AFRICOM an effective organization or a military hurdle?

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AFRICOM: AN EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION OR A MILITARY HURDLE?

by

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December 2010

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### Title and Subtitle
AFRICOM: An Effective Organization or A Military Hurdle?

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### Abstract
Many organizations face challenges that impact their effectiveness and therefore success. These challenges are not easy to visualize, thus making it more difficult to derive and implement appropriate measures to deal with them. The problem becomes compounded when procedures or treatments are applied without diagnosis.

The establishment of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) to serve Africa’s unique security concerns generated some reservations both within and outside the United States (U.S.). Despite attempts to communicate AFRICOM’s intentions, the lukewarm acceptance among its stakeholders still persists and has raised concerns about its efficacy as a panacea for the problems on the African continent.

The basic premise of this study is to diagnose AFRICOM’s internal processes and examine its external environment in order to identify any organizational or environmental variables that support or hinder its effectiveness in attaining its goals. This thesis examines the extent to which key variables, such as mission, tasks, structure, culture, and environment are congruent or incongruent. Data was obtained both qualitatively and quantitatively. This study establishes that there is some degree of misalignment among the inputs, outputs, and the desired outcomes of AFRICOM’s programs, and profers recommendations for a better fit.
ABSTRACT

Many organizations face challenges that impact their effectiveness and therefore success. These challenges are not easy to visualize, thus making it more difficult to derive and implement appropriate measures to deal with them. The problem becomes compounded when procedures or treatments are applied without diagnosis.

The establishment of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) to serve Africa’s unique security concerns generated some reservations both within and outside the United States (U.S.). Despite attempts to communicate AFRICOM’s intentions, the lukewarm acceptance among its stakeholders still persists and has raised concerns about its efficacy as a panacea for the problems on the African continent.

The basic premise of this study is to diagnose AFRICOM’s internal processes and examine its external environment in order to identify any organizational or environmental variables that support or hinder its effectiveness in attaining its goals. This thesis examines the extent to which key variables, such as mission, tasks, structure, culture, and environment are congruent or incongruent. Data was obtained both qualitatively and quantitatively. This study establishes that there is some degree of misalignment among the inputs, outputs, and the desired outcomes of AFRICOM’s programs, and proffers recommendations for a better fit.
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<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>PACOM</td>
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<td>PEPFAR</td>
<td>President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief</td>
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<td>People Living with HIV/AIDS</td>
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<td>PMTCT</td>
<td>Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission</td>
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<td>RFS</td>
<td>Request for Forces System</td>
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<td>SADBRIG</td>
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<td>Senior Defense Officials</td>
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<td>Tuberculosis</td>
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<td>TDA</td>
<td>Trade and Development Agency</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>UAV</td>
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<td>VLCC</td>
<td>Very Large Crude Carrier</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity. Together with our European allies, we must help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists.

President George W. Bush in 2002 National Security Strategy

Proponents of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) claim that the creation of the Command reflects the strategic importance of Africa to the United States (U.S.) and recognition that a single independent Command can address Africa’s unique security concerns effectively. Its critics suggest a pessimistic viewpoint as described in many articles: ‘It does not work!’, ‘It is the militarization of Africa!’, ‘The Africans do not want it!’ , or ‘It is going to take away the importance of what Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are doing currently!’

Other than an expression of optimism or initial misgivings, what leads proponents and critics to these beliefs? How can we evaluate AFRICOM if we do not understand the organization? Assuming some of these criticisms are factual, what might be ways to mitigate them? This in turn, begs the question, is AFRICOM an effective organization or a military hurdle?

Many organizations have challenges that are complex, making it more difficult to derive and implement appropriate measures to deal with them. The problem becomes even worse when procedures or treatments are applied without diagnosis. According to Harry Levinson, “without diagnosis there is no assurance that any treatment will address


what ails the organization or what is likely to result in long-lasting change.”³ Arguably, AFRICOM has entered an unchartered territory, both physically and metaphorically, and a steep learning curve is not unexpected. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness of AFRICOM in its current organizational design. A misalignment of an organization’s internal processes with its environment has the potential to encumber its effectiveness. The challenge is to accomplish a fit in the organization, because too often there is a gap between what an organization seeks to accomplish and what it is actually doing. Therefore, this thesis will examine the extent to which key variables such as mission, strategy, tasks, structure, outputs, and environment are congruent or incongruent.

A. BACKGROUND

U.S. military concerns around the world are administered through unified combatant commands (COCOMs), which are the highest organizations within the Department of Defense (DoD) responsible for a geographical area (e.g., U.S. European Command, EUCOM) or a mission (e.g., Special Operations Command, SOCOM). Africa was the only geographic region without a designated U.S. military command before the official activation of AFRICOM on October 1, 2008. Hitherto, U.S. military programs on the African continent were administered by three COCOMs.⁴ The shift in focus became necessary in recognition of the growing strategic significance of Africa to the rest of the world and in particular, to U.S. national security and economic interests. The 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa, challenges posed by piracy off the coast of Somalia and along other coasts, civil wars, and health concerns, including terrorist activities in the Trans-Saharan region and Somalia, exacerbated by undergoverned spaces

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⁴From 1952 to 2006, U.S. national interests in Africa had been overseen by different geographical COCOMs. The US European Command (EUCOM) was responsible for the African continent minus Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan, which were under the responsibility of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The islands of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Seychelles were under the US Pacific Command (PACOM), while the African continent’s western islands were assigned to the former US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). See Global Security, “Africa Command (AFRICOM),” accessed January 21, 2010, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/africom.htm.
and an absence of state capacity to exercise control, highlight Africa’s strategic significance, which AFRICOM has been created to help address.

Unlike the three other COCOMs, AFRICOM is designed along nontraditional lines to focus on military-to-military (mil-to-mil) programs oriented towards conflict prevention rather than war-fighting and to play a supporting role to DoS, USAID, and other USG agencies to promote regional stability.\(^5\) To this end, AFRICOM integrates representatives from other U.S. agencies into the structure of the Command headquarters in critical leadership and decision making positions. Overall, the Command represents an internal reorganization within DoD to provide a single focus for all DoD activities in Africa. According to President George Bush:

> This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa.\(^6\)

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Theresa Whelan also remarked:

> Our primary objective is, in addition to making the U.S. DoD organizational structure more efficient and effective by having one command focused on Africa as opposed to having three separate commands focused on separate pieces of Africa, we also want to try to integrate better with our counterparts in the U.S. Government, such as the State Department….\(^7\)

By organizing AFRICOM around both military and interagency organizations, the U.S. hopes to synergize all aspects of its instruments of national power for dealing with security concerns relating to Africa more effectively. In essence, this new organization has the capacity to address key coordination issues that are prevalent in the interagency realm.

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Although the U.S. military has worked in Africa prior to the creation of AFRICOM, the new Command has been received with a widespread lack of enthusiasm among Africans and within the U.S. interagency realm. Indeed, the establishment of AFRICOM has raised concerns about its efficacy as a panacea for the problems on the African continent. Is it a new recipe for old realities or an old recipe for new realities? As an open system subject to influences by forces internal and external to the organization, AFRICOM must continually adapt and influence its operating environment in order to leverage challenges and opportunities to become effective. This raises some pertinent questions about AFRICOM’s performance.

B. THE UNANSWERED QUESTION

The fundamental question this thesis seeks to answer is how effective is AFRICOM in its current organizational design? An ideal organization “does not necessarily exist in reality, but it could be and it is desired.” It is suggested that an organization will be more effective if two or more of certain variables such as an organization’s environment, mission, technology, strategy, and structure are congruent with each other, which goes beyond looking at internal functioning to the more intricate problem of how what happens inside the organization is related to conditions in its environment - an open system view in which the different characteristics of the organization are interrelated, interdependent, and interacting with its environment. Although everything outside the boundary of the organization is its environment, not everything is equally relevant to the system’s purpose and survival. Based on the aforementioned, the theoretical framework of this study seeks to establish the causal mechanisms neglected in the existing literature, such as the linkage of the internal processes of an organization and its environment to its effectiveness or performance.

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8 Schaefer and Eaglen, “U.S. Africa Command: Challenges and Opportunities.”
10 Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for Application, 1–2.
Thus, for AFRICOM, this thesis argues that a misalignment of internal processes and the environment increases the likelihood of ineffectiveness or poor performance.

This thesis will utilize qualitative and quantitative research methods. Data was collected from libraries, archives, reports, seminar papers, executive summaries, and memoranda available through open sources. The model used for data analysis is a modified version of the congruence model by Nadler and Tushman with some components added from the McCaskey model.

C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The significance of this study is to improve situational awareness of the Command’s operating environment. An understanding of the dynamics of the operating environment will assist AFRICOM in becoming more adaptive to environmental changes and thus better deal with the desires, expectations and challenges, and to leverage opportunities to become more effective in accomplishing its mission. Furthermore, it will assist AFRICOM in its intra and interagency collaboration efforts with other agencies that have shared missions. Interagency collaboration is vital to the overall mission of AFRICOM, especially since AFRICOM was uniquely intended to support other agencies. It is the authors’ hope that this study will assist the U.S. government (USG) in mitigating encumbrances to AFRICOM’s effectiveness, contribute to the existing body of literature on AFRICOM-related issues, and address further areas that need to be researched.

D. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

It has been two years since AFRICOM was established and thus it deserves to be considered a relatively new organization and a work in progress. The major limitation of this study is the lack of involvement of AFRICOM and other stakeholders through surveys or interviews. The authors were unable to receive assistance from the Command despite several attempts and could not reach out to other stakeholders discussed in the study due to time constraints. AFRICOM’s involvement would have provided additional information from an insider’s perspective about the internal processes of the Command while the views of the other stakeholders could have provided additional insights.
This thesis assumes that the African continent will remain strategically important to the U.S. in the foreseeable future and AFRICOM will continue to play a significant role in advancing U.S. interests. If this assumption is true, the USG will need to summon the political will and economic means to support AFRICOM in accomplishing its mission effectively.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Chapter II identifies the gaps in literature from summaries and reviews of publications and studies about organizational effectiveness as it relates to AFRICOM. It also introduces relevant concepts about organization and the internal processes, organizational effectiveness, and the environment. Based on these concepts, Chapter II examines the relationship among organizational effectiveness, internal processes, and the environment, as well as how organizations can be influenced by an organization’s external environment. It also outlines the methods used as the basis for research. Chapter III addresses the external environment, paying particular attention to the African continent, excluding the U.S. agencies that are operating in the area. Chapter IV examines AFRICOM’s internal processes as well as those of the U.S agencies that are part of its external environment. The inclusion of U.S. agencies in this chapter is to provide an overall focus on how the U.S. applies the whole-of-government approach to addressing U.S. interests in Africa. Chapter V discusses the findings and analysis of the data, and finally, in Chapter VI the recommendations and conclusion are presented, with continued research areas identified.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter identifies the gap in the existing literature regarding AFRICOM’s effectiveness. It draws from reviews and summaries to be found in major publications. It also introduces relevant organizational concepts as they relate to organizational effectiveness, internal processes, and the external environment. This chapter then goes on to specifically define an organization, introduces an open system perspective as a way to view an organization, and highlights the characteristics of an organization and its internal processes. The characteristics of an external environment, including how an organization can be influenced by its external environment, are also highlighted. Various perspectives on the concept of organizational effectiveness, including the relationships among organizational effectiveness, internal processes, and environment are discussed. Finally, this chapter describes the methods by which data was collected and the model used for analysis.

B. GAP IN LITERATURE ON AFRICOM’S EFFECTIVENESS

There is a lack of literature regarding AFRICOM’s effectiveness. Most studies on the Command center on controversies arising from its establishment rather than its performance.11 One possible reason for this lack of literature is due to the recent establishment of the Command and therefore recognize it as a work in progress. Another reason seems to be that the African continent has been of relatively low strategic value to the U.S. Nevertheless, the available literature on the subject can be categorized into three main groups: literature with recommendations about what needs to be done in order for

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AFRICOM to function effectively, but with no justification for these arguments;\textsuperscript{12} literature that asserts that AFRICOM’s effectiveness will improve or decline by some degree, but without identifying the causes or effect of the any such changes;\textsuperscript{13} and literature that does not adequately address, but outlines recommendations to enhance AFRICOM’s effectiveness anyway.\textsuperscript{14}

Several questions arise from a critical examination of the variables that have the potential to adversely impact AFRICOM’s effectiveness. First, throughout the literature there are no specific linkages between AFRICOM’s effectiveness and its external environment. Whose perspective or which constituency’s point of view is considered when it comes to evaluating AFRICOM’s effectiveness? AFRICOM is an open system and therefore must focus attention on its interactions with its external environment, which influences its activities and choices, and determines its risks and opportunities. How then, and to what extent, does the environment influence AFRICOM’s effectiveness?

Secondly, the literature does not specify the factors that could adversely impact AFRICOM’s effectiveness from the perspective of its internal design. An in-depth study of key influences, such as the organization’s internal processes, is largely missing.


Therefore, to what extent can any recommendations made towards AFRICOM’s effectiveness be compelling without adequately understanding the nature of its internal processes?

C. WHAT IS AN ORGANIZATION?

“An organization is a consciously coordinated social entity, with a relatively identifiable boundary, which functions on a relatively continuous basis to achieve a common goal or set of goals.”15 According to Arrow, “[t]he purpose of organizations is to exploit the fact that many (virtually all) decisions require the participation of many individuals for their effectiveness….”16 Basically, an organization provides a means of using individual strengths drawn from the group to achieve more than can be accomplished by the collective efforts of group members working individually. Coordination of the collective efforts or activities of individual members is necessary for the organization to accomplish its purpose. This is achieved through information exchange among subsystems or components, such as departments, teams, individuals, or activities inside and outside an organization’s boundary.17

D. AN ORGANIZATION AS AN OPEN SYSTEM

“An open system model recognizes that organizations exist in the context of a larger environment that affects how the organization performs and in turn is affected by how the organization interacts with it.”18 It is an arrangement of interrelated, interdependent, and interacting components of an organization with its external environment to achieve a common purpose. Essentially, inputs are taken into the system, transformed into outputs and then returned to the environment, and can be used as feedback for the organization’s functioning and survival. The organizational components


17Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for Application*, 3.

that make up the system are not completely in control of their own behavior, but are open to influences by forces in the external environment, which the organization depends on to survive.\textsuperscript{19} Such a model suggests that organizations have common characteristics and features that explain how they are organized and how they function. The open system perspective is thus based on observing the relationship of the organization with its external environment and the factors that compose it.

1. Characteristics of an Open System Organization

The characteristics of an open system organization consist of inputs, transformations, and outputs, in addition to boundaries, feedback, equifinality, and alignment. This is shown in the model of an open system in Figure 1.

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Figure 1. After Modification David Hanna’s Model of an Open System\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{a. Inputs, Transformations, and Outputs}

The inputs include people, money, ideas, equipment, etc., which are part of and acquired from the system’s external environment for it to function. Transformations are the processes of converting inputs into outputs by the interactions of such mechanisms as social components (people and their tasks or work relationships) and technology (tools, techniques, and methods of service delivery). The outputs are the


\textsuperscript{20}Hanna, \textit{Designing Organizations for High Performance}. 
products, services, skills, etc., that have been transformed and returned to the environment to fulfill the purpose of the organization.21

b. **Boundaries**

Open system boundaries are the borders that help to distinguish between systems and environments. Although the boundary outlines the limits of one system from another, open systems have permeable boundaries, which allow for interactions with the environment. “The degree of permeability (or openness) in the boundary is critical for the system’s survival. However, too much permeability can overpower the system with external demands, too little can cut off the system from needed resources.”22

c. **Feedback**

Feedback is information about the actual performance of the system. It describes whether or not the output is on course with the purpose and goals (negative or deviation correcting feedback) or the purpose and goals are aligned with the environmental needs (positive or deviation-amplifying feedback). This characteristic enables the system to be self-correcting to maintain itself in a steady state (dynamic homeostasis) or help the organization adapt to changing circumstances.23 However, because not all information is feedback, organizations will need to select essential elements within them to seek feedback and devise ways of monitoring these information channels in order to control the future functioning of the system.

d. **Equifinality**

The concept of equifinality states that systems can achieve the same results or outputs from different initial conditions and through a variety of ways.24 This suggests that organizations have adaptive capacity, options, or flexibility to use varying

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degrees of inputs and transform them in different ways to develop or achieve the same satisfactory results. Rather than insisting on one best way to handle a situation, organizations should evaluate whether proposed actions will lead to desired results.

e. **Alignment**

Alignment or fit refers to the extent to which the different features, operations, and characteristics of an organization are congruent with each other and with its environment. Lawrence and Lorsch’s contingency theory,25 Nadler and Tushman’s model,26 and the McCaskey model,27 among others, follow the common theme that there must be a fit between the environment and the organization, as well as among the different components of the organization. This alignment partly determines a system’s overall effectiveness.

2. **Organizational Configuration**

Organizational configuration is often represented by an organizational chart and specifies the general principle used for dividing work, tasks, and coordinating activities.28 Mintzberg distinguishes five basic organizational configurations: simple structure, machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, adhocracy, and divisional form configuration, in which one of five parts that make up the whole organization has a key

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28Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for Application*, 45.
role and one of the coordinating mechanisms is central. However, not all organizations require all of these parts. The five basic organizational configurations including the five parts are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Mintzberg’s Five Organizational Configurations

The simple structure configuration is characterized by one or a few top managers and operators who do the basic work. The definition of work, coordination, and decision making is carried out at the strategic apex by direct supervision. Machine bureaucracy is based on the standardization of work processes where the entire organization’s administrative structure is more elaborated with a clear distinction between line and staff. It requires many analysts to design and maintain its systems and a large hierarchy in the

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29 The five parts of an organization include: the strategic apex (top management), middle line (middle management), operating core (operations, people that do the basic work), technostructure (analysts that design systems, processes, etc), and support staff (support outside of operating workflow, provide indirect services to the rest of the organization). See Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?” Harvard Business Review, January–February 1981.

30 Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”
middle-line to oversee the specialized work of the operating core. Professional bureaucracy relies on the standardization of skills for its coordination. Power over many decisions flows down the hierarchy to the professionals at the operating core and, because the professionals work independently, the size of the operating core can be very large thereby requiring a few line managers.  

The divisional form configuration relies on standardization of output for its coordination or performance control. It is a derivative of machine bureaucracy and consists of a set of semiautonomous divisions where top management maintains a semblance of control through the mangers of the divisions, whom it holds responsible for divisional performance. The middle-line manager is the key part of the organization. Adhocracy relies on mutual adjustment. It has high horizontal and low vertical differentiation, including low formalization. Much of the power lies with trained and specialized experts who are dispersed unevenly throughout the different parts of the organization according to the decisions they make.  

3. **Coordination Mechanisms**

Using Mintzberg’s model in Figure 2, coordination can be obtained by a number of mechanisms that may be used in various combinations. These are explained below:

**a. Mutual Adjustment**

This mechanism involves the coordination of work by a process of direct informal communication in which there is no hierarchy between those performing interdependent works. It is often used for multi-functional or very complex tasks by people who have a higher competence and especially when nobody really knows at the outset what needs to be done but people need to take initiative as work progresses. To some degree, mutual adjustment exists in every activity of every organization, but is

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31Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”

32Horizontal differentiation refers to the specialization within an organization while vertical differentiation is the number of hierarchical levels between top management and the bottom of the hierarchy. See Burton and Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for Application, 45, 69–71.

33Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”
typical of innovative organizations. It allows for immediate adaptation to local needs, especially when coordination directly involves members of the organization doing the work.34

b. Direct Supervision

In direct supervision, coordination is achieved by working through a chain of command where a designated supervisor or person in an organization has centralized control, issues instructions or orders to several people, monitors their work to verify that it is done according to directives, and takes responsibility for their actions. This coordination mechanism is necessary when competencies are unavailable, when procedures or rules cannot be employed, or subordinates cannot be trusted to coordinate with each other through mutual adjustment.35

c. Standardization of Work Processes

Coordination through standardization of work processes is achieved when each person carrying out interrelated tasks follows specified routines, rules, or procedures with little or no direct supervision. This coordination mechanism is typical in machine organizations or is used by workers on assembly lines.36

d. Standardization of Outputs

This coordination mechanism is achieved by ensuring that an activity or task meets specified objectives, desired standards, or outputs without any need for mutual adjustment or interference from the hierarchy. It requires that individuals involved are sufficiently competent and given adequate means to function. This mechanism is typical of diversified organizations.37

34Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”
35Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”
36Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”
37Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”
e. Standardization of Skills or Competencies

Coordination through a standardization of skills relies on trained professionals or skilled people working independently of their colleagues and which allows for considerable control over their work. The organization also surrenders some of its authority to their associations or institutions that select and trains them. According to Mintzberg, standardization of skills is typical of professional bureaucracies.38

4. Internal Processes

As earlier suggested, an organization’s internal processes include its goals/mission, objectives, or strategy; structure; tasks and technology; information systems; policies; culture; and decision making, among others. The internal environment sets the pace for an organization’s workflow, and the conditions, entities, events, and factors that influence its activities and choices.39 These interacting forces within an organization should be synchronized to enhance the strengths and reduce the weaknesses of the organization. While the organization’s internal processes must match the environment, the organization itself must be internally consistent. Highlighted below are some of the key areas that would need to be synchronized.

a. Mission/Objectives/Strategy

The concept of mission/objectives/goals and strategy are analogous. Generally, the mission, objectives or goals of an organization are its reason for existence and guide decisions about what tasks the organization will complete, and what products or services it will provide to the stakeholders. Strategy includes the decisions or tactics the organization will employ or is employing to achieve its mission/objectives/goals or how the organizational resources are utilized to meet the demands, constraints, and

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38 Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?”
opportunities of the environment. Generally, while the mission, objectives, or goals define where the organization wants to go, strategies determine the tasks and plans for how to achieve the objectives.

**b. Task/Technology**

A task is a piece of work assigned or done as part of one’s duties, or a function to be performed. Technology refers to the purposeful application of a wide range of tools, knowledge and/or techniques, and actions to transform organizational inputs into outputs. It also specifies how a given organization accomplishes its tasks.

