of theirs, but seeing the flag of the Garland, she found her error and sprang her luff,* thinking to escape ; but the earl pursued her, with the loss of some time, when he should have followed the fleet, and there- fore was desired to desist from that chase by Sir William Monson, who sent his boat to him. By a shot from my lord this frigate was sunk ; and while his men were rummaging her, Sir Francis Vere and Sir William Brooke in the Mary Rose and Dreadnought came up in their two ships, who, the Spaniards taken in the frigate, would have made the earl believe were two galleons of theirs. And so much did my lord signify to Sir William Monson, wishing him to forbear his chase and stay their coming up, for that there would be greater hope of those two ships, which there was no doubt but we were able to master, than of the fleet, for which we were too weak.
When Sir William had made the two ships to be the Queen's, which he had ever suspected, he began to pursue the Spanish fleet afresh, but by reason they were so far ahead of him, and had so little way to sail, they recovered the road of Ter-
* Came up to the wind, having been running large.
28 MONSON'S TRACTS
ceira. But he and the rest of the ships pursued them, and himself led the way into the road, yea, into the very harbour, followed by the rest of our ships, where he found sharp resistance from the castle. One fort at the entrance of the harbour having but three pieces of ordnance shot him through three times, but notwithstanding he so battered the ships that he might see the masts of some shot by the board, and of others the men quit the ships, so that there wanted nothing but a leading gale of wind to enable him to cut the cables in the hawses and to bring some of them off. Wherefore he sent to the other three ships of ours to desire them to man their boats and a small bark that was in company of us that we might attempt the cutting their cables, but Sir Francis Vere, who was inexperienced in sea stratagems, desired Sir William Monson to come off himself that they might consult and take a resolution what to do. Sir William once more sent him word, that if he quitted the harbour the ships would be towed near the castle ; and that as the night drew on, the wind would freshen, and come more off the land, which indeed proved so, and we above a league from the road in the morning.
We may say, and that truly, there was never that possibility to have undone the State of Spain as at this time, or to have enriched ourselves by their poverty ; for every real of plate we had taken in this fleet, had been two to them, by our converting it by war upon them.
No man can receive blame hereby ; all is to be attributed to the want of experience in my Lord, and his flexible nature to be overruled.* For the first hour he anchored at Flores, and called a council,
* SI. i reads ' his flexible easy nature to be misled and over- ruled.'
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 29
Sir William Monson advised him, upon the reasons following : — After his watering to run west, spreading his fleet north and south, so far as the easterly wind that then blew would carry them ; alleging, that if the Indian fleet came home that year, by computa- tion of the last light moon, (from which time their) disemboguing in the Indies (must be reckoned),* they could not be above two hundred leagues short of that island, and whensoever the wind should chop up westerly, he bearing a slack sail, they would in a few days overtake him.
This advice my Lord seemed to embrace ; but was suddenly f diverted by divers gentlemen, who, coming principally for land-service, found themselves tired by the tediousness of the sea so that they courted nothing more than to be on shore. Certain it is, if my Lord had followed his advice, within less than forty hours he had made the Queen owner of that fleet ; for by the pilot's card, which was taken 111 the frigate, the Spanish fleet was but fifty leagues in traverse with that easterly wind from Flores, when my Lord was there. Which made my Lord wish, the first time Sir William Monson repaired to him after the escape of the fleet, that he had given his right hand so he had been ruled by him.
Being met aboard Sir Francis Vere we con- sulted what to do, but God knows it was too late. Notwithstanding we resolved to acquaint my Lord with what had happened, desiring his presence with us, to be an eye-witness if there were any possibility to attempt the shipping, or surprise the island, and so to possess the treasure. My Lord received this advertisement just as he was ready with his troops to have landed in St. Michael, but this message
* The passages in brackets are emendations by the Churchill editor, but are necessary to the sense. f Immediately.
3o MONSON'S TRACTS
diverted his landing, and made him presently cast about for the island of Terceira, where we lay all this while expecting his coming. In his course from St. Michael it was his hap to take three ships, belonging to Don Juan de Maldanava, Governor of the Havana, that departed thence three days after the fleet, which three ships did almost then countervail the expense of the whole voyage.
After my Lord's arrival at the mouth of the road of Angra, where we lay expecting him, he had a consultation of the sea commanders how the enemy's ships might be fetched off from under the castle, or destroyed as they lay ; but all men, with one con- sent, agreed the impossibility of the one or the other. The attempting the island was propounded ; but withstood for these reasons : The difficulty in landing ; the strength of the island, which was increased by fourteen or fifteen hundred soldiers in the ships ; and our want of victuals, to abide by the siege. [5]
Seeing then we were frustrate of our hopes at Terceira or of the ships lying there, we resolved upon landing in St. Michael, and arrived the day following at Ponta Delgada, the chief city. Here my Lord embarked his small army in boats, with offer to land ; and having thereby drawn the enemy's greatest force thither to resist him, suddenly he rowed to Villa Franca, three or four leagues distance from thence, and without mistrust of the inhabitants surprised the town at unawares. The ships had order to abide in the road of Ponta Delgada, for that my Lord made account to march thither by land ; but being ashore at Villa Franca, he was informed that the march was impossible, by reason of the high and craggy mountains which diverted his purpose.
Victuals now grew short in many of our ships ; *
* A, B, and R read 'in all the ships.'
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 31
and my Lord General began discreetly to foresee the danger in abiding towards winter about those Islands, which could not afford him so much as safe harbour- ing, only open roads that were subject to southerly winds ; and upon every such wind he must be forced to put to sea for his safety. He considered, that if this should happen when his troops were ashore, and he not able to reach the land in three weeks or a month, or more, which is a thing ordinary, what a desperate case he should put himself into, especially in so great a want of victuals. He weighed also that he had seen the end of all his hopes by the escape of the fleet, and so embarked himself and army, though with some difficulty and danger, the seas were now so overgrown.
By this time the one-half of the fleet that rid in Ponta Delgada put room for Villa Franca ; and those that remained behind rode as a bait to such Spanish ships as should seek that road. And one morning there bore in, without mistrust of us, a ship of Brazil that was thus betrayed, taking us to be the King of Spain's fleet. And after her there followed a carrack, who had been served in the like manner but for the hasty and indiscreet weighing of a Hollander, which made her run ashore under the castle when she was ready to put in amongst us. But, notwithstanding that the castle was a guard unto her, when the wind began to lessen, for at that time it blew very hard, Sir William Monson weighed with the Rainbow, intending to give an attempt upon her, notwithstand- ing the castle, which she perceiving, as he drew near unto her she set herself on fire and burned down to the very keel. She was a ship of fifteen hundred tons burden, that the year before was not able to double the Cape of Good Hope in her voyage to the East Indies, but put into Brazil, where she was laden with sugars, and afterwards thus destroyed. [6]
32 MON SON'S TRACTS
The Spaniards, who presumed more upon their advantages than valour, and thought it too equal a condition to follow us to the Islands, and put their fortunes upon a day s service, subtly devised how to intercept us as we came home, weak and weather- beaten, when we had least thought or suspicion of them and their fleet, which was all this while in Corufia and Ferrol, not daring to put forwards while they knew ours to be upon the coast. Against the time we should return, their General, the Adelantado (not so called from his office of admiral as many suppose, but a title of dignity received from his ancestors), came for England, with a resolution to land at Falmouth, and fortify it, and afterwards with their ships to keep the sea, and expect our coming home scattered. And having thus cut off our sea- forces, and possessing the harbour of Falmouth, they thought with a second supply of thirty-seven Levan- tine ships, which Don Marcos de Aramburu com- manded, to have returned and gained a good footing in England.
These designs of theirs were not foreseen by us for we came home scattered, scarce two ships in company, some with the loss of their masts and few but had reason to complain of some disaster or other. We say, and that truly, that God fought for us, for the Spaniards had never so dangerous an enterprise on us. The Adelantado, being within a few leagues of the islands of Scilly, he commanded all his cap- tains on board him to receive his directions for before the common sort was ignorant of the design ; but whilst they were thus busy in council, a violent storm took them at east, insomuch that the captains could hardly recover their ships, but in no case were able to save their boats. The storm continued so furious that by morning the whole fleet was scat- tered, and happy was he who could recover home,
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 33
seeing their design thus overthrown by the loss of their boats, whereby the means of landing was taken away. Some who were more willing to obey the directions of the General than the rest kept the seas so long upon our coast, that in the end they were taken ; others put themselves into our harbours for refuge and succour ; and it is certainly known, that in this voyage the Spaniards lost eighteen ships, the St. Luke and the St. Bartholomew being two, and in the rank of his best galleons.
We must ascribe this loss of theirs to God only ; for certainly the enemies' designs were dangerous, and not diverted by our force, but by His will, who from time to time would not suffer the Spaniards in any one of their attempts to set footing in England, as we did in all quarters of Spain, Portugal, the Islands, and both Indies.* [7]
In this voyage to the Islands, I have set down my Lord's design upon the Spanish fleet lying at Ferrol, wherein his lordship required a captain he most relied on to have his opinion in writing. First, whether he should attempt the ships in harbour, or no ? Secondly, whether before or after his being at Terceira ? And, lastly, the manner how to assail them ? The captain's answer follows, which you may read and judge of : —
To the Right Honourable the Earl of Essex.
In answer to your lordship's demand, ' Whether to give an enterprise upon the ships in Ferrol, before
* R has ' There went in this journey, counting the Holland squadron, about 170 sail of ships.' In all the MSS. of Book I. the Islands voyage ends here, the succeeding portion having been written, presumably, years later, and is included in various parts of the following books. The Churchill editor, of course, placed it in its right position.
VOL. II. D
34 MONSOATS TRACTS
the landing your men and the castles gained,' this I say, that before I can give my resolution, I must de- scribe the state of that harbour, and the situation of the forts, with the strength of the ships, before I can frame my reasons.
I conceive at the entrance of the harbour there are three castles, two on the one side, one on the other, all three commanding at one time any ship that shall enter. They are seated low by the water, the cliffs on both sides very high, and the harbour to be chained.
I conceive, if your lordship do land your men in the bay before you take the forts, as there is no other place of landing, you must consider it is an open road, the coast subject to northerly winds, which make so great a siege * on the shore, that you cannot land your soldiers and their furniture with conveniency and safety, especially being sure to find resistance at your landing.
But your lordship may answer, ' That he who attempts great things, must run all hazards, and, as it is wisdom to forecast all doubts and dangers, so were it too great security not to hazard loss upon hope of victory.' And whereas the danger of landing by reason of the siege on the shore is alleged, you may think we are not always sure of a northerly wind, nor of so great a siege, and therefore you must put your attempt in adventure.
But for your lordship's satisfaction in this point, you must know that you cannot seize that coast but with such a wind as makes such a siege as that you can hardly land. Or, suppose that being upon the coast as you were the last year when you came from Cadiz, and that the wind should now do, as then it did, chop up from the south-east to the north-west, your lordship would be embayed, and forced to seek
* Surf.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 35
the harbour of Coruiia or Ferrol, and make good those places, which then you might have done. But now you must consider your army is not so great as it was then, and their fortifications and shipping are much stronger than they were. My opinion is, therefore, that there is little possibility of attempting the shipping without gaining the forts ; neither do I see any possibility to possess them with your small army.
But your lordship may allege that, though the forts were impregnable, yet they may be passed with a large wind ; for every shot that comes from them hits not, or if it does it kills not, but though it should, it sinks not.
I allow it is no great difficulty to pass any fort with a ship under sail, being a movable thing where no certain aim can be had. Yet I think no place more dangerous than Ferrol, because of the hugeness of the hills and the narrowness of the entrance that makes a continual calm, or the little wind, so uncertain that every puff brings sundry shift of wind. Many of the King of Spain's ships have found this and been there lost. And therefore the advantage of a ship in passing a castle is the force and largeness of a wind ; as to the contrary, these forts will be able to annoy a ship by reason of a continual calm.
But allow that your lordship's fleet should enter safely ; for the greatest difficulty is not to pass in, but to perform the service when they are within. Your fleet being entered, they will be in the state of a prisoner that cannot get out of a hold without leave of his keeper ; for the wind that is good and large for them to enter, is as much against their coming forth, and therefore it behoves every com- mander as well to think of bringing himself off with discretion as with valour to execute danger.
D 2
36 MONSON'S TRACTS
Hitherto I have showed the uncertainty of your lordship's landing, the doubtfulness of your attempt, and the danger in not having the castles. But I will now suppose the forts to be ours, and the whole shipping passed them without any loss ; yet will the enemy have as great an advantage as they can require, for the number of men and shipping, and the greatness of their vessels, are known to exceed ours.* And, where there is an equality in shipping on both sides, the victory is not to be obtained on either side whilst there is ammunition and men on the other side, unless it be by a general boarding, or stratagem of firing, in which the Spaniards shall have advantage of us, they being in their own har- bour where they may be supplied, and we can have no relief but what we bring with us.
If your lordship shall hold it convenient, as in discretion I think you will not, to send in her Majesty's ships upon this service, then you must consider the rest of your fleet to be far inferior to the enemies' strength. And so you will send them apparently to their own destruction, slaughter, and ruin.