**c. Structure**

Organizational structure is the framework within which lines of authority, tasks, and responsibilities are defined, delegated, and coordinated, and how information flows between levels of management. It is the formal system for reporting and the backbone for decision making. The complexity of the organization’s structure is often proportional to its size and geographical spread.

**d. Information, Information Processing and Decision Making**

Information is the nervous system of an organization. It is “something told or facts learned.” Organizations need quality information and an adequate information processing capability to cope with environmental uncertainties and improve decision making.

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42 Eric Jansen, “Tasks and Technology,” Organizational Design class notes, briefed November 2009, Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.


making. “Innovations in information technology change both the organization’s demand for information processing and its capacity for processing information.” However, if there is information overload and decisions are not being made in a timely manner or there is a lack of information, this could be detrimental to an organization.

e. Policies and Procedures

“Policies are principles, rules, and guidelines formulated and adopted by an organization [governing the implementation of processes] to reach its long-term goals... [and] to influence and determine all major decisions and actions…” On the other hand, “[p]rocedures are the specific methods employed to express policies in action in day-to-day operations of the organization.” It is argued that procedures are developed with the users/client in mind and evolve over time as new processes develop in response to internal or external environmental changes.

f. Culture

Organizational culture is “the specific collection of values and norms that are shared by people and groups in an organization and that control the way they interact with each other and with stakeholders outside the organization,” including how decision-making processes are framed. “It encompasses beliefs, expectations, norms, rituals, communication patterns, symbols, heroes, and reward structure…,” commonly distinguished between the visible and the hidden levels of organizational culture. Organizational culture is a key variable that affects organizational performance. According to Ouchi and Wilkins, organizational performance cannot be adequately or

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45Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for Application*, 5.


accurately understood without a comprehension of the culture of the organization, necessitating its alignment with other organizational components to enable effective performance.

g. Outputs

As earlier defined, outputs are the products, services, skills, etc., that have been transformed and returned to the environment to fulfill the purpose of the organization. According to the second edition of the Webster Dictionary, it is the work done or amount of goods or services produced over a given period.

E. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF AN ORGANIZATION

An organization’s environment includes everything outside the system’s boundary, such as competitors, suppliers, human resources, financial resources, clients, technology, economic conditions, government, socio-cultural, and international sectors. “Although everything outside the system is its environment, not everything is equally relevant to the system’s purpose or survival.” Lawrence and Lorsch recognized that different parts of the organization may be facing different types of environment. Therefore, it is necessary for an organization to understand the different characteristics of its environment to identify and manage the key influences in order to function effectively.

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52 Hanna, *Designing Organizations for High Performance*, 17.

53 Lawrence and Lorsch, *Organization and Environment*. The external environment is composed of two sectors: general and task environments. The general environment consists of those sectors that may not have a direct impact on the daily operations of an organization but will indirectly influence it while the task environment includes sectors with which the organization interacts directly and that have a direct impact on the organizations ability to achieve its goals. See Daft, *Essentials of Organizations Theory & Design*, 2001.
1. Characteristics of the External Environment

The characteristics of the external environment include: complexity, diversity, uncertainty, hostility, routineness, high-velocity, equivocality, and rate of change.\(^\text{54}\) These characteristics place constraints on organizations and are considered as measures of the environment. For this thesis, a four-dimensional typology: uncertainty, equivocality, complexity, and hostility, will be used to measure an organization’s environment because each of these addresses a different aspect of the environment and they can be operationalized for different components of an organization.

a. Uncertainty

Uncertainty refers to the extent to which environmental events are stable or unstable and the domain is simple or complex.\(^\text{55}\) According to Milliken, uncertainty is when “one does not understand how components of the environment might be changing,”\(^\text{56}\) or what the exact value of a particular variable is to the organization. Uncertainty decreases an organization’s ability to use existing procedures to predict external changes and increases the risk of failure in making appropriate responses. This requires increased capability to seek information or knowledge about the environment to forecast or adapt successfully.

Daft notes that an organization can be structured to reduce uncertainty through boundary spanners or liaison personnel to link the organization with key elements of the external environment for increased information about changes in the environment and to send favorable information about the organization to the environment. Buffer positions can be established to absorb uncertainty from the environment. The organization can also increase planning and environmental forecasting to scan environmental elements and analyze potential moves or countermoves by other

\(^{54}\)The problem of defining, describing, and measuring an environment is difficult and remains contentious. See Burton and Obel, 1998, 165–189.

\(^{55}\)Daft, Essentials of Organizations Theory & Design, 5.

organizations. Other responses to environmental uncertainty include the amount of
differentiation and integration among the departments, organic versus mechanistic
management processes, and institutional imitation.57

b. **Equivocality**

Equivocality is a “measure of the organization’s ignorance of whether a
variable exists in the environment.”58 It is when a variable is too ill equipped to scan and
attempt to monitor, and its importance to the organization is unknown; however, the
organization is aware of its ignorance. Unlike uncertainty, this characteristic is related to
something in the environment that the organization has not experienced before, for
example, new regulations. “Greater equivocality requires broader scanning of the
environment for heretofore unknown and unimportant environmental parameters.”59

c. **Environmental Complexity**

Environmental complexity refers to the number of diverse elements in the
environment relevant to an organization that interact with and influence the
organization.60 Increased complexity increases the number of variables and the amount

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57 According to Lawrence and Lorsch, increased uncertainty in the environment requires increased
differentiation in the organizational structure for the organization to be efficient, which then requires
increased integration to make the different departments work in cooperation. Organization differentiation is
“the differences in cognitive and emotional orientations among managers in different functional
departments, and the difference in formal structure among these departments” while integration is the
quality of collaboration between departments. See Daft, *Essentials of Organizations Theory & Design*, 3–
33. Integration devices typically include rules and procedures, configuration plans, the authority of the
hierarchy, and decision-making committees. See Lawrence and Lorsch, *Organization and Environment*.
Organic structure is characterized by low formalization and decentralization of authority and responsibility
to lower levels, while mechanistic structure is characterized by high complexity, formalization, and
centralization. Burns and Stalker believed that organic structure was needed for an organization to be
efficient if the environment was unstable. If the environment was stable, the mechanistic structure was the


59 Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for
Application*, 177.

of information that the organization has to monitor, assess the effects of and react to. In most cases, this requires it to decentralize its decision-making process for proper alignment.

d. Hostility

Hostility refers to the extent to which an organization’s environment is supportive of or threatening to an organization’s existence or to its progress. Hostile environments are characterized by intense competition, a relative lack of exploitable opportunities, and a harsh or restrictive operating environment. The greater the hostility of the environment the more difficult it is for an organization to survive or achieve its purpose. According to Mintzberg, if an organization’s existence is threatened, decision making in the organization should be centralized regardless of the complexity of the environment to enable direct and decisive intervention to counter against the threat.61

2. The Effect of the External Environment on an Organization

Based on the aforementioned characteristics, a model of the effect of external environment on an organization is shown in Figure 3.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental complexity</th>
<th>Equivocality</th>
<th>Uncertainty</th>
<th>Organization Complexity</th>
<th>Requires:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>MC and HF (A)</td>
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<td>Low</td>
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<td>LC and MF (B)</td>
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<td>Low</td>
<td>HC and HF (C)</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>HC and HF (D)</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>MC and MF (E)</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>HC and LF (F)</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>LC and LF (G)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>HC and LF (H)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: L/M/H/C/F – Low/Medium/High/Centralization/Formalization

Figure 3. Model of the Effects of External Environment on an Organization

From the proposition in quadrant G, for example, if the environment has high equivocality, high complexity, and high uncertainty, the organizational complexity should be low. Accordingly, the organization should have low formalization and low centralization. Similarly in quadrant B, the environment is relatively simple. Low equivocality means that we know what is important. Low complexity indicates that only a few variables describe the environment. Low uncertainty suggests that the values of each variable can be predicted with a high degree of certainty. The information processing requirements from the environment are small. Therefore, if the environment has low equivocality, low complexity, and low uncertainty, the organizational complexity is likely to be low. This may require some degree of formalization and centralization to align the organization in order for it to be effective.

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62 Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing Theory for Application*, 180–189.
F. ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

The concept of organizational effectiveness has been used in a variety of ways, and definitions vary as much as terminology does. In general, effectiveness has been defined as the “degree to which an organization achieves its goals” and as “a desired state of affairs which the organization attempts to realize.” It is typically viewed in terms of the outputs and outcomes of organizational activities. Despite some consensus, there is no universal agreement on the definition and operationalization of the concept. In the following discussions, four main theoretical approaches to organizational effectiveness are reviewed and evaluated, giving several views from relevant researchers and writers. By identifying a definition that can be broadly applied, a general framework for analyzing organizational effectiveness for this thesis can be developed. It is noteworthy that the terms ‘effectiveness’ and ‘performance’ are used interchangeably because problems related to their definition, measurement, and explanations are similar.

The four main approaches to organizational effectiveness are: goal-based approach, resource-based approach, internal process approach, and strategic-constituencies (stakeholders) approach. The goal-based approach to organizational effectiveness is measured in terms of accomplishment of goals or desired outputs. The goals of the organization need be determined and assessed to ascertain whether the goals have been achieved. Sometimes identifying organizations goals may seem difficult because people in the organization may have difficulty stating the real goals. Different stakeholders may also have different goals for the organization. Moreover, organizations

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have not only official goals, but also operative goals. The resource-based approach defines organizational effectiveness “in terms of its bargaining position, as reflected in the ability of the organization, in either absolute or relative terms, to exploit its environment in the acquisition of scarce and valued resources.” This approach focuses on obtaining and successfully managing resources as the criterion for measuring organizational effectiveness.

On the other hand, the internal processes approach measures effectiveness as internal organizational health and efficiency or the efficient use of resources and harmonious internal functioning. This approach does not consider its relationship with the external environment and organizational output, but considers all departmental activities, which must be aligned with one another for the organization to be effective. The strategic-constituencies or stakeholders approach seeks to at least minimally satisfy the expectations of the various important constituents or stakeholders both within and outside the organization. Each stakeholder has a different criterion of effectiveness due to different interest in the organization. In this approach, organizational effectiveness becomes an assessment of how successful the organization is in meeting the expectations of the various constituencies critical to its continued existence. However, according to Daft, “[t]he stakeholders approach also handles several criteria simultaneously – inputs, internal processing, outputs – and acknowledges that there is no single measure of effectiveness.”

Not all criteria for organizational effectiveness can be relevant to every organization. Some may be more important than others, especially because organizations

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67Official goals, sometimes called the mission, are the formally stated goals, which typically describe the organization’s general statement of purpose and outcomes the organization is trying to achieve, while operative goals reflect activities the organization is actually performing. Official versus operative goals represent stated versus actual goals. See Daft, Essentials of Organizations Theory & Design, 18.


71Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 28.
perform many different functions and their success depends on performance in a number of areas. Consequently, in agreeing with the argument that organizational effectiveness requires multiple criteria to evaluate and measure, this thesis adopts a hybridization of the goal and strategic-constituencies approaches. This thesis also adopts Robbins’ definition: “the degree to which an organization attains its short – (ends) and long-term (means) goals, the selection of which reflects strategic constituencies, the self interest of the evaluator, and the life stage of the organization.”

G. RELATIONSHIP AMONG ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, INTERNAL PROCESSES AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Figure 4 illustrates the theoretical expectations of the alignment of the internal processes and the environment, and indicates the likelihood of an effective or ineffective organization. The environment has needs that the organization must satisfy, and also exerts constraints that must be managed in order to survive and be effective. This demands that critical elements within the organization be aligned and focused towards environmental demands. A good fit with the environment gives a high level of effectiveness. According to Hanna, “[a]n organization that ignores its environment will be characterized by several blind spots…, which are critical for its survival. In contrast, an organization that deeply recognizes its dependence on the environment for survival and growth will do whatever necessary to implement strategies and policies that accurately address key environmental expectations.” Therefore, to be better aligned, an organization may either control the environment or balance the needs between itself and the environment.

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73Hanna, *Designing Organizations for High Performance*, 43.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Environmental Constraints</th>
<th>Level of Effectiveness</th>
<th>Level of alignment of internal processes variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Fit</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Misfit</td>
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<td>High</td>
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Figure 4. Model of the Alignment of Internal Processes and Environmental Variables

H. METHODS

1. Data Gathering Methods

This thesis utilized both qualitative and quantitative research methods. Data was collected from archives, libraries, reports, seminar papers, executive summaries, and memoranda available through open sources. These include information reviewed from U.S. Government Accountability Offices (GAO) reports, AFRICOM posture statements, and relevant literature on the concepts of organizational effectiveness and environment, as well as relevant works on the African environment including activities of various U.S. agencies. The numerical data gathered for the quantitative research consist of statistical figures on African countries and populations as these relate to size, health concerns, funding, and military equipment, among others.

2. Data Analysis Methods

The model used for data analysis is a modification of the congruence model by Nadler and Tushman with some components from the McCaskey model as shown in Figure 5. Both the congruence model by Nadler and Tushman and the McCaskey model
sit firmly within the open system school of thought. Nadler and Tushman consider the transformation process as the heart of their model. However, their model lacks a few important components that are present in the McCaskey model, such as mission, technology, and outcomes. The modified version for this analysis considers every part of the system: input, transformation process, output, and outcome, equally important for an organization’s effectiveness.

As depicted in the modified model, technology (one of McCaskey’s design factors in the transformation process) replaces the individual component in the Nadler and Tushman model, while the mission indicated in the input replaces history (the history component is embedded in the culture component). The outcome component from McCaskey’s model is also introduced into the Nadler and Tushman model. Worth noting, too, is that structure replaces formal organization, and culture replaces informal organization, but all retain the same meaning. The culture in the transformation process does not only infer interaction among internal organizational element, but also includes interactions among external environmental variables.

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74 The Nadler and Tushman congruence model views the organization as a system that draws inputs from both internal and external sources (strategy, resources, history, and environment) and transforms them into outputs (activities, behavior and performance of the system at three levels: individual, group and organizational). The organization contains four key components: task; the individuals who perform the work; the formal organizational arrangements that provide structure and direction to the tasks; and the informal organization, sometimes referred to as the culture that reflects the values, beliefs, and behavioral patterns. See Nadler et al., Managing Organizations: Readings and Cases.

Using the modified model, the data collected from the various sources were analyzed for information they reveal about the challenges and opportunities presented by the external environment, including the character or performance of the organization. Then, a comparison is made between the organizational performance and the desired performance given the nature of the environment, among other things, to determine the degree of fit and possible causes of problems so as to develop courses of action to mitigate them. These processes can be analyzed through the following four steps:

- Determine the sectors of the environment that may indicate possible existence of problems or opportunities and examine the nature of those environmental elements.
- Describe the basic nature of the four components of the organization with specific emphasis on their critical features including mission or goals, resources, strategy, and outputs (as desired according to the strategy and as actually obtained).
- Conduct analysis to identify areas where there are significant and meaningful differences between desired and actual outputs and, to the extent possible,

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**Figure 5. After Modification Nadler and Tushman’s Model**

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76Nadler et al., Managing Organizations: Readings and Cases, 45.
identify costs associated with each problem. Determine relative congruence or fit among the organizational components (transformation process) as well as among the components, inputs, outputs, and outcomes. Generate and identify causes associated with specific problems.

- Indicate possible actions to deal with the problem causes.

Nadler suggests that “[i]t’s important to view the congruence model as a tool for organizing your thinking … rather than as a rigid template to dissect, classify and compartmentalize what you observe. It’s a way of making sense out of a constantly changing kaleidoscope of information and impressions.”77

I. SUMMARY

In this chapter, gaps were identified in the literature regarding AFRICOM’s effectiveness. It was suggested that there are no specific linkages between AFRICOM’s effectiveness and its external environment, which raised the question about whose perspective or which constituency’s point of view is considered for evaluating AFRICOM’s effectiveness by some of the existing literatures. There was a gap in literature on specific factors that could adversely impact AFRICOM’s effectiveness from the perspective of the internal design, including an in-depth study of key influences, such as the organization’s internal processes. All of these, among others, raise the question about whether AFRICOM is effective in its current organizational design, which this thesis seeks to answer.

As addressed in this chapter, an organization is considered to consist of a group of people working together to leverage their individual strengths within the group to achieve more than can be accomplished by the collective efforts of group members working individually. The organization is viewed from an open system perspective, which is an arrangement of interrelated and interdependent components of an organization interacting with its external environment to achieve a common purpose. According to this perspective, inputs are taken into the system, transformed into outputs, and then returned to the external environment that also influences the organization.

According to this chapter, the external environment of an organization includes everything outside its boundary, such as competitors, suppliers, human resources, and financial resources. Those sectors that may not have a direct impact on the daily operations of the organization but have an indirect influence are considered as the general environment, while the task environment has a direct impact on the organization’s ability to achieve its goals. Although there are several aspects of the external environment that place constraints on organizations, a four-dimensional typology (uncertainty, equivocality, complexity, and hostility) are being used in this thesis to measure an organization’s environment. While equivocality suggests an organization is ignorant of a variable that exists in the environment, hostility refers to how supportive or threatening the environment is to an organization’s effectiveness or achievement of its purpose.

This chapter considered organizational effectiveness to be the degree to which an organization achieves its goals. Having identified four main approaches to organizational effectiveness: goal-based, resource-based, internal process, and strategic-constituencies (stakeholders), the definition adopted also takes into account short-term and long-term goals, with due consideration given to the interests of various stakeholders.

The chapter described the data gathered and methods of data analysis, with the congruence model by Nadler and Tushman being modified by using some components of the McCaskey model. The thesis model thus captures all the important components of the system: inputs, transformation processes, outputs, and outcomes, and enables the identification and determination of misalignments and their possible causes in order to proffer solutions.
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III. THE EXTERNAL OPERATING ENVIRONMENT OF AFRICOM

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to examine various aspects of AFRICOM’s external operating environment to identify challenges and opportunities. As earlier noted, an environment includes everything outside the boundary of an organization, which the organization directly or indirectly interacts with and which has the potential to impact its ability to achieve its goals. However, because it will be difficult to examine every aspect of AFRICOM’s external environment due to time constraints, this study examines those aspects of the environment which the authors consider to be sensitive for AFRICOM.

Specifically, this chapter focuses on various aspects of the African operating environment, excluding U.S. organizations to be discussed in Chapter IV. This chapter covers geopolitical and demographic trends, transnational security challenges, health challenges, wars and conflicts, and competition for influence by other international actors operating on the continent. Additionally, regional perspectives on security challenges and mechanism for prevention, including an overview of Africa’s militaries, will be discussed.

B. GEOPOLITICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

The geopolitical and demographic trends in Africa are complex and dynamic, and provide significant challenges as well as opportunities not only to Africans, but also to other stakeholders. Africa is the world’s second-largest and second most populous continent, after Asia, with an area of about 30.2 million km² (11.7 million mi²) including adjacent islands. It covers six percent of the Earth’s total surface area and 20.4 percent of the total land area, and is about three and half times the size of the continental U.S. Africa is home to over one billion people in 54 countries, which accounts for about 14.7 percent (one seventh) of the world’s population. According to United Nation’s (UN) projections published in March 2007, Africa’s population is envisioned to at least double between
now and 2050. There are over 800 ethnicities and between 1500 and 2000 diverse African languages and dialects,\(^{78}\) representing many different cultures not only from one country to another, but also within individual countries.\(^{79}\) The religions in Africa include: Christianity; Islam; and African traditional beliefs.\(^{80}\) In essence, it is in the sheer vastness, wide diversity of cultures, religion and ethnicities that gives the African environment its uniqueness and complexity.

In addition to a high population growth rate, Africa has increased unemployment, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, which breeds frustration and the potential for criminality. “Today, two out of three inhabitants of this large region of Africa are under 25 years of age … [and] two-thirds of its population still live in rural areas, [with prospects for] massive migration to the towns and cities…. At the present rate of rural exodus, half [s]ub-Saharan Africa’s population would be urban dwellers by 2030.”\(^{81}\) It is argued that the growth rate is the result of relatively high fertility and a decline in mortality due to continuing socio-economic improvement. The International Labor Organization (ILO) already estimates that the unemployment rate in Africa will remain high,\(^{82}\) which has to be of concern as more young adults become unemployed. Due to


\(^{80}\)Islam is the most widely practiced and dominant in North Africa, Horn of Africa, the West African interior and far west coast of the continent as well as the coast of East Africa. North Africa has strong ties to Arab culture and are mainly French speaking; West Africa has a mixed Christian/Muslim population; Eastern and Central Africa have a mixed Christian/Muslim population; and South Africa has a predominantly Christian population.


sub-regional diversity and disparities within African countries, it is unlikely that any general proposals or strategies for reducing fertility to mitigate the situation on the continent will be successful.  

As displayed in Figure 6, about two thirds of the continent (mostly the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, and the Kalahari in the south) is desert or semi-arid with a sparse population. The same is true in heavily forested areas or near mangrove swamps. Herbst argues that because of the cost of building infrastructure posed by the nature of Africa’s political geography; African leaders find projection of government authority over substantial portions of their population to be difficult.  

For example, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has a large population concentration around the capital, Kinshasa, and the border regions while the interior is relatively empty, making it costly to construct infrastructure (especially roads) through vast relatively under-populated areas. Herbst notes that “[i]t is therefore no wonder that Kinshasa, has had such an extraordinarily difficult time consolidating power and that many provinces have formally seceded.” However, he also argues that many African leaders confronting vast territories will engage in patronage politics in the densely populated cities and let those outlying areas, especially those that want to threaten the state, to remain relatively ungoverned rather than spend limited resources on roads to secure their authority.

Against the background of population explosion and unemployment, as well as challenges posed by political geography, lie some of the complexities and uncertainties associated with the African environment. The UN argues that these factors constitute the

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83 The high fertility rate has to do with a combination of cultural and socio-economic factors such as reproduction at young ages (age at marriages is early); lack of birth control or limited use of contraceptives; high demand for children due to tradition, religion, or the need for more children to assist in food and livestock production; and high infant mortality. See UN Economic Commission for Africa/Food Security and Sustainable Development Division (ECA/FSSD), “The State of the Democratic Transition in Africa,” Report, accessed June 24, 2010, http://unitednationonline.org/eca_resources/Major_ECA_Websites/icpd/fourth/FC4-03a.%20Doc%20Demo%20Transit_full%20report.htm.


85 The countries in the Sahel such as Chad, Mali, Niger and Mauritania that are exceptionally large and sparsely populated are almost impossible to govern. Given the poverty in these countries, it is difficult for any government to be able to exert effective control. See Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, 145–159.
major causes of deadly conflicts and socio-economic instability that undermine the very foundations for securing sustainable livelihoods, economic growth, and poverty eradication.

Figure 6. From the Encyclopedia Britannica, Africa: Population Density

C. TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

Africa has a very wide range of transnational security challenges that impact diverse areas of human behavior. These challenges include organized criminal activities such as terrorism and violent extremism; maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea including theft of natural resources; as well as illegal trafficking in drugs, persons, and

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small arms and light weapons (SALW). The occurrence of these security challenges varies across the different countries and regions as discussed below.

1. Terrorism and Violent Extremism

One of the pressing security challenges in Africa is the threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism or militancy. The litany of transnational terrorist activities by al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Africa, including social conflicts in which combatants or militants use terrorist tactics, underscores the presence of local, regional, and worldwide terrorism on the African continent. Such activities range from the terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya in 1998; Casablanca, Morocco in 2003 and 2007; and more recently in Uganda. In addition, challenges posed in Nigeria by Islamists in the north and militant groups in the southeast and al-Shabaab militancy in Somalia return focus towards the African continent. Despite many successful host nation security efforts and U.S.-supported military interventions against these aforementioned groups (among others), terrorists or violent extremists continue to function actively in Africa.

It is argued that Africa’s vast ungoverned spaces, including porous borders in Northern Africa, the Trans-Saharan region and Somalia, especially badly governed areas or those with the lack of state capacity or political will to exercise control elsewhere, offer sanctuary to extremists and insurgent groups to recruit, indoctrinate, train, equip, transit, and mount operations including smuggle and traffic in drugs, persons and weapons. It is suggested that although “al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

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formerly *Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat* (GSPC) focused its major
attacks on Algeria, [it] continued to operate [almost uninterrupted] in [the vast
ungoverned] Sahel region, crossing difficult-to-patrol borders between Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Algeria, and Chad to recruit extremists within the region for training and terrorist
operations in the Trans-Sahara and, possibly, for operations outside the region.”

Similarly, the large areas in Somalia where the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
lacks capacity to exercise control offers uninterrupted sanctuary to al Shabaab to focus on
carrying out attacks against Somali citizens, the TFG, and African Union (AU)
peacekeeping forces.

While terrorism is just one tool used by global insurgents, “[a]l-Qa’eda and
similar groups feed on local grievances [supporting many local causes that have little to
do with the objectives of the global jihad], integrate them into broader ideologies, and
link disparate conflicts through globalised communications, finance and technology.”

Such groups include *Boko Haram* (which literally means non-Islamic education is a sin),
a Nigerian Islamist group that is opposed to the influence of Western education and seeks
the imposition of strict Islamic law throughout the country as its ideology.

In his 2010 posture statement, General Ward notes that “enhancing security [to
respond to terrorism and violent extremism] depends upon regional cooperation and the
development of stable and growing economies to undercut the recruiting activities of
violent extremist organizations.” Yet, considering the long history of international
efforts especially by the U.S., has there been any demonstrable regional capacity for
cooperation and development to respond to this challenge?

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90David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” *Executive Summary*, Version 2.2 (November 30,

91Vangaurd, “Boko Haram Resurrects, Declares Total Jihad,” August 14, 2009, accessed August 3,

2. Maritime Challenges

Africa’s rich resource laden and highly commercial maritime environment, especially in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and the waters off the coast of Somalia, have been undermined by multifaceted domestic, regional, and international challenges. These challenges have destabilizing consequences both for the economies of the littoral nations and the international community, and they occur because of vulnerabilities in the littoral states. Some of these challenges discussed below include piracy and armed robbery at sea, oil theft, poaching, and environmental degradation, as well as human and narcotics trafficking, and proliferation of SALW.

a. Piracy, Armed Robbery and Sea and Oil Theft

Until 2007, maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea have been largely concentrated in Asia.93 Between January and June 2009, Africa ranked higher with about 66 percent of the world’s 240 reported incidents. The Gulf of Aden had 86 incidents, and became the world’s epicenter for maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea. Other places in Africa are Somalia – 44 incidents, Red Sea – 14 incidents, and Nigeria – 13 incidents, including Tanzania and Kenya.94 Despite the strong international naval presence along the transit corridor in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere around East Africa, pirates have conducted attacks beyond the 200 nautical miles (n miles) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). For example, one incident occurred on November 29, 2009 at about 800 n miles off the Somali coast where pirates hijacked Maran Centaurus, a Greek-flagged very large

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93 Africa dominated in 2007 with about 120 actual and attempted attacks, South America had 21, South East Asia had 70, the Indian Sub-Continent had 30, the Far East had 10 and there were about 12 in the rest of the world. See International Chamber of Commerce (ICC - IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report 1 January – 31 December 2007 (UK, London: International Maritime Bureau, January 2008), accessed July 9, 2010, http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/ICC-IMB-PRC-2007.pdf.

94 While a majority of these incidents in Nigeria were against vessels at anchorage or berth, those in the Gulf of Aden, Somalia, Red Sea and Tanzania were mostly against vessels underway, and largely involved the boarding of vessels, the use of sophisticated weaponry and taking of hostages, indicating sophistication in these areas. See ICC-IMB, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships.”
crude carrier (VLCC) containing two million barrels worth $162 million.\textsuperscript{95} About $7 million in ransom was paid for the release of the vessel and hostages, and with the availability of this ill gotten money, weapons and private armies among others become easily funded. Also, the international shipping industry becomes affected thanks to high-risk insurance premiums, among other costs.

Oil theft and oil infrastructure sabotage are also a significant feature in the resource-laden GoG,\textsuperscript{96} particularly in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta area. The oil is stolen by criminals either attaching secondary pipelines to the main pipelines of an oil company, blowing-up pipelines, or through connivance with government and oil company officials. According to the UN Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC), about 10 percent of oil in Nigeria is stolen every year, reducing the production capacity to about two thirds when sabotage and violence are included.\textsuperscript{97} The result is an upward surge in oil prices, including pollution of the waterways by spillages caused by sabotage. In addition, as with piracy, criminals acquire sophisticated weapons with which to challenge the security agencies. These activities destabilize the economy of the region with implications far beyond the Niger Delta. Unfortunately, the agitation in the Niger Delta has provided a convenient smokescreen for persons intent on personal enrichment through oil theft.


\textsuperscript{96} The Gulf of Guinea consists of countries along the west and central coast of Africa: Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, and Ghana. All are oil producing, and Liberia and Sierra Leone have made energy discoveries.


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b. Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing

In addition to armed attacks on fishing vessels, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing otherwise called poaching, constitutes a significant challenge in the EEZs and on the high seas. It is suggested that the worldwide total loss of between 11 and 26 million tons of fish from poaching, costing between nine and 24 billion dollars per year, is particularly prevalent in developing countries, especially across sub-Saharan Africa. Studies between 2003 and 2004 in ten African countries suggest a loss of about 372 million dollars to IUU fishing by vessels from Asia, Europe, and other parts of Africa. Apart from the loss of revenue to the littoral states, there are losses/environmental damages to the ecosystem caused by overfishing and consequent reduction in availability of sea food in local markets. There is also the loss of employment, including the loss of fishing gear or human lives arising from encroachment by industrial fishing vessels into zones reserved for artisanal fishing, which often results in conflicts. Additionally, the UN estimates that about 38 percent of Africa’s coastal ecosystem is under threat from pollution.

c. Illicit Trafficking in Drugs and SALW

Coupled with the above concerns is trafficking in illicit drugs and SALW with their attendant consequences. West Africa is a major transit route for cocaine.
trafficking into Europe from Latin America, much as East Africa is for heroin and cannabis resin from Asian producing countries. It is estimated that about 50 to 60 tons of cocaine, worth about two billion dollars, transits the West African region annually and about 20 to 30 tons of Afghanistan heroin is trafficked into East Africa.\textsuperscript{102} As a result of the volume of seizures in West Africa, it is suggested that the region may not just be “a transit area but a stockpiling logistics base for drug trafficking.”\textsuperscript{103}

The seriousness of drug trafficking to Africa’s security and stability is, in part, linked to the value of the drugs passing through the region. The worth of drugs being trafficked is in some cases greater than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of some countries like Liberia and Guinea-Bissau.\textsuperscript{104} Aside from the possibility that the proceeds could be used to challenge or bribe law enforcement agencies as well as corrupt financial officers to launder the proceeds through the financial system, this traffic prevents licit commercial activities and the growth of the already weak African economies.\textsuperscript{105}

Similarly, while it is inevitable that some of the drugs will be consumed locally with the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{102}Since the mid-1990s, trafficking in hard drugs became a booming business in Central and West Africa. The introduction and transshipment of mostly heroin and cocaine from outside these regions has required the necessary complicity of local actors. In the East African region, the few reported seizures of heroin, cannabis, and cocaine between 1995 and 2006 did not reflect the extent of trafficking, availability or growing abuse in the region. The transshipment from Asia is through the ports in Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya and Tanzania. The drug syndicates connect each other in West and East Africa mainly through international airports in Nigeria and Ethiopia. See UNODC, “Drug Trafficking Patterns to and from Eastern Africa,” accessed July 19, 2010, \url{http://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/illicit-drugs/drug-trafficking-patterns.html}; and AFRICOM, “Africans Participate in Multinational Counter-Narcotics Seminar,” January 21, 2010, accessed June 20, 2010, \url{http://www.africom.mil/getarticle.asp?art=3893}.
\item \textsuperscript{104}The GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) for Liberia in 2009 is estimates at $1.578 billion, which is less than the estimated $2 billion that transits West Africa. See CIA World Fact Book, September 29, 2010, accessed October 19, 2010, \url{https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/li.html}.
\end{itemize}
potential risk of widespread addiction and a cycle of dependence, trafficking also has the
total potential to fuel crime and local violence, as well as increase the school dropout rate with
the belief that you can get rich quick.\textsuperscript{106}

Africa also has a long history of trafficking in SALW due to its long
history of numerous armed conflicts. “The traffickers themselves are a diverse group,
with some originating in countries with large arms supplies, some in regions with stability problems, and some from the wealthier nations.”\textsuperscript{107} A UNODC report suggests
that most military arms trafficking into Africa takes place under a veneer of legality,
using the mainstream mechanisms for shipping legitimate goods: land, sea or air
depending on the location of the buyer and commercial concerns. African maritime
nations have been vulnerable to these problems.

Beyond the lack of capability to monitor and affect arrest, is the lack of
necessary legal mechanisms (criminal justice systems) or political will to support
prosecutions for effective deterrence against these maritime crimes. For example, “the
police in many West African countries are rated as the most corrupt sector of the
society.”\textsuperscript{108} Additionally, the UNSC report indicates that “captured pirates with powerful
links have continued to avoid prosecution notwithstanding increased international focus
on the need for accountability.”\textsuperscript{109} This report suggests that in the Horn of Africa and
East African region, only Kenya and Seychelles accept pirates captured by other
countries to be tried in their courts, although Kenya recently revoked this agreement.

\textsuperscript{106}Abdullahi Shehu, “Drug Trafficking and its Impact in West Africa,” paper presented at the Meeting
of the Joint Committee on Political Affairs, Peace and Security/NEPAD and Africa Peer Review
Mechanism of the ECOWAS Parliament, held in Katsina, Nigeria, on July 28 to August 1, 2009, accessed
July 19, 2010, \url{http://giaba.org/media/speech/09-8-4-EFFECTS_OF_DRUG_TRAFFICKING_FOR_PARLIAMENTARIANS_09-comrs.pdf}.

144.

\textsuperscript{108}Discussion Paper by the Permanent Representation of Denmark to the European Union Brussels,
Belgium, “Workshop on Building Capacity in the Area of Counterterrorism in West Africa in the
Framework of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” September 17, 2009, accessed August 26,
2010, \url{http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/discussion/09Sept17_discussion_paper.pdf}.

All these maritime challenges reflect the heightened level of insecurity in the maritime environment of the continent, which underscores the relevance of proactive regional mechanisms for improved maritime security.

D. HEALTH CHALLENGES

The public health sector in Africa is inundated with many challenges, namely; inadequate human resource capacity and laboratories, limited drug supplies, weak healthcare infrastructure, limited public financing, and poor management and planning, including lack of integrated systems. However, the major public health concerns are malaria, tuberculosis (TB), and Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS). It is estimated that over 8,500 people in Africa die every day from these three preventable and treatable diseases. However, HIV/AIDS remains the major global health problem and Africa is the epicenter of the pandemic. Based on 2008 estimates, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 72 percent of the 2 million global AIDS-related deaths, with new HIV infection at 1.9 million of the global total of 2.7 million, surpassing the numbers in treatment. As of December 2009, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 67 percent of the 34.4 million HIV positive people worldwide (for


details see Appendix 1).\textsuperscript{113} Obviously, since the vast majority of those infected are between the ages of 15 and 49, in the prime of their working lives, the needed workforce will become depleted.

It has been argued that African militaries and peacekeeping forces are within the HIV/AIDS high risk population group.\textsuperscript{114} The military is not only most vulnerable to HIV infection, but is also most likely to spread the virus. It is suggested that for a variety of reasons, including the amount of time stationed away from their families due to high mobility, stressful and difficult operating conditions, and a willingness to take risks, members of the military often wind up as clients of sex workers, indulging in unsafe sexual activities, thereby increasing their chances of contracting or spreading HIV.\textsuperscript{115} This practice is especially evident “[i]n environments of conflict and violence, where people are displaced and livelihoods are lost, [and] women and girls are also forced to exchange sex for protection, food, water and basic necessities.”\textsuperscript{116}

Although statistics and the extent of impact are difficult to collate, especially because of the military’s culture of concealment, available estimates indicate that HIV prevalence is abnormally high in most African countries. For example, according to South African government figures, seven out of 10 military deaths in 2002 were AIDS


\textsuperscript{115}Essa, “HIV/AIDS and Africa’s Military: Are we Winning this War?”

related. In Nigeria, a study of returning soldiers conducted by Civil Military Alliance to Combat HIV/AIDS (CMA), found that infection rates are more than double that of the country’s total estimates and that a soldier’s risk of infection doubled for each year spent on deployment in conflict regions, suggesting a direct link between duty in a war zone and HIV transmission.

Although the prevalence of this pandemic and the number of people dying varies significantly from country to country in both scale and scope, the above statistics are unlikely to change overnight. The combined impact of losses, absences on extended sick leaves, and financial constraints has implications, not only for national security, but also on military readiness for peacekeeping operations across the continent, which increasingly depends on African armed forces.

E. WAR AND CONFLICTS

Despite a recent decline in the number of wars or conflicts in Africa, due largely to the efforts of African governments, the UN and other members of the international community, statespersons and civil societies, Africa is still home to the world’s most complex conflicts and most demanding UN peacekeeping operations. These conflicts have caused deaths, terrible human suffering, the spread of disease, gross violations of human rights, and they have undermined economic growth and stability, as well as proved a breeding ground for transnational organized crimes.

A snapshot of deaths in African conflicts was exemplified in DRC. Since the outbreak of the conflict in 1998, considered to be the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II, about 5.4 million people have died. It is suggested that “[t]he vast majority actually died from non-violent causes such as malaria, diarrhea, pneumonia, and malnutrition - all typically preventable in normal circumstance, but [came] about because of the conflict.”

In other conflict environments, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, both

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criminal and terrorist organizations profited from illegal trade in precious gems and arms sales. Thanks to conflict, the continent has recorded some of the highest numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world. For example, out of the world’s 27.1 million IDPs in 2009, Africa had the most, with 11.6 million IDPs in 21 countries, about 40 percent of the world’s total.120

African conflicts have also incurred tremendous human resource and financial costs for peacekeeping. For example, as of March 31, 2010, the UN has deployed about 75,423 uniformed peacekeepers in the seven peacekeeping missions in Africa. That is a large percentage of the estimated 101,000 uniformed peacekeepers in 14 peacekeeping missions worldwide.121 Out of the $7.75 billion approved for the period from July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2010, for the 14 UN peacekeeping missions, including the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), African missions cost about $5.7942 billion.122 This excludes hundreds of millions of dollars spent on humanitarian relief and support to the AU and regional militaries by the U.S., and other governments and nongovernmental organizations.

While corruption, politics, limited resources, and the lack or failure of supporting institutions have been adduced as reasons for Africa’s conflicts, some of these conflicts are rooted in the legacy of colonial rule. Colonial rule transformed the entire African continent and arguably left a permanent European footprint. The creation of African

120 At the end of 2006, of the 24.5 million IDPs in about 52 countries of the world, Africa was the region with the largest number of IDPs, with about 11.8 million in 21 countries. The number fell in 2008 by nine percent to 11.6 million, but Sudan remained the country with the most IDPs in the world, at 4.9 million. The second largest population in Africa is in DRC with 1.9 million, followed by Somalia with 1.5 million. See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Internal Displacements: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2009,” May 2010, accessed June 29, 2010, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/8980F134C9CF4373C1257725006167DA/$file/Glo bal_Overview_2009.pdf.

121 The African UN missions include: UN Mission on the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), African Union-UN Hybrid Operations in Darfur (UNAMID), UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), UN Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), and UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). In the African missions, there are about 4,343 of 5,800 international civilian personnel, 10,351 of 14,000 local civilian staff, and 2,091 of 2,400 UN volunteers. See UN, accessed June 29, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/currentops.shtml#afrea.

states with artificial boundaries by the colonial rulers in their scramble for Africa brought many different ethnic groups within areas that could not easily accommodate so much cultural or ethnic diversity.\textsuperscript{123} Unable to exercise physical control over their territories, the colonialists had to rely on local power structures that were eventually exploited by various groups within the societies to gain positions in their communities. The colonialists in turn exploited this and applied various techniques to achieve their own ends, such as creating dominant minority societies. The African leaders that followed soon after independence inherited these same structures, improving on the colonialists’ discrimination against minority, ethnic, or religious groups. Many African conflicts, such as the ones in Uganda and Rwanda, are rooted in this history of colonial rule.

In Uganda, “the British colonial policy emphasized ethnic divisions.”\textsuperscript{124} The British set-up the southern Bantu-speaking ethnic group to benefit from economic, political and western-style education, as well as to provide the bulk of Uganda’s civil servants, while the northern Acholi and Langi ethnic groups were mainly recruited into the prisons, army, and police. By exploiting linguistic, ethnic, and cultural differences between these groups, the divide and rule policy created tensions between them and helped to maintain British rule. The conflicts that followed independence were largely fuelled by this ethnic or tribal division.\textsuperscript{125} In Rwanda, for instance, the French and Belgians excluded the Hutus from power, replaced Hutu chiefs with Tutsis, and made the Hutu ethnic groups the work force to serve the Tutsis. In addition, they issued identity cards to differentiate between Rwandans’ ethnic identities. This created divisions and enmity between the Hutus and Tutsis.\textsuperscript{126} However, as the Tutsis asserted their influence and sought autonomy to break away from colonial rule in the 1950s, the Belgians switched their support in favor of the Hutus. The manipulation and politicization of these


two ethnicities and cultures, exacerbated by decline in socioeconomic conditions, engineered several conflicts that would later culminate in the genocide of 1994.\textsuperscript{127} As with other African countries affected by similar colonial misrule, the scars of the Ugandan and Rwandan conflicts still exist today, as do the divisions planted long ago.

The above descriptions bear witness to the fact that many people in Africa have not achieved national awareness. To them, the meaningful world starts and ends with the village, clan, or tribe. According to Connor, such people pursue their daily business and obey laws and the like, while living within a political system to which they do not ascribe legitimacy because of a mélange of fear, habit, apathy and/or inertia, or political and cultural isolation.\textsuperscript{128} Arguably, legitimacy is not needed for a state to function in Africa. This, in part, also testifies to the widespread failure of governments to induce their citizenry to transfer their primary loyalty or allegiance from an informal and unstructured sub-division to ties that bind them to the formal and legalistic state structure in which they find themselves.

F. COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE BY OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

In the search for resources, many external actors like France, Britain, China, India, Japan, and Brazil, along with several Gulf States and European countries, including several international corporate organizations, have established a foothold in Africa. “[Some of the activities of these groups] may have consequences not only for access to African resources but perhaps more importantly for the pursuit of important U.S. objectives of good governance, protection of human rights, and sound economic policies.”\textsuperscript{129} For example, it has been generally suggested that China’s activities in Africa, present an important challenge to U.S. interests and values.


\textsuperscript{128}Walker Connor, “Nationalism and Political Illegitimacy,” accessed November 6, 2010, \url{http://easyweb.easy.net.co.uk/conversi/legitimacy.pdf}.

China is actively engaged in almost every part of Africa: gaining control of natural resources; contributing to infrastructure development projects; and providing soft loans and other incentives.\textsuperscript{130} It imports about 30 percent of its oil from Africa, mostly from Angola, Sudan, the Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea.\textsuperscript{131} Due to its growing demand for oil and political influence, the largely state controlled Chinese oil companies have underbid and secured exploration and drilling rights in over 15 African countries, including Angola, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan. Economic cooperation extends beyond the oil sector and includes trade, development assistance in the form of low-interest loans, debt relief and cancellation, educational training, and military support. China’s bilateral trade with Africa has improved remarkably from about $55.5 billion in 2006 to $106.8 billion in 2008, surpassing trade with Britain and France; China has become Africa’s second largest trading partner,\textsuperscript{132} indicating a tremendous rate of growth in export and imports.