As I am against the attempt of Ferrol before you return from the Islands, so I am also against your lordship's presenting yourself upon that coast, for in thinking to entice forth the fleet, besides that you shall discover your own strength, you shall give them occasion to arm their country. And more- over, it will be in their choice, whether to set upon you, yea or no, for they will be able to value their force by yours after you are descried, and besides such is their discipline, that though they had your lordship upon advantage, yet they dare not attempt
* A has an erased passage, ' exceed ours and your lordship cannot propound any advantage of them in a harbour fight^ and where,' &c.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 37
you without a special order from the King ; which your lordship found by experience in the Conde de Fuentes his answer to your lordship's challenge at the walls of Lisbon. And to conclude, since your lordship intends to go from Ferrol to Terceira, it were much better, in my opinion, first to attempt that island, whilst your army is strong and in health. It is a place of much more importance, and more likelihood of prevailing than in your enterprise upon the shipping. That island being possessed, will draw contributions from the rest to maintain it ; your lord- ship will cut off the relief and succour the Spaniards and Portuguese receive in their navigations from both the Indies, Guinea, and Brazil ; your lordship will provide a place of refuge for our fleet hereafter from whence they may with ease keep the seas, and endanger all the trades aforesaid ; your lordship will unite that island to the Crown of England ; and if there be an agreement of peace betwixt the two nations, you will gain advantageous conditions to the State of England upon a treaty ; your lordship will be in a possibility of drawing the armada of Ferrol to pursue you thither, that island importing them so much to defend ; and then your lordship will have your desire to fight them upon equal terms at sea. If you attempt Ferrol at first, and should happen to be repulsed, your lordship will confess it will be so great a dishonour and loss that you will not be able to resolve upon any other service, and then will your expedition for Terceira be utterly void. Whereas if you would please to make your attempt upon Terceira first, it will not take away your hope of Ferrol afterwards ; for in your return from thence you will find the shipping either in the same state you left them in harbour or shall encounter them at sea upon advantage. Thus have I answered your lordship's expectation to your demands. [8] W. M.
38 MONSON'S TRACTS
[i] The fleet was made up as follows : — l Earl of Essex's Squadron
|
Ships. |
Tons. |
Captains and Period of Commission. |
|
Merhonour |
865 |
(Earl of Essex) ; Sir Robert Mansell, 1 st June-i3th August. |
|
Garland . |
660 |
J. Troughton(Vice-Admiral of squad- ron), 14th June-i7th November. |
|
Defiance . |
S5o |
George Fenner, sen., 14th June- 25th December. |
|
Mary Rose |
600 |
J. Wynter, 14th June-2 7th No- vember. |
|
Swiftsure . |
400 |
Sir Gely Meyricke, 14th June-24th December. |
|
Foresight |
300 |
Sir Carew Reynells (Reynolds), 14th June-8th August. Sir Alexander Ratcliffe, 9th August- 28th November. |
|
Armed Merchant- |
||
|
men : |
||
|
Swan |
35o 2 |
— |
|
Prosperous |
400 |
— |
|
Unicorn . |
250 |
— |
|
Hercules of Rye |
240 |
— |
|
Katherine |
— |
— |
|
Black Galley . |
— |
— |
|
Vice-A |
dmiral's Squadron. |
|
|
Repulse . |
770 |
Lord Thomas Howard, Vice-Ad- miral,3 14th June-i7th August. Sir Robert Mansell, 18th August- 23rd December. |
|
Lion |
500 |
Lord Thomas Howard, i7thAugust- 24th December. |
1 Pipe Office Declared Accoimtsy 2235 ; State Papers Dom. Eliz. cclxiv. 3, 19.
2 The tonnage of the merchantmen is taken from the Exchequer warrants, granting the bounty of $s. a. ton on ships of 200 tons and upwards.
3 Wages, 3/. a day. When the fleet started for the second time, the Merhonour was left at home, and Essex shifted to the Repulse, giving Lord Thomas Howard the Lion. Howard's pay was then re- duced to 2/. 1 5 s. a day.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 39
|
Ships. |
Tons. |
Captains and Period of Commission. |
|
Hope |
600 |
Sir Richard Leveson (Vice- Admiral of squadron), 14th June-i ith No- vember. |
|
Nonpareil |
500 |
Sir Thomas Vavasour, 14th June- 26th November. |
|
Rainbow . |
500 |
Sir William Monson, 14th June- 24th December. |
|
Dreadnought . |
400 |
Sir William Brooke, 14th June-24th December. |
|
Advice . |
5o |
William Willis, 14th June-i7th November. |
|
Armed Merchant- |
||
|
man : |
||
|
Sun |
250 |
— |
|
Rear-A |
dmiral's Squadron. |
|
|
Warspite . |
648 |
Sir Walter Ralegh, ' captain and rear-admiral,'4 14th June -9th November. |
|
St. Matthew . |
1,000 |
Sir George Carew (Vice- Admiral of squadron), 16th June-i7th Sep- tember. |
|
Antelope |
400 |
Sir John Gilbert, 14th June- 10th August.5 |
|
Bonaventure . |
600 |
Sir William Harvey, 14th June-26th November. |
|
St. Andrew |
900 |
Marcellus Throckmorton, 14th June- 15 th October. |
|
Adventure |
34o |
Sir George Carew, 19th September- 2 1 st November. |
|
Armed Merchant- |
||
|
men : |
||
|
Guiana6 . |
— |
— |
|
Consent . |
35o |
— |
4 Wages, 15-r. a day. Sir Arthur Gorges, who wrote an account of the voyage, claims to have acted as captain ; if so, he did not act officially. His list of ships and officers differs in several respects from the official one.
5 The Antelope was detached to strengthen the Channel squadron on the news that reinforcements had arrived at Blavet {Cecil MS S. 10th August). In the same letter Essex said that he had also sent the Tramontana, but, according to the pay lists, the latter was one of the Channel division during the whole year.
0 The Guiana belonged to Ralegh {State Papers, cclxiv. 60), and
40
MONSON'S TRACTS
|
Ships. |
Tons. Captains and Period of Commission. |
|
|
Dutch Squadron- |
||
|
Orange . |
— |
Jan van Duyvenvoord, Admiral. |
|
Dolphin . |
— |
Jan Gerbrandtsen, Vice-Admiral. |
|
/Eolus |
, — |
Cornelius Lensen, Rear- Admiral.7 |
|
Neptune . |
— |
— Cales. |
|
White Falcon . |
— |
— Bancker. |
|
Fox |
— |
— Walle. |
|
Drake |
— |
— Doune. |
|
Neptune . |
— |
— Segarson. |
|
Greyhound |
— |
Elkart Cox. |
|
Drake |
— |
— Whipcall. |
With Essex's squadron there were ten transports carrying troops and stores, with Howard's twelve, with Ralegh's ten, and with Duyvenvoord's fifteen ; five or six small vessels with each squadron completed the fleet. Gorges says that there were 120 ships, Monson 170, and as, in a letter of 8th September, Ralegh speaks of being accompanied by ' twenty voluntary barks of the west country that came out with me,' we may take it that, as usual in these expeditions, there were many additional unplaced ships sailing in company on the chance of plunder. In April, and on 9th May, the Privy Council sent out circular letters order- ing a levy of 6,000 men ; on 30th May the number was reduced to 4,000, of whom half were to be musketeers and half pikemen if so many of the former could be obtained.8 On 21st May the Council wrote to Sir Francis Vere that he was to apply to the States for ten men-of-war and fifteen flyboats, which were to be in England by 12th June and bring 1,000 veteran soldiers in them.9 The seamen were obtained in the usual way — by impressment — but appear to have been of an exceptionally unsatisfactory quality. On 7th July, just before sailing, Essex, dealing with the Lord Admiral's comments on so many men being dismissed, wrote, ' none are discharged but men utterly unsufncient and unservice- able taken up by the pressmasters, in mariners' clothes but shall not know any one rope in the ship ; and yet all the ships are so
when the fleet left for the second time, he took another of his ships, the Roebuck, with him {ibid.).
7 Meteren gives Lensen as Vice-Admiral and Jacob Michielsen as Rear-Admiral. The names in the text are from State Papers Eliz. cclxiv. 3.
8 MS. Council Register.
9 Ibid. The Dutch did not join until 25th June, when they came into the Downs.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 41
ill manned as if at this place and Plymouth we be not better supplied we shall be very much troubled how to sail the Queen's ships, for though we have enough for number yet we have none of our fleet that hath half her complement of good men.' The next day he continued on the same subject, 'We are at our wit's end to find her Majesty's fleet thus weakly and wretchedly manned as it is. We did from Weymouth advertise your lordships, my Lord Admiral, and Mr. Secretary of the monstrous abuse in the pressmasters that sent the men which brought us hither. We were furnished with men of all occupations that never knew any rope many of them, nor ever were at sea. And, as many of our men tell us, all the good men for 20s. apiece let go. When we looked for a supply in the West there of Dorsetshire appeared not a man, but either were underhand discharged by the pressmasters or made a jest of the press.' 10 The method of working the system of impressment must have rendered it always a matter of chance whether fit men were obtained, for the central authorities had no power of selection and remained in the dark until the men appeared, when, as in this case, they could dismiss the unfit if they chose. Press warrants were issued by the Privy Council, on the authority of the Queen's commission, and directed to the vice-admirals, lieutenants, and justices of the peace of the maritime counties ; eventually the warrants found their way to the mayors and constables, with whom the power of selection remained and who were frequently amenable to persuasion or bribery, with the results complained of by Essex. The men pressed were given conduct, or travelling, money and told to report themselves at the place named in the press warrant, and not until their arrival did the persons chiefly concerned — the navy authorities — know what sort of crews they were going to be provided with. Nearly a century was to elapse before the captains of men-of-war were also supplied with press warrants that they might pick up men for themselves, and then the two systems worked side by side, but down to the last days of impressment the local authorities were being continually censured for the same faults that Essex taxed them with. Moreover, with the lapse of years the question was additionally complicated by the growth of a feeling of the injustice of the press system, due to the development of ethical sense in even provincial justices and their underlings, which rendered them frequently unwilling to put the warrants into execution or give more than grudging assistance.
If the seamen were of a poor stamp no complaint was made of the soldiers, and distinction was lent to the expedition by the presence of many aristocratic volunteers. Sir Arthur Gorges says that there were 500 of them, including the Earls of Rutland and
10 State Papers Dom. Eliz. cclxiv. 11, 12.
42 MONSON'S TRACTS
Southampton, and Lords Audley, Gray, Rich and Cromwell ; it is rather curious that so many of these volunteers were from the north that some fear was felt for the safety of the English Marches against the Scots.11 The experience of a stiff gale took the courage out of many of them ; one or two actually died of sea- sickness, and when the fleet returned at the end of July from the first unsuccessful attempt to pursue the voyage a number deserted the expedition. ' This storm hath killed the hearts of many voluntary gentlemen, who are returned already from Plymouth,' wrote Rowland Whyte to Sir Robert Sidney. Sir Arthur Gorges says that a number went away secretly, ' forgetting either to bid their friends farewell or to take leave of their General.' We have, however, a letter of one of the Yorkshire volunteers which shows that the terror of the sea was not the only factor, ' many of the gentleman adventurers already gone, some for sea-sickness discouraged by the last storm, some out of a more base disposition, hopeless now to make profit of the voyage, for which end only they under- took the journey. . . . For my own part at the seas I was the sickest of 600 in our ship . . . were not my respect of my reputation more to me than hope of advantage I would long since have left the journey.' 12 Evidently the plunder of Cadiz had drawn many to this voyage with fresh hopes.
The Staff was composed of Charles, Lord Mountjoy, as lieutenant-general and second in command ; Sir Francis Vere, marshal ; Sir George Carew, master of the ordnance ; Sir Ferdi- nando Gorges, serjeant-major ; Sir Christopher Blount, colonel- general of foot ; Sir Oliver Lambert, quartermaster ; and Sir Hugh Beeston, treasurer.
[2] Although Philip was again helpless after the storm of October, the full extent of his weakness was not at first known in England; when the information coming in showed that the fleet was ruined, and the men dying by hundreds of sickness, Elizabeth appears to have been persuaded to convert her defence into an attack, or to allow it to be debated. Towards the middle of December the Privy Council applied to the City of London for ten ships, but the citizens were in a bad humour because no part of the 19,000/., their share of the Cadiz expedition had cost them, had been repaid them, contrary to the contract made in the Queen's name, although enough plunder had been brought home, they said, to defray the whole cost of the voyage.
11 State Papers Dom. Eliz. cclxiv. 61 ; Robert Cecyll to Essex, 29th July. Chamberlain thought that there were 2,000 of them {Letters, Camden Soc. p. 3).
12 Wm. Slingsby to Fr. Slingsby, 12th, 15th August (Parsons, Diary of Sir Henry Sliiigsby . . .family correspondence ... p. 250 et seq.)
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 43
Elizabeth had now to face the consequences of what the citizens regarded as a breach of faith in a refusal, although it was masked under colour of declining trade and heavy debt.1,5 However, the returns of bounties paid on new ships show that building was never brisker than from 1595 to the end of the reign, and the customs receipts were equally flourishing. Moreover, the Lord Mayor and Common Council were troubled with some constitu- tional questions of their own, for they added that people were asking ' by what authority the said payments are imposed upon them by the governors and other ministers of this city,' which seems to point to accusations of unfair rating. They ended by hoping that the Queen would be content if they gave in propor- tion to the other cities of the kingdom ; but clearly the real diffi- culty was their feeling of injury at Elizabeth's conduct to them over the Cadiz voyage. Information from Spain and elsewhere seemed to agree that the shattered fleet lying in Ferrol might be destroyed without much difficulty, and, in January 1597, two plans put forward by Cumberland and Essex were under con- sideration. The first only asked for two Queen's ships, twenty Dutch, and some of his own ; the second required ten or twelve of the Queen's, twenty Dutch, twelve London ships, and 5,000 men. Burghley, while thinking that there was ' nothing so need- ful ' as to attack Ferrol, doubted whether so large a force could be prepared soon enough, or whether, large as it appeared to him, it was strong enough for the work.14 For various reasons the project fell through for the time ; all accounts concurred in reporting that Philip was quite powerless for the present, and a winter or spring campaign was not a thing to be undertaken lightly. The treaty consolidating and defining the triple alliance between England, France and the States, signed the previous year, had placed the allies in a strong position, and the defeat of Turnhout in January seemed to mark its importance by doing for the Archduke's army what the storm had done for Philip's fleet. But the brighter the prospects of the alliance the more suspicious his allies became of Henry IV., who was more than suspected of listening to proposals for a separate peace contrary to his engagements. Henry was also believed not to have forgiven Elizabeth the loss of Calais he ascribed to her delay in propound- ing conditions, and something more was attributed to ' the general inveterate malice and envy of France against the prosperity of England.' 15 The general political conditions, therefore, also
13 Cecil MSS. 24th December, 1596.
14 State Papers D0771. Eliz. cclxii. 16. It appears that Essex did not volunteer his plan, but was ordered by Elizabeth to draw it up (Birch, ii. p. 266).
15 Robert Naunton to Essex (Birch, ii. p. 211).
44 MONSON'S TRACTS
made for delay, but proposals were made to the States in February to provide a sea force, which they readily assented to. Vere, whose opinion as a military adviser carried great weight with the States-General and with Essex, was strongly in favour of recover- ing Calais, but as he thought the siege would require 20,000 men there was little chance of its being undertaken. Calm observers had never considered the Archduke's possession of Calais a serious danger to England, and, notwithstanding the slackness of the Channel cruisers,16 it had proved of even less annoyance than had been anticipated, and the Dutch, therefore, were not eager to take it in hand.17 To the Archduke Calais was of little use as a privateer port, custom and capital having already settled upon Dunkirk in preference ; to Philip it was of no use whatever as the advanced base he required, and single ships bound for it must, after running the gauntlet of the English, French and Dutch vessels in the Channel, make it, if of any size, exactly at high tide. The placid consideration of the allies was interrupted by an unexpected event on -^T March — the capture, by the stratagem of a Spanish captain, of Amiens, the second city of northern France, where Henry lost his artillery park and most of his ordnance stores. This occurrence brought Calais to the front again for the moment, for Henry, determined to besiege Amiens, offered Elizabeth the former town as a guarantee for any expenses incurred in giving him the assistance he required. But, in view of the little injury Calais had caused, the Queen was not tempted by the permission to recover it at her own cost for temporary occupation.
The months which followed Essex's return from Cadiz marked the turning point of his career. A soldier by inclination, and by rank and reputation the leader of professional English soldiership, his brilliant capture of the city had established his renown and given him a dangerous popularity. Moreover, his share of the voyage stood out in contrast with the failure of the seamen to take the Flota and their refusal to cruise for the homeward West India fleet ; and the expedition as a whole seemed to redound to the glory of the army and to bring into relief the many naval failures that had preceded it. That it would not have been possible at all for the army but for the very moderate successes obtained by the navy in even its worst years was probably an observation that occurred to
10 Sir Robert Sidney, the governor of Flushing, wrote to Essex that the captains in the Channel neglected their duty in scouting and examining ships, sacrificing everything to the chance of obtaining convoy money. He instanced George Fenner, jun., and William King, of the Advantage and Tramontana, ' they are the scrapingest fellows in the world . . . they will take anything that is given them, and care not how they come by it' {Cecil MS S. 12th March, 1597).
17 Cecil MSS. 7th January, 1597.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 45
but few. Essex's nature was to follow the path of least resistance, and he easily slid into the character of popular hero assigned to him, but not without warnings from those most closely, if selfishly, interested in his welfare. On 4th October, 1596, Francis Bacon addressed to him the famous letter of advice urging him to eschew the perilous course of a military career, to be content with the fame he had won at Cadiz, and lay himself out for success at court by skilfully flattering the Queen and endeavouring to obtain high civil office. Above all things, Bacon repeats, he must quit playing the soldier, 'that kind of dependence maketh a suspected great- ness.' Others, besides Bacon, saw the danger ; when the earl was ordered in January to draw up his plan of attack on Spain his secretary, Reynolds, lamented that ■ the drift of some is to draw on his lordship by insinuations to take the charge of chief commander.' Perhaps Essex was to a certain extent impelled into the path he followed by his failure to overthrow the rising influence of Robert Cecyll in the world of statesmanship and the court, and was thus tempted into a sphere where he would meet less opposition. Notwithstanding the earl's arguments and entreaties with the Queen she had made Cecyll Secretary of State during his absence, and he therefore endeavoured to regain his ascendency by obtaining the nomination to the Earl Marshalship or the Mastership of the Ordnance, the two great military appoint- ments then vacant. Bacon had directly warned him against taking either of these posts, and Cecyll does not seem to have opposed his desire, an acquiescence which hall-marked the wisdom of Bacon's advice. Cecyll made advances to Essex, but apparently without much success,18 for Ralegh was called in as mediator, and that he should have been able to assume that office shows that the feeling between him and the earl had been improved instead of worsened by the Cadiz voyage. He was not only successful in restoring outwardly amicable relations between the two opponents, but also appeased the remains of Essex's enmity to himself. In appearance everything went to admiration : Essex withdrew his opposition to Ralegh's resuming his duties of captain of the guard, from which he had been suspended from the time that his marriage was discovered, and Ralegh allowed Essex to share some of the advantages of his contract for victualling the land forces. Cecyll cultivated both, and the triumvirate, of which Essex was certainly the most ingenuous member, were inseparable : 1 they are grown exceeding great, and often goes the earl to Sir Robert Cecyll's house, where they all meet.'19 On 10th March Essex obtained his appointment as Master of the Ordnance.
18 In February (Birch, ii. p. 282).
19 Events forced Essex and Ralegh into antagonism, but they had much more in common than either had with the shifty Cecyll. Sir
46 MONSOJSTS TRACTS
In January the Lord Admiral had been spoken of as to be joined with Essex, but he had no desire to share another com- mand with the earl, and Howard's name soon ceased to be mentioned. It was no doubt a consequence of the renewal of friendship between the three courtiers, and with the consent of Essex, that the next plan was for a small fleet under Lord Thomas Howard and Ralegh. During the winter all the information coming in had agreed in describing the Spanish fleet at Ferrol as a dismantled wreck, without rigging, stores, or crews, and it may be that the apparent ease with which it could be destroyed allured Essex, with the encouragement of Cecyll, to undertake the work himself with a larger force. There was nothing to tempt Essex to occupy a subordinate position on the continent instead of a leading one at sea ; the only military events of the summer were Henry's siege of Amiens and the Archduke's attempts to relieve it, operations which engaged all their forces for six months. Calais remained ' a bird in the air ; you may have it if you can catch it ' ; and Elizabeth was not enticed by the prospect of being the fowler.
In his Apology £0 Essex says that the Howard-Ralegh idea was abandoned because a council decided that such a squadron would be too large for scouting and too weak to effect anything against the Flota or the ports. 'I was resolved,'21 he writes, 'that not only Ferrol, where the Adelantado lay, but any port in Spain might be entered and the force of the King that should be found in it beaten and destroyed, or any port or island of the enemy taken and forfeited, besides the commanding of any fleet of war or of treasure that should be met with,' if an additional six ships to the ten he had previously proposed and 5,000 troops were given to him. This was agreed to, and in April a warrant was issued to prepare the fleet and a general embargo laid on foreign bound ships until it should be manned.22 In May the States- General was formally applied to for the Dutch contingent, but there are indications of the usual struggle with Elizabeth before
Arthur Gorges says, ' Though the earl had many doubts and jealousies buzzed into his ears against Sir Walter Ralegh, yet I have often observed that both in his greatest actions of service and in the times of his chiefest recreations he would ever accept of his counsel and company before many others who thought themselves more in his favour' {Relation of I sla?id Voyage, Purchas, iv. p. 1938). Whatever may have been the opinions given by Ralegh in the councils of war during the Cadiz voyage, the subsequent events show that they left no bitterness behind in Essex's mind.
20 State Papers Dom. cclxix. 71.
21 Meaning that he was convinced, a sense in which the Eliza- bethan writers frequently use ' resolve.'
22 MS. Council Register, 21st April.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 47
matters got so far. Rowland Whyte, who had good sources of information, wrote to Sir Robert Sidney there was 'much ado between the Queen and the Lords about the preparation to sea . . . they urge necessity ; she opposes, no danger appearing towards her anywhere, and that she will not make wars, but arm for defence.' He adds that she was very angry with those who were pressing her.23 Several pinnaces were kept down on the Peninsular coast during April and May, and the information sent or brought home by their captains pointed to the possibility that Philip's fleet was at last resuming shape as an offensive factor. Early in the year Stallenge, who, at Plymouth, was in the way of obtaining the best information, wrote to Cecyll that ' as far as I can understand they are more afraid of us there than we of them here,' and a report in April that the English were at sea caused all the usual terrors in Lisbon and along the coast, which was still practically defenceless. Essex's words show that he at least was not blinded by the old illusions of Spanish strength. Although Vere knew that he would probably be sent with Essex he had not received any official instructions to that effect, but he was in correspondence with the earl during May as to the proposed operations. He expressed his desire to serve under Essex, and repeatedly impressed on him that for any successful attack on Ferrol a powerful fleet, army, and battering train were all equally necessary.24 Vere seems from the beginning never to have regarded very hopefully the prospect of success at Ferrol, preferring Calais, and would have left the chance of a fortunate dash into Ferrol with fire-ships to Ralegh and Lord Thomas Howard, being ' fitter for them to whom the charge was first nominated.' Vere's eagerness for the expedition grew still less when he heard that Lord Mountjoy, who had yet to make a military reputation, was to be put over his head as lieutenant-general, and he seems almost to have hesitated about coming over. As late as 7th June the Privy Council wrote in a way evidently intended to soothe his feelings that, although he appeared to be still in doubt whether he was to come, he might have understood from their previous letters that his assistance would be required, as ' her Majesty hath too good an experience of your service to draw thence so good a part of her forces and leave you behind.' 25 When Vere met Essex he told the latter that he knew his influence with the Queen was too great to have had Mountjoy forced upon him without his consent, and that he would never serve under him again. It is, however, quite possible
23 Collins, Sidney Papers, ii. p. 52.
24 Cecil MS 'S. 25th, 30th May, 5th June. ' You must land, beat, or make an army retire, before you can destroy their shipping.'
25 MS. Council Register.
48 MONSON'S TRACTS
that Essex's influence in the matter was not so great as Vere imagined, and that Mountjoy, another of Elizabeth's favourites, was forced upon him. But not only was Essex determined not to quarrel with Vere, but at Weymouth he made him and Ralegh shake hands, thus temporarily terminating the feud that had broken out between them at Plymouth the previous year.
On ist June Essex went to Chatham to superintend the equip- ment of the fleet, on 23rd June he was at Sandwich, and on 8th July was at Plymouth. Not the least onerous portion of his duty, on his way round the coast, was the composition and despatch of adoring letters to Elizabeth, in which the student is irritated at finding the smallest amount of information concealed in the largest number of words,26 but they served his purpose of keeping her in a good temper. A council held at Portland on the 6th discussed Elizabeth's fears that they might miss the Spanish fleet if it sailed for Blavet, and Essex assured her that information daily brought in agreed that it was in no condition to put to sea, and that there were so many English privateers on the coast that if it did come out he was sure to have ample warning ; to make certain, however, he would send some pinnaces to the Breton coast with instructions to join him before he left the Channel. The council also decided to send Fulke Greville to beg another month's supply of victuals in view of the short supply, and ' the distance of place where the intended services are to be performed.' In his farewell letter of 10th July Essex grovels in gratitude : ' for your Majesty's blessed, wise, and magnanimous resolution to increase our store with a month's victual we have praised God ; first on our knees for inspiring your royal heart with it, and next given that acknowledgment and that glory which is due to your- self.' 27 It must have been arduous work to achieve anything for a sovereign whose servants had to believe that her resolution to supply her forces with a month's necessary provisions was so mar- vellous as to be due to the direct intervention of Providence. The victuallers were to come out under the convoy of Sir Robert Crosse in the Lion, but he had not started when Essex was driven
26 Elizabeth's familiar epistolary style was a ghastly premonition of Mr. George Meredith : — ' How irksome long toil much danger and hearts care may seem to the feeler's part when they that only hears reports of what might be full of evil chance or danger's stroke are so filled with doubts of unfortunate sequel,' &c. (Queen to Essex, 24th July) : ' when I see the admirable work of the eastern wind, so long to last beyond the custom of nature, I see, as in a crystal, the right figure of my folly that ventured supernatural haps upon the point of frenatical imputation ' {ibid, undated).
27 State Papers Do?n. cclxiv. 11; Cecil MSS. 6th July, 1597 ; Devereux, Lives of the Devereux^ i. p. 426.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 49
back to England, and the Lion was then taken into the fleet in the place of the Merhonour.