The widespread Chinese development effort in Africa strongly suggests a long-term approach to promoting African economic growth and security. African governments almost universally welcome Chinese development assistance on the continent, which complements as well as offers an alternative source of development, financial assistance,

\textsuperscript{130}With the exception of Somalia, where for security reasons neither the U.S. nor China has a diplomatic presence, China has a diplomatic mission in all the African countries, and all except Comoros maintain embassies in Beijing. David Shinn notes that China’s principal interests in Africa include: access to oil, minerals and agricultural products that contribute to China's security and GDP growth rate; good relations with all African countries so it can count on their political and economic support in regional and international forums; an end to Taiwan's diplomatic presence on the continent, to be replaced by recognition of Beijing; and to significantly increase its exports as African economies become stronger and Africans become wealthier. See David H. Shinn, “Africa: The United States and China Court the Continent,” \textit{Journal of International Affairs}, April 1, 2009, accessed April 12, 2010, \url{http://www.allbusiness.com/economy-economic-indicators/economic-conditions-decline/12324932-1.html}.

\textsuperscript{131}China is one of the fastest growing economies in the world with real domestic growth at a rate of 8-10% a year and its need for energy is projected to increase by 7.5 % per year, seven times faster than the U.S. To sustain its growth, China requires increasing amounts of oil. See Gal Luft, “Fueling the Dragon: China’s Race into the Oil Market,” \textit{The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security}, 2004, accessed August 1, 2010, \url{http://www.iags.org/china.htm}.

and political support, especially when Western countries are not forthcoming.\textsuperscript{133} However, some concerns have been raised about China’s support of corrupt or rogue regimes and exploitative economic practices, among other issues.\textsuperscript{134}

One of the challenges to U.S. objectives in Africa is China’s willingness to use its seat on the UNSC to protect allegedly corrupt or rogue countries from international pressure for reforms and China’s offering alternative source of support. China has offered support to such countries as Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola and Zimbabwe. With the withdrawal of Western oil companies (Chevron and Talisman of Canada) because of concerns about Sudan’s ties with extremist groups, China, as well as Malaysia and India, quickly filled the gap rather than support international efforts to exert pressure against the Sudanese government. Similarly, in 2004, following threatened oil sanctions against the Sudanese government unless it discontinued its support for belligerent militia groups in Darfur, China used its position on the UNSC to frustrate resolutions for sanctions which, in part, also protects its interest.

Especially troubling in Africa are arms sales to nations regarded by the West as rogue states. The availability of weapons in Africa has made conflict possible and their continuing availability fuels the protraction of conflicts, diverting economic investment and energy from normal productivity, and sucking up resources otherwise available for domestic services and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{135} For example, the wars in Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have destroyed both physical and social capital, as well as the economic well-being of these impoverished countries. While the proliferation of weapons in Africa threatens internal stability, it also presents an increasing threat to U.S. global security interests in Africa. It poses threat to commercial shipping as well as to U.S. naval vessels


\textsuperscript{135}Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 2.
and allied forces operating in the Suez Canal including the waters adjoining other African nations. It also limits the ability to ease humanitarian sufferings in conflict-infected regions without risks.

Some practices of the Chinese in Africa have also had consequences for local African markets, industries, and the environment. For example, while Chinese consumer goods have provided variety in African markets, low cost imports of cheap Chinese textiles have virtually shut down the growth of most uncompetitive African textile industries. This practice has incited protests in places like Nigeria and South Africa which, in 2007, prompted the South African president to warn of the danger of Africa becoming a Chinese colony.136 Also, in 2006, the Gabonese government suspended a Chinese oil firm’s operations due to unsafe environmental practices. From an African perspective, these practices are not particularly limited to China, but include other countries doing business in Africa, though arguably to a lesser extent. Nevertheless, some corrective measures are being applied, as evidenced by responses of African governments and peoples.

G. REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY CHALLENGES AND MECHANISMS FOR PREVENTION

Within the broad concept of regionalism embodies the idea of dealing with regional peculiarities such as regional economic development, regional cooperation, and integration and security.137 What, then, are the different regional actors’ perspectives on security challenges in Africa, and how have they responded to these challenges? Since, while the objectives across the region are similar, they differ in respect to capabilities. Accordingly, the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), the


Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the East African Community (EAC) will be examined, but starting with an overview of the AU.

1. African Union

Unable to fulfill the objectives of its founders, to promote cooperation and integration on the continent while addressing the multifaceted socio-economic and political challenges mitigating the attainment of peace, security, and stability, the erstwhile Organization of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the AU in 2002. In its quest to achieve its objectives, the AU has adopted several strategic programs, such as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) to resolve the paradox of poverty in the midst of abundant resources, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) for good governance, and several structures/bodies and mechanisms to prevent and resolve conflicts and to fast track the process of regional integration, such as the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) to serve as a permanent African peacekeeping force.

The AU explicitly recognizes the right to intervene in a member state in circumstances of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity as provided by Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. Accordingly, it has been active in addressing various crises on the continent through the creation of AMISOM and other peacekeeping missions in Darfur, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), and the Comoros.

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138 In French it is called Communauté Économique des États D’afrique Centrale and in Portuguese, Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Central, CEEC.


140 ASF is intended as a quick response force to enable Africa to deal with regional crises quickly or at least to contain them until a stronger international force can be deployed, as well as for mobilization in case of natural disaster or other emergencies.


Generally, through its various legal instruments, the AU has provided guidance to its member states on collective responses to matters of concerns.

Despite its progress so far, the AU is beset with tremendous financial and human resource challenges in the face of endemic poverty and the conflicts among many of its member states, which renders it donor dependent. Another concern is its preoccupation with peacekeeping with no peace to keep, rather than developing a capacity for peace-enforcement with a mandate to disarm.\textsuperscript{143} Although the AU is a work in progress, given its accomplishments in its short life as well as its strong political will to act, it has the prospect to deliver on its commitments to peace and security when provided with adequate political, technical and material support from the international community.

2. ECOWAS

Generally, the ECOWAS region is faced with underdevelopment and is recovering from numerous prolonged conflicts and insurgencies within and across the borders of its member states, with the consequent proliferation of SALW. There is prevalence of malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS, as well as drug and human trafficking. As noted earlier, oil theft, piracy, and armed robbery at sea are also prevalent in some littoral states. With the exception of countries in the Sahel, Nigeria, and Senegal, West Africa confronts few obvious terrorist threats. However, this could be because ECOWAS has focused considerable attention on the full spectrum of transnational crimes, including conflict management and preventive issues that lead to proliferation and cross-border transfer of SALW.

In addition to different measures to accelerate economic and social development, ECOWAS has established ‘the Mechanism’ for conflict prevention, management, resolution, and peacekeeping and security, which prescribes enhancement of cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping operations, and control of cross-border criminality and international terrorism, including the proliferation of

\textsuperscript{143}It has been argued that a preoccupation with peacekeeping doomed the Darfur peace agreement in 2006. See John Prendergast and David Sullivan, “Irresolution: The UN Security Council on Darfur,” July 24, 2008, accessed July 31, 2010, \url{http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/irresolution-un-security-council-darfur}.  

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SALW. This Protocol provided for the establishment of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) as one of the five regional commands of ASF. To its credit, many achievements have been recorded by ECOWAS including its interventions in Liberia (1990 and 2003), Sierra Leone (1997), and Côte d’Ivoire in 2002.

While ECOWAS has recorded successes, the results have so far been sobering. ECOWAS has identified that its interventions have at times been characterized by weak internal coordination, underutilization of limited instruments, and misdirection of existing human capacities, including a late response to crises. It has also been observed that many of its key conventions have yet to be ratified by member states despite being adopted, and only a few are being implemented. For example, it is suggested that most member countries consider the Convention on SALW, ammunition, and other related materials to not be legally binding. Although progress has been made recently, its implementation is still hampered by a lack of resources and requisite specialists. Obviously, these developments bring to the fore the wide gap between rhetoric and follow-through at all levels of governance, requiring the development of effective and durable cooperative intervention strategies.

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145 The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire were classic military operations designed to stop wars or monitor cease-fires, to enable peace negotiations and humanitarian operations, and to allow subsequent deployment of larger UN peacekeeping and international humanitarian missions.


3. ECCAS

The challenges facing member countries of ECCAS\textsuperscript{148} are similar to those in ECOWAS, but to a greater degree. Endemic instability has plagued the region in the last two decades, resulting in proliferation of SALW and large numbers of refugees as well as IDPs. Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, and DRC barely emerged from one of Africa’s worst and protracted conflicts, while CAR, Chad, and some other member states remain unstable or mired in cross border armed conflicts which significantly increase the proliferation of arms and massive human suffering. While economic underdevelopment is a general concern in the ECCAS region, the resolution of conflict including proliferation of SALW and IDPs are important considerations.\textsuperscript{149}

ECCAS was established to promote of regional economic co-operation in the region and raise the standard of living of its population, while the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) was established for the promotion, maintenance, and consolidation of peace and security.\textsuperscript{150} The ECCAS peace and security architecture is similar to those of ECOWAS and SADC. It has the Central African Brigade or Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Central (FOMAC), which was formed in December 2004 as one of the five regional commands of ASF, but only recently stood-up amidst serious underfunding and substantial conflicts in the region. FOMAC was recently involved in


\textsuperscript{149}The high poverty rate and social inequality in the midst of vast mineral wealth and poor governance has exacerbated conflict and deepened instability, including political and economic stagnation in the region.

\textsuperscript{150}COPAX was formed in June 2002 with three key technical organs: the Central African Early Warning System (MARAC), which collects and analyzes data for the early detection and prevention of crises; the Defense and Security Commission (CDS), a technical planning and advisory body made up of chiefs of staff and Commanders-in-chief of police and gendarmerie forces of each member state; and the FOMAC, which comprises contingents made up of military, police, and civilians from each ECCAS member state.
the “Kwanza 2010” military exercise from May 22 to June 5, 2010. However, according to experts, there is still a lack of political will at the highest levels of ECCAS, partly due to the lack of a hegemon in the Central African region that can push the ECCAS agenda forward and take the lead in funding its operation, such as Nigeria does ECOWAS and South Africa does SADC.

4. SADC

The SADC member states are faced with considerable health challenges, transnational criminal activities such as trafficking in SALW and drugs, environmental disruption from floods and famine, and resource exploitation (especially in the Congo). However, SADC considers HIV/AIDS as its most significant security challenge as suggested in the statistics on HIV/AIDS prevalence and per capita expenditure; this exceeds other challenges in the region. “SADC has also designated drug trafficking as a ‘public security challenge,’ whereas the proliferation and trafficking of SALW is considered a defense and public security challenge.” Beyond these issues is another important concern about how to develop the region’s economy.

To address some of these challenges, several protocols have been ratified, including the Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking in the Southern African region, and the SADC Protocol on Health which adopted a multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS strategic framework and program of actions. These measures fall under SADC’s objectives to achieve development and economic growth through increased regional

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152 Member states of SADC are Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.


integration, including its focus on conflict mediation, preventive diplomacy, and
peacekeeping through its Organ for Defense, Politics, and Security.\textsuperscript{155} As in other
regions, the establishment of the SADC Standby Brigade (SADBRIG) on August 17,
2007 is in line with AU’s mandate.\textsuperscript{156} While the regional economic development leg of
SADC is generally well established, the political, defense and security cooperation legs
have sadly been lacking in commitment from a number of SADC member states.

As is apparent today, “[m]any of the participant countries … do not share, to a
sufficient degree, a common consensus around the political values which are reflected in
the SADC Treaty,”\textsuperscript{157} beyond the desire to ensure regime survival. It is argued that
because of criticisms for perceived authoritarianism, intolerance, and shared beliefs about
anti-imperialism, some member heads of states have been reluctant to support programs
that would facilitate democracy and elections that might backfire on them. For instance,
Swaziland is perceived to be non-democratic and Zimbabwe has been accused of being
undemocratic in election-related practices, yet members have remained committed to
non-interference and nonintervention. Nevertheless, factions within SADC have
intervened in Lesotho and Congo in 1998 on invitation,\textsuperscript{158} and suspended Madagascar’s
membership after the coup d'état led by the former mayor of Antananarivo.\textsuperscript{159} Clearly,
the region suffers from a lack of consensus regarding the political values that the SADC
Treaty so obviously endorses.

\textsuperscript{155}African Union, “Profile: Southern African Development Community,” accessed on July 21, 2010,

\textsuperscript{156}SADC 2010, “Memorandum of Understanding amongst the [SADC] member states on the

\textsuperscript{157}Mark Malan and Jakkie Cilliers, “SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Future
Development,” \textit{Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, South Africa}, Occasional Paper No 19,

\textsuperscript{158}In its military interventions in Lesotho and DRC, it is argued that SADC acted under questionable
legal mandates, which sharply divided the population and had a limited impact on the political impasse,
thereby prolonging the war and weakening its approach to peacemaking. See Anthoni van Nieuwkerk,
“Regionalism into Globalization? War into Peace? SADC and ECOWAS Compared,” \textit{African Security
Review} Vol. 10 No. 2, 2001, accessed July 30, 2010,

\textsuperscript{159}SADC, “History and Present Status,” accessed on July 25, 2010,
5. EAC

The EAC is faced with security challenges similar to those of other regions, including increased burglary, hijacking, poaching in the game parks, banditry/robbery, and cattle rustling in the rural areas. In the last two decades, the most serious challenge was from intra-state conflicts compounded by poor governance, unemployment and underdevelopment. Although these issues are still relevant today, according to EAC Secretary General Juma Mwapachu, the current most important security challenges are piracy and terrorism. Additionally, the Secretary General notes that the region, and Kenya and Tanzania in particular, are emerging as major drug trafficking routes.

Although its priority is economic cooperation, the EAC plays a role in enhancing regional stability. It has put in place an institutional framework to provide direction and guidance for cooperation in areas of defense, inter-state security, as well as foreign policy formulation so as to enhance peace, security, and governance initiatives in line with the dictates of the Treaty establishing the EAC. In particular, the EAC is in the process of creating its own standby force that will work parallel to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Standby Brigade (EASTBRIG). The EASTBRIG was meant to have about 15 member states: Kenya, Eritrea, Rwanda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Comoros, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Madagascar, Seychelles, Uganda, and Mauritius, but it currently has 10 member countries because Tanzania, Mauritius, and Madagascar, who had previously been members, are now active in SADC.

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To add to the complexity of divisions in this region is the fact that members of EASTBRIG belong to different economic blocks: EAC - 3 members, IGAD\textsuperscript{164} – 7 members, and the Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA) – 13 members. These divisions, including an overlap in activities, are already presenting problems as a result of the unwillingness or inability of some members to contribute to EASTBRIG and at the same time meet their obligations to other regional groups. For example, “[n]on-IGAD members do not want to contribute to EASTBRIG, so the three EAC states, Ethiopia, and Rwanda are the only contributors.”\textsuperscript{165} In addition to a lack of an all-encompassing composition of all members from the region, especially with regards to funding, is the lack of cooperation between two very important states, Ethiopia and Kenya, as well as daunting challenges posed by the ongoing conflicts in Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia.

H. AFRICA’S MILITARY

The military in most African countries consists of an army, navy and air force. The military is typically relatively small in relation to each country’s population or by global standards and, arguably, is above average in terms of funding and level of professionalism. The armies are generally better funded, equipped, and thus more targeted for professionalization than the other services, not only because of the overwhelming reliance on the army for both internal and international deployments, but due to armies being historically highly politicized. Currently, most of Africa’s militaries are undergoing transformations aimed primarily at fostering greater efficiency and professionalism.


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1. **Armies**

Generally, most African armies maintain a presence in the country’s regions that corresponds to national administrative areas to assist civilian authorities suppress insurrection and restore order, and to protect the country’s territorial integrity against external threats as well as support international deployments for peacekeeping. In most countries, if not all, the army is by African standards relatively well-funded and well-equipped, and has developed useful combat expertise through various interventions, including multinational military training and exercises. Regardless of relative power and experience, almost all the armies in Africa have participated in peace support operations and/or other regional tasks. Yet, without exception, their effectiveness in both internal and external military commitments has been limited by relatively low funding, including ageing, unserviceable, and inappropriate mixes of equipment (as can be seen in the equipment holdings listed in Appendix 2). While there is manpower available, the inability of African countries to indigenously produce or externally procure adequate equipment for their armies limits some countries’ commitment to regional and international peace support operations.

2. **Navies**

The roles and capabilities of navies are generally defined in terms of their military, policing, and diplomatic functions. The first two functions, especially maritime policing, otherwise called coast guard duties, are principally concerned with maritime law enforcement and protection of socio-economic activities. Given the predominance of maritime security challenges and the demand for policing capabilities, it is apparent from the collated data on African navies summarized in Appendix 2, that many African navies lack effective capacity for policing duties. Exercising effective and sustained security over a vast maritime domain is a daunting challenge for the littoral states. For instance, using a quantitative coverage index of the total number of naval vessels, including Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) per length of coastline, only a few countries, such as Mauritius, DRC, Cameroon, Djibouti, Eritrea, Nigeria and Gambia, can provide coverage of at least one vessel for every 10 n miles length of coastline. The acute policing
deficiencies become more glaring when examined in relation to the totality of each country’s maritime area (using 12 n miles territorial sea and 200 n miles EEZ limits). In qualitative terms, the coverage estimates are expected to be much lower, considering age, endurance, and maintenance factors.

Furthermore, in looking at the inventory of acquisitions within the past 10 years, only a few countries like Algeria, South Africa, Tunisia, Nigeria, Kenya, Mauritius and Djibouti have demonstrated fairly significant acquisition priorities towards policing capability.\textsuperscript{166} Despite their acquisitions, only three of the littoral countries can provide a vessel for every 1,500 square (sq) n miles coverage of their maritime area (see Appendix 2). The ongoing efforts by sub-regional leaders towards collective maritime security (for example, the GoG Commission) represent an important sub-regional focus. However, good intentions are being limited by many factors, including weak infrastructure, poor resource bases, and limited Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) across Africa.\textsuperscript{167}

3. **Air Forces**

Generally, African air forces like the navies, are much worse off than its armies. The air forces also suffer from obsolete or ageing equipment, lack of training, and underutilization. Aside from the air forces in a few countries like Nigeria, Libya, and Ethiopia, none have made contributions to UN or African peace support operations (except as observers) and are not known to have participated in any major training exercises, either at the national or multinational levels. Nevertheless, some countries like South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana have demonstrable air force capabilities. From the collated data on African air forces summarized in Appendix 2, it is apparent that

\textsuperscript{166}Between the seventies and eighties, a few navies, such as those of Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa acquired limited offensive and out-of-area capabilities, but this tempo had since abated. With the exception of the South African Navy, African navies have not achieved significant renewal of credible military capabilities. Rather, recent acquisitions reflect dwindling funding and dependence on external support.

\textsuperscript{167}Basic maritime infrastructure such as surveillance systems, and maritime patrol craft to include those trained to use them are either lacking, obsolete, in need of repair, upgrading or replacement. Most African countries have always been dependent on foreign sources for equipment, spare parts, and training. Obviously, these factors largely restrict remote surveillance and crime detection within the fringes of territorial waters.
majority are now operating a small number of ageing (combat and non-combat) aircraft, with much emphasis placed on basic transport and utility operations for very important persons and in support of small ground forces.

The undesirable situation of the air forces can be illustrated by the fact that some countries like Burkina Faso have assumed several paramilitary subsidiary roles, such as providing charter air services to private customers and engaging in rain-seeding operations rather than conducting their core statutory roles. It has been argued that because of the land-centric approach to security on the continent, the majority of littoral states have systematically neglected providing their air forces with maritime capable aircraft to support maritime operations.

Obviously, the attainment of effective security at the regional and sub-regional levels is necessarily predicated on having the required capabilities, including efficient coordination and appropriate procedures at the national levels. This requires the political will to see militaries revitalized in terms of professionalism and adequate logistics support for sustained operations, including the development of common operating procedures and information sharing networks among individual services and militaries from Africa’s member countries.

I. SUMMARY

Africa is generally considered a complex environment with many uncertainties and abundant opportunities. This assertion is suggested by Africa’s sheer land size of about 20.4 percent of the Earth’s total land area, its population of about 14.7 percent of the world’s population with potential to at least double between now and 2050, including its multiplicity of ethnicities, languages, cultures, and religions spread across 54 countries. The challenge posed by worsening unemployment, especially with the growing number of unemployed youths amidst rural-urban migration and difficulties projecting government authority as a result of inhospitable political geographies also illustrate the complexity, uncertainty, and perhaps even hostility of the African environment.
In addition to the above, this chapter identified terrorism/violent extremism, trafficking in persons, drugs, and SALW, including maritime challenges, as some of the transnational security challenges in Africa. It was suggested that Africa’s vast ungoverned areas including areas where state capacity or the political will to exercise control is lacking, offers sanctuary to Islamic extremists and militant groups to recruit, train, and mount operations. These activities are evidenced in the actions of AQIM and al Shabaab in Somalia. The absence of effective policing capabilities have also raised concerns for the littoral countries in the GoG, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and the waters off the coast of Somalia, which are among the worst in terms of piracy, armed robbery at sea, IUU, and illegal trafficking in drugs and SALW. Nigeria is particularly impacted by oil theft and oil infrastructure sabotage. Unfortunately, all of these challenges have implications far beyond the immediate littoral countries.

Africa remains the epicenter of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and this has been compounded by inadequate human resource capacity and laboratories, limited drug supplies, weak healthcare infrastructure, and limited public financing. Africa’s militaries are also considered to be among the HIV/AIDS pandemic high risk population group. The consequences for HIV/AIDS in the military are its impact on vulnerable groups in conflict areas where peacekeeping forces deploy, financial constraints on military budgets, and limitations to readiness/availability of forces for peacekeeping operations.

Although several reasons have been adduced for the causes of wars and conflicts, this chapter identified the legacy of colonial rule as one of the enduring causes of conflicts in Africa. The scars of misrule by colonialists are still visible judging from the nature of conflicts that are fought along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines. The involvement of international actors in Africa for development and assistance to mitigate the challenges found in Africa also have their unintended consequences as suggested in China’s support to some countries alleged to be undemocratic and, perhaps, in pursuit of its national interests.