[3] We have the Instructions in full and, in some respects, they merit particular attention.'28 The expedition was being sent because Philip was preparing a force to assist the Irish rebels, to invade England, ' and likewise to endanger our isles of Jersey and Guernsey,' and by taking Brest to conquer Brittany. Obviously one Spanish fleet could not do all these things, and the vagueness of the sweep shows how ignorant Elizabeth's advisers were of the Spanish plans ; the reference to the Channel Islands is a new fear, and, I believe, a solitary instance, but the Scilly Islands, on which Philip's generals had had an eye for more than twenty years, are not considered, apparently, as a possible object of attack. Essex is repeatedly told that, although he is in command, it is ' with the advice of special persons appointed 29 ... by whose advice we require you to direct all your actions and enterprises.' This is strict and definite enough, but, as usual with Elizabeth, it is immediately qualified by permission to follow his own opinion in case of disagreement if he has the consent of any four of the council, ' or at least three.' All resolutions are to be reduced to writing and signed, and the opinions of all the principal land and sea captains are to be called for, although decisions are to be taken by Essex and the council. In particular George Fenner is to join the council in any matter relating to sea affairs, but without a vote. Fenner was one of the men of the Frobiser-Drake- Hawkyns school still in active service, and it is possible to see in the recommendation some distrust of the practical seamanship of the new men in the absence of the moderating circumspection of the Lord Admiral, to whose influence the recommendation was no doubt due. Essex is to attack the Spanish fleet and army in Ferrol, or wherever it may be, ' but we will that none of our ships be appointed to enter into any havens to the manifest danger of our said ships ' ; in fact omelettes were to be made without injury to any eggs. If the Spaniards had put to sea before his arrival, the earl was to follow them with all or part of his force, as his council might deem advisable. The destruction of the Spanish force is ' one of the special purposes ' of the expedition, and that done he was to turn his attention to intercepting the Flota and the carracks, and if they were found in any port of the Azores 'you shall do your best with the advice of your assistants in council to assail the said places and roads by sea or by land.' If Terceira was taken the earl was to use his discretion with the advice of his council — a somewhat difficult combination — about leaving a
28 State Papers Dom. Eliz. cclxiii. 102 ; 15th June (original).
29 Lord Thomas Howard, Ralegh, Mountjoy, Vere, Sir George Carew, and Sir Ferdinando Gorges.
VOL. II. E
50 MONSON'S TRACTS
garrison to hold it, but he was to have especial regard as to whether it could be self-supporting in the matter of provisions, as the troops could not rely on supplies from England, and also whether it could be made strong enough to resist Spanish attempts to reconquer it. Then Elizabeth added a warning which deserves precise quotation : —
Of all things we would have you consider whether we shall not hereby be driven to make an army every year to relieve that place, which if we should, then would your labour or success whatsoever before, be altogether absurd and inutile ; for where hereby you pre- tend that it will be a way to direct the war from us, whereby we may spare these daily and intolerable charges at home continually augmented by these voyages, you should be an author unto us of such a growing charge, such a continual peril of our subjects' lives and our honour, and, shortly, of such a confusion as we should repent to have given you the charge, power, or trust, we committed to you. Thus do you see that we do yield hereunto not as persuaded yet that it can be safe for us, but as a prince that would not be thought wanting to ourself if occasion be offered.
It would be of supreme interest to know whether Elizabeth was here expressing her own intuitions or reasoned reflections, or voicing the opinions of others. Certainly it marks a decided advance in the apprehension of the principles of naval warfare from Drake's ill-considered proposals of 1585 to hold Cartagena and the Havana, of which she was either ignorant or had passively allowed to pass without comment. She now understood that trans-oceanic possessions are retained not by forts and garrisons but by fleets, and although the Azores are little more than a fourth of the distance to the West Indies, would be occupied among a comparatively friendly population, would be held by a garrison partly self-supporting, and although England was now enormously stronger — stronger than she ever realized — than in 1585, she still doubted, and perhaps rightly, whether the country could stand the strain in money, men, and snipping the occupation would involve in face of an enemy not yet beaten off the seas by successful fleet actions. Assuredly if she was not prepared to enlarge her fleet and expend her ships it was impossible, for the retention of the Azores was a matter of life and death for Spain, and only by being at sea in overwhelming superiority of strength could she hope to win those victories which decide the mastery of the ocean. That secret of the necessity for superior force in sea fights she never learned, and she could not always expect the gales of 1588 and 1596 to do the work of her battleships. As neither antagonist would, or perhaps could, have sent large fleets to sea, an English garrison in Angra would, if it had held out, have involved a series of indecisive sea battles until one of the Powers was exhausted. One great sea battle might have been sufficient in 1591 to have
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 51
gained the command of the Azores, but Spain had been allowed some years in which to recover and could not, in 1597, be crushed at sea with such ease. To have torn the Azores from Spain was possible in 1597, but not for a navy as weak as Elizabeth's; it would have required to have been at least doubled in strength, and whether the national wealth, and the political conditions under which Elizabeth retained the popularity which was the source of her power, would have permitted this is doubtful.
The fleet sailed on Sunday, 10th July, and on Monday it blew a gale from the north-east ; Ralegh and most of his squadron parted company that night, which he attributed to his having to stand by the St. Matthew and St. Andrew, both sluggish sailers. The weather moderated but remained stormy, and on the 12th Essex was off Ushant ; by the evening of that day it was blowing a hard gale from the south-west which continued for the remainder of the week. After being battered about for days, Ralegh and Essex both gave in and ran back for England, Ralegh making Plymouth on the 1 8th, and Essex Falmouth on the 19th. Both Admirals at once proceeded to write impressionist letters of the terrors of the gale and the appalling risks they had run.30 Lord Thomas Howard was more fortunate and either experienced less severe weather or thought less of it ; he parted company with Ralegh on the evening of the 12th, but did not run into the bad weather until the night of the 13th, and then described it as only ' a stiff gale.' 31 On 19th July, on the coast of Spain, when Essex was putting into Falmouth, he wrote to Cecyll that ' our purpose is to go for the Groyne, where we hope to meet our General,' and had sent the Tramontana back to England with the information of his where- abouts.32 Within a few days of his return Essex sent out the
30 Ralegh wrote that in the Warspite ' it hath shaken all her beams, knees, and stancheons well nigh asunder . . . our ship so open everywhere, all her bulkheads rent, her very cook-room of bricks shaken down into powder.' Essex, in the Merhonour, said that he sprung his fore and main masts, ' her seams opened, her decks and upper works gave way, and her very timbers and main beams, with her labouring, did, tear like laths.' If all this is to be taken literally, they must have been wonderful ships to have remained afloat. It may be worth notice that, in the Mary Rose, a sprung mainmast was fished with anchor stocks. Vere says that the captain and master both wanted to cut it away but that he would not consent. On 20th July Ralegh wrote that most of the ships in Plymouth had ' cracked ' their masts. Vice-Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge is of opinion that the great housing in of the sides of these ships, which prevented the shrouds having sufficient spread to support the masts, was the cause that so many were sprung.
31 State Papers Eliz. cclxiv. 64.
32 Ibid. 36. Probably he picked up the Tramontana during the gale.
E 2
52 MONSON'S TRACTS
Moon and Advice to collect stragglers and to take orders to Howard not to show himself on the coast of Spain, but to lie twenty leagues off Finisterre or in the mouth of the Channel until he was rejoined. But on the 25th Howard was close inshore off Coruna and cruised off the port, boasting that he gave the Spaniards 'a fair sight of us.' For some unexplained reason Howard understood the orders brought by the Advice, which fell in with him on the 28th, as a recall and bore up for Plymouth, where he arrived on Sunday, 31st July.33
As soon as he landed Essex wrote to the Queen and to Cecyll, ' in haste, in passion . . . the childbirth of our success is with show of danger and more than ordinary panic,' and declaring his intention of losing no time in repairing damages and getting to sea again. On 23rd July he expressed his wonder at not having heard a word from the court, but on that date Burghley and his son were writing to him on behalf of the Queen that she had ' fallen into many con- siderations, the time being so far advanced, whether in any good time you could unite such an army together, being once separated in so many places and many of the ships being reported to be so much impaired by the rage of storm and tempest. All which as her Majesty taketh as an act of God and therefore repineth not at it, so is it far from her Majesty's nature to throw any imputation upon you.' The Queen learns from Sir Thomas Gates that he is eager to continue the voyage and she will not decide for him, but submits certain points for consultation : ' her Majesty had diverse ends in this action, principally the diversion of the Spanish forces from her own kingdoms and especially of Ireland by disarming him of his ships, and afterwards to lie for some matter of profit. For the first we know that you are not ignorant how long this matter hath been expected in Spain, and therefore in general you may think that they have prepared to make the place defensible.' 34 Now, as he is short of provisions, boats lost, and the fleet in bad condition, he and his council are to consider seriously all this. Essex and his council answered this on or before 26th July,35 saying that it had been considered several times and that they expected to sail the next day with seven Queen's ships, three Dutch, ten armed merchantmen, and four or five transports with troops, to join Howard, to whom orders had already been sent.
33 State Papers Eliz. cclxiv. 64. 34 Ibid. 50.
35 Ibid, cclxiv. 60. The editor of the Calendar of State Papers assigns the reply to 29th July, but in a private letter to Burghley of the 26th the earl refers to it as already despatched. On the 24th July Elizabeth herself wrote to the earl doubting the truth of a report that the Spaniards were in the Tagus. If, however, it should prove to be the case, he was strictly forbidden to attack the city ; if he and his council thought that the shipping could be assailed without danger she would not interdict it {State Papers, cclxiv. 54).
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 53
They assured the Privy Council that if the Spaniards came out and fought there would be no doubt of the result : ' if they keep in and stand upon the defensive, we will think how by landing and turning along the coast we may draw them forth to fight if we cannot destroy them in harbour . . . and if we either can give them a blow or know them not to be in a state to put to sea we will get us into such a height and place as we may hope to meet with the carracks and West India ships.' The earl did not share Elizabeth's misgivings, and in his Apology, written in 1598, dwells insistently on his purpose to attack Ferrol — ' when I went forth my first design was upon Ferrol both by her Majesty's command and my own choice, that when I had defeated that force I might go forward whither I list and almost do what I list, I mean in any places upon the coast.' And again, ' my first, chiefest, and main design being to sail to the Adelantado at Ferrol, Ferrol was the rendezvous I gave.' It will be observed that Essex thoroughly understood the importance of striking at the enemy's military force before proceeding to subsidiary, if more profitable, operations, and disposes of the accusation brought against him b6 that in leaving the Spanish fleet untouched in Ferrol and the sea open behind him, he acted in ignorance of the first principles of war. He even returns to it again, dwelling on the results of the destruction of the Adelantado's fleet ; that it would have put an end to invasion, left the Flotas defenceless, rendered the capture of the Azores easy, and thus made Elizabeth 'absolute Queen of the ocean.' The man who, in 1597, could so clear-sightedly measure the strategical advantages to be expected from a shattering blow directed at the enemy's means of offence was not likely to err from ignorance, and his reasons, good or bad, for leaving Ferrol untouched and unmasked will be seen shortly.37
The weak point of Essex's character was that common to many men of more than average intellect who can see that there are more than two sides to every question, but who have not that tenacity and confidence in themselves associated with mental power of the highest kind. Although he saw so clearly the principles that should direct his action, he permitted himself to dally with a plan of another sort, which was apparently Ralegh's,38 and an absolute contradiction of the leading truths he had grasped. The wind remained steadily adverse and their store of victuals was lessening daily ; in these circumstances the question arose whether most of the troops should not be disbanded, the Ferrol attempt abandoned, and in its place substituted a more
36 By the late Admiral Colomb, for instance.
37 Monson's note {ante, p. 21) shows that he believed that the earl was in earnest about going to Ferrol.
38 Cott. MSS. Otho E. ix. f. 377.
54 MONSON'S TRACTS
attractive run to the West Indies. Vere tells us that everyone was in favour of it but himself,89 and perhaps his influence still held it in suspense when the return of Lord Thomas Howard on 31st July with the news that the Spaniards would not venture out decided Essex's doubts.40 The next day Essex and Raleigh rode for the court with the intention of persuading the Queen to allow them to keep 1,000 soldiers and half the fleet and start ' for such a place as I and the council of war had chosen.'41 From Ralegh's letter, much of it destroyed by fire, it seems that he dwelt on the lateness of the season and the dangers and difficulties of the Ferrol enterprise, proposing to venture to the West Indies instead because there would be no suspicion of such an intention and the treasure fleets of 1596 and 1597 would both be captured.42 He expected that they would be away for five or six months and thought it the most favourable opportunity that had yet offered. Elizabeth rightly rejected the proposition without much considera- tion, and Vere remarks that, after the earl's return, 'no more speech was had of the Indian voyage.' At the first glance it seems extraordinary that a man of Ralegh's penetrating insight should have even considered a scheme which involved leaving the country unprotected in face of an enemy's fleet known to be pre- paring for sea, even if a smaller English force had, for the moment, challenged it ineffectually to come out. What remains of his paper is not free from obscurity, but a closer examination suggests that he was not proposing an immediate departure for the West Indies but one to be deferred until the probability of Spanish invasion was past for the year : ' The Spanish fleet now at Ferrol is not in any estate to come out, and by that time in which we shall be ready to depart it will be no time of the year to make invasions or incursions by sea. We shall only be wanting in the dead of winter and be able to return in the spring sufficient timely to answer any attempt from Spain.' This reads as though the departure were to be deferred until the late autumn or the begin- ning of the winter, and although the experience of 1596 showed that the Spaniards were not slaves to the season, and in no case could it have been good strategy to sail leaving the Ferrol fleet intact within striking distance of home, the design was not so outrageously bad as to leave immediately would have been. No doubt, also, Ralegh would have said that the naval force left in
39 Commentaries.
40 On the 31st the Adelantado was booming Ferrol harbour, and throwing up earthworks, in mortal terror of an attack {State Papers, cclxvi. 69).