The perceptions of Africans about the challenges and opportunities on the continent vary across regions and individual countries. As for the AU, its concerns range from challenges in individual countries to the readiness of the ASF to support
peacekeeping efforts. ECOWAS, like the other regional organizations faces several challenges, such as: malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS; trafficking in SALW, drugs and persons; and oil theft, piracy and armed robbery at sea in some littoral countries. ECCAS has, in the last two decades, been unstable due to conflicts and, consequently, is faced with problems of proliferation of SALW, IDPs, and refugees, in addition to enduring poverty in many areas. SADC considers HIV/AIDS as the most significant security challenge, in addition to drug trafficking and proliferation and trafficking of SALW. The region also suffers from a lack of consensus regarding political values beyond the desire to ensure regime survival. Countries like Swaziland and Zimbabwe are perceived to be non-democratic, yet members have remained committed to non-interference and nonintervention in some instances. The EAC is faced with similar challenges, with the most prominent being piracy and terrorism. Another major challenge is considered to be the complexities arising from the proliferation of different economic and security arrangements that results in unwillingness or inability of members to meet their obligations.

The military is generally viewed as a unifying entity for most African nations. Although the armies are considered to be better trained and supported than their sister services, the navy and air force, they are all generally underfunded and ill equipped to appropriately respond to the growing challenges on the continent. Sadly, it could be argued that most African militaries largely rely on non-African nations to develop their capabilities, including multinational interoperability. Like other assistance rendered by many foreign nations, the U.S. through AFRICOM and other agencies has partnered with African countries on several initiatives in support of its objectives. It is suggested that the ongoing U.S. efforts would see Africa’s militaries better trained, equipped, and prepared to meet Africa’s security needs, as well as to participate more easily in regional and international peace operations.
IV. AFRICOM’S INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

The inability of many states to police themselves effectively or to work with their neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to the international system. Armed sub-national groups, including but not limited to those inspired by violent extremism, [among other security challenges], threaten the stability and legitimacy of key states. If left unchecked, such instability can spread and threaten regions of interest to the United States, [its allies, and friends].

—2008 National Defense Strategy

A. INTRODUCTION

Some of the multi-dimensional influences of the external environment on AFRICOM, identified in Chapter III, are of strategic concern to the U.S.: Africa’s population explosion and unemployment; transnational challenges, such as violent extremism, and threats posed by ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas; armed conflicts; and HIV/AIDS. Although other elements exist in AFRICOM’s external environment, the U.S. agencies discussed in this chapter play a central role in the U.S.’s whole-of-government approach. These U.S. agencies exist in the task environment with which AFRICOM interacts on a fairly regular basis.

This chapter primarily examines the internal environment of AFRICOM – the focal organization of this study. AFRICOM was created to assume responsibility from the three COCOMs previously engaged on the continent with the aim of providing a more strategic, holistic focus for all DoD activities that address U.S. interests on the continent. AFRICOM’s area of responsibility covers 53 African countries, and does not include Egypt, which falls under CENTCOM. Unlike the three COCOMs, AFRICOM integrates other U.S. agencies into the structure of its Command headquarters in critical leadership and decision-making positions. Its activities also represent a shift from the


169 GAO-09-181.
traditional war fighting to nontraditional mil-to-mil crisis prevention programs in collaboration with other U.S. agencies to strengthen capabilities of African partners and bring peace and stability to the continent.\textsuperscript{170}

Since AFRICOM’s nontraditional activities required collaboration with other U.S. agencies to achieve DoD objectives on the African continent, its intra-agency and interagency relationships to include the overall impact of its efforts, cannot be established without knowing something about the programs and activities of the partner U.S. agencies, as well as overall U.S. foreign policy objectives toward Africa. Hence, this chapter discusses U.S. foreign policy and programs toward Africa, and the main U.S. implementing agencies, before examining AFRICOM’s internal processes, such as its mission, strategy, and resourcing. Finally, this chapter highlights the transformations and outputs produced by AFRICOM.

\section*{B. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND PROGRAMS TOWARD AFRICA}

For too many years, Africa in the minds of many Americans has been regarded as a remote and mysterious continent which was the special province of the big game hunters, explorers and motion picture makers...

There must be a corresponding realization throughout the executive branches of government, throughout the congress and throughout the Nation, of the growing importance of Africa to the future of the United States and the Free World and the necessity of assigning higher priority to our relations with the area.

—Vice President Richard M. Nixon, speech after returning from a twenty-two-day tour of African continent in 1957\textsuperscript{171}

Recognizing the growing importance of Africa on the international scene, especially beginning with the Cold War era, several U.S. administrations embarked on bold policies and foreign assistance initiatives for Africa, although with limited interest


focused on specific African issues until recently. Current U.S. foreign policy priorities for Africa include the following areas of U.S. national interests:

1. **Security Assistance and Capacity Building**

   ‘Security assistance and capacity building’ is one of six U.S. policy priorities for Africa. It is geared toward providing security assistance and advisors to help end armed conflict and secure the objective of a peaceful African continent. The USG works closely with African partners to build capacities, not only at the level of the AU, but at the sub-regional and individual states levels as well. Programs include: the International Military Education and Training (IMET), the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), Africa Partnership Station (APS), as well as equipment and logistics support.

2. **Building Strong and Stable Democratic African Governments**

   The U.S. is engaged in development assistance intended to strengthen the capacity of governments on the continent to govern justly and promote the consolidation of democratic systems and practices toward enhancing stability. In this regard, the U.S. works with African partners, the international community, and civil societies in critical areas of good governance and accountability to control corruption, protect civil rights, and strengthen the rule of law. It also undertakes supportive efforts in African regions.

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172 In the wake of the Cold War, U.S. policies towards Africa were geared to stem Soviet expansion or maintain strategic balance. See Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2. For more insight into the history of U.S. foreign policy relationship with Africa, see Peter J. Schraeder; and Donald S. Rothchild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa,” *SAIS Review* Vol. 21 No. 1 (Winter-Spring 2001), 179–211.


that have a minimal government presence. Some of the programs include training and support in democracy and governance for elected officials, as well as civil-military relations programs for both civilian and military personnel.

3. Supporting Socio-Economic Growth and Development

The U.S. works with African partners and the international community for the promotion and advancement of broad-based and sustainable fiscal and market-led economic development and growth on the continent. The U.S makes target investments, stimulates private sector development, focuses on suitable trade policy and fiscal reforms key to development, and reduces entry barriers for businesses in order to increase competitiveness and integrate African nations into the global economy. Other socio-economic activities include agricultural and educational assistance and capacity building programs that focus on science and technology advances to reduce poverty and hunger, infrastructure construction, small enterprise loans, and credit guarantees. Some of the relevant programs include the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), Global Hunger and Food Security Initiatives ($3.5 billion food security initiative, Feed the Future), and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA).

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4. **Strengthening Public Health**

The USG is committed to solving health challenges on the African continent by working with African governments, civil society, and the international community to ensure that quality treatment, prevention, and care are easily accessible to communities throughout Africa. In addition, the U.S. invests significantly in public health infrastructure and the training of medical professionals through programs under the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the Global Health Initiative (GHI).\(^{179}\)

5. **Transnational Challenges**

A priority for the U.S. in Africa is to address transnational challenges by bolstering African maritime security through the APS; supporting the fight against violent extremism through programs under the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTFOA), TSCTP and EACTI; and meet the challenges posed by narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in persons and SALW. The U.S. also seeks to meet the challenges of climatic change and building sustainable clean-energy.

6. **Humanitarian Assistance**

The U.S. also seeks to prevent and respond to humanitarian crises across the African continent as one of its Africa policy priority focuses. As a preventive strategy, the U.S. works with various African stakeholders to raise awareness and to support improved disaster preparedness, mitigation, and response capacity. The response strategies include emergency relief and rehabilitation with programs such as Foreign

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\(^{179}\)GHI is a U.S. government six-year, $63 billion initiative to meet public health challenges throughout the world. Its particular focus is on improving the health of women, newborns, and children through programs that target infectious disease (HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis), nutrition, maternal and child health, and safe water, which are closely related to several Millennium Development Goals. See The White House, “The U.S. President's Engagement in Africa,” accessed 20 August, 2010, www.africom.mil.
Disaster Assistance (FDA), Food for Peace, and Ocean Freight Reimbursement.\textsuperscript{180} This long time U.S. humanitarian effort has been supported by several international governmental and non-governmental actors.

C. PRIMARY ACTORS IN U.S.-AFRICA FOREIGN POLICY AND PROGRAMS

U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa have long been carried out by multiple U.S. government agencies. The primary actors are DoS; USAID; DoD; and country ambassadors. Other agencies include: Departments of Health and Human Services; Justice; Treasury; Energy; Commerce; Agriculture; Homeland Security (DHS); Trade and Development Agency (TDA); National Institute for Health (NIH); Centers for Disease Control (CDC); and Millennium Challenge Corporation.\textsuperscript{181} The three main agencies of DoD, DoS, and USAID represent defense, diplomacy, and development which, according to the National Security Policy, comprise three key elements of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. DoS oversees several programs that relate to democracy promotion, narcotics control and international law enforcement, terrorism, weapons proliferation, and non-UN peacekeeping operations, including oversight of PEPFAR through the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator. “USAID is responsible for most of the bilateral development assistance, including economic growth, global health, and democracy programs, [and] Title II of P.L. 480 food assistance…”\textsuperscript{182} DoD is responsible for foreign military financing and training programs, support for international peacekeeping operations, healthcare, and humanitarian assistance, among others.


\textsuperscript{182}For more information on U.S. agencies and their foreign related assistance programs/activities see Lawson and Epstein, “Foreign Aid Reform: Agency Coordination,” 21-22.
These programs are mostly bilateral in nature (country specific) rather than multilateral (combined with contributions from other donors). Individual agencies are largely responsible for bilateral programs, which often have considerable overlap. The multilateral programs are also intended to accomplish many of the same objectives as the bilateral assistance, although through different channels. Although all programs are under the policy guidance of DoS and, in some cases, under its direct authority,183 the diverse and sometimes related objectives of the many implementing aid agencies operating within the African environment raises questions about whether these agencies are working at cross-purposes or duplicating each others’ work.184

As the establishment responsible for all DoD activities on the African continent, AFRICOM focuses its efforts toward the attainment of overall U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa. This new concept dates back two years since AFRICOM took full responsibility for existing U.S. missions on the continent, and thus remains a work in progress. However, since the purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which the Command is aligned with various elements it is interacting with, it will be necessary to examine different variables such as its mission, structure, and its range of activities as discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

D. AFRICOM MISSION/OBJECTIVES

United States Africa Command, in concert with other US government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of US foreign policy.

—Mission statement approved by the Secretary of Defense May 2008185

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183 At the country level, the Ambassador exercises full responsibility for security, coordination and supervision of all USG executive branch employees, including personnel permanently assigned to embassies, such as Defense Attaches and Security Assistance Officers. See GAO-08-860, 23.

184 Lawson and Epstein, “Foreign Aid Reform: Agency Coordination.”

“Between February 2007 and May 2008 AFRICOM’s mission statement went through several iterations that ranged in its emphasis on humanitarian-oriented activities to more traditional military programs.” Arguably, these changes were as a result of concerns raised that AFRICOM would engage in activities that are traditionally the mission of civilian agencies and NGOs, including assuming leadership over directing all USG efforts, as well as concerns about militarization of U.S. foreign policy. So far, the current mission has stood the test of time.

AFRICOM’s primary objective in accordance with U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives is to create, sustain, and support opportunities to assist African partners in their efforts to build enduring security capacity to prevent or mitigate the effects and costs associated with instability, conflict, transnational threats, and humanitarian disasters. Specifically, AFRICOM’s theater strategic objectives are to: (1) defeat the Al-Qaeda terrorist organizations and its associated networks; (2) ensure peace operations capacity exists and continental peace support operations effectively fulfill mission requirements; (3) cooperate with identified African states in the creation of an environment inhospitable to the unsanctioned possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities and expertise; (4) improve security sector governance and increased stability through military support to comprehensive, holistic, and enduring USG efforts in designated states; and (5) protect populations from deadly contagions.

The pursuit of these objectives “support efforts to consolidate democratic principles and good governance by fostering transparency and accountability in the military, which historically has been one of the most important institutions in modern

186GAO-08-947T, 15.
188The 2010 AFRICOM posture statement outlined four defense-oriented goals, which are similar to the 2009 objectives. See AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United States Africa Command.”
African societies.” It is suggested that when these objectives are realized, it will enable the U.S. to engage its forces elsewhere. To accomplish these objectives, AFRICOM employs several strategies.

E. **AFRICOM STRATEGY**

The overall strategy of AFRICOM is based on “active security” or “persistent and sustained security engagement.” This strategy emphasizes long-term capacity building of partners at theater, regional, and state levels, with a primary focus on conflict and crisis prevention rather than reaction. This serves the interests of the U.S., the African partners, and other U.S. allies. To that end, AFRICOM’s strategy does not only focus on cooperation with the African partners, but also focuses on collaborative engagement with other international stakeholders and non-governmental organizations within its operating environment, such as the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and France; and provides support to broader national efforts, in coordination with U.S. interagency partners such as DoS and USAID. The interagency coordination is built into the Command’s structure, which is critical to maximizing the effectiveness of AFRICOM’s capacity building in different locations on the continent.

F. **AFRICOM’S LOCATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE**

As earlier stated, AFRICOM’s area of responsibility covers all of Africa except Egypt - about 53 countries. Yet, while some administrative and operational components of the Command are located on the African continent, the headquarters of the Command, including its service components, are located elsewhere around the world.

1. **Location**

AFRICOM is headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany and has a small U.S. military and civilian presence in various African countries, including Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, which houses CJTF-HOA which provides support for U.S. military operations in the Gulf

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of Aden and Yemen;\textsuperscript{191} DoD personnel assigned as senior defense officials/defense attachés (SDO/DATT) to U.S. Embassies and diplomatic missions to coordinate DoD programs supporting U.S. diplomacy; as well as Offices of Security Cooperation (OSCs) or Security Assistance Offices (SAO) in many African countries, which report to the ambassador and COCOM to strengthen existing mil-to-mil relationships.\textsuperscript{192} AFRICOM also has military liaison offices (LNOs) at the headquarters of the AU in Ethiopia, and ECOWAS in Nigeria, as well as at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana. “[AFRICOM] also has access to a number of air bases and ports in Africa and has established \textit{bare-bones} facilities [which DoD refers to as Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs)], maintained by local troops in several locations.”\textsuperscript{193} The details of AFRICOM’s locations in Africa are shown in Figure 7.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{AFRICOM_Locations.png}
\caption{From USAFRICOM Command Brief – AFRICOM’s Locations in Africa\textsuperscript{194}}
\end{figure}

While the decision on AFRICOM’s final headquarters location has been postponed to 2012, AFRICOM has expanded its footprint on the continent and is making additional efforts to establish new offices including four new OSCs in Cameroon, Chad, Libya, and Rwanda.\(^{195}\) Therefore, it could be argued that AFRICOM’s footprint on the continent including the location of its headquarters is still an ongoing developmental process. Obviously, the ongoing expansion will also impact the Command’s structure.

2. Organizational Structure

As earlier noted, from inception, AFRICOM was structured with a greater interagency involvement and coordination with the DoS, USAID, and other government agencies, including a larger non-DoD civilian staff, than has been traditional with other COCOM’s.\(^{196}\) The organizational structure in Figure 8 establishes the chain of command from which information and decision making flows, and also indicates the flow of tasking and operational control to the Commander.

Below the position of the AFRICOM Commander, are the Deputies to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) and for Military Operations (DCMO). The DCMA is a non-DoD civilian (a Senior Foreign Service Officer) who directs AFRICOM’s civil-military plans and programs in support of other U.S. agencies’ activities, including policy development, resourcing, program assessment, and implementation of various security cooperation initiatives consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives. The DCMO is the DCMA’s military equivalent, responsible for the implementation and execution of the command’s military-to-military programs and operations. While both Deputies exercise supervisory authority for the civilian and military personnel in their respective offices, the DCMO will also exercise command


\(^{196}\)Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” 7. SOUTHCOM, like AFRICOM, also supervises programs that are non-combat related.
authority in the Commander’s absence. Further down the hierarchy of the organizational structure are the levels of authority and tasking of other personnel including seven Directors who oversee various departments of the command.

Figure 8. From USAFRICOM Command Brief – AFRICOM Headquarters Organizational Structure

Other AFRICOM subordinate elements not shown in Figure 8 comprise four service component commands: U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) located in Vicenza, Italy; U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF) in Naples, Italy; U.S. Air Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA) in Ramstein Air Base, Germany; and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) in Stuttgart, Germany; as well as one sub-unified functional command,


198Snodgrass, “USAFRICOM Command Brief.”
U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA); and the CJTF-HOA.\textsuperscript{199} These elements contribute to AFRICOM’s mission through bilateral and multilateral application of the full spectrum of their forces capabilities, including civil affairs, information operations, crisis response, campaign planning, and conduct of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities, among others.\textsuperscript{200}

Perhaps, in line with its unique organizational structure, AFRICOM’s decision making and coordination mechanisms are based on variations of simple, divisional, professional, and adhocracy configurations of diverse elements (some of which are permanent, standing, on-call, or ad hoc) at different levels of the structure. For example, the direct supervision and strategic guidance provided by the commander depicts a simple configuration at the AFRICOM headquarters level. The divisional configuration is depicted in the arrangement of the service components, including SOCAFRICA, CJTF-HOA, and other elements that are semiautonomous with the AFRICOM Commander exercising operational control over their activities through their individual commanders.\textsuperscript{201} These components execute their functions based on their expertise and in line with standard operating procedures (SOPs). Professional configuration is expressed by DoD health professionals who rely on their skills for coordination. As for adhocracy, the Civil Affairs assets work in a highly flexible way in meeting new and rapidly changing reconstruction projects to match the desires of host nations. Despite these configurations and coordination mechanisms, the U.S. Ambassador exercises overall leadership and authority, including providing some resources in terms of manpower and funding for the implementation of AFRICOM’s activities in each of the partner countries.


G. RESOURCING AFRICOM

1. Manpower

A U.S. GAO report indicates that as of July 2010, AFRICOM and its service components had about 4,400 assigned personnel and forces. About 2,400 of these personnel were based in Europe, and the remaining 2,000 personnel (400 staff and 1,600 forces) were assigned to CJTF HOA in Djibouti. In addition, AFRICOM estimates between 3,500 to 5,000 rotational forces deploy on the continent during a major exercise.\footnote{GAO-10-794, 4, and Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa.” Ploch notes that as of January 2010, AFRICOM headquarters had 1,140 of the 1,300 staff projected for the Command while its four service components had about 1,300 (However, AFRICOM reports that as at September 1, 2009, more than 1,200 have been assigned to the Command headquarters). Some of the exercises necessitating the rotation of U.S. military include the annual communications interoperability exercise African Endeavor; counterterrorism operations, such as the OES-TS; TSC activities such as APS; and various conferences and meetings. See Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” 12. The USG also contracts out military functions, such as the training of peacekeeping forces to private military contractors (PMCs) who are answerable only to the host country ambassadors. See Stephen Roblin, “AFRICOM: Washington’s New Imperial Weapon,” September 2010, accessed October 3, 2010, http://www.zcommunications.org/africom-washingtons-new-imperial-weapon-by-stephen-roblin.} In essence, AFRICOM, including the service components, has no assigned forces, but relies on the Global Force Management (GFM) and Request for Forces System (RFS) administered by DoD for any additional forces.\footnote{AKO, “AFRICOM Posture Statement: Ward Reports Annual Testimony to Congress,” March 9, 2010, accessed October 7, 2010, http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/03/09/35595-africom-posture-statement-ward-reports-annual-testimony-to-congress/} General Ward notes that between 80 and 85 percent of requests for forces are being satisfied by DoD, which is commensurate with what happens in other COCOMs.\footnote{AKO, “AFRICOM Posture Statement: Ward Reports Annual Testimony to Congress.”} He has acknowledged that because AFRICOM does not have any assigned forces to complement the shortfall, its operations are affected to some extent.

2. Funding

The funding allocation for AFRICOM has increased exponentially, but budget cuts have impacted some programs. AFRICOM’s start-up cost was about $50 million in

For FY 2010, DoD’s budget for AFRICOM is approximately $295.5 million, excluding approximately $80 million funding allocation to CJTF-HOA operations (classified as Overseas Contingency Operations), funded through emergency supplementary appropriations. AFRICOM’s funding for FY 2010 covers both existing and new activities, including funding for four new OSCs. However, it is suggested that budget cuts to some activities such as cuts to AFRICOM’s counternarcotics operations and the COCOM’s Information Operations, which affected the budget for AFRICOM’s Operation Objective Voice (OOV), has had a potential impact on the accomplishment of AFRICOM’s tasks.

H. CULTURE

As earlier noted in Chapter I, the authors were unable to interview any staff of AFRICOM, hence did not assess the culture of the Command. Despite the fact that the authors are also in the military, a determination as to the interplay between AFRICOM’s culture and its external environment could not be made due to the deeper levels of an organizations’ culture that is somewhat hidden.

I. TASKS AND TECHNOLOGY

As earlier noted, when AFRICOM became fully operational on September 30, 2008, it inherited the DoD programs and activities in Africa that had previously been shared by its predecessors. However, the programs and activities represent a shift from traditional war fighting toward building the security capacity of partner African militaries to provide security for their own countries and the continent as a whole, which furthers U.S. foreign policy objectives. These programs and activities include U.S. support to


countering transnational and extremist threats, Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Saharan (OEF-TS), CJTF-HOA, and OOV; Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) under the GPOI; building maritime security capacity through the APS; IMET; Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs; HIV/AIDS programs, and Humanitarian Assistance (HA).207

Some technologies used as integration mechanisms are: controlling management systems (communication systems that connect DoD to DoS and other USG agencies), performance measurement systems for evaluations, resource allocation procedures used to request for forces, and fiscal responsibility processes for contracting office. Other technologies used for its Information Operations including website initiatives such as Maghrebia.com and the AFRICOM’s OOV to counter extremist messaging.