41 Essex's Apology.
42 It is strange that Ralegh should have been under the impression that the 1596 silver had not been brought to Spain.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 55
English waters was sufficiently strong to guard against any Spanish enterprise, and, if properly handled, this was true enough. Essex was back at Plymouth on 8th or 9th August ; the wind was still contrary, the troops were beginning to develop serious sickness, and the victuals were rapidly diminishing. On the nth the council sent up Sir Anthony Sherley, who had succeeded Sir Ferdinando Gorges as serjeant-major,43 to report on the state of things, and on the same day Lord Thomas Howard wrote to Robert Cecyll that he hoped they would not be thought vacillating, but there was so much sickness among the soldiers that if they were taken to sea they would die in heaps ; he trusted, however, that they would not be disbanded altogether.44 The earl now offered to go into Ferrol if the Queen would leave him the 1,000 men brought over by Vere, and permit him to enter the harbour with the St. Matthew, St. Andrew, and fire-ships, leaving the remainder of the fleet outside.45 On the 13th the Privy Council replied that the Queen allowed the disbandment of the troops, and approved the attempt on Ferrol with the ships named, but Essex was forbidden to risk himself in the venture ; he was reminded that he had promised to do nothing but with the consent of his council, and she was of opinion that the council would not permit the design to be put into execution.46 On the same day Ralegh, who was then at Sherborne, received a letter from Cecyll saying that eighty sail of Spaniards were in the Channel ; 47 the report was of course absurd, but it was in continuation of a smaller alarm of the reinforcement of Blavet by some galleys and troops under Pedro de Zubiaur which had forced Essex, on 10th August, to detach the Tramontana and the Antelope by the Queen's orders to strengthen the Channel squadron. As a matter of fact Blavet was, at this time, even less
43 Gorges, Sir Carew Reignalls (Reynolds), Sir Hugh Beeston, and Lord Rich had left the fleet. Essex wrote of Rich and Reynolds, * if I had carried them to sea they would have been dead in a week.'
44 Cecil MSS. The alliance between iCecyll, Essex, and Ralegh continued apparently unclouded. The first wrote many effusively friendly letters to both the others, containing innocent remarks in- tended to instil suspicion between them. But if Essex was deceived it was not for lack of warning (Birch, ii. p. 351).
4"' State Papers Doin. Eliz. xlv. p. 126; Apology. In the State Paper letter Essex again took the opportunity to inculcate that 'if you would be commandress of the sea you must always be ready and your magazines well stored . . . the main points are two : you must keep him from strengthening himself at sea, and bringing home his Indian fleet.'
46 Cecil MSS. 13th August. However, Essex seems to have dis- banded the troops before receiving this letter of the 13th {ibid. 14th August). Ralegh was to take the fire-ships into Ferrol (Vere ; Gorges).
47 State Papers Dom. cclxiv. 81.
56 MO N SON'S TRACTS
a threat than usual : in June the troops in Brittany had mutinied, not being able to endure any longer, they said, the hard treatment of their commander, Don Juan de Aguila. They wrote to Philip protesting their loyalty, although they had been fighting seven years without pay, but said that they would sooner be cut to pieces than have any more of Aguila.48 At the same time the garrison of Calais was also threatening to deliver the town to the enemy.
On 14th August there was a momentary change of wind, and part of the fleet got out, only to be forced back again immediately. This last disappointment was not an unmixed misfortune, as it gave time for the victualling ships to join, and as four-fifths of the troops had been discharged the fleet was now much better furnished. But it was exasperating to those who had been so long waiting in Plymouth, and the general impression seems to have been that if an instant departure was not made Essex would be recalled, and part of the fleet sent out under Lord Thomas Howard and Ralegh.49 The same writer says that 'we languish with desire to repair our losses, but with small hope,' and when the fleet did at last get away, on 17 th August, Cecyll appears to have been of much the same opinion ; he hoped for nothing more than the maintenance of English reputation by keeping the sea in defiance of the Adelantado, and a cruise for the Flota, ' but the fleet at Ferrol will not be burnt, the carracks are come home, the Islands cannot be taken, so that their weak watery hopes do but faintly nourish that noble earl's comfort,'50 and here, assuredly, the wish was father to the thought. Essex asserted that he sailed with the intention of attacking Ferrol, and Vere supports his statement,51 but Gorges says that ' our General and the wisest of his council of war did well enough know that the Groyne or Ferrol were then no morsels fit for our mouths ' ; 52 Ralegh is silent on the point unless the opinion of Gorges, who was in his confidence, may be held to reflect his sentiments, but it is significant that he took a pessimist view from the time of his return to Plymouth. On the 18th July he wrote to the Privy Council that the fleet was much battered, victuals spoilt, and many sick, and adds, suggestively, that he understood that the Spaniards were strong in Ferrol, ending with ' you, my good lords, can judge how we shall be able to beat it up
48 Fernandez Duro, Armada Esfiafiola.
49 Slingsby Corresponde?ice, ubi sup.
50 Cecil MS 'S. 2 1 st August ; Sir Robert Cecyll to the Lord Deputy of Ireland (Thomas, Lord Burgh of Gainsborough).
61 Apology ; Commentaries.
52 Relation (Purchas, iv. p. 1941). His words imply that there was some division of opinion in the council. If Essex remembered his own arguments of the previous year (ante, i. pp. 372, 373) he must have known that it was not advisable to attempt Ferrol under the limitations now imposed.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 57
with these weighty ships. I dare not advise.' On 26th July he says : ' we only attend the wind . . . but we shall not be in any great courage for winter weather and long nights in these ships.' It was not a cheerful frame of mind in which to head a desperate rush with fire-ships into Ferrol.
[4] On the 25 th August the fleet made the land east of Cape Ortegal 53 and beat about for two days in bad weather, in which the St. Matthew lost her foremast and had to run back across the Bay,54 and the St. Andrew and other ships parted company for some days. Essex, probably much against his will, was standing close inshore, ' which was reputed no great policy or discretion in us,' says Gorges, and the Spaniards were lighting beacon fires along the coast. Then the Repulse sprang a bad leak, and failing to stop it by ramming down pieces of beef and clothes 'wrung together,' had to lie to in order to get at it. This was on the 27th, and on the same day the Warspite broke her main yard; Ralegh was ordered to stand in for Finisterre, the first rendezvous, but in the maimed condition of his ship could only run before the wind, and by the next day his and twenty other ships were missing.55 Thus when Essex made Finisterre on the 28th, Ralegh, with an important portion of the fleet was separated, the St. Matthew gone for good, and, for the moment, the fleet had ceased to be capable of the offensive. Evil tongues were not wanting to tell Essex that Ralegh had ordered this strong force to keep with him for his own purposes, which Gorges characterizes as 'a monstrous untruth.'
53 Cecil MSS. 28th August. Gorges says the 23rd.
54 Essex called the St. Matthew and St. Andrew ' two great carts.' Carew, in the St. Matthew, made La Rochelle, where the great ship, although in all likelihood well under 1,000 tons, was regarded as a wonder. He says that 4,000 people came on board to see her, and that she was looked upon as so huge shows the reduced state of the French marine. Among the 4,000 were thirty ladies of rank who ' for three long hours talked of the Queen's beauty, wisdom and govern- ment,5 says Carew, who must have been proud of his endurance. He got the ship back to Portsmouth during the first week of September, and immediately took the Adventure and set out to find Essex, trying all the rendezvous in succession. Hearing from a privateer that the fleet was at the Azores he stood across, but when 100 leagues from the Islands had news of its return. OfTUshant, on his way back, he fell in with the Spanish fleet, but as it was at night and in a gale managed to get clear. When he got back to the Downs only fifteen men out of his crew of 140 were able to work {Cecil MSS. 13th September, 3rd November).
ss In his despatch of 28th August Essex says that twenty, and in his Official Relation written afterwards, thirty, sail went with Ralegh (Harl. MSS. 36, f. 419). Ralegh, himself, says twenty, 'voluntary barks,' the Dreadnought, three transports with soldiers, and three victuallers {Cecil MSS. 8th September).
58 MONSON'S TRACTS
Essex appears to have taken the same view, ascribing the absence of many ships to their following Ralegh's light at night according to custom.56 The mischance was of the less importance because the wind blew persistently from the east, thus rendering any attack on Ferrol practically impossible, and Essex was told by some Spanish prisoners that the Adelantado was not going to sea during the year, so that there appeared to be plenty of time for further consideration if necessary. A council was held on the 28th, at which the Ferrol enterprise was formally abandoned on account of the want of ships and the adverse wind, and it was then no doubt that the decision to lie north and south for the Flota, still keeping touch with the coast and with Ferrol, was taken, although Monson sadly confuses the sequence of events. There can be little question that it was fortunate that circumstances prevented the Ferrol enterprise, as modified and permitted by Elizabeth, from being put into execution. It is true that there were not more than twenty men-of-war in Ferrol, but to enter one of the most difficult ports in Europe with two especially clumsy vessels and half-a-dozen fire-ships, without even the possibility of a surprise, and with the knowledge that there was no support to be expected from the fleet left outside, was a forlorn hope, and according to all probability could only have resulted in the capture or destruction of the whole detachment.57 Ralegh's silence on the whole subject seems to indicate that he was not eager to lead them in ; Essex, besides knowing that the second plan was bad, was never hot for anything where he was not to command in person, and perhaps had no great desire to give Ralegh an opportunity to distinguish himself by a possible success.58
Until the 31st August Essex was between Finisterre and Cape Roca, and although the Ferrol venture was formally relinquished he was still within touch of the port and able to watch it, when he took a step which altered the character of the cruise. In the meanwhile Ralegh, with his squadron, had brought to off Cape Roca, the second rendezvous, where he appears to have intended to wait for Essex or orders, but his attitude of expectation was
56 Harl. MSS. 36.
57 As early as April the Spaniards anticipated the use of fire-ships at Ferrol ; they also feared that vessels filled with stone would be sunk at the entrance to block the fairway {State Papers Ven. 19th April).
58 An English prisoner, called an interpreter, taken at St. Michael, told the governor that Essex sent a challenge to the Adelantado to come and do battle at the Azores. If so it must have been about this time. The other statements made by this prisoner that can be checked are, on the whole, fairly accurate, and that Essex should challenge some one was very probable (Vaz Coutinho, Hist, do Successo que na Ilka de S. Miguel .... Lisboa, 1630).
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 59
disturbed by news that the Adelantado had sailed for the Azores to meet and convoy the Flota. This information he sent off at once to his chief, with a message that he would lie twenty leagues off the Burlings until he received an answer. The earl received the intelligence late on the 30th, and early the next morning a council was held at which it was decided, on account of the positive nature of the information,59 to leave at once for the Azores ; orders were despatched to Ralegh to follow immediately.60 In considering whether Essex is to be condemned for so readily acting on this communication, the point to be examined is not that we now know that the news was false, but whether the earl was justified in believing it to be true. As described by Gorges, and by Essex himself, it does not sound convincing, being merely that a Southampton privateer spoke Ralegh and gave him the information ;61 the story was second-hand when it reached the General, for Ralegh had no power to send on the captain of the privateer for examination. Ralegh did his duty in forward- ing the tale ; he was not called upon to decide and, so far as we know, took no responsibility; but it is odd that in his next letter home, of 8th September, he makes no allusion to an occur- rence which sent them on a wild-goose chase to the Azores in which he was a leading, if innocent, actor. Seeing, however, the number of enemies he had in the fleet, we may take it that he would have been charged with negligence at least had the accusa- tion been possible. Ralegh must have written some kind of despatch to the earl, and that, taken with the answers of the Captain Cobbett who brought it, may have led the impulsive commander-in-chief to fly to the conclusion that the Spaniards had gone, but it is important to remember that the full council, composed of cooler heads, seem also to have been convinced. No doubt at the time Essex dismissed the statements of his prisoners that the Adelantado was not going to stir that year — a prima facie improbability — as a deliberate attempt at deception. More knowledge of the details would be desirable,62 but we
59 ' The direct and confident delivery of the advertisement.'
60 Cecil MSS. 31st August; Essex to Privy Council. The fleet council, which was attended by all the principal masters of the ships, appears to have been unanimous (Lives of the Devereux, L p. 453 ; Essex to Queen). Ralegh is extraordinarily silent about the incident, whether he was innocent or blameworthy. The authorities do not support Monson's statement that the privateer was sent on to find Essex, nor was the message brought by its captain.
G1 Harl. MSS. 36. Gorges (Purchas, iv. p. 1947).
62 The Scotch ambassador in London gives another version, received, he says, by letters from the fleet of 31st August ; letters, that is to say, that had come with Essex's despatch of that date (Cecil MSS. vii. p. 390). This was to the effect that Ralegh had taken an
60 MONSON'S TRACTS
cannot lightly assume that Essex's decision was unjustifiable in face of the support given to it by his naval and military advisers, and the fact that it led to no later recriminations, being looked upon as an unfortunate mistake for which no one was to blame.63 It may be said that before leaving the coast Essex should have reconnoitred Ferrol, but it happens to be an extremely difficult place for such an operation. It is so situated as to be entirely invisible from the sea, and the entrance from the outer bay is by a tortuous channel nearly two miles long with forts on each side, and with a fairway so narrow in some places that it gives passage to only one ship at a time. To see the Spanish fleet in the harbour any scout vessel would have had to run up this entrance during daylight, and unless favoured with marvellous good luck would assuredly never have come back. But if Essex could not look into Ferrol he could and should have left some light vessels off the port with instructions where to find him. The Adelantado came out on 9th September, but did not finally leave Coruna until 8th October, so that the earl might easily have reached the coast again before the later date.
The General sailed direct for Terceira,64 and, as Monson tells
aviso, sent on from the Flota with messages desiring the Adelantado to come out to the Azores to convoy them. Douglas should have been in a position to obtain authoritative information, but this does not fit in with anything we are told by the principals. If the privateer had taken an aviso it would surely have been mentioned, nor were the convoys arranged by messages from the Flotas.
63 On 28th October the Queen reproached Essex that ' by your late leaving of the coast of Spain, upon probability that no army would come forth of Ferrol till March, the enemy,' &c. [State Papers Dom. cclxiv. 153). This referred to a letter of the earl's of 16th September, by which time he had returned to his former opinion that Padilla would not come out, but she says nothing of Essex's first reason for leaving the coast.
64 Boazios map. I regret that I have been unable to ascertain anything about this man, but he must have been one of Essex's dependants for some time, as he drew a plan of the action at Cadiz for the earl. Rear- Admiral Sir William Wharton, K.C.B., has been kind enough to examine the map, and to write the following note upon it :—
' This chart is, considering its date, a wonderfully good representa- tion of the group of the Azores. The scale of latitude is, curiously enough, exactly the same as that of the present Admiralty Chart, which facilitates comparison.
' In its detail, in the general correctness of the shapes of the several islands, and in their relative positions, it is far ahead of any of the charts in Lucas Wagenaar's Mariners Mirrour of the same period, which are for the most part very wild and crude representations of the coasts they depict.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 61
us, was not long in finding out that the Adelantado was not there and was not expected to come ; worse still, from their point of view, they learnt from a prize that the Flota was not expected to sail that year, or if it did would take a course to the south and avoid the islands.65 Strategically the proper plan for Essex to follow was to rush back to Portugal and take up a position which would enable him at once to watch for the Flota and close with the Ferrol fleet if it came out, and to keep that station until one of the events happened or until he was forced back to his base for supplies. By this time, however, the earl had persuaded himself again that the Spaniards were not coming out ; 66 to wait patiently within striking distance of Ferrol, for theoretically that was of higher importance than the Flota, was a procedure which suited neither his disposition, the hopes of his officers, nor Elizabeth's
' It may, I presume, be taken for granted that it could not have been drawn from observations made by the ships of Essex's squadron alone, as to arrive at the fair approximation of their several shapes and sizes would have required a separate circumnavigation of each island.
* Wherever the material came from, the principal part of it must have been gathered from ships passing — not from a land survey.
' The distances would be measured from the run of the ships as estimated, checked by latitudes measured by cross staff or astrolabe. Probably a good many latitudes were observed on shore, as it is re- markable that the errors are nearly all in one direction, viz. they are too great. Latitudes observed on board ship would vary in either direction, but with a careful observer on land instrumental errors would show. Some of the Spanish pilots of the period obtained latitudes marvel- lously correct when they observed from land or from a ship at anchor in quiet water. I am, therefore, inclined to think that this part of it was the work of one man, probably a Portuguese pilot belonging to the Islands.
'The mean error of latitude for the north points of the Islands is + 1 8', and for the south sides or points it is +12', a very close ap- proximation on the whole, assuming that instrumental error accounts for a considerable part of the discrepancy.
1 The distances are all too great, a very common error in all rough draughts of an unknown land, especially islands, even in these days.
' Thus, the total distance from the eastern end of San Miguel to Flores by Boazio's map is 360 geographical miles, when it should be 300 miles, or a proportion of 6 to 5 ; while each island is magnified in dimensions in a mean ratio of 8 to 5, and every bay and indentation is exaggerated. The latter errors are also probably due to the tendency which always exists on the part of untrained persons to map individual parts too large.
1 The numerous names must have come from Portuguese sources, from people who knew the Islands well.'
65 Meteren. But more probably to the north.
66 Cecil MSS. 16th September ; Essex to Robert Cecyll.
62 MONSON'S TRACTS
anticipations, who was looking for news of both the capture of the West Indian fleet and the defeat of the Adelantado. In naval affairs Elizabeth was never capable of judging the means required, and the voyage is another illustration of the inadequacy of the fleets she commissioned for the work asked of them. The fleet was more than strong enough to deal with the Flota, but not any too strong to fight the Adelantado ; it had been prepared on the supposition that the events were to happen, as Elizabeth wished, consecutively ; now they were falling simultaneously, and one or the other had to be given up. Even if Essex had gone back to the coast of Portugal he would probably have found himself compelled to renounce one of his aims, and Elizabeth would hardly have understood a campaign of which the results, if the Spaniards remained in port and the treasure ships came home unmolested, could only be negative in preventing invasion. No doubt another reason determining Essex was the impression held by Monson, which could not have been exclusively his, that the presence of the English at the Azores would bring the Adelantado there, if he put to sea at all, to protect them and the Indian trade.
From Angra the fleet stood on to Flores to take in water, and here Ralegh rejoined on 15th September, but the force was weakened by the dismissal of a Dutch admiral in his flagship on account of illness. Essex welcomed his Rear- Admiral cordially, ' saying that he never believed that he would leave him, although divers persuaded him to the contrary,' 67 showing that when Ralegh parted company his enemies had tried to persuade the General that it was with the intention of going cruising on his own account. His look into Angra had satisfied Essex that he was too weak in troops and heavy guns, of which the latter had gone home in the St. Matthew, to attack that port, and a council held before Ralegh's arrival had decided, in view of the information obtained from the captured Spaniard while they were at Flores that the Flota was not coming this year, to attempt the other islands, keeping scouts out, however, north and south, in case the Indian fleet should appear.68 The fleet was to be divided into separate commands for the work : Essex and Ralegh were to attack Fayal ; Lord Thomas Howard and Vere, Graciosa ; Mountjoy and Blount, St. Michael ; and the Dutch, Pico. Time was to be given to Ralegh to revictual and water, but at midnight of the 1 6th September he received a message from the earl, that he was to weigh and make sail for Fayal instantly and supply his
e7 Gorges. Ralegh seems to have delayed two or three days off Villa Franca (St. Michael), attempting to wood and water. The governor of the island thought that his firm attitude frightened him away. No doubt Ralegh was wisely chary of undertaking independent action.
68 Harl. MSS. 36.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 63
ships there, the rest of the fleet having departed six or eight hours previously. Ralegh reached Fayal the next morning, but to his surprise Essex was not there, and, in the delicate position he was in towards his chief, was uncertain what to do. Two Portuguese, who, like most of the islanders, hated their Spanish masters, swam off to the fleet and gave information that led Ralegh to call a council to consider the advisability of a landing, as the inhabitants of Horta were removing their property, and the men were dis- contented at the delay and the prospective loss of plunder. The decision was to wait for the commander-in-chief, and two more days elapsed in perplexity, when another council was held on the 19th, at which Essex's adherents were still opposed to taking action, while others supported Ralegh's wish to land. On the 20th there was still no sign of the main body, and Ralegh took advantage of a change of wind to shift to a better anchorage four miles from the town ; his squadron was now in great want of water, and this may have been the determining cause of his resolution to land, but, according to his own account, he had not intended to do more than obtain water if the presence of the Spaniards had not taunted him into attacking them. The landing, which he undertook on the 21st with the men of his own squadron alone, was opposed by 500 Spaniards,69 who broke and ran when the English came to close quarters with them. The first party ashore consisted of 260 men, and the boats were sent back for 200 of the Low Country soldiers who, in the advance inland upon Horta, did not distinguish themselves, which Gorges excuses by explaining that they belonged to the garrisons of the cautionary towns 70 and had no experience of war. Horta lies at the foot of a semicircular sweep of hills forming the background of the bay, and when the hills were crossed the town was easily occupied, an entrenched position above the town, however, still holding out. This was to be assaulted the next day, but before the assault was delivered Essex at last appeared, having been searching for the Adelantado ' and other adventures,' says Gorges, but a Dutch historian ascribes the delay to the earl having received in- formation about the Flota and gone looking for it. No doubt Boazio was with Essex in the Repulse, but as he only draws a straight course from Flores to Fayal we get no knowledge from him of the movements of the fleet. It was a golden opportunity for Ralegh's enemies, and Meyricke, Blount, Sherley and Vere 7L aggravated the case against him, persuading the earl that it had
69 The Spaniards said that the garrison was only 150 men.
70 Flushing, Rammekens, and The Brill, held by Elizabeth as ' caution,' or security, for the money advanced by her to the States.
71 Vere says : ' for my part no man showed less spleen against him than myself,' but his animus is evident.
64 MONSON'S TRACTS
been deliberately done, 'to steal honour and reputation from him,' and urged that he should be brought before a court-martial and be beheaded. Ralegh, either expecting or fearing nothing, had set out to visit the Repulse as soon as she anchored, ' not sus- pecting that anything had been ill taken in that matter but rather looking for great thanks.' 72 Essex gave him ' a faint welcome,' and then charged him with breaking the article which forbade the landing of troops except in the General's presence or by his order. This may have been custom,73 but Ralegh pointed out that it was overridden by the specific orders composed by the council of war for the voyage, which prohibited the landing of troops unless by order of the General ' or of some other principal commander,' and he was himself a principal commander ; he continued that he waited four days until ' I heard mine own company even at my back murmur and say that I durst not adventure it,' and that it seemed probable that he was judged strong enough to perform the task alone, and that the fleet had gone to the other islands. He might have added that it was Essex's duty when, whatever the cause, he found himself delayed to send instructions to his subordinate if he did not consider him to be in independent command. To court-martial and degrade Ralegh, much more to behead him, might, as Monson hints, have led to unpleasant questions at home, especially as there was always the third person of the alliance, Robert Cecyll, to be remembered, as he might find it to his interest to show intense sympathy and indignation on behalf of the victim who, after all, had won the first success of the voyage. At first Essex was inclined to admit the validity of the defence, but Sir Christopher Blount is said to have fanned his anger again, and for the moment the situation appeared serious, for if it came to the worst Ralegh ' had meant to have put himself into his own squadron and so to have defended himself or to have left my lord.' Fortunately Lord Thomas Howard, whose words carried weight by reason of his birth, character, and reputation, mediated between the other two Admirals and persuaded the one to give and the other to receive an apology, the earl saying that ' the rest would think him a very tame and weak commander if he should receive no manner of satisfaction.' Ralegh went on board the Repulse the next morning to make his apology, and a few days
72 Gorges. His want of suspicion may be doubted ; the long hesitation about landing shows that he knew the risk he was running with his commander.
73 ' The Book of Orders for the War,' drawn up by order of Henry VIII., and earlier than 1532 (Harl. MSS. 309, f. 10), directs that an admiral shall not enter a harbour, or land men, without the counsel of his captains. Certainly the converse must have held. It was this traditional custom that Borough had in mind when he protested against Drake's conduct in 1587.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 65
later Essex and the other principal officers dined with him in the Warspite, and the earl restored the officers who had landed with Ralegh, cashiered by him in his first outburst of anger. In the Official Relation of the voyage "4 no reference whatever is made to this episode ; many years later, when he wrote the History of the World, Ralegh referred without bitterness to it, saying that * there were indeed some that were in that voyage who advised me not to undertake it, and I hearkened unto them somewhat longer than was requisite, especially while they desired me to reserve the title of such an exploit (though it was not great) for a greater person.' 75 It would be doing an injustice to Essex to say that his attitude was that of one ' willing to wound yet afraid to strike,' for that would be to forget his weak but generous character. It was an illustration rather of what Bodley calls ' his perilous, feeble, and uncertain advice, as well in his own as in all the causes of his friends,' a remark in striking agreement with the comment made by Monson. Essex was peculiarly amenable to personal influences, and it is conceivable that had the third flag officer been any other than Lord Thomas Howard, Ralegh might have been driven to the armed defence he professed to be ready to adopt. But Lord Thomas was a general favourite, and his persuasions therefore had more weight with Essex than they would have had with a man of colder temper. Even Elizabeth felt the attraction of Howard's character and gave a curious proof of it later in the year. In December he was lying so ill that his death was expected hourly, and his only son being a minor could not, if the father died, be given a peerage. Elizabeth, when she knew his condition, ordered a warrant creating him Lord Howard of Walden to be drawn up ' instantly ' and brought to her for signature ; 76 the new peer recovered to enjoy his dignity for many years, and on 2 1 st July, 1603, was created Earl of Suffolk. His probable influence on Monson's career has been shown in the General Introduction.