J. TRANSFORMATIONS AND OUTPUTS IMPLEMENTED BY AFRICOM

AFRICOM’s use of resources, including transformation processes and outputs, are impressive, but may have misalignments. Perhaps the resources may be insufficient for the desired execution or the frequency and intended services may be inadequate or not delivered as designed. The succeeding paragraphs explain how AFRICOM transforms its resources into outputs.

In its efforts to plan and implement the wide range of programs and activities from its widely dispersed geographical locations, AFRICOM applies various resources in coordination with other U.S. agencies, its African partners, and other international stakeholders. Although AFRICOM executes several important programs and activities on the African continent, six bilateral programs and activities as well as some regional ones were selected for analysis to determine how various inputs have been or are being transformed into outputs. These include programs and activities to prevent HIV/AIDS among African militaries, and to support the fight against violent extremism through OEF-TS, IMET, the GPOI-funded ACOTA program, APS, and FMS and FMF. The regional programs and activities include Exercises PHOENIX EXPRESS, AFRICA

ENDEAVOR, and NATURAL FIRE. These programs and activities were chosen for several reasons, including the considerable involvement of interagency and international partners, wide coverage, their history, and because they also raise important questions for this study.

1. Preventing HIV/AIDS Among African Militaries

African militaries have been identified as high HIV/AIDS-risk populations. As part of its effort to combat the impact of the pandemic, and to improve the state of readiness and increased availability of Africa’s militaries for peacekeeping duties, DoD established the DoD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) in 2001 under the administrative direction of the Naval Health Research Centre (NHRC) in San Diego. Through preventive care, treatment, and sustainability programs provided by DHAPP to service members, including families infected or affected by the disease, AFRICOM has achieved unprecedented successes. The successes have been made possible by the U.S. “whole-of-government” approach to health assistance, including efforts by African governments and other international actors. The integration and coordination of efforts are reflected in the support from various U.S. agencies, including DoS’s Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator using PEPFAR, the HIV/AIDS Military Health Affairs FMF program, and Congressional supplemental funding provided through the Office of the Secretary of Defense Health Affairs Defense Health Program.

DHAPP has supported training in HIV treatment and care to military medical professionals from many African countries, acquired laboratory equipment and supporting reagents and supplies related to the diagnosis and treatment of HIV/AIDS, initiated seminars and communication methods to promote messages towards behavioral changes that may help reduce HIV transmission, provided Prevention of Mother-to-Child

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Transmission (PMTCT) services, and antiretroviral therapy (ART), including HIV
counseling and testing.\textsuperscript{211} As an implementing partner of PEPFAR, DHAPP concentrates
on 12 African countries that have been hard hit by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.\textsuperscript{212} Overall,
however, DHAPP supports about 39 countries as indicated in the statistics in Appendix 1.
As a result of the collaborative efforts over the course of its operations from 2001 to
2009, it is estimated that DHAPP has reached over 497,000 African troops and family
members with prevention messages, including testing and counseling services for over
102,000. It has trained over 12,000 individuals, and is providing ART treatment to over
19,000 individuals.\textsuperscript{213} Due to these efforts, AFRICOM has been able to contribute to the
overall success of PEPFAR far and above its stated goals.\textsuperscript{214}

2. \textbf{Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS)}

As with the EACTI and CJTF-HOA in East Africa and the Horn of Africa
respectively, OEF-TS is the DoD component of TSCTP aimed at addressing violent

\textsuperscript{211}In FY 08, about 39 participants from 6 countries: Benin, Gambia, Lesotho, Nigeria, Uganda, and
Zambia, were sponsored by DHAPP for different courses at the Infectious Disease Institute (IDI) at

\textsuperscript{212}PEPFAR was signed into law with special attention to be focused on 15 hard hit focus countries:
Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia. With the exception of Vietnam, the other countries are
named in the Leadership Act. Although, the U.S. has been involved in efforts to address the global AIDS
crisis since the 1980s and, historically, has been focused on public health programs in Africa, the
establishment of PEPFAR marked a significant increase and attention to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. See
and Jen Kates, Julie Fischer and Eric Lief, “The U.S. Global Health Policy Architecture: Structure,
Programs, and Funding,” \textit{Executive Summary} April 2009, accessed July 26, 2010,

\textsuperscript{213}AFRICOM, “United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement of General William E. Ward,
AFRICOM Commander,” 16-17. The 2010 Posture Statement indicates different figures with – 117,000
reached with a prevention message, 114, 430 provided with counseling and testing, and 3,024 have been
trained as of the first half of FY2009.

\textsuperscript{214}PEPFAR’s initial goal was to support the prevention of 7 million HIV infections; treatment for 2
million with HIV/AIDS with antiretroviral therapy (ART); and care for 10 million people infected and
affected by HIV/AIDS, including orphans and other vulnerable children. See United States Leadership
OGAC, 2004. As of September 30, 2009 at the expiration of the initial authorization, PEPFAR reports that
it has supported ART for more than 2.4 million, care for nearly 11 million, including 3.6 million Orphans
and Vulnerable Children (OVC), and, enabled nearly 340,000 babies of HIV-positive mothers to be born
HIV-free, as well as supported HIV counseling and testing for nearly 29 million people, providing a critical
Results,” December 2009, accessed July 27, 2010,
extremism and defeating terrorist organizations in countries within the pan-Saharan, Maghreb, and sub-Saharan regions of Africa. Specifically, OEF-TS programs provide mil-to-mil capacity building and engage in advice and assist activities and information operations, to deny safe havens to terrorists, improve border security, deter piracy and prevent, narcotic and human trafficking. Another aim is to reinforce regional and bilateral military ties. Through AFRICOM, OEF-TS activities are closely coordinated with USAID and DoS as the program lead, but also the Departments of the Treasury and Justice who conduct limited counterterrorism activities in the TSCTP partner countries.

As always, in each of the partner countries, the U.S. Ambassador exercises overall leadership and authority over a country team for the implementation of TSCTP activities.

The erstwhile Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) operated with a budget of $17.5 million for the period between November 2002 and March 2004. This increased to $16 million in FY 2005 under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), and subsequently to $100 million annually for five years until 2011. Since the commencement of the TSCTP program in 2005, U.S. Special Operation Forces and Marine Corps units have

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provided training to the OEF-TS partner countries “on marksmanship, operational planning, communications, first aid, land navigation, communications, and patrolling …[geared towards] hunting down, capturing or otherwise eliminating terrorist groups.”

Obviously, this assistance has helped in the capture or killing of a number of extremists.

3. **International Military Education and Training (IMET)**

The IMET, including Expanded-IMET (E-IMET), programs are components of U.S. Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) to build long-term relationships with foreign military and civilian leadership through a variety of education and training activities. They are implemented by DoD through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), but under the policy authority of DoS.

Overall objectives of IMET:

[t]o further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations that culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the [U.S.] and foreign countries; [p]rovide training that augments the capabilities of participant nations’ military forces to support combined operations and interoperability with U.S. forces; and increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights in their own government and military.

IMET activities include formal instructions involving over 4,000 courses in approximately 150 DoD and U.S. military service schools and installations, with U.S.

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217 Piombo, “Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview.”

218 IMET is provided on a grant basis with funding from the International Affairs budget of the DoS to enable foreign military officers from countries incapable of paying for training under the Foreign Assistant Act to be availed of such opportunities. The E-IMET expanded the focus of IMET to provide courses on defense management, civil-military relations, law enforcement cooperation, and military justice to both the military as well as civilian personnel working on military matters. See FAS, “IMET,” accessed October 5, 2010, [http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training/IMET2.html](http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training/IMET2.html).

military personnel; on-the-job training; orientation tours for key senior military and civilian officials; and mobile education teams which take the curriculum to the host countries.220

From a budget of $50 million appropriated in FY2000,221 IMET program funding increased to about $85 million for FY2008, with $17.9 million benefiting participants from 46 African countries; $93 million (including a supplemental of $2 million) spent in FY2009 to train over 8,000 students from over 100 countries, of which $18.3 million was to benefit 49 African countries.222 Based on DSCA reporting as of September 30, 2008, about $467.5 million had been expended to fund IMET education and training programs to train approximately 162, 329 personnel from 49 African countries between 1950 and 2008.223 General Ward suggests that graduates of IMET funded training fill key positions in many African countries, as evidenced in the positions held by 11 of 14 serving General Officers of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) who are graduates of IMET-funded programs. Furthermore, the AFRICOM Commander suggests that IMET-funded training contributed to the excellent reputation the Senegalese military have earned during numerous peacekeeping operations deployments, including the military’s positive and responsible involvement in civil affairs.224 Despite these good intentions and successes, some IMET recipient countries engaging in anti-democratic practices are being denied


224AKO. “AFRICOM Posture Statement: Ward Reports Annual Testimony to Congress.”
training as a way to deal with the governments of such countries. However, this “comes at a cost in terms of lost influence and access, which policy makers and the military believe is often crucial in times of crisis.”


The GPOI is a DoS-led program primarily designed to train and equip 75,000 military and security forces from developing nations by the end of 2010 to be able to participate in international peacekeeping. It is also intended to foster development of transportation and logistics support systems to facilitate deployments and the sustainment of peacekeeping forces in the field. In addition, GPOI provides assistance to the Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Italy to increase the capabilities and interoperability of stability police to participate in peace operations. ACOTA, which became a part of GPOI in 2004, is the successor program to the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), providing Peace Support Operations (PSO) training, including in light infantry and small unit tactics, to African troops. In support of ACOTA training, DoD through AFRICOM provides small military teams for special mentoring and training assistance but, overall, training is largely provided by PMCs employed by the DoS.

Funding allocations and numbers of peacekeepers trained, including the number of countries involved in the program, have significantly increased from about 16,000 troops from 10 African countries under the ACRI/ACOTA between FY1997 and up to

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225FAS, “IMET.”


early FY2005. As at January 31, 2009, with a total of about $480.38 million spent beginning in FY 2005, the GPOI program has provided training for about 57,595 personnel (54,245 peacekeepers and 3,350 peacekeeper trainers). From these figures, GPOI funding to ACOTA programs was responsible for the training of about 52,110 personnel (49,254 peacekeepers and 2,856 peacekeeper trainers) in sub-Saharan Africa. As at July 23, 2009, DoS claimed over 81,000 peacekeepers have been trained in addition to over 2,000 stability/formed police unit trainers. Apart from training, ACOTA has provided non-lethal equipment support to many African countries, including to Ugandan and Burundian forces for AMISOM. Obviously, these accomplishments have been crucial to support of U.S. national objectives of promoting military professionalism and stability in Africa.

5. **Foreign Military Sales and Financing Programs (FMS/FMF)**

Like the GPOI program, FMS and FMF programs are important components of DoD assistance to foreign militaries, including African partners approved by the U.S. Congress to acquire weapons and associated military equipment and training to enhance security capacity building. According to General Ward, both programs are fundamental to U.S. long-term strategy to increase interoperability, effectiveness, and efficiency for preventive rather than just reactive responses. As a matter of national policy, these programs are administered by DSCA for DoD under the oversight and guidance of DoS. Under FMS, defense articles and services are procured through Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) by a country or through USG-sponsored assistance on behalf of the foreign

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228 It is suggested that under ACRI, the U.S. initially provided field and classroom training in traditional peacekeeping skills where there was an existing cease-fire or peace accord. With the introduction of ACOTA in 2002, peacekeeping training included tasks in more hostile environments, including force protection, light-infantry operations and small-unit tactics. Funding provided for ACRI/ACOTA from DOS PKO account totaled $83.6 million during its six years of operation (FY1997 – FY 2002), excluding funding support through FMF program. See Serafino, “The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress,” 5–6.


country. Under FMF, articles and services are obtained on a grant basis or through low-interest loans approved by the U.S. Congress using FMS or DCS. In some instances, the U.S. government has waived FMF repayment of loans.

The FMS to African countries has increased from $39.2 million in FY2005 to $59.8 million in FY2006, but fell to $27.9 million in 2007. On the other hand, funding for FMF has significantly increased. For example, the Obama administration raised the total amount for arms sales from $8.3 million in FY2009 to $25.6 million in FY2010. As indicated by the programs funding details in the DSCA FY Series report as of September 30, 2009, many African countries have obtained military equipment to support their militaries in pursuit of common security objectives with the U.S. For example, through the EDA, the Senegalese military has been supplied with trucks to enable it to deploy troops in support of peacekeeping operations in Darfur. Similarly, through the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) EDA transfers, and FMS, Nigeria, Ghana, and Tunisia

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233 Although all sales of defense articles must undergo same monitoring, retransfer agreements and Congressional approval before final delivery, unlike with Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) that allows the country or customer to negotiate directly with the private company, the government-to-government purchase through FMS guarantees that the articles procured by the country (using its own funds) are standardized with those of U.S. forces; administrative services are provided that may not be available through the private sector; and it helps to lower cost. See Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “The FMS Advantage: Frequently Asked Questions About Foreign Military Sales,” accessed October 12, 2010, [http://www.dsca.osd.mil/PressReleases/fmsadvantagev2.pdf](http://www.dsca.osd.mil/PressReleases/fmsadvantagev2.pdf). FMF credit to African partners is issued in the form of DoD direct loans, which require repayment, or FMF grants which do not require repayment. Additionally, African countries benefit from the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program where articles that are excess to DoD requirements are transferred to foreign countries at the original acquisition cost. See DSCA, “Fiscal Year Series,” last modified September 30, 2009, iv, accessed October 12, 2010, [http://www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/biz-ops/factsbook/Fiscal_Year_Series_2009.pdf](http://www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/biz-ops/factsbook/Fiscal_Year_Series_2009.pdf).


acquired some 25-foot Defender Class response boats, including 210-foot Reliance Class cutters.\textsuperscript{237} Obviously, these deliveries have helped to improve African partners’ capacity.

6. Regional Programs and Activities

AFRICOM implements a collection of programs across the five regions of Africa geared towards fostering regional cooperation, situational awareness, and interoperability in the various areas of counterterrorism, border, and maritime safety and security (MSS), including communication and disaster responses. Some of these programs and activities include APS, exercises PHOENIX EXPRESS, AFRICA ENDEAVOR, and NATURAL FIRE.\textsuperscript{238} The APS is AFRICOM’s initiative using sea-based training platforms to build maritime security capabilities of African partners in areas such as law enforcement operations and response capabilities (e.g., boarding, search, seizure and arrests, small boat training, anti-terrorism/force protection), MDA, port facilities management, seamanship/navigation, and the use of AIS. Through APS, AFRICOM has successfully deployed a number of vessels such as USS FORT MCHENRY, USS NASHVILLE, and HSV-2 SWIFT to several countries in the West, Central, and the East African regions,\textsuperscript{239} including partner nations in the West Indian Ocean. Several EU partners, NGOs, and USG agencies, and USCG, have also partnered with the Navy to use the APS for their own training and development initiatives.\textsuperscript{240} AFRICOM suggests that the effectiveness of its engagements is demonstrated in about 18 African countries that now share unclassified AIS data through the maritime Safety and Security Information Systems

\textsuperscript{237}U.S. Coast Guard, “Coast Guard’s Foreign Military Sales Program delivers 200th vessel,” January 29, 2009, accessed October 13, 2010, http://www.piersystem.com/go/doc/786/251286/. It is suggested that the transaction through the USCG is building enduring partnerships that enhance capabilities to pursue cooperatively shared maritime safety and security goals.

\textsuperscript{238}Joint and combined exercise programs are conducted under the auspices of the CJCS exercise program, and are dependent upon funding from the Combatant Commander’s Exercise and Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) program. See AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United States Africa Command,” 37.

\textsuperscript{239}MDA provides participating states the capability to network maritime detection and identification information with appropriate national defense and law enforcement agencies.

(MSSIS) to achieve MDA,\textsuperscript{241} the boarding and freeing of a pirate tanker by the Benin Navy without loss of life, and the arrest of about five fishing vessels by the Sierra Leone Armed Forces Maritime Wing.\textsuperscript{242}

AFRICA ENDEAVOR is another regional exercise designed to improve communication and information systems interoperability between U.S. and African partner militaries\textsuperscript{243} to enable coordination in regional peacekeeping and humanitarian and disaster relief operations. AFRICA ENDEAVOR 2009, held in Gabon, brought together about 25 countries and 3 regional organizations (the AU, ECOWAS, and ECCAS). Through the exercise, communications links were developed with the U.S., NATO, and other countries. As for Exercise NATURAL FIRE, it is intended to improve interoperability and help build African partner forces capacity to provided humanitarian aid and respond to complex emergencies. This exercise has been ongoing since 1998 in the East African region, with three exercises carried out prior to 2009. Exercise NATURAL FIRE 10, held in Uganda in 2009, brought about 550 U.S. personnel and 650 soldiers from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda together along with USAID, World Health Organization (WHO), International Red Cross, and partner states civil organizations.\textsuperscript{244} To a large extent, these regional programs are fostering capacity building and long-term regional integration, interoperability, and collaboration among the African partners and the U.S.

\textsuperscript{241}NAVAF is also assigning Maritime Assistance Officers (MAOs) to U.S. embassies to assist country teams in planning for maritime security cooperation activities. See AFRICOM,"United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement of General William E. Ward, AFRICOM Commander,” 32.

\textsuperscript{242}AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United States Africa Command,” 14 and 16. Like the APS, PHOENIX EXPRESS is a naval exercise involving NAVAF and the North African navies, along with navies from several European countries. This exercise is intended to contribute to MSS, focusing on maritime interdiction, communication, and information sharing. The first in a series is PHOENIX EXPRESS 2008 that involved the U.S. SIXTH Fleet, along with some North African navies (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania), as well as navies from the European countries of Malta, Turkey, Greece, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. See AFRICOM, “United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement of General William E. Ward, AFRICOM Commander,” 22; and AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United States Africa Command,” 25.


\textsuperscript{244}GAO-10-794, 52; and AFRICOM, “2010 Posture Statement United States Africa Command,” 13.
K. SUMMARY

This chapter primarily focused on the internal characteristics of AFRICOM by explaining its mission, strategy, tasks and technology, including its structure, transformations, and outputs. A broader perspective of U.S. foreign policy objectives toward Africa and how various government agencies are positioned to address U.S. overall interests on the African continent were discussed. The purpose was to offer insight into how AFRICOM relates with other U.S. agencies or how it can better relate with them in support of overall U.S. foreign policy objectives toward Africa.

It was pointed out that U.S. foreign policy priority towards Africa had been generally benign, especially as it relates to DoD activities, until recently when AFRICOM was established to give it focused attention. The chapter described several programs and activities, such as IMET, GPOI, TSCTP, APS, and PEPFAR that were designed to meet six identified U.S. policy priorities, such as security assistance and capacity building to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflict; the building of strong and stable democratic institutions; the strengthening of public health; and addressing transnational challenges in Africa. These programs are being implemented by multiple USG agencies. It was suggested that the accomplishment of these U.S. objectives required effective interagency collaboration.

In addition to the uniqueness of AFRICOM integrating various U.S. agencies into its structure, the Command’s programs and activities were designed along nontraditional lines of war prevention rather than war fighting, which differentiates it from its predecessors, the three erstwhile COCOMs. Although considered a work in progress, AFRICOM had nonetheless made remarkable progress towards the realization of its objectives. While it has continued to improve its resource base and expand its presence and activities on the continent, some misalignments were noticeable. These concerns are the subject of discussion in Chapter V.
V. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Organizations, too, suffer insult and injury from their environments or conflict because of contradictory goals and purposes. Like individuals, they can be self-destructive. At times it becomes necessary to assess both the nature and the degree of dysfunction.

——Harry Levinson\(^\text{245}\)

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to determine the extent to which some of the key variables examined in AFRICOM’s internal environment are aligned with one another and with the different variables found in the external environment in order to determine the effectiveness of the Command. The model used for this analysis is a modified version of the congruence model by Nadler and Tushman described in Chapter II. This model is a useful tool for understanding and analyzing AFRICOM’s interactions and interrelationships. It offers a combination of ten key components that are critical for determining alignments: resources, mission, tasks, strategy, structure, technology, culture, outputs, outcomes, and environment. A mismatch amongst these components suggests low performance or organizational ineffectiveness in the areas analyzed.

Assessment indicators for this analysis are observable from changes that have occurred over time from the inputs, outputs, and outcomes, a system perspective. Evaluations will focus on many areas such as the need for a program or activity, the adequacy of design and resources to accomplish objectives intended, if what the organization seeks to accomplish meets what it is actually doing, and the desirability of the services or goals being achieved from the recipients’ perspective. As a consequence of what recipients’ desire, the extent to which the environment impacts the organization will also be examined. While AFRICOM may be new (only about two years old), it already has a commendable track record. Nor is, a steep learning curve unexpected
considering that it is a work in progress. The succeeding paragraphs of this chapter will thus locate areas of misalignment and opportunities yet to be leveraged by AFRICOM.

B. MISSION ALIGNMENT

In the course of our research, we were struck by the noticeable positive shift from the lukewarm acceptance and hostility over AFRICOM’s perceived ill-conceived initial concept and mission. In contrast to its earlier days, AFRICOM’s mission has gained clarity, especially when considered from the perspective of its ever-increasing relationships and demonstrable commitments to strengthening domestic and regional capacities of its African partners. However, it is not a fait accompli. Apprehension still exists in Africa over exactly what AFRICOM wants to do. This could limit AFRICOM’s ability to develop key partnerships and extend its influence. Perhaps the unresolved location of AFRICOM’s headquarters in Africa may be suggestive of Africa’s apprehension over the Command’s mission.246

Generally, perceptions about U.S. foreign policy towards Africa are framed by U.S. antecedents and actions around the world. In fact, the Command has offered changing and sometimes conflicting rationales for its establishment. To many Africans, AFRICOM represents a U.S. intention to maintain its power and hegemony in Africa as suggested by its unilateral actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.247 Also, past U.S. involvement in Africa tended to be episodic, brief, and largely defined by U.S. national security interests and, arguably, without consideration of Africans’ interests, as evidenced during the Cold War era (when the superpower rivalry was expressed through proxy wars

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246 Apart from President Ellen J. Sirleaf of Liberia and probably a few others that are favorably disposed to the idea of AFRICOM, it cannot be determined with certainty that all African leaders are or will eventually be similarly disposed to the idea.

and regime change), and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). These events have continued to shape the Africans’ attitudes and to raise questions about AFRICOM’s true mission in Africa. While AFRICOM is a sound concept that can succeed, the concern is how to build trust with its African partners. Having sold AFRICOM as an organization focused on non-kinetic missions, will the U.S. act unilaterally to kill or capture high value targets in Africa should there be need based on a U.S. national interest? If the reason for such an action is due to the lack of capability of African partners, will that not raise questions about their training and equipping? What if the lack of capability is due to unwillingness of Africans to act? Will such an action align with AFRICOM’s stated mission and Africans’ interests?