[5] During the night the Spaniards deserted the entrench- ments above the town, which were occupied by Vere the next morning, when the bodies of a murdered Englishman and a Dutchman were found there. In revenge the country was laid waste before the troops were re-embarked on the 24th, and the whole fleet stood over to Graciosa, where it arrived on 26th September. From Monson's phrase the Dutch seem to have rejoined from Pico, where, Gorges says, they behaved with great cruelty, 'yet I must say truly for them that the Spaniards again
74 Harl. MSS. 36. Signed by Essex, Lord Thomas Howard, Ralegh, Mountjoy, Vere, Ant. Sherley, and Christ. Blount.
75 Book V. cap. i. sect. vi.
76 Egerton Papers, p. 268 (Camden Soc).
VOL. II. F
66 MONSON' S TRACTS
have used such tyranny and outrage in their jurisdictions over that industrious people as hath well merited their irreconcilable malice.' It must always be remembered in reading anything that Monson says about the Dutch that he was writing after his quarrels with them when he commanded in the Channel, and after his Spanish pension for which abuse of them was part pay- ment. Essex intended to get supplies at Graciosa, but, Gorges tells us, was persuaded by Thomas Grove, the master of the Repulse and one of the six principal masters of the navy, to stand over to St. Michael as affording safer anchorage, ( a dull, unlucky fellow,' Gorges calls him. The sequence of the events following is not quite clear, Monson, Vere, and the Official Relation all differing somewhat in details, but the pith is the same, and Monson, as a seaman and as the chief actor in the affair, is perhaps the most likely to be accurate. Essex, indeed, in the Official Relation makes the business appear still worse for himself, for he says that it was only by reason of his orders being misunderstood that the Rainbow and the other ships were left west of Angra at all. In discussing the Earl of Cumberland's voyage in 1589, it was pointed out that to intercept the Flota it was absolutely essential that the cruising ground west of the Island of Terceira should be clung to. Cumberland may have had some excuse for deserting it in his empty water-casks, but no such apology can be made for Essex, whose conduct in sailing for St. Michael because he thought that the first information brought to him was false, or because his Graciosa anchorage was a bad one, is quite indefensible. As a theoretical strategist Essex holds a high position ; as a com- mander at sea he showed the deficiencies to be expected from one thrust at once into place of command, without having under- gone the apprenticeship of service.77 Monson, taught by ex- perience, had given him excellent advice, but Monson was not always at his side, and the soldiers, eager for distraction on land, always had more influence than sailors with him.
The Flota, which included six galleons laden with silver, was under the command of Juan Gutierrez de Garibay, Baskervile's antagonist off Cape St. Antonio, and was made up of forty-three ships, with treasure to the value of 10,000,000 of pesos.78 On board one of them was Sir Richard Hawkyns, coming to Spain as a prisoner, and it may be imagined with what anxiety and dis- appointment he watched the unsuccessful attempts to close with the Spaniards ; he afterwards wrote to Essex that there would
77 On 27th September he wrote to Elizabeth that he intended spending some part of October in the latitude of St. Michael, and would then come home {Cecil MS S. 16th October), thus displaying an unaccountable blindness to the right course, although there was nothing novel in the situation.
78 Herrera, Hist. Gen. ; Fernandez Duro, Arm. Esftanola.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 67
have been no doubt of the result had the English been able to get among them. When Monson's message reached the earl he was off St. Michael and immediately put back, but took two or three days beating up to Angra. On his arrival he sent in a pinnace with four or five captains and masters to judge whether it was practicable to take in the fleet, and, when they reported that it was impossible, went in himself, only to find that the Spaniards were lying in the wind's eye and that the place was strongly fortified.79 These steps were no doubt what Monson calls the consultation of the sea commanders. Gorges adds that a full council was held to debate the advisability of a landing and storm of the town, that the soldiers were at first eager for it when the seamen thought it impracticable, but that when Lord Thomas Howard and Ralegh said that the navy would provide 3,000 men if the soldiers were in earnest, the latter became much less ardent. Gutierrez had landed guns and trenched the approaches to the town, and the garrison was increased by the soldiers of the Flota,80 so that an assault from the land side would have been no easy task \ moreover, the want of water in the English fleet was now so great that men were falling sick for lack of it, so that everything forced an abandonment of the attempt. Still the conditions were favourable from a naval point of view, for the fleet was in undis- puted command of the waters around the Azores, and was strong enough to deal with any Spanish force that might appear, thereby covering the land operations. If the inhabitants could obtain water, the invaders could surely do the same somewhere; the real question was whether the military force was adequate to a siege, or could be made so without dangerously depleting the ships' crews. The passage of years did not lead to any alteration in Ralegh's opinion, for, although he despised forts in general as a check to the passage of ships, he made an especial exception of Angra : ' Yet this is true that where a fort is so set, as that of Angra in Terceira, that there is no passage along beside it, or that the ships are driven to turn upon a bowline towards it, wanting all help of wind and tide, there, and in such places, it is of great use and fearful ; otherwise not.' 81
79 Official Relation (Harl. MSS. 36).
90 Fernandez Duro.
81 Hist, of the World, Book V. cap. i. sect. ix. As a theorist Ralegh was the first strategist of his day. It is unfortunate that he never commanded in chief so that his qualities might have been fully tested, and that he was powerful enough politically to make enemies, but not powerful enough to have followers, so that we get no full or fair account of his actions and influence. It is possible that in supreme command he might have failed like Essex, and for the same reason, the lack of apprenticeship. On the other hand, he possessed a touch of genius while the other man only had talent, but there was certainly
F 2
68 MONSON'S TRACTS
1 6] We possess a very full account of the events at St. Michael from the pen of Senhor Gongalo Vaz Coutinho, the governor of the island, who, although he appreciated his own ability to the uttermost, acted with more skill and energy than was customary with Portuguese or Spanish officers.82 Essex was first sighted from Terceira on 7th September, and an advice boat was sent to St. Michael with the news, but the vessel took eleven days accomplishing the thirty league voyage, having to dodge Essex's stragglers and Ralegh's arriving squadron, and therefore brought but a belated warning when she did get in. Ponta Delgada, the capital of the island, is only an open town which possessed a fort dignified by the name of castle, but when Ralegh disappeared the governor preparer1 for a return by provisioning town and castle, and warned the local levies for service. Thus, when, on 28th Sep- tember, a caravel sailed in with the information that it was only just ahead of the English fleet, he was in readiness in most respects, having 3,500 men available and having used the spade in trench work to some purpose; but he was weak in that ammunition was scanty for his 2,000 arquebusiers, and there were only two or three hundred regular Spanish troops in his command. On the 29th Essex appeared and, after sending in light vessels to sound, anchored in Rosto de Cao bay, out of range of the castle, which is close to the sea on the western side of the town, but Vaz Coutinho remarks that, on shore, they saw them take up such a dangerous anchorage with amazement. Here, the fleet commenced a furious cannonade of the trenches, in the midst of which Essex sent off a boat bearing a flag of truce which the governor ordered to be fired upon, notwithstanding some protests from his own officers in order that his men should not be dispirited by even the appear- ance of hesitation. From a prisoner on board the Repulse, he afterwards heard that ' the General was extremely angry, saying that this was one discourtesy upon another,83 but that the last was that of a desperate man ; but when his passion had cooled he said that there was a good head on shore, though but a small force.' The cannonade, which appears to have been quite harm- less, was continued at close range until dark ; the governor expected an immediate landing that afternoon or during the night, and the women and children were sent away from the town, the streets barricaded, and everything prepared for a desperate resistance, to end with a retreat into the castle at the worst. It
a want of practical capacity shown in his two Guiana voyages, and this would, probably, have been still more marked in command of a great fleet.
"2 Hist, do Successo que na II ha de S. Miguel ovoe com Armada Ingresa .... Lisboa, 1630.
*3 The governor had not acknowledged the single shot fired in salute <jf the flag of St. Sebastian, the patron saint of the city, in-passing it.
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 69
was already decided to abandon Villa Franca as incapable of defence, which could be better undertaken on the five leagues of bad and difficult road which separated it from the capital. The night was passed under arms, Vaz Coutinho ordering fresh trenches to be dug on the shore of Rosto de Cao bay and arranging the plan of action to be followed by his subordinates if he, with the 600 men, all that it would hold, should be forced into the castle. At daylight, the next morning, the bombardment com- menced again, and continued until a ship was observed to come in and speak the flagship, bearing, as we know, the message from Monson, whereupon Essex made sail in the direction of Terceira. But, contrary to what has hitherto been understood, he did not take his whole force with him, for we are told that twenty-three ships were left off the city, and thirteen moved eastward, first to Ponta da Galera, and then to within the island, forming part of the anchorage of Villa Franca. In face of such a comparatively small force Villa Franca was hastily reoccupied, when a message came ashore from the flagship of the squadron, the St. Andrew, presumably from Throckmorton, demanding water and provisions under penalty of the destruction of the town in case of refusal.84 The officer in command demanded twenty-four hours to com- municate with the governor, and the answer sent, with reinforce- ments, was that if the English desired these things they must come ashore and take them.
Throckmorton, if it was he, remained sullenly before Villa Franca ; Vaz Coutinho, who felt certain that the main body of the fleet would return, kept his men in the trenches, feeding them well and cheering their spirits. What became of the twenty-three ships left off Ponta Delgada we are not told, but as no further mention is made of them, and as Essex, when he reappeared on 4th October, is said to have been accompanied by 130 or 160 sail, they may be supposed to have followed the earl shortly after his departure. On his return Essex took up his old anchorage in Rosto de Cao bay, where he was at once rejoined by the squadron from Villa Franca ; under cover of a cannonade the boats were filled with men and pulled for the shore. Vaz Coutinho says that when within musket shot of the beach they stopped and then went back, which he attributes to a well-aimed shot from a field piece which struck what appeared to be the principal boat, but which was more probably due to the heavy surf making a landing very perilous ; or, according to Monson, it was never intended as anything but a feint. Before nightfall a pinnace was observed to stand close in reconnoitring,85 and by daylight of the 5th it was
>4 As Villa Franca had been destroyed by earthquake as recently as 1 59 1, the threat can hardly have caused much dismay.
b Collating Gorges' Relation, Essex and Ralegh were in this pinnace.
jo MONSON'S TRACTS
found that sixty ships had disappeared, and the governor soon received information that they had come inside the island off Villa Franca at dawn, and effected a landing without opposition, the bulk of the fleet under Ralegh remaining before the trenches at Rosto de Cao and renewing the bombardment.86 The exami- nations of five English prisoners tallied in saying that 3,000 men87 had landed, the intention being that Ralegh should attack from the sea when the other force reached the town. The governor concentrated his troops but still occupied the roads leading from Villa Franca, some of which, he says, were so difficult that the invaders would have required scaling ladders to pass them. A fresh prisoner brought in told the governor that Essex had reconnoitred the roads himself and had given up hope of marching on the capital ; his troops were endeavouring to forage round Villa Franca, but so unsuccessfully, says Vaz Coutinho, that they ' hardly dared move from the town, for when they did they were at once captured and killed.' It was not a dignified position for a force numbering 2,000 or 3,000 men, but the defenders had the advantage of knowledge of an extremely difficult country, and at last grew so bold that they harassed with impunity the main body in Villa Franca itself. In these circumstances a council was called, at which it was determined, in view of the difficulty of the roads and the apparent strength of the garrison, to relinquish the march on the capital and order the rest of the fleet round to Villa Franca to water.
In the meanwhile Ralegh was keeping up a harmless bom- bardment of the trenches 88 at Rosto de Cao, ' but they did not kill or wound a single man, and the soldiers grew so fearless that when the guns were fired they ran to pick up the balls, the governor paying a silver rei for each.' On the 6th occurred the incident of the carrack related by Monson, but the governor says nothing about the Dutch rashness, but that she was warned by a boy who swam off to her at his request.89 When aground she
86 The English version is somewhat different, being that a landing- was intended to the eastward, and under the shelter of Ponta da Galera, but that the strong westerly wind carried them down to Villa Franca. Vere says that the landing was not effected until the evening, but he was writing from memory.
87 Vere and Gorges say 2,000.
88 The fleet used 28 lasts 17 cwt. of powder out of the 53 lasts 6 cwt. supplied (Cecil MSS. viii. p. 34).
89 Meteren, however, tells Monson's story circumstantially, and adds that Ralegh confiscated the Brazil prize which had been taken by the Dutch as a punishment. According to Vaz Coutinho the carrack was chased in by eight English ships, although she took those lying in the roadstead for Spaniards, and Gorges notices that the mistake was easily made because Spanish fleets were composed of so
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 71
was attempted by the English boats, but the governor sent down musketeers and covered her by the fire of field pieces so that they were driven off, but, on board her, ' all was in such confusion that they never even thought of their artillery.' She was not set on fire until the ammunition and the more valuable portion of the cargo had been landed ; she burnt until the 8th, and in the meantime Essex had come round, leaving Vere in command at Villa Franca,90 and on the same day he took the remainder of the fleet back with him to that place. The governor believed that the earl intended to force the passes with his whole strength, professing to have been informed afterwards that such had been his purpose,91 and he moved down to Alagoa, a town midway between Ponta Delgada and Villa Franca, with a strong force, purposing to attack the English in Villa Franca. Whatever fears may have been felt at first, the ill-success of the invaders had restored confidence, and Vaz Coutinho tells us that his men were all volunteers eager to prove their valour. During the night of the 9-ioth an attack was made by two companies of foot, but the governor says that little resistance was met with, having only to fight a rearguard which was chased down to the beach on the morning of the ioth, the embarkation having been carried out the day before ; he claims to have captured seven guns, four horses, seventy boats, and many full water-casks ready to be transported to the fleet, and that nearly 200 men were drowned in the last rush for the boats. The English accounts are quite irreconcilable with all this. Vere describes a successful rear- guard action fought by a small detachment, and an orderly retreat and embarkation conducted without loss. According to the Official Relation, the departure was decided upon in consequence of the protests of the masters of the ships, who warned Essex that if the fleet was forced to sea by one of the gales, that might now be daily looked for, the troops might expect to be left on shore the whole winter.92
Spanish prisoners, left behind at Villa Franca, told the governor that the fleet sailed ' full of discontent,' and Gorges uses nearly the same words ; 93 he cannot refrain from a sneer at the
many nationalities. The Indiaman was the Sao Francisco, captain Vasco da Fonseca.