C. STRUCTURE ALIGNMENT

The current structure and footprint of AFRICOM on the continent raises questions about its ability to process adequate information from the environment and whether the command’s concept of developing enduring interagency coordination, relationships and partnerships can be achieved. It is suggested that “DoD has not yet reached agreement with the State Department and potential host nations on the structure and location of AFRICOM’s presence in Africa.” This is despite the fact that AFRICOM’s presence within Africa has been identified as important because it will provide a more in-depth understanding of the African environment and Africans’ needs. In addition, it will help build relationships and partnerships with African nations, regional economic communities, and associated regional standby forces.

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248 James J.F. Forest and Rebecca Crispin, “AFRICOM: Troubled Infancy, Promising Future,” Contemporary Security Policy 30, no. 1 (April 2009), 5–27. The counterterrorism operation in Somalia, in league with Ethiopia, also represents U.S. use of proxies and intent on regime change. The U.S. also has some conditions that are non-negotiable, such as the exemption from International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecution for U.S. personnel working for the Command, which is not in sync with African governments. See ICC exemption, or “bilateral or non-surrender agreements,” this is a provision of Article 98 of the Rome Statute (1998) of the International Criminal Court that the U.S. uses in negotiating Status of Force Agreement (SOFA).

249 GAO-08-947T, 4. At the country level, senior defense officials/defense attachés (SDO/DATT) serve as military liaisons at embassies and also serve on interagency embassy Country Teams, led by the U.S. ambassador in each country.
Although the thought of a large U.S. footprint on the continent generates mixed reactions, AFRICOM’s lack of effective representation is suggested by the fact that there are only about 17 OSCs and 30 DATTs covering the 53 African countries (excluding Egypt).\textsuperscript{250} How effective can AFRICOM be in achieving its mission with such minimal representation on the continent? The absence of AFRICOM’s presence in so many countries is a recipe for information overload and underload. For example, in cases where an SDO/DATT or OSC is overseeing more than one country, there can be difficulties understanding and processing too much information (deciphering the needed information from disinformation or misinformation) from the environment for effective decision-making, especially when time is of the essence. Also, in a country without any representation, there is the obvious possibility of not having access to specific information needed to accomplish tasks. Although AFRICOM has non-DoD agencies embedded at all levels in the Command that could reach out to other USG agencies in partner countries, an absence of AFRICOM’s presence in certain countries limits planning and execution of its plans, programs, and activities, and slows down collaboration with the USG agencies and African partners at the regional level. The shortfalls in personnel already being experienced by DoS and USAID necessitate AFRICOM’s presence, at the very least where there are U.S. embassies on the continent.

\section*{D. ALIGNMENT OF TASKS, PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES}

The programs and activities examined here are: DoD HIV/AIDS prevention programs, OEF –TS counterterrorism program, equipment support through FMS and FMF, GPOI-funded ACOTA, as well as IMET programs. Some of the common indicators specific to these programs and activities include: input - the adequacy of

needed resources; output - the number of personnel trained or receiving health assistance, and amount of equipment transferred; outcome - improvement in the problem being targeted by the program or activity.

1. Addressing HIV/AIDS Pandemic

Whilst the intent and accomplishment of DHAPP in mitigating HIV/AIDS among Africa’s militaries cannot be minimized, this study established that DHAPP’s focused attention on 12 of 53 African countries due to PEPFAR legislation to include limited and delayed funding support to DoD, undermined AFRICOM’s ability to improve the state of readiness and availability of African troops for peacekeeping duties. At a general level, a policy that excludes countries that are equally at risk from the impact of HIV/AIDS has unintended consequences. For example, “[b]etween 2004 and 2007, the difference in the annual change in the number of HIV-related deaths was about 10.5 [percent] lower in the [12] focus countries than in the [29] control countries [receiving minimal support].” Obviously, it is the pervasiveness of this disease and the lack of treatment that multiplies its effects to the point that it becomes a security issue.

Based on PEPFAR funding to DHAPP (as indicated in Appendix 1) and DHAPP activities in Africa including frequency of other funding support (as detailed in the 2008 DHAPP Annual Report), DHAPP support to Africa over the years has been irregular and many countries are not catered for by PEPFAR. Some of the countries affected, such as Benin, Burundi, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Gabon, Chad and Togo, are either contributors or potential contributors to peacekeeping operations, which raises important questions for AFRICOM. For example, as of March 2009 in Gambia, apart from the training of two health practitioners and the upgrade of one health center in basic

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251 Some have suggested that “[a]lthough the criteria for selecting focus countries were not explicit, they were related to the burden of disease, the focus countries’ government commitment to fighting HIV, administrative capacity, and a willingness to partner with the U.S. government.” See Eran Bendavid and Jayanta Bhattacharya, “The President’s emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in Africa: An Evaluation of Outcomes,” Annals of internal Medicine by American College of Physicians Vol. 150 no. 10, 688–695, accessed July 28, 2010, http://www.annals.org/content/150/10/688.full

252 Most of the neglected and control countries are among the poorest on the continent with a lack of capacity to mitigate HIV/AIDS spread. See Bendavid and Jayanta, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance.
laboratory services for counseling and testing, DHAPP provided only prevention messages and condoms to the Gambian military.\textsuperscript{253} Although the size of the military may be small and the impact of HIV/AIDS unclear, the general prevalence of the pandemic in the country as indicated in the increase in number of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) from 6,800 in 2003 to 8,200 in 2009 (see Appendix 1), suggests the need for more attention to the military.\textsuperscript{254}

Although statistics on the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the military are rare, it has been suggested that the pandemic is significantly higher than among civilian population. This means large numbers of personnel will remain on extended sick leave and become unfit for active duty, thereby significantly weakening military operational capacity and capability. Another concern is that the costs of replacing personnel and managing the disease are very high, with consequences for military budgets. Therefore, with the irregular support to many African countries, including selective engagement of only a few countries that are assumed to be hard hit by the pandemic, the realization of AFRICOM’s desired goals to reduce HIV/AIDS and improving the military state of readiness and availability for peacekeeping duties will be negated.

2. Countering Extremism Through OEF-TS

Despite the pioneering intent behind its establishment as an interagency program, the TSCTP program has morphed into a seemingly unilateral military fight against terrorism, virtually overshadowing other agencies’ efforts, including DoS responsibility to coordinate the public image of the interagency partnership. The overwhelmingly military public image and the unbalanced allocation of funds between the three main U.S.

\textsuperscript{253} U.S. DoD, “DHAPP 2008 Annual Report.”

\textsuperscript{254} Most of these militaries receive little or no external assistance. Despite their participation in some of the neglected countries, most of the stakeholders providing assistance work independently of each other. There is a lack of coordination which often leads to duplication and/or contradictory assistance programs that undermine efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency in the distribution of scarce funds. With PEPFAR’s current focus on program sustainability and expansion in prevention, treatment, and care, as well as strengthening partner government capacity towards ownership, the dream of addressing the pandemic will be absent will be absent in the neglected countries to include their militaries, which will have severe consequences to those neighboring them (even when they are receiving considerable support). As noted by Salim Andool Karim during the VXIII International AIDS Conference held in Vienna in July 2010, the pandemic is a misnomer given the different subtypes of the virus in different countries or regions, thus necessitating equal attention and shared responsibility.
TSCTP agencies suggest that the TSCTP program is primarily a military endeavor. This, in turn, suggests that the U.S. military shapes, rather than supports U.S. foreign policy priorities on the continent through AFRICOM, thus raising concerns about misperceptions of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. The military face of TSCTP through OEF-TS could, over the long-term, undermine the legitimacy and potential success of the program.

AFRICOM’s proactive publicity about OEF-TS activities has been featured more prominently in websites and other news media than those of most other partner agencies.\(^{255}\) This public image is further enhanced by AFRICOM’s incomparably larger personnel footprint than that of its agency partners.\(^{256}\) In terms of funding, except for FY2005, the overall TSCTP funding allocation to DoD has been over three times the amount allocated to DoS and USAID combined,\(^{257}\) which contrasts with the stated organization and objectives of the program. In Niger, for example, funding allocations increased for USAID’s TSCTP budget from $750,000 in FY 2005 to $5 million in FY 2008, OEF-TS received over $8.5 million in FY 2007.\(^{258}\)

Without doubt, with these resources the OEF-TS component of TSCTP has provided partner African militaries with the means and methods to combat domestic terrorism. Many AQIM members have been arrested or killed, including the recent killing of six militants in a raid to free a 78-year-old French citizen.\(^{259}\) Unfortunately, U.S.

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\(^{257}\) GAO -08-860, 10.

\(^{258}\) There are other funding allocations to USAID and DS that complement their TSCTP programs. For example, a non-TSCTP and TSCTP fund for development assistance in FY 2008 was $18.5 million, with $15 million in non emergency-food assistance. See Collin Thomas-Jensen and Maggie Fick, “Foreign Assistance Follies in Niger,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 31, 2010, accessed August 31, 2010, [http://csis.org/blog/foreign-assistance-follies-niger](http://csis.org/blog/foreign-assistance-follies-niger).

efforts have also given many governments good reason to be inflexible, preferring police and military responses to resolving conflict. In Niger, military actions have led to more violent extremism and general banditry, making life increasingly difficult for people in the region, including the few humanitarian agencies working there. They have also helped Tuareg extremists gain support from large numbers of people in northern Niger, and it is suspected that alliances have been formed with rebel groups in Mali. These outcomes are undesirable, and perhaps suggest a need for a more balanced interagency approach to tackling Niger’s challenges.

Sadly, even U.S. diplomats have viewed most violent extremism in Africa from the military lens and ignored holding Africa’s governments responsible for their long-term failure to adequately address the root causes of grievances. For example, in Niger, DoS TSCTP activity focuses on law enforcement counterterrorism training of the government’s civilian security and law enforcement personnel on police procedures, as well as public diplomacy “to communicate messages among vulnerable populations to isolate and marginalize violent extremists…” This public diplomacy emphasizes marginalization rather than dialogue with African governments to address underlying concerns. From the standpoint of the U.S., “[n]egotiations grant legitimacy to terrorists [or extremists] and their methods and undermine actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means. Negotiations can destabilize the negotiating government’s political system, undercut international efforts to outlaw terrorism, and set a dangerous precedent.”

Many structures have been destroyed; medical clinics and schools have been closed; and food supplies and basic necessities have become difficult to get or have been cut off due to the conflict and government ban on humanitarian aid. The “state of emergency” imposed by the government restricted the flow of goods and people in the north, and enabled the military to arrest and detain people at will. This may suggest military occupation, which is a significant driver of violent terrorism.

The unintended consequences of the U.S. decision not to
support dialogue toward peace settlements makes the mediation process much harder between governments and aggrieved parties;\textsuperscript{263} it also helps contribute to increased population displacement and costs lives due to the use of violence by the military.\textsuperscript{264}

Perhaps, as with many other countries, the history behind Niger’s underlying conditions have not been given due consideration. The Tuaregs are not Islamic extremists, but have practiced a moderate form of Sufi Islam for centuries. For a long time, the Nigerien government sought Tuareg passivity rather than allegiance. Violence began to intensify in the 1990s and culminated in extremism in 2005 as a result of the Nigerien government’s failure to uphold its pledge for more focused development in northern Niger; it also failed to strengthen local government. However, the Tuaregs’ genuine grievances have been adulterated with terrorism, trafficking in persons, drugs, and cigarettes.\textsuperscript{265} The government has branded the Tuareg extremists as “bandits,” and has consistently refused to dialogue with them despite efforts for peaceful settlement initiated by opposition parties and members of the ruling government. This changed recently when a ceasefire agreement was reached with three main rebel groups in Tripoli.

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{263}Beginning a dialogue with terrorists is often a necessary first step on the road toward a political settlement and an end to the violence. However, the conditions for progress are often lacking, and the initiation of talks may strengthen terrorists and anger allies. Nelson Mandela, Yasir Arafat, and Jerry Adams are among those once branded terrorists whom the U.S. and other countries have engaged in the hopes of bringing a lasting peace to strife-torn lands. Yet, the experiences of these three individuals have been mixed. Potential rewards and risks abound. According to Daniel Byman, Director, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, paying the price of recognizing a terrorist group might be worthwhile if there is a guarantee of success in the end, especially in transforming a terrorist group into a legitimate political actor or driving it out of the terrorism business altogether. See Daniel Byman, “The Decision to Begin Talks with Terrorists: Lessons for Policymakers,” \textit{Studies in Conflict & Terrorism}, 1521-0731 29, no. 5, 2006, 403–414.
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{264}Berschinski argues that the emphasis on counterinsurgency has disrupted traditional trade networks and allowed local governments to neglect the need for finding negotiated solutions to concerns of the Tuareg and people in other neglected regions. See Berschinski, “AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The ‘Global War on Terrorism,’ and ‘Capacity Building,’ ‘Humanitarianism,’ and the ‘Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa.’”
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\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{265}The Tuaregs recognize that security and stability in the region are inextricably linked to their economic livelihood; hence, they have persistently called for development and reintegration into the larger Niger society. The northern Agadez region of Niger is one of the world’s largest sources of uranium, but high levels of unemployment and chronic food shortages persist. The Tuareg in this region have taken to such tactics as a way to express their frustration due to the lack of government attention. See Discussion Paper by the Permanent Representation of Denmark to the European Union Brussels, Belgium, 3.
\end{footnote}
The peace process remains fragile because it failed to include all stakeholders (e.g., several rebel groups) and consequently the government has made no formal plans to discuss or negotiate the claims that motivated the extremism in the first place. The Tuaregs’ unresolved claims provide AQIM an opportunity to fill gaps created by the government, thus making Tuareg grievances more challenging to resolve later.

According to Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania, “if a door [to negotiation] is shut, attempts should be made to open it; if it is ajar, it should be pushed until it is wide open. In neither case should the door be blown up at the expense of those inside.” There will always be a temptation to continue on the narrow military approach, even when this path is widely recognized to be self-defeating. However, it should be noted that “the need to use force will be necessary where the door of peaceful progress to freedom is clammed shut and bolted.”

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266 According to Jessica Piombo, in sub-Saharan Africa, there are a number of organizations that are labeled “terrorists” by their governments, but the U.S. is reluctant to recognize the groups as such, because they may be opposition groups, which the government tries to gain support to combat. See Piombo, “Terrorism and U.S. counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview.”


268 It has been suggested that Niger has had limited problems in the north with AQIM and some speculate that AQIM’s active interest in the area is linked to Tuareg claims that are yet to be resolved. See Tobi Archer and Tihomir Popovic, “The Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative: The US War on Terrorism in North Africa,” The Finish Institute of International Affairs, 2007: 14–15, accessed September 2, 2010, http://search.hp.my.aol.com/aol/search?query=T.+Archer+and+T.+Popovic+2C+%20+The+Trans-Saharan+Counter-Terrorism+Initiative%2C+The+US+War+on+North+Africa&si=1&oe=utf-8&aq=t&f=hp.


3. Equipment Support

The provision of critical U.S. military equipment and services to African partners through FMS and FMF programs is laudable. Apart from helping to meet gaps in equipment needs, these programs have improved existing security capacities of the U.S.’s African partners. However, despite increased funding for equipment support, there is still a noticeable gap between what is being provided by the U.S. and what is generally needed. Although in comparison to other regions of the world, Africa has consistently received the least FMF support as indicated in DoS FMF funding summaries from FY2006 through FY2010, including FY 2011 requests, the concern is not only to better meet equipment requirements, but to ensure the military equipment provided will have beneficial or intended effects.

Generally, across Africa, there is too little of the right technology to effectively execute and sustain often difficult, expensive, and extended military operations given limited economic capacities without having to call on the international community. Despite financial constraints, many African governments have made remarkable contributions to bridge the gaps in interoperable U.S. equipment. However, the procurements as depicted in Appendix 2 suggest they are largely for conventional warfare.

271 According to DoS FMF account summaries for FY2006 to FY2010, East Asia and the Pacific received a total of $245.6 million, Europe and Eurasia received $596.6 million, the Near East (including Israel and Egypt) received $20.7 billion, South and Central Asia received $1.5 billion, the Western Hemisphere received $869.4 million, while Africa received $64.5 million. FMF FY2011 requests for Africa are about $23.8 million as against $46.5 million for East Asia and the Pacific, $162.1 million for Europe and Eurasia, $4.8 billion for the Near East, $306.6 million for South and Central Asia, and $96.1 million for Western Hemisphere. The funding gap in Africa is further worsened by the fact that the U.S. focuses most of its support on a few countries, especially Tunisia and Morocco. For example, in FY2008, of the $18.7 million for the 53 African countries, General William E. Ward’s AFRICOM 2009 Posture Statement indicates that most of the amount was to Tunisia and Morocco. See U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Military Financing Account Summary,” June 23, 2010, accessed October 14, 2010, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm.

272 For example, from FY2006 to FY2009 the total FMS sales and commercial exports deliveries cost African governments about $295.5 (about $79.3 million and $216.2 million respectively) to complement a total of $45.7 million in FMF deliveries to Africa. African governments also procure military equipment from other sources outside the U.S., such as from Israel, Russia, China, and the U.K. Furthermore, some African countries, such as Nigeria and South Africa, also manufacture some military equipment. See DSCA, “FY Series,” As of September 30, 2009, 278–279.
rather than for meeting contemporary asymmetric challenges. Also, most of the equipment countries possess is aged and is not sufficiently operational to effectively meet security challenges.

It is noteworthy that despite acquisition of vessel tracking facilities, such as Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), radar, and cameras largely through APS assistance, there are still coverage challenges beyond the littorals and against detection of vessels below 300 gross registered tons, many of which are usually involved in piracy and other maritime crimes. Interoperability is difficult due to the proliferation of tracking devices, such as AIS and the Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system, requiring vessels to carry multiple transponders. Similarly, while an increase in the number of military assets, such as the USCG EDA transfers of naval vessels to Ghana, Tunisia, and Nigeria, will help reduce the acute maritime policing deficiencies of these countries, the endurance and interdiction capability of such vessels, including maintainability and sustainability factors, are a requirement for their effective presence. Similar deficiencies also exist among the other services. One difficulty in tracking extremist groups with the attendant high cost of supporting large military forces in the vast trans-Saharan region for extended periods reflects the dire need to acquire an appropriate force level for policing operations. Thus, U.S. support in terms of equipment assistance programs must be matched by the appropriate force levels to meet the contemporary nature of challenges on the continent.

4. **GPOI**

The DoS and DoD have achieved tremendous accomplishments, having surpassed the GPOI objective to train and equip 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010. They have successfully facilitated the deployment of nearly 50,000 peacekeepers to 20 UN and regional PSOs, and trained over 2,000 stability/formed police units trainers. The U.S.’s African partners have been the greatest beneficiaries of this support. This feat is beyond the expectations of a GAO report to Congress in June 2008 that predicted the

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unlikelihood of meeting the goal of training 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010. Nevertheless, some of the challenges highlighted in the report, such as delays in providing timely delivery of equipment in support of training and missions, assessing the proficiency of trained peacekeepers against standard skills taught in training, and accounting for the activities of trained instructors, persist. In addition, there are noticeable misalignments between the supports being provided to effectively meet the challenges in the African peacekeeping environment.

While armies have been the focus of GPOI-funded ACOTA training and equipment support, common knowledge suggests that peacekeeping operations are a joint effort, which means that the other services also have an important role to play in peacekeeping environments. For example, in Darfur, the lack of utility and tactical helicopters to effectively carry out UNAMID and AMIS mandates was apparently due to the absence of African air forces that typically operate this equipment. The gap in integrating other services into the GPOI training and equipment support needs to be bridged.

5. IMET

Many GAO reports have acknowledged that the proficiency of trained African partners is not being assessed against standard skills taught in training. Generally, assessments of IMET programs have focused on purely objective outputs, such as the number of students trained; money spent on training or on number of visits and equipments provided, excluding assessments of whether the programs influenced and helped build capabilities, and capacities needed by the African partners and AFRICOM. In addition, the prevailing situation on the African continent suggests that implementation of training agreements between host partner governments and the USG are not being assessed. To a large extent, IMET-funded trained students are utilized based on the host

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274GAO-08-754.

country’s requirements. However, we were unable to establish whether AFRICOM monitors how IMET-funded students are utilized upon return to their home countries in the skills for which they were trained in accordance with SAMM, Chapter 10, as agreed by both governments. With such a gap, AFRICOM will be unable to determine the outcome of its programs.

In addition, according to DoD’s objective for the IMET program, providing African partners “with a firsthand knowledge of America are expected to make a difference in winning access and influence for both US diplomatic and military representatives in foreign countries.” Unfortunately, such relationships are largely understood and invoked at the highest levels of government, but are not being nurtured at all levels. Considering the fact that IMET provides the U.S. military with important opportunities to cultivate relations with foreign military and civilian officers, do U.S. counterparts under training understand that they are a tool in this program? With the number of Africans that have been trained in the U.S., one would have expected a greater level of interaction and understanding.

E. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT ALIGNMENT

It has earlier been suggested that although everything outside the system is its environment, not everything is equally relevant to the system’s purpose or survival. This section analyzes how AFRICOM collaborates with other U.S. agencies, international partners, and the African regional organizations to determine how the Command balances its needs with those of other actors in the environment.