90 Commentaries.
91 All the English writers say that it was only to water Ralegh's division.
92 If their opinion is repeated correctly they were guilty of exaggeration or ignorance. The sailing directions for the North Atlantic give ' ten days or more ' as the time limit in winter during which ships may expect to be unable to recover the island.
93 ' With grief and discontent,' the town (he must mean the troops in Villa Franca) firing salvoes of derision.
72 MONSON'S TRACTS
soldiers who wanted to attack Angra but were now unable to take an open town. Essex signalized his departure by making knights, but, affected perhaps by the hardly triumphant nature of the occasion, confined himself to a much smaller number than usual.94 Vaz Coutinho, who indulges in a justifiable paean over his meri- torious defence, criticizes Essex's generalship unfavourably, but does justice to his chivalry and generosity. On the question of generalship we have not, at this distance of time, a sufficiently intimate knowledge of the local conditions and the equipment of the army for the offensive to pronounce a definite judgment ; moreover, the defending force was stronger and better led than has hitherto been supposed. Vere's narrative is so colourless that the reader cannot tell whether he was satisfied or dissatisfied with the proceedings at St. Michael ; but, as he defended the earl to the Queen, after their return, because he was discontented with him, we may infer that if he disapproved the course followed he would not say so. When the inhabitants returned to Villa Franca they were agreeably surprised to find the churches uninjured and the pictures in them untouched, ' which filled us with amazement,' says the governor, who, as he was unable to comprehend any sort of intellectual tolerance, immediately leaped to the conclusion that Essex must be well affected to the Catholic faith. On occupying the town, five women, lagging behind their companions, were taken and brought before the earl, who, seeing that some of them were good-looking, put them in a house alone under guard, threatening dire punishment to anyone who insulted them, and sent them food from his own table, ' as if they had been women of a different rank.' And ' It may well be that if we invaded England we might not show the same restraint,' remarks Vaz Coutinho wonderingly.
[7] As soon as the fleet put to sea all discipline was lost and each made the best of his way home, ' the fleet kept no order at all, but every ship made the best haste they could.95 For the first few days the wind was fair, but then came north-easterly gales, which completed the separation of the fleet and strained the battered ships badly. The Warspite and Mary Rose both sprang leaks, and no doubt many others were in the same plight ; water was short, and on board the Warspite ' we were fain to begin to set our great stills on work.' % The navigation was hesitating and Ralegh followed the Repulse from duty, 'although our
,J4 One authority {Add. MSS. 5482, f. 16) says eight ; another (Metcalf, Book of Knights), four. Vere names four and 'the young noblemen.' 95 Vere.
96 Gorges. Sir R. Hawkyns had an 'invention' on board the Dainty, in 1594, for the distillation of salt water {Observations, Hak. Soc. p. 164).
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 y3
master was very unwilling thereunto, assuring himself that our General's master was mistaken and beside his course by too much crediting the persuasions and art of one J. Davis, a great navigator reputed, who at that time failed much of his pilotage and con- jecture for the Sleeve.'97 In a few days they were in Soundings, ' though indeed by that sounding I saw few wiser or more assured of the coast. For it was the back of Scilly, but none could say so, nor then so judge it but only the master of our ship, whose name was Broadbent, a careful man and a right good mariner.' Many ships, either from bad navigation or force of weather, were driven into Irish ports; the Warspite, being leaky, made for St. Ives, where, to their astonishment, they found some Spanish transports and pinnaces, belonging to the Adelantado's fleet, scattered and driven to shelter by the same storms that had so troubled themselves.
On 1 6th October Elizabeth prepared a despatch to be sent to Essex, saying that she could not reproach him, but that when she remembered the great promises made she was sorry to see the fruitless conclusion. Not knowing what had happened since Essex's despatch of 27th September, to which this was intended to be a reply, she recommended him, before he left the Azores, to detach a small squadron to look for the Flota, and to beware of the Adelantado who intended to watch for his return to cut off stragglers, ' though haply they dare not encounter with the gross.' 98 Therefore on this date the Queen had no expectation of invasion, and did not think that the Adelantado would venture to fight Essex, although he had actually sailed with both intentions eight days before the date of this despatch.
After Don Martin de Padilla had been beaten back by the winds in October 1596, Philip had undauntedly bent his efforts to refitting his armada for another attempt. The task was not easy, for the military and commercial exhaustion of his kingdom was now accentuated by the State bankruptcy of that year, and progress was very slow. Every man and every necessary that
97 These words seem to imply that John Davis, the celebrated explorer, was with the fleet. Sir Clements Markham says, ' it is certain that Davis served under Essex in one or both of these expedi- tions (Cadiz and the Azores), for in a letter to the earl, written after his return from India, he says that he ordered his men " after that excellent method which we have seen in your lordship's most honour- able actions'" {Life of Joh?i Davis, p. 178). Sir C. Markham thinks that he may have sailed as pilot of the Repulse, but it seems probable that if he held any appointment it would have been that of master, for that officer was now undertaking the navigating duties formerly per- formed by the pilot. Davis was not master of any man-of-war in the Cadiz voyage, and Grove was master of the Repulse in this one.
w Cecil MS S. 1 6th October, 1597 ; a draft.
74 MONSON'S TRACTS
could be obtained was sent to Ferrol, but after six months of preparation the Venetian ambassador said of his fleet that it was ' such that it is better suited for transport purposes than for an attack on England, where he would find a fleet far superior to his own.' " Philip's faith was still in soldiers rather than seamen, or perhaps it was because he could still get soldiers of a sort while his seamen were dead, that towards the end of August 4,000 Italian troops left Cadiz for the north, and if Ralegh had remained on his station a few days longer, he might have fought his first fleet action. We have seen that the Adelantado was so far from being ready when Essex was off Ferrol that, instead of thinking of coming out, he was fortifying the harbour, but the departure of the English to the Azores seemed to be the Spanish opportunity. Don Martin protested in vain that he was not strong enough, insufficiently victualled, and that his ships' stores were bad and inadequate ; if he, like his men, thought it dangerously late in the year, such an argument had no force against Philip's passion for revenge. He was urged to go at all costs, and was promised that reinforcements should be sent on under Don Marcos de Aramburu. He left Ferrol on -^ September for Coruna, which he did not make until the g|, experiencing a foretaste of the weather which bore so hardly on Spanish seamanship.100 A galleon was wrecked going into Coruna, but the fleet consisted of from 130 to 140 ships, manned by 4,000 seamen and upwards of 8,000 troops ; of the ships, however, only a small proportion — about twenty — 101 were men-of-war, the rest being made up as usual of Levantines, Easterlings, ' and all other nations.' 102 Although the expedition was poorly enough supplied on the naval side, great care had been used in providing everything likely to be necessary after landing ; it was characteristic of Philip now to believe that all depended on the army, and to neglect the naval victory that must precede invasion. All sorts of material for fortification were carried ; carts, horses, and oxen for transport; mills, ploughs, and twenty large boats capable of holding 200 men apiece, especially built to land the troops quickly. The fleet was divided into four squadrons, wearing the green, yellow, red, and white flags, under the Adelantado, Diego Brochero, Martin de Bertendona, and Pedro de Zubiaur respectively; the last named had the windward, or vanguard, station, Bertendona the leeward, or rearguard.
99 State Papers Ven. 12th June, 1597.
100 Ibid. 8th November ; Cecil MSS. vii. p. 457.
101 State Papers Dom. Eliz. cclxv. 26 ; cclxvi. 69 ; Cecil MSS. 28th November, 1597. But the Venetian ambassador says that there were forty-four royal ships.
102 ' Their mariners very few and those whom they durst not trust, being compounded of all nations.'
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 75
Marcos de Aramburu was to follow with the reserve of thirty ships, carrying some 5,000 men. The instructions were to seize and fortify Falmouth,103 and, leaving a garrison there, then to take up a station off Scilly and await Essex's return ; having defeated Essex the Adelantado was to return to Falmouth, land all the men available, and capture Plymouth, and all else that he could. What chance Philip had of success can best be estimated by anticipating a little and considering the result of the Irish expe- dition of 1 60 1. There, Philip III. undertook the perfectly warrantable operation of throwing an auxiliary force into a country whose natives were allied in faith and friendship, and had long been looking for help ; and where a patriot army was already in the field and almost holding its own, and the country, as a whole, seething with revolt. Yet when Leveson went into Castlehaven, and finished with Zubiaur as a terrier finishes with a rat, and when Mountjoy smashed Tyrone, advancing to join hands with Aguila, all the apparent advantages of the situation vanished and the expedition crumpled up as a house of cards, leaving Aguila only an honourable capitulation. That was because after Tyrone's defeat and with the English in command of the sea he could not wait for a native rally, hope for reinforcements from Spain, or escape. Assuming that the Adelantado had captured or destroyed some of Essex's fleet, for as it was returning scattered and making for different ports he could not expect to do more, he would still have had to deal with the remainder when it had united with the bulk of the navy as yet uncommissioned, and forming, with the merchantmen available, a far stronger fighting force than his own.104 Moreover, although Philip ignored them, the Dutch were now to be reckoned with as a naval power, and a powerful contingent from Holland would not have been long in joining the English flag. In less than two years, though he did not live to see it, a Dutch fleet was to insult his coasts and plunder his colonies, but he was so far from recognizing the presence of a new maritime factor, that for all notice in his combinations it might well not have existed. In 1588 a single victorious sea action might have given the command of the Channel for a time sufficient
103 The town of Falmouth was not yet in existence. What the Spaniards intended to hold was the peninsula — nearly an island — on which Pendennis Castle stands and commands the entrance of the harbour. The castle had fallen into a weak state, but the immediate result of Elizabeth's alarm was its reparation and enlargement on an important scale. By February 1598 there were 400 men at work upon it {State Papers, eclxvi. 75).
104 From the superior skill of English seamen and the greater handiness of English ships, it is improbable that he would have been able to bring to action any that did not blunder into the midst of his fleet in ignorance.
76 MONSON'S TRACTS
to enable Parma to cross, which, rightly or wrongly, was all that he asked ; but here it was not the command of the Channel that was wanted, but the command of the sea, and to obtain that would have required more than one victory, while the Adelantado had neither ships nor necessaries to replace the losses of battle, nor had the King any reserve of ships or seamen. Granting the Adelantado's first victory, and his return to Falmouth, we may ask that if Aguila, with nearly as strong a force, landing in a friendly country with an ally marching to meet him, could not maintain himself, what prospect was there for Padilla, friend- less amid enemies, and with all the military strength of England directed into Cornwall, while the English and Dutch fleets were cutting his communications outside ? Nor was Falmouth a good choice for the invader ; to render the haven secure from attack from the sea he must hold St. Mawes Castle, opposite Pendennis, and a much less defensible situation, while the greater portion of his fleet would be within heavy gun range from any point on the shores of the harbour. It is to be regretted that the Spaniards did not reach Falmouth for they would have ' seized ' the harbour in the sense that a fox seizes its earth with the dogs outside and with the prospect of the spade, in the shape of cannon fire from the shores around, to follow. The order to take Plymouth afterwards showed an entire ignorance of the local conditions ; Pendennis and St Mawes might have been held for a longer or shorter period, but the Spanish general had not enough men properly to defend them and the necessary ground around, much less to treat the port as a fortified base from which an advance might be made. He could expect no help from the Archduke, for the situation on the Continent was very different from that existing in 1588 ; in any case not a man could come over until the English and Dutch navies were destroyed, and with the Adelantado's resources that was an idle dream. The whole scheme was hopelessly bad. Whether Philip intended a formal invasion or to hold Falmouth as an advanced base for future operations, the command of the sea was equally necessary to enable him to pour in supplies and troops, but that was the one point that he set aside. In 1588 he had admitted at least one crushing fleet action as a part of the campaign ; but it would seem as though failing physical and mental powers had led him now to persuade himself that he might ignore that English fleet he could not master, that was ever in the path of the soldiers whom he could not land.
Don Martin de Padilla remained in Coruna from || September until r% October, delayed, it is said, by contrary winds, and em- ployed the interval in drilling his men and exercising them at the heavy guns. On the T\th, two days before Essex left Villa Franca, and eight days before Elizabeth wrote to him that the Spaniards
THE ISLANDS VOYAGE, 1597 77
might come out to pick up stragglers, they sailed.105 Thirty leagues at sea, orders were sent round trie fleet that the destination was Fal- mouth, and so, for the first time, the objective was really known. On the |j£, in Soundings, the fleet was hove to, while a messenger was sent into Blavet to call