1. Interagency Collaboration

Integrating interagency personnel in AFRICOM has been viewed by DoD as critical to synchronizing the command’s efforts with other USG agencies in its interagency collaboration. Despite this concept and the waning of initial misgivings about its establishment, several GAO reports, among other publications, have identified that

interagency collaboration is a work in progress.\textsuperscript{277} However, because of the interests of individual agencies and their employees, as well as cultural differences, one should not expect interagency collaboration to mature overnight. For example, a GAO report suggests that disagreements about whether DoS should have authority over DoD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP in the African partner countries has hampered the implementation of some activities.\textsuperscript{278} Also, military culture’s desire for autonomy and dominance and short-term focus has often limited effective collaboration. On the other-hand, those outside of the military stereotype military personnel and are resistant to collaborate.

2. International Collaboration

International collaboration is a force multiplier. As evidenced in many of its activities, such as FLINLOCK multinational exercises, counter-piracy operations in East Africa and the greater Indian Ocean region through the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, and APS, AFRICOM synergizes efforts of many international partners. However, in many areas, the rhetoric has been less about collaboration and more about competition with powers like China in particular.

In the countries of West Africa and the Sahel, for example, the UN, EU, and U.S. have increasingly played significant roles in improving counterterrorism capacity fostering cooperation across the wider region. However, while their goals may be similar, some international partners have collaborated less. Some observers have argued that the presence of the U.S. military along with France have served to stoke anti-Western sentiments and cynicism regarding Western motives. This suggests the need for a broader holistic and integrated framework to internationalize the efforts already undertaken by the EU and U.S., to include the states in the region, the UN, AU and efforts by other international partners.


\textsuperscript{278}GAO-08-860, 4.
As has been suggested in Chapter III, the U.S. and its allies are finding their interests and vision of a prosperous Africa governed by democracies that respect human rights and the rule of law, and which embrace free markets, being challenged by expanding Chinese influence.\(^{279}\) China claims it tries to separate politics from business. However, is there any convergence of U.S. and Chinese interests in Africa? What if interests diverge and China becomes more willing to challenge the U.S. and other international partners to protect its interests, or the U.S. and its allies decide to act similarly? Where does Africa fit in this situation?

Despite such concerns, China has provided considerable development assistance to Africa. As has been suggested, African governments almost universally welcome Chinese development assistance since, in their eyes, its unconditionality respects sovereignty, avoids protracted negotiation processes usually associated with the West,\(^{280}\) and offers alternative support, especially when a country is under international sanctions. However, as with assistance programs from elsewhere, some of China’s assistance has often been challenged by recipient countries due to its undesirable impact (see Chapter III), which suggests even African countries have their interests to protect. The conflict of interest between China, on the one hand, and the U.S. with its allies on the other, is reminiscent of the Cold War era. Already, this has played out in Zimbabwe and Sudan. The U.S.-influenced withdrawal of Western oil companies from Sudan and the limitation of aid to as well as investments in Zimbabwe due to human rights violations have been counterbalanced by China, weakening U.S. influence in those countries and heightening China’s. Although AFRICOM is not an intervention force and is not structured to compete for influence with foreign powers like China, any temptation to withdraw its services or apply direct pressure to China will be counterproductive to the long-term U.S. security objectives in Africa.


\(^{280}\)Hofstedt, “China in Africa: an AFRICOM Response.”
3. **Regional Collaboration**

Through partnerships with Africa’s regional organizations in various programs and activities, AFRICOM has developed awareness of the strengths and weaknesses relating to the interoperability of its African partners, and it has helped to strengthen regional stability and security (see Chapter IV). However, different perceptions of regional security issues pose challenges which, in some instances, result in U.S. programs and activities that African partners do not consider a top priority; hence, African participation becomes a matter of courtesy. Also, there is the problem of competing interests in the exercise of influence between regional hegemons and AFRICOM in the various regional spheres of influence, which causes hostility towards the Command. Obviously, with these concerns, collaboration towards regional developments becomes difficult to realize.

In West Africa for example, “[m]any continue to view terrorism as a predominately Western problem and counterterrorism a Western-imposed priority, and rightly argue that many more people in the [region] are directly affected by disease, crime, poverty, and hunger, than by terrorism.”281 Nevertheless, in the words of Martin Luther King Jr., “[i]njustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”282 Accordingly, despite not being seen as a top priority for the West African region as a whole, several countries in the region have taken steps to strengthen their capacities to prevent and combat terrorism based on recognition that terrorism is a shared concern. Yet, with different priorities in shared security concerns, how committed are the African partners in their engagements?

AFRICOM considers Morocco an important player in the war against terrorism in the region, but Algeria’s interest in exercising its influence as a regional hegemon, including its lack of collaboration with Morocco, hampers efforts to secure the North Western area and the Sahel. Algeria politically, for example, excluded Morocco from a meeting held in Algeria to discuss the deteriorating security situation in the region and

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281 Discussion Paper by the Permanent Representation of Denmark to the European Union Brussels, Belgium, 4.

tried to force an unrealistic military strategy to counter and eradicate terrorism in the region. The ongoing relationship between Morocco and U.S. is seen by Algeria as a hindrance to local ownership of security efforts.\textsuperscript{283} Obviously, AFRICOM is not content with this development because Algeria’s actions run against the U.S.’s overall strategic approach of security cooperation efforts to promote stability in support of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. One has to wonder, despite the fact that every nation has an interest to protect, is Algeria’s concern for local ownership of security in the region a genuine concern that needs AFRICOM’s attention?

F. SUMMARY

This chapter again noted that despite AFRICOM being in its infancy and despite the fact that current initiatives are threatened by inadequate funding and insufficient interagency coordination, it has registered significant achievements.

Previous U.S. involvement in Africa tended to be episodic, brief, and largely defined by U.S. national security interests, and led to a negative perception and encouraged Africans to question AFRICOM’s true mission. This view was reinforced by the fact that AFRICOM has established OSCs in some countries while being completely absent in others. Overall, AFRICOM only maintains continuous engagements with a small number of countries. In addition, whilst the intent and accomplishment of DHAPP in mitigating HIV/AIDS among Africa’s militaries cannot be discounted, the focused attention on only 12 of 53 African countries undermines AFRICOM’s ability to improve the state of readiness and availability of African troops for peacekeeping duties.

This chapter has also noted that because the TSCTP program has been turned into a seemingly unilateral military fight against terrorism, it has virtually overshadowed other agencies that have also been involved. This suggests that the U.S. military, through AFRICOM’s shaping techniques, projects its own programs in Africa rather than performing a supporting role for U.S. foreign policy priorities, thus raising concerns about misperceptions of militarization of U.S. foreign policy. While the IMET program is the most widely-used military assistance program, there are suggestions that it is not

being utilized effectively to cultivate the aim of building a lasting relationship with its African partners. Also, interagency collaboration is still yet to be effected. International collaboration is another that needs to be explored. Although AFRICOM is not an intervention force and is not structured to compete for influence with foreign powers like China; yet, any temptation to withdraw its services or apply direct pressure on China would be unsuitable and even counterproductive to the long-term U.S. security objectives in Africa.

Understandably, AFRICOM has been evolving since its inception, and this analysis should assist the Command in focusing resources in areas of interest that have been neglected. Chapter VI provides the conclusion of the diagnosis with recommendations to assist AFRICOM further.
VI. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH

This chapter summarizes the research by highlighting the areas of interactions between AFRICOM’s external environment and its internal processes, as well as misalignments that could encumber its effectiveness. This chapter also recommends areas for AFRICOM’s consideration, to assist it in taking steps towards mitigating the highlighted misalignments. In addition, some areas of further research are identified.

A. CONCLUSION

This research examined the interactions of external and internal organizational variables of AFRICOM to determine the effectiveness of its current organizational design. The research used a modified version of the congruence model by Nadler and Tushman with added components from McCaskey’s open systems model to determine AFRICOM’s organizational performance and the degree of alignment between its internal system components such as: mission; resources; strategy; tasks; structure; and technology, in addition to the challenges and opportunities in the Command’s external environment. The conclusion of the research indicates that AFRICOM has some misalignments in its interactions that could use improvement in order for it to effectively reach its desired goals, as well as meet the expectations of its external environment. Nevertheless, the Command is rightfully deserving of commendation in its singularly bold effort towards partnering with other USG agencies to help strengthen security cooperation with African nations and bring peace and stability to the continent.

The history of DoD’s responsibility in the African operating environment has been marked by the division of the continent between three COCOMs with activities that tended to be episodic and largely defined by U.S. national security interests rather than placing emphasis on Africans’ interests. The establishment of AFRICOM was a realignment of U.S. efforts in recognition of the growing significance of shared security concerns. Within the African environment, high population growth rates, worsening unemployment, and a pandemic of HIV/AIDS have added to instability created by
terrorism and extremism, maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea, wars and conflicts, and undesired consequences of some activities of international players. The efforts by African governments to mitigate these challenges have been hampered by misallocation of resources, underdevelopment, inadequate regional cooperation, lack of political will, and limited military capacity arising from ageing equipment.

The USG has invested enormous resources into several programs and activities of AFRICOM enlisting other government agencies to support African governments’ efforts towards mitigating the challenges and leveraging opportunities in line with U.S.-Africa foreign policy objectives. The various programs and activities executed by AFRICOM through interagency collaboration include: GPOI-funded ACOTA program; OEF-TS component of TSCTP; FMS and FMF; IMET; and PEPFAR funding to DHAPP to solve health challenges. This also includes other regional activities and exercises such as: APS; Operation ENDURING FREEDOM; FLINTLOCK; and NATURAL FIRE. However, apprehensions about AFRICOM’s true mission in Africa have continued to shape the positive reception of these programs as has the establishment of the Command’s headquarters on the continent, which necessitates trust building efforts with the U.S.’s African partners.

Areas of misalignment in the execution of these programs, which are important to AFRICOM’s effectiveness, are wide-ranging. First, the minimal representation of AFRICOM in many partner African countries limits the Command’s ability to cultivate relationships (even with other USG agencies) or to develop capacity to obtain the much needed information for effective decision-making. The complexity and diversity across and within each of the 53 African countries in AFRICOM’s area of responsibility makes it essential to devise a method to establish relationships. Second, DHAPP’s focused attention on 12 of 53 African countries due to PEPFAR legislation undermines AFRICOM’s ability to improve the state of readiness and availability of African troops for peacekeeping duties. Third, AFRICOM’s incomparably large public image and seeming dominance of the TSCTP program eclipses the exposure and support given by other partnering agencies. This eclipse raises concerns about the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and has the potential to undermine the legitimacy and success of the
program. Success of the TSCTP program cannot be measured only by the number of terrorists or extremists captured or killed. This approach treats the symptoms rather than the causes, requiring a reevaluation of this approach if the overall objective of the program is to be achieved.

Fourth, there is a gap between the mix of interoperable U.S. equipment provided by AFRICOM and the needs of African partners. The difficulty in sustaining operations given vast ungoverned land and maritime environments requires improved technologies. Fifth, the GPOI-funded ACOTA training and equipment support program is largely army-focused, which suggests a gap in integrating other services into the program. The exclusion of equally important players, like the African air forces, that play a significant role in providing air assets, limit effective peacekeeping operations. Sixth, it is suggested that most IMET-funded students are utilized on return to their respective countries based on operational requirements by the country and do not necessarily apply the skills in which they were trained. The gap in assessing implementation of IMET training agreements between host partner governments and the USG limits AFRICOM’s ability to ascertain the effectiveness of its programs. In addition, relationships between foreign students and U.S. counterparts are not adequately cultivated while they are undergoing training in U.S. schools to enable long-term friendships in line with IMET objectives.

Lastly, AFRICOM’s collaboration with other USG agencies, international partners, and African regional organizations has remained a work in progress. Generally, the competing interests among the different stakeholders operating in the African environment limit effective collaboration. Obviously, effective collaboration cannot be developed by AFRICOM alone; it takes two to tango. Addressing these misalignments and challenges will enhance the effectiveness of AFRICOM; otherwise, the costs of the Command’s programs and activities on the continent will outweigh the benefits.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS

To effectively implement AFRICOM’s programs and activities and align them with its mission, clarify stakeholders’ perceptions and expectations, make effective use of resources, and better identify programs outcomes, it is recommended that AFRICOM should:

1. Demonstrate Consistent and Predictable Actions That Are Congruent With Its Mission and Seek African Partners’ Perspectives in Order to Build Trust and Enduring Partnerships

While effective strategic communication is essential to correct misinformation, disinformation, and rumor about AFRICOM’s mission, a problem arises when AFRICOM fails to consider the interests of Africans, who view both the messenger and the message with suspicion and fear. AFRICOM should also ensure that its actions are predictable and consistent – being both transparent about its intentions and motives for actions - and are congruent with its stated mission. Furthermore, AFRICOM should ensure it seeks African partners’ perspectives rather than relegating them to the background as passive recipients; after all, Africans have a greater stake on the continent. In the words of Henry David Thoreau, “[t]he greatest compliment that was ever paid me was when someone asked me what I thought, and attended to my answer.” Overall, AFRICOM should empower Africans and allow them to drive the train; Africa’s problems took several decades to create, and it will take time for the concerns raised by the African partners to subside.

2. Leverage Technology as a Force Multiplier and Use This Comparative Capability to Offset Security Challenges in the African Environment

Considering the acute deficiencies in policing capabilities coupled with limited economic capacities to exercise effective and sustained security over vast porous borders,
inhospitable territorial and maritime domains, it is worthwhile to leverage technology as a force multiplier to provide increased situational awareness, such as via Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). Continuing with current forms of support, although commendable, will in the long-term become too costly and may not adequately improve the capability of African militaries to address the sophisticated nature of their contemporary challenges. Although technology acquisition may seem expensive, it is considered that over the long-term, the costs would be reasonable relative to the enormity of the benefits. In addition, AFRICOM should integrate other services into its GPOI-funded ACOTA training and equipment program and focus support in those areas where African militaries have a comparative capability. For example, a country that has strategic lift or helicopter gunships should be supported to serve as a hub to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, particularly since the U.S. long-term objective is to empower the African partners to take ownership of their security without having to call on the international community for support.

3. **Synergize Resources and Efforts with Other International Partners to Bridge Gaps in Training and Equipment Support to Africa’s Militaries in Order to Have More Effective Outcomes**

Looking at the costs associated with training and equipment support, as well as the gaps in meeting the African militaries’ ever increasing competing demands, it is apparent from a security standpoint that no one country can go it alone in the current environment. The interdependencies of today’s globalized community require a synergy of efforts among all of the international partners. Unfortunately, the operational coalition and capacity building in the Horn of Africa, to include APS, have not led to a perceived increase in security capacity against the menace of pirate attacks, for instance. Yet, the interests of the global community are at stake. Although this may sound like a cliché, the synergy of efforts between AFRICOM and other international partners should go beyond rhetoric and towards putting aside competing national interests, national pride, and cultural differences to foster trust.
4. Create Feedback Mechanisms to Determine the Outcomes of AFRICOM’s Training and Equipment Support

Although the U.S. does not have control over its African partners’ use of personnel in the skills for which they were trained, including its use of equipment transferred with U.S. funding, it is necessary to establish linkages between the outputs and outcomes to determine when and whether programs and specific activities should be continued as is, altered in some way, or discontinued due to insufficient performance. The OSCs are better positioned as a “looking glass” into host nations to serve as a feedback mechanism for AFRICOM’s training and equipment support efforts. AFRICOM could also harness new concepts to receive appropriate information from sources operating in the environment.

5. Develop a Process Whereby U.S. Training Institutions and Personnel Cultivate Enduring Relationships With Foreign Military and Civilian Partners While Undergoing Training to Foster Cooperation

Building enduring, mutually beneficial relationships that culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the U.S. and foreign countries evolves from contacts at institutional and individual levels and seldom happens overnight. It is often said that “true friendship isn’t about being there when it is convenient: it is about being there when it is not.”285 The important opportunities provided by IMET programs should be leveraged by the U.S. military to cultivate enduring relationships through its schools. While the schools should regularly maintain contacts with its alumni, there should be an awareness program for U.S. personnel to educate them on the importance of IMET’s objectives.

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6. **Conduct Adequate Evaluation of the Full Range of Causal Factors for Extremism in Each Country to Avoid Generalizations in Other Countries That Unintentionally Promote Disorder and Societal Disagreement**

The complexity and diversity of the African environment make generalizations very risky. A solution to a problem in one country may not be applicable in another country. The apparent military face of TSCTP across the Trans-Saharan region, especially in a country like Niger, says much about the U.S.’s understanding of Africa’s real concerns. The focus should be on the causes of terrorism, rather than the symptoms, i.e. building trust and enabling the government rather than placing emphasis on securing ungoverned areas. Therefore, all of the instruments of national power should be applied evenly and appropriately in the operating environment.

7. **Leverage Existing Resources Under the UN and the Regional Organizations, Such as ECOWAS, SADC and Others to Reinforce Legitimacy and Credibility**

To help build public support for and ownership of ongoing programs and activities at all levels, AFRICOM should increasingly engage or use the existing frameworks under the UN and regional organizations. The UN is present in virtually every part of Africa and commands respect and support from almost every African government and people. To the extent that AFRICOM is perceived as supportive of the UN, this has the potential to mitigate anti-Western sentiments and enhance trust.

C. **FURTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH**

This thesis has undertaken analysis of AFRICOM’s effectiveness in its current organizational design and highlighted areas of misalignment that have the potential to encumber its effectiveness. However, because of the complexities and dynamic nature of the African environment, there are areas of further research that could contribute to continued improvement of AFRICOM’s organizational effectiveness. The following are the suggested areas of further research:
1. **Optimizing Budget Cycles in Support of AFRICOM’s Engagements**

As earlier suggested, DHAPP indicated in its 2008 Annual Report that it lacks the flexibility necessary to appropriately respond to emerging environmental challenges. DoD notes that its “traditional security assistance takes three to four years from concept to execution.” This begs for leadership at the highest levels of government to develop effective methods to meet and sustain programs that are critical to U.S.-Africa foreign policy objectives. It is expected that this new area of study would review the extent to which current budgetary cycles affect AFRICOM’s programs, and identify policy and regulatory changes needed for the Command to operate effectively.

2. **Considering Competing Interests and Differences in Priorities, as Well as Perceptions of Shared Security Concerns, Examine to What Extent Are African Partners Committed to Their Engagements**

Competing interests and priorities, as well as different perceptions of common security concerns between AFRICOM and other stakeholders on the African continent - for example, between the Command and a regional hegemon like Algeria - suggest there could be commitment problems. Where do U.S. and African security interests diverge? To what extent is there a commitment problem? This area of research would assist AFRICOM in discovering further environmental sensitivities and how the Command can more effectively align its programs and activities.

3. **How Does AFRICOM’s Culture Affect Behavioral Expectations of Its Stakeholders?**

As earlier indicated, the authors were unable to study the culture of AFRICOM due to our inability to interview any member of the Command. This area of research would look into AFRICOM’s emerging organizational culture relative to that of the stakeholders in its environment. It would examine how behavioral expectations are influenced by the Command’s culture. Generally, this area of research would address how outcomes are affected by organizational culture and how they can be accommodated. This is necessary to gauge the impact internally in implementing AFRICOM’s programs and activities.

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http://search.hp.my.aol.com/aol/search?query=T.+Archer+and+T.+Popovic%2C+%E2%80%9CThe+Trans-Saharan+Counter-Terrorism+Initiative%3A+The+US+War+on&s_it=spelling.


http://www.annals.org/content/150/10/688.full.


http://www.tbpa.net/workshops/InWent/Febr2003%20Mweka%20Workshop/Mweka%204.1.pdf.


### Appendix 1: African HIV/AIDS Statistics and PEPFAR/DHAPP Funding

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***Figures are in hundreds

**Sources Used for Appendix 1:**


**Abbreviations Used in Appendix 1:**

- PLWHA – People Living With HIV/AIDS
- CAF - Central African Republic
- DRC – Democratic republic of Congo

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145
## Appendix 2: Statistics of Africa’s Military Equipment Holding

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**Army:** There are about 414 Air Defense and Anti-Tank Weapons, and several makes of 7.62mm and 5.56mm rifles, among others. Most of the procurements were made between 1990 and 2008.

**Navy:** Four of the vessels were transferred from China in 1975 and 1992, and the two other vessels were obtained in 2005 (built in 1998) and the other four were delivered in 1973 and 1974. Because of their sizes they have been categorized as IPCs.

**Army:** There are about 980 Air Defense and Anti-Tank Weapons, and several makes of 7.62mm rifles, among others. It is suggested that most of the weapons are non-operational or lost in DRC. Most of the procurements began in 1980.

**Navy:** The coastline is from a lake. All the vessels are unarmed Rodman Class boats.

**Sources Used for Appendix 2:**

**Legend:**

| SP | Service Personnel |
| MBT | Main Battle Tanks |
| APC | Armored Personnel Carriers |
| IFV | Infantry Fighting Vehicles |
| RV | Reconnaissance Vehicles |
| Sub | Submarine |
| Fri | Frigates |
| Des | Destroyer |
| Cor | Corvettes |
| PV | Patrol Vessels |
| FAC | Fast Attack Crafts |
| FA | Fighter Aircraft |
| RPC | River Patrol Craft |
| CPV | Coastal Patrol Vessel |
| CH | Combat Helicopters |
| T-FW | Transport - Fixed Wing |
| T-RW | Transport - Rotary Wing |

**Notes:**
1. Artillery Weapons and Tanks are included under MBT
2. Generally, majority of capital military hardware are second-hand equipments
3. The statistics are estimates and remarks are collated from the Jane’s publications.
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   Abuja, NIGERIA

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    Abuja, NIGERIA

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12. The Secretary General  
   East African Community  
   Arusha, TANZANIA

13. The Executive Secretary  
   Southern African Development Community (SADC)  
   Gaborone, BOTSWANA

14. Department of State (DoS)  
   ATTN: Bureau of African Affairs  
   Washington, D.C.

15. Agency for International Aid (USAID)  
   ATTN: Sub-Saharan African Desk  
   Washington, D.C